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       „Knowledge is strength.‟ 
 
          Uyghur proverb 
 
 
 In past twenty years, numerous trends emerged in some parts of our world that could 
be acting towards disappearance of political borders and boundaries between nations. Indeed, 
the fall of the Iron Curtain in Central and Eastern Europe, economic and political integration 
of Western Europe in the form of the European Union, end of the apartheid in South Africa, 
globalization, multiculturalism, boom of the internet and social networks and other 
phenomena often do eliminate multiple barriers among both peoples and states, and act 
toward trans-nationalization of contemporary society. In many contexts, the world really 
seemed to find itself at the end of history as posited by Francis Fukuyama (Fukuyama 1992).  
 
 On the other hand, instead for the national identities to lose their appeal and for the 
world to become post-national, often the opposite is happening: ethnic and national identities 
persist. Sometimes, these identities are reactive to trans-nationalization trends and are even 
gaining intensity or experiencing revival, as exemplified by the disintegration of 
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union into nation-states, skeptical attitudes of Czech public 
towards European integration or resurgence of some minority cultural and economic identities 
in southern and southwestern China. Revival of ethnicities results also in increased popular 
interest in the phenomenon of ethnicity, as embodied by the boom of tourism into ‗ethnic‘ or 
‗tribal‘ areas, popularity of ‗ethnic‘ cuisine, of ‗ethnic‘ art or of ‗world‘ music. Occasionally, 
politicized nationality issues even result in nationalist tensions or armed conflicts, such as in 
the cases of Northern Ireland, Basque Country or Corsican ethnic unrest, violent 
disintegration of Yugoslavia or recent armed ethnic conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh between 
Armenians and Azeris, in Rwanda between the Hutu and the Tutsi or in Sri Lanka between 
the Tamils and the state. Obviously, ethnic identity and nationalism are phenomena which 
continue to powerfully shape our lives in an extent which does not seem to be decreasing. 
 
 It has been pointed out that both nation and nationalism are relatively shallow 
intellectual concepts (Anderson 5) that can hardly function as a single ideology unmixed with 
other political theories (Denitch 31, 142). Nevertheless, theoreticians of ethnicity and 
nationalism continue to seek answers to several recurring questions, such as ‗What is a 
nation?‘, ‗At which moment does it form?‘, ‗For what reasons does it emerge?‘, ‗What are the 
stages of this process?‘ or ‗What are the stimuli and obstacles to its birth?‘ These queries have 
engaged minds of several generations of scholars from multiple disciplines since the very 
beginning of modernity. In fact, it can be said that modernity as such is to a large degree 
defined by answers to these questions. But even at the dawn of the twenty-first century, the 
discourse of nation and nationalism is not losing its complexity and a rich debate rages on 
about even the most basic terms and approaches. This is of course reflected in the sizeable 
amount of studies that have been until now written about nation and nationalism. 
 
 This dissertation strives to contribute to discussion of nation and nationalism by 
submitting a case study of emergence of modern national consciousness and nationalist 
ideology on the example of Uyghurs, a Turkic Muslim nation today numbering approximately 
ten million and inhabiting the vast Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in 
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northwestern People‘s Republic of China (PRC). In particular, the research examines the 
perceptions of community and its interests as expressed by Uyghur intellectuals and activists 
in the period 1884-1949, the context in which these perceptions came into being and what 
were the factors that contributed to their emergence. The research also reconstructs the 
process, in which the concept of communal identity evolved into early modern Uyghur 
national consciousness and the course of politicization of this consciousness into national and 
nationalist movement. In short, this dissertation seeks to make a contribution to study of 
Uyghur intellectual history by attempting to relate the process of Uyghur national awakening 
as perceived and expressed by Uyghur enlighteners in early modern era between founding of 
the Xinjiang province in 1884 and the People‘s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949.  
 
 Apart from contributing to general debate about emergence of modern nations, the 
dissertation also adds to research of Xinjiang. Due to its position along ancient set of trade 
routes commonly known as the Silk Road, Xinjiang is still romanticized by many as a 
mysterious, wild and remote periphery of both China and Turko-Islamic world. This image, 
which underlines the remoteness and marginality of Xinjiang, is augmented by the seeming 
decline of the once thriving Silk Road during Middle Ages after the East-West trade routes 
shifted to the seas of South Asia. In this fashion, Xinjiang continues to be orientalized as a 
land with glorious past but dismal and little known present. Even on the eve of modernity one 
hundred years ago, Xinjiang indeed was considered one of the most remote and backward 
places of Eurasia. Such perception is indeed to a certain degree confirmed by the insufficient 
amount of research in contemporary Xinjiang history, politics and culture. Although the 
number of research volumes and articles on Xinjiang and Uyghurs has grown over recent 
years, numerous events and phenomena of both past and present still are a true terra incognita 
within the academic realm. Intellectual history and history of ideas of modern Uyghurs in 
early modern era 1884-1949 belongs to one of the least clarified phenomena in the history of 
Xinjiang. This dissertation hopes to contribute to the currently insufficiently researched and 
understood phenomenon of emergence of modern Uyghur national identity. 
 
 Besides the romantic cloud of mystery and timelessness, Xinjiang is equally notorious 
as a place ripped by ethnic conflict where the strained relations between autochthonous 
Uyghurs and Chinese state result in bloody clashes and uprisings. Indeed, since the founding 
of the PRC in 1949, Uyghur discontent with party-state policies vis-à-vis their motherland has 
posed a formidable challenge to the efforts of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) strategists at 
winning Uyghur loyalty and integrating them into the ‗nation of China‘ (中华民族 Zh nghuá  
mínz ). As a result, Xinjiang regional ethnic affairs have a strong influence on stability of the 
whole country. The confrontation of Uyghurs with the state has been gaining intensity since 
late 1980s. So far the most tragic events occurred in the regional capital Urumchi in July 2009, 
when clashes of Uyghurs with security forces, as well ordinary Hans, brought about several 
hundred deaths of ordinary citizens. Primarily, this dreadful incident repeatedly underscored 
the serious dysfunction in the PRC‘s ethnic policy towards, but not only, Uyghurs. At the 
same time, it is also clear that the roots of present ethno-political tension in Xinjiang must be 
sought in the past. Contemporary situation in Xinjiang is indeed a continuation of Uyghurs‘ 
negotiation of their status within the Chinese state which has been lasting since the pre-
modern incorporation of their land into the empire of China. For this reason, formation of 
Uyghur national identity in 1884-1949 is one the most crucial phenomena directly influencing 
today‘s Xinjiang ethnic affairs and social stability of the world‘s most populous state.  
 
 Political situation and ethnic affairs in Xinjiang are an integral component of social 
context of not only the People‘s Republic, but also of Central Asia. In both past and present, 
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Uyghurs have been an inseparable part of Islamic cultural sphere with close cultural, political 
and economic ties to their Turkic relatives in western part of Central Asia and present-day 
Turkey, as well as their fellow Muslim believers in Asia and Africa. Throughout the twentieth 
century, developments in Russia/Soviet-administered western Turkestan and 
Chinese-administered eastern Turkestan have born a number of traits that are shared by the 
two regions, which have not been severed even by the two decades of Sino-Soviet split in 
1960s and 1970s. Many of these bonds naturally continue to exist after the five Soviet Central 
Asian republics attained their independence in 1991. As illustrated by the tragic anti-Uzbek 
pogroms in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, Central Asian ethnic issues are far from solved. Obviously, 
political system in the five Central Asian republics, interaction of their authorities with ethnic 
and religious sentiment of their citizens and emergence of modern Central Asian Turkic 
national identities are some of the many intriguing issues relevant for the region. In this 
context, birth of modern Uyghur national consciousness in Xinjiang is necessary for 
comprehending modern reality of Central Asia and ethnicity of Turkic nations in general. 
 
 Due to the fact that Uyghurs and Xinjiang have been since distant past closely 
integrated with Central Asia, China has also accordingly been aware of the area‘s enormous 
geopolitical importance in both regional and global politics. Since ancient times, it was along 
the fabled Silk Road through where goods and ideologies streamed in all four cardinal 
directions, making today Xinjiang‘s territory a gate to Central Asia and the West for China, 
and to China for the West. This significance has carried over to modern era. Although Owen 
Lattimore, one of the doyens of Xinjiang studies, was not the first to point to re-emerging 
geopolitical significance in modern times, it was him who aptly expressed this trend in the 
first sentence of his excellent study of Xinjiang, Pivot of Asia: ‗A NEW CENTER of gravity is 
forming in the world.‘ (Lattimore 1950: 3) Since the onset of the twentieth century, Xinjiang 
has been the focus of comprehensively designed policy of the Chinese empire aiming to retain 
and consolidate control over this strategically priceless region. During the World War II., 
Xinjiang became one of the vitally important strategic rears of China (Norins 1944). After 
founding of the PRC, Xinjiang turned into a hotbed of open military conflict with India in 
1962 and with the USSR in 1969. It also played major role in proxy or unconventional 
conflicts, such as when China was involved in the Afghan war by training Uyghur 
mujaheddin in Xinjiang and dispatching them onto the Afghanistan battlefield in 1980s, or 
during concurrent arrival of radical Islamist ideology from Pakistan into Xinjiang. Recent 
tensions in the Kashmir region in September 2010 suggest that even today Xinjiang does not 
lose its potential of turning into a stage of armed conflict between nuclear superpowers.  
 
 Another aspect of Xinjiang‘s central position in Chinese geopolitics is related to 
energy security. The region is currently China‘s top domestic supplier of oil and a significant 
supplier of other raw materials, such as coal, natural gas, non-ferrous metals, uranium, gold 
and other precious commodities. At the same time, the region is a vital point of transit through 
which enormous oil reserves are brought into the PRC, currently from Central Asia through 
Kazakhstan and in future also from Africa and Middle East through the Gwadar port in 
Pakistan. All these characteristics make Xinjiang one of the most important geopolitical hubs 
of Asia over which the PRC administration can under no circumstances afford to lose or 
loosen its control. The problematic interaction of Uyghur ethnic identity with central 
government could have disastrous implications for China, and potentially also for the whole 
East Asian region and the entire world. An intense scrutiny of Xinjiang ethnic issues is 




Insufficiency of Research in Early Modern Uyghur National Consciousness 
 
 The insufficiency of research in emergence of modern Uyghur national consciousness 
and nationalism in early modern era (1884-1949) is related to somewhat ‗natural‘ scarcity of 
primary historical sources, caused mainly by the fact that there were a relatively low number 
of newspapers, magazines, propaganda leaflets and other printed matter produced in Xinjiang 
before 1949. However, another agent behind the paucity of available sources is tied to current 
political agenda of the Chinese Communist Party. One of the basic premises of Chinese 
Communist nationality theory and practice is the assertion that all ‗minority nationalities‘ (少
数民族 sh osh  mínz ) of today‘s PRC have since antiquity strived to form an ‗ethnic unity‘ 
(民族团结 mínz  tuánjié) with the culturally, materially and politically superior Hans in order 
to form the ‗great family of Chinese nationalities‘ (中华民族大家庭 Zh nghuá mínz  d  
ji tíng), eventually also a supra-ethnic ‗nation of China‘ (中华民族 Zh nghuá  mínz ; Zhao 
2004; Bovingdon 2004). In this context, a probe into subjects such as emergence of national 
awareness and nationalist ideology is not permitted by the state in the case of many ethnic 
groups of China. This is even more the case for the Uyghurs, who are virtually the enfant 
terrible Turkic Muslim ethnic group that has historically more than loose cultural and political 
ties with China proper-based powers and currently is more than skeptical towards People‘s 
Republic of China‘s administration. Early modern Uyghur demands for increased political 
autonomy and proclamation of an independent East Turkestan Republic (Sherqiy Türkistan 
Jumhuriyiti) two times during early modern times naturally constitute issues, which directly 
challenge Chinese communist historical and ethnopolitical ideology.  
 
 The very phenomenon of rise of early modern Uyghur national consciousness and 
nationalist thinking therefore refutes CCP‘s assertions of harmonious unity of all nationalities 
of China and thus also challenges the overall legitimacy of the CCP rule. Communist Chinese 
party-state hopes for this uncomfortable feature of Uyghur intellectual and political history to 
utterly disappear. For this reason, an enormous amount of Uyghur pre-1949 printed materials 
have been deliberately destroyed during violent Communist campaigns such as against so-
called ‗local nationalism‘ (地方民族主义 d f ng mínz  zh y ) or ‗Four Olds‘ (四旧 S ji ), 
which from 1950s through 1970s targeted non-Han and non-proletarian aspects of minority 
cultures. Many Uyghurs voluntarily destroyed valuable cultural artifacts, including pre-1949 
manuscripts and newspapers, in order to avoid being harassed or killed over their possession. 
Also for this reason, the existing PRC research on early modern Xinjiang history is conceived 
from the perspective which supports government‘s ethnopolitical stance. Even in early 
twenty-first century, independent scholarship in early modern Uyghur intellectual history is 
curtailed by covert, yet firm, state barriers. The scarce Uyghur writings, which survived until 
today and are kept in Xinjiang archives, are inaccessible to scholars unaffiliated with 
Communist authorities. Mere possession of any material related to pre-1949 Uyghur 
nationalism, let alone to one of the East Turkestan Republics, is punishable by several years 
of prison on the charges of separatism and subversion of state. Research and publishing about 
history of national awakening is extremely difficult, if not outright impossible, for today‘s 
Uyghur historians and intellectuals. Notorious cases of persecution of Uyghur historians on 
the grounds of their academic arguments include the ban on works and almost ten-year house 
arrest of Turghun Almas in 1990s, or the eleven-year sentence for Tokhti Tunyaz in 2000. For 
Uyghurs in today‘s Xinjiang, the freedom of academic expression is as non-existent as the 
freedom of civic religious and political expression. 
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 Consequently, due to the scarcity of accessible sources, modern Uyghur 
nation-formation process is also more susceptible to zealous manipulation by both Han 
chauvinists and Uyghur nationalists. The two groups strive to relate this phenomenon in ways 
that support their respective political agenda. Along these lines, Communist propaganda and 
state affiliated scholarship portray the first East Turkestan Republic (1933-1934) as a ‗bogus‘ 
state proclaimed by a handful of pan-Turkic ‗splittists‘ (e.g. Chen and Chen 1999), whereas 
Uyghur nationalists tend to view it as a full-fledged country. Analogously, the second East 
Turkestan Republic (or so-called Three Districts‘ Revolution; 三区革命 S nqū gém ng; Üch 
wilayet inqilabi; 1944-1949) is claimed by Chinese propaganda to be a component part of 
Communist revolution of the nation of China (e.g. Xu 1998), whereas Uyghur protagonists 
see it as an acceleration of national liberation struggle. These conflicting interpretations of the 
emergence of modern Uyghur national consciousness and nationalism thus show how today‘s 
politicized interpretation of past events is detrimental to independent research and should 
have no place in academic arenas. 
 
Review of Previous Scholarship and Its Main Arguments 
 
 Until now, a decent amount of research has been carried out in the topic of general 
political history of Xinjiang province in early modern era (1884-1949). Primary sources for 
this research can be roughly divided into two categories. The first is material authored by 
Xinjiang governments between 1884 and 1949. These are documents related to late Qing (清) 
governance of Xinjiang (清, 1878-1911) and to the Yang Zengxin (楊增新, 1911-1928), Jin 
Shuren ( 金 屬 仁 , 1928-1933), Sheng Shicai ( 盛 世 才 , 1933-1944) and Nationalist 
(Kuomintang 國民黨, 1944-1949) administration of the province. In particular, this type of 
sources consists of government proclamations, communications, investigative reports and 
assessments, memoirs by officials working in Xinjiang etc. A wide range of such documents 
is openly available in archives of Taiwan and to a certain degree also in the archives in the 
People‘s Republic of China. 
 
 The second category is sources authored by foreign agencies active in the region 
during early modern era. A major part of these sources was assembled by mainly 
Russian/Soviet, British and United States‘ consulates that existed in the cities of Kashgar, 
Urumchi, Ghulja, Chochek and Sharasume in early modern era. Other sources of this kind are 
investigative reports by travelers, who journeyed in early modern Xinjiang on scientific, 
journalistic, intelligence or other (or combination of the above) missions. Many of these 
works have been published while some, especially consular and intelligence reports, remain in 
archives in the respective countries, where they are relatively well available. Another valuable 
body of foreign-authored materials was gathered by Christian missionaries active in the 
region during the period, namely the Swedish Mission Society in southeastern Xinjiang and 
China Inland Mission in Urumchi. The missionary materials are today also relatively easily 
accessible, mainly in Sweden and Great Britain. 
 
 These two categories of sources enable research in Xinjiang early modern history from 
two main angles. One can be perhaps named the administration perspective – its major theme 
is the management of Xinjiang by Han authorities. The other can be termed the competition 
perspective – it analyses the complex interaction of Xinjiang Chinese administrators‘ agenda 
with that of foreign powers and also with that of indigenous anti-Chinese insurgent groups, or 
in other words a phenomenon which may be referred to as the Great Xinjiang Game. It is 
these two prisms, which characterize the major proportion of currently available scientific 
output concerned with history of early modern Xinjiang. Several instances of such analyses 
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are works by Du Zhongyuan (杜重遠; Du 1938), Martin R. Norins (Norins 1944), Owen 
Lattimore (Lattimore 1950), An Ning (安甯; An 1952), Allen S. Whiting and Sheng Shicai 
(Whiting and Sheng 1958), Clarmont Skrine and Pamela Nightingale (Skrine and Nightingale 
1973), Lars-Erik Nyman (Nyman 1977), Han-jung Ziemann (Ziemann 1984), Chen Huisheng 
and Chen Chao (陈慧生, 陈超; Chen and Chen 1999), David Wang (Wang 1999) or Huang 
Jianhua (黄建华; Huang 2003). A special mention should be made here about Zhang Dajun 
(張大軍), a former Kuomintang military intelligence officer based in Xinjiang down to 1949. 
Zhang is the author of 新疆風暴七十年 Xīnji ng fēngb o qīshí nián (Seventy Years of Storm 
in Xinjiang; Zhang 1980), a monumental 12-volume and 7500-page opus drawing on his own 
eye-witness experience in the region, as well as on an enormous amount of primary sources. 
Thus, despite the fact that Zhang‘s text is conceived largely from the administration and 
competition perspective and is also richly spiced up with Kuomintang ideology, it is perhaps 
the most complex existing narrative of early modern Xinjiang history. Finally, Zhou Hong‘s 
(周泓) book provides a detailed and well researched glimpse of republican Xinjiang society 
that is largely devoid of both the administration and competition approach, but does not rely 
on sources in Uyghur language (Zhou 2001). 
 
 While studies drawn up from the administration and competition perspective provide 
us with a large amount of relevant information on political history of early modern Xinjiang, 
they fail to address at least one important aspect of early modern Xinjiang history. Namely, 
they convey only very modest knowledge about Uyghurs as such. Uyghurs are in these works 
perceived largely as one of multiple agents in the administrative/competitive plethora of 
relations, while the overall emphasis is laid on analysis of development and interaction of 
these relations. In this place, it is useful to borrow Ildikó Bellér-Hann‘s (Bellér-Hann: 1-2) 
reference to what can be called boundary perspective formulated by Fredrik Barth: ‗…the 
nature of continuity of ethnic groups is clear: it depends on maintenance of a boundary.‘ 
(Barth 14) Or, in other words: ‗The critical focus of investigation from this point of view 
becomes the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff within that it 
encloses.‘ (Barth 15) Thus, from the majority of existing research we learn only very little 
about what was inside the Uyghur ethnic boundary of a community which constituted some 
75% of the province‘s population (Benson 1988: 34; Toops 1) at the dawn of communist 
takeover. In other words, relying solely on Barth‘s boundary perspective cannot produce a 
sufficient amount of knowledge on early modern Uyghurs. Accordingly, Bellér-Hann opines 
that ‗…the boundary focus is important, but, in itself, unsatisfactory.‘ (Bellér-Hann 2), and 
dedicates her extensive volume solely to study of the cultural matter within the Uyghur ethnic 
boundary, basing her historico-anthropological perspective on extensive field research and 
textual primary sources. Analogously, Linda Benson in her unsurpassed study of the second 
East Turkestan Republic in northern Xinjiang in 1944-1949 submits that approaching events 
in Chinese frontier regions from the perspective of China‘s domestic minority policy provides 
only a single section of the overall interpretation. Rather, frontier peoples‘ modern history 
emerges ‗…from circumstances and perceptions uniquely their own and distinct from that of 
the Chinese…‘ and their struggle against Chinese domination should be viewed not as a 
rebellion, but as ‗…an attempt to win political and military control over what they themselves 
viewed as their traditional homelands.‘; or in other words, as a liberation struggle conceived 
by twentieth-century nationalism (Benson 1990: 8). Along this line, Benson‘s work draws on 




 This dissertation attempts to emulate the approach of Bellér-Hann and Benson in 
supplementing Barth‘s boundary perspective and adopting an approach which could be 
perhaps called the content perspective – it concentrates primarily on the content within the 
early modern Uyghur ethnic boundary, particularly on its intellectual segment. I do not argue 
in this dissertation that examination of ethnic boundary is irrelevant for study of early modern 
Uyghurs. Quite on the contrary – this research shows the extreme importance and complexity 
of criteria according to which Uyghurs perceived themselves as different from other groups or 
agencies, as well as changing significance of modern Uyghur ethnic boundary. However, this 
research rather strives to clarify modalities of and forces behind Uyghur realization of 
importance of these boundaries and of their preservation. In other words, instead of 
examination of how nascent modern Uyghur national consciousness projected itself onto the 
stage of political events in Xinjiang in 1884-1949, this dissertation rather aims to clarify how 
this consciousness originated and evolved in the minds of Uyghur intellectuals. 
 
 Previously, there has been already a certain amount of research published in early 
modern history of Xinjiang which are conceived, at least partially, from the content 
perspective. Two important works are entirely dedicated to the topic of early modern Uyghur 
nationalism. So far the most systematic and thoroughly researched account of political events 
in the province in the period 1911-1949 was authored by Andrew Forbes and its central theme 
is ‗…the development and nature of Warlord government and Muslim dissidence…‘ (Forbes: 
1) Thematically similar is Laura Newby‘s (unfortunately) unpublished dissertation, which 
explores the ‗…nationalist movement of Eastern Turkestan – a people‟s search for autonomy 
during the period 1930-1950‘, or in other words seeks to ‗…trace the rise of national 
consciousness among the peoples of Eastern Turkestan as reflected in the development of the 
nationalist movement.‘ (Newby 1986: v) Furthermore, Shinmen Yasushi‘s article researches 
the first modern attempt at founding an independent state of East Turkestan in 1933 (Shinmen 
2001),
1
 while Eden Naby‘s article looks more broadly into general intellectual trends acting in 
southern Xinjiang in the 1930s (Naby 1987). Linda Benson‘s now classic works based on a 
large number of primary sources provide a deep insight into Uyghur liberation movement and 
nationalist ideology in late republican era in the period 1944-9 (Benson 1990, Benson 1991 
and Benson 1992), and are indeed essential for understanding pre-1949 Xinjiang. Similarly, 
Roostam Sadri‘s article also concentrates on the Uyghurs‘ and other nationalities‘ second 
attempt of independence in the republican era (Sadri 1984). Shinjiro Oishi‘s article is an 
excellent research in the rise of early modernization trends in the Kashgar area (Shinjiro 
2000), while Eric Schleussel‘s article provides a useful overview of currently available 
literature on pre-1949 Uyghur education (Schleussel 2010).  
 
 The phenomenon of emergence of Uyghur national consciousness has also attracted a 
certain amount of scholarly attention. Several earlier arguments (exemplified for example in 
works of Pritsak 1959, Chen 1977, Gladney 1990 and Rudelson 1997) stress the institutional 
aspect of the phenomenon. In this interpretation, after the word ‗Uyghur‘ as an ethnonym fell 
out of use for some five hundred years following Islamization of Uyghur Buddhist kingdom 
in today‘s east Xinjiang in late fifteenth century, the crucial moments in modern history were 
the institutional decisions taken to revitalize the ethnonym Uyghur as a designation for 
indigenous sedentary Turkic Muslims of southern and eastern Xinjiang oases. According to 
such theories, the significant institutional resolutions were particularly the decision to 
revitalize the term Uyghur for use in Soviet Central Asia taken at a conference held in 
                                                 
1
 Shinmen authored two other influential works in Japanese dealing with the events in southern 
Xinjiang in 1930s (Shinmen 1990 and Shinmen 1994), which this dissertation does not draw on. 
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Tashkent in 1921 by delegates of Xinjiang descent, and the introduction of the concept of 
Uyghur nationality into Xinjiang nationality policy by Sheng Shicai in 1934 (Pritsak 525; 
Chen 100; Gladney 4; Rudelson 5-7). Some contentions go as far as claiming that prior to the 
moment of being labeled Uyghur in modern era, the people thus designated possessed no 
sense of ethnic commonality or national cohesion and clung to sub-ethnic (local) or supra-
ethnic (religious) patterns of self-identification. In another words, such interpretation submits 
that the disuse of the term Uyghur between early sixteenth and early twentieth centuries 
implies also total absence of collective sub-religious and supra-local identity of people 
designated by this term prior to and following the period of this disuse (Warikoo 107-8; 
Gladney 11). Similarly, it has been argued by a foremost Central Asia specialist that on the 
eve of early modern era in mid-seventeenth century, inhabitants of Eastern Turkestan 
‗…spoke closely related Turkic languages and shared a common Islamic culture and 
sedentary mode of life, but they had no sense of belonging to a single nationality, and their 
cities were not united by any common political structure other than that provided by the 
Oyirad conquest…‘ and that ‗…the idea that the Kashgarians and the inhabitants of 
Uighuristan (i.e. eastern Xinjiang; note by Ondřej Klimeš) were one and the same nationality 
– let alone they were all Uighurs – is an innovation stemming largely from the needs of 
twentieth-century nationalism.‟ (Fletcher 1968: 218, 364; Fletcher 1978a: 69) 
 
 Another way of understanding the formation of Uyghur modern national 
consciousness maintains that sedentary Turkic residents of Xinjiang shared some sort of 
ethnic kinship even prior to being labeled Uyghur in 1920s and 1930s. An extreme version of 
this argument was posed by Geng Shimin, according to whom the modern Uyghur nationality 
emerged already by early sixteenth century after the fusion of indigenous Indo-European 
groups with Turkic Uyghur immigrants and subsequent political, economic, religious, cultural 
and linguistic unification of the Tarim basin (Geng 1984). Laura Newby argues that as early 
as in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the people of southern Xinjiang shared a sense of 
commonality, which surpassed their local identification with a particular oasis and even 
extended north of Tianshan and to eastern Xinjiang (Newby 2007). Similarly, Bellér-Hann‘s 
thorough anthropological survey portrays early modern Uyghurs of Xinjiang between 1884 
and 1949 as a distinct ethnic community, whose common characteristics overpowered local 
identities of its constituent components (Bellér-Hann 2008). David Brophy‘s (Brophy 2005) 
and Sean Roberts‘ (Roberts 2010) fascinating research shows that in late Czarist and early 
Soviet Central Asia, negotiation of the contents of the label Uyghur, in other words of Uyghur 
ethnic identity, unfolded as a complex process which lasted from early 1910s well into 1930s, 
and that this process occurred as much among various elements within the ‗Uyghur‘ ethnic 
community as between this community and Soviet authorities. Similarly, Justin Jon Rudelson 
maintains that since fifteenth century the ancient Uyghur identity and common culture existed 
as a historical undercurrent, which was redefined and tapped into by Soviet and Sheng 
Shicai‘s ethnic policies in 1920s and 1930s (Rudelson 6-7). 
 
Research Objectives and Research Questions 
 
 This dissertation elaborates on the second of the two above summarized hypotheses 
regarding origins and process of formation of modern Uyghur national consciousness: it 
strives to ascertain notions of communal identity and interest among Turkic Muslims of 
Xinjiang throughout the entire early modern era from 1880s to 1949 (that is to say, also prior 
to official institution of the term Uyghur in Xinjiang in 1930s). By analyzing a large number 
of previously unresearched sources, this dissertation traces and inspects the process of 
emergence of modern Uyghur ideas of nation and nationalism in Xinjiang, as articulated in 
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key texts authored by early modern Uyghur intellectuals in the period 1884-1949. In other 
words, it reconstructs the creation of Uyghur national symbology and practice by Uyghur 
intelligentsia by the ways this symbology and practice were reflected in early modern Uyghur 
discourse of nation and its interest. Or, in yet another words, the dissertation researches the 
nation and nationalism work performed by early modern Uyghur intellectuals. Based 
predominantly on the criteria of chronology and contents of primary sources, the dissertation 
is structured into four research chapters. The respective chapters are concerned with the pre-
modern intellectual perceptions of communal identity and interest of Xinjiang sedentary 
Turkic Muslims (who were in the subsequent periods to become called Uyghur) during late 
imperial era (Chapter 1), emergence of their modern national consciousness from late Qing to 
early 1920s (Chapter 2), politicization of nascent national consciousness into intensified 
national and nationalist movement in 1930s (Chapter 3) and negotiation of the status of 
Xinjiang Turkic Muslim within the Republic of China in 1940s (Chapter 4). 
 
 The first key concept this dissertation addresses is idea. The research explores ideas, 
images, perceptions and beliefs of nation and nationalism as rendered into writing by 
educated Uyghur individuals, who fulfilled themselves in the spheres of historiography, 
literature, journalism and politics, or in combination of these fields. An important feature of 
the research is perhaps best summarized by the premise drawn by several specialists arguing 
that a nation exists when a large number of people feel, consider or imagine themselves to be 
members of this nation (Seton-Watson 5; Connor 156; Barth 15 etc.). Similarly, the acclaimed 
volume by Benedict Anderson illustrates how collapse of imperial and religious realms, 
changing perceptions of time, growing prestige of vernaculars and subsequent marketing of 
vernacularized printed books, newspapers and other printed matter played a critical role in the 
emergence of the national imagination in early modern era (Anderson 1991). Along these 
arguments, this dissertation investigates the specifics of emergence of the national idea in 
minds of early modern Uyghur intellectual elite. In particular, the research aims to show how 
and when the various markers of a nation, such as for instance common name, religion, 
language, culture, history, customs, identity sites or myths of common origin and the like, 
were articulated in intellectual discourse, what role they played in the debate of Uyghur 
national awakening and how they were used by respective actors of early modern Uyghur 
national movement and articulators of nationalist ideology. It will be illustrated by this 
research that, despite the fact that early modern Uyghur intellectuals shared a common drive 
toward the enlightened strife for their nation‘s well-being, their ideas of nation and 
nationalism varied greatly depending on the time when they were active, or on their affiliation 
with a particular political agency. 
 
 The focus on perception of national identity as reflected in printed material, or in other 
words the textual approach of dissertation, generates an important methodological issue: it is 
very hard, if not outright impossible, to assess the degree of what has been elsewhere called 
social penetration (Smith 1986: 70-2) of the national idea among non-elite strata and the 
appeal the nationalist ideology carried for common people (Breuilly 120). Based on existing 
research, it is sensible to assume that only a very modest proportion of individuals native to 
early modern Xinjiang had the capacity to cogitate in categories such as communal identity 
and interest. It is also clear that only even a smaller subgroup of this already modest enough 
proportion of individuals were able to put their thoughts into writing (Bellér-Hann 327). 
Similarly, observations made by foreign nationals active in early modern Xinjiang reveal that 
the perceptions of communal identity embraced by sizeable strata of ordinary, i.e. uneducated, 
Uyghurs were often quite different from or even in conflict with those held by their kindred 
intellectuals and political activists. In other words, the degree of social penetration of 
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intellectual discourse of nation and the intensity of appeal of these concepts to common 
sedentary Turkic populace of Xinjiang oases is unknown and arguably even low. Given the 
fact that in early modern Xinjiang, there was no systematic field research conducted in 
perceptions of communal interest and identity, and that we therefore have no data on these 
issues, we then have no fully reliable means of assessing the depth of social penetration of 
early modern Uyghur ideas of nation and nationalism. On the other hand, given the fact that 
an overwhelming majority of authors of sources of this research were actively involved in 
communal politics, it is likely that their writings reflected and articulated, with more of less 
significant contributions or their own, popular views. Anyhow, regardless of the degree of 
social penetration, this dissertation refrains assessing the particulars of modern Uyghur nation 
in early modern period and instead assesses Uyghur intellectual articulations of it. The ideas 
of belonging to a nation examined in this dissertation should not be mistaken for the nation 
itself. 
 
 In the analysis of the second central theme, Uyghur perceptions of nation, this 
dissertation aspires to answer the following question: ‗What were the characteristics based on 
which Uyghur intellectuals perceived their people as a community?‘ Or, shall we choose to 
speak in terms of nation, the first question this research asks is: ‗Which criteria defined nation 
for Uyghur intellectuals?‘ It is important to remain aware here that the phenomenon of nation 
has originated in European context and has been only secondarily transferred into other 
culturo-political realms throughout the world, such as Central and East Asia. Therefore, the 
concept of nation necessarily has an altered meaning in early modern Uyghur milieu than in 
situations described by most currently available studies of nation and nationalism. 
Nevertheless, for the purpose of relating results of this particular case study of Uyghur 
nation-formation to similar processes throughout the world, in approaching the first research 
question, this dissertation draws on three main theoretical approaches to national identity and 
nation-formation processes. It is firstly the primordialist, or perennialist, theory which 
interprets nation as a group of people bound together by shared innate and organic attributes 
such as kinship, language or culture, and who at a certain point become politically active. 
According to Pierre van den Berghe, a nation is an extended kinship (ethny) of people, who 
became politically conscious and aspire to create a state on the grounds of belonging to this 
ethny (Van den Berghe 1981). John Armstrong has illustrated that pre-modern ethnic 
identities existed in medieval European and Islamic culturo-political spheres and were later 
transformed into modern nations (Armstrong 1982). The examination of common traits shared 
by members of such pre-modern collectivity also clarifies the boundaries, which are vital for 
the existence of the collectivity (Barth 14). 
 
 Along this line of argumentation, this dissertation responds to Dru Gladney‘s 
notorious thesis that prior to introduction of the ethnonym ‗Uyghur‘ in 1921 in Soviet Central 
Asia and 1934 in Xinjiang, there was no Uyghur nation (Gladney 1990). In fact, it is 
impossible to compare the use of the term ‗Uyghur‘ in modern era, when it denotes politicized 
identity, with the way it was used from seventh to early sixteenth century, when it acted as a 
clan and dynastic name (Hebibulla 43-55). Therefore, the practice of using the term ‗Uyghur‘ 
in a modern, politicized sense to denote a nation, nationality or ethnic group (Uy. millet) 
could not have existed before the emergence of national idea in Xinjiang, i.e. sometime 
between 1884 and 1949. For this reason it is equally problematic, as it is customary in today‘s 
PRC scholarship and politics, to interpret the entire history of Xinjiang as a continuous 
movement of primordial ‗people of all nationalities‘ (her millet khelqi, 各族人民 gèz  rénmín) 
toward unification with the motherland. In the same way, in the context of China proper it is 
anachronistic to call historical ethnic and cultural communities by the modern term 民族
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mínz  (in English ‗nation‘, ‗nationality‘, ‗ethnic group‘), for it appears that the term has not 
been used in Chinese milieu until the turn of nineteenth and twentieth century (Crossley 1990: 
19; Dikötter 97). 
 
 On the other hand, it is equally problematic to infer that since the term ‗Uyghur‘ 
generally fell out of extensive use for a group of currently living people (and was instead used 
to refer to ancestral tribal formations or geographic locations) since the sixteenth century, the 
people who had been previously or subsequently labeled by this word also correspondingly 
ceased to exist or lost their sense of communal identity. Mainly Chapter 1 of this dissertation 
argues that, to borrow words of Mark C. Elliott, in its principles the process of ethnicity did 
not operate all that differently in late Qing Xinjiang than it does today (Elliott 19). In 
particular, this research posits that at least since the late nineteenth century, when the national 
idea or modern ethnonyms did not yet exist in Xinjiang and therefore we cannot call the 
contemporary community of ancestors of today‘s Uyghurs a nation, early modern 
intelligentsia of Xinjiang Turkic Muslim oasis-dwellers articulated a clear ethnic, or 
proto-national, collective identity of their fellow kinsmen, who only several decades later 
came to be designated by the ethnonym ‗Uyghur.‘ 
 
 The modernist, or constructivist, view interprets nations as social constructs that 
emerged as a consequence of modernization process. For Ernest Gellner, nations are groups of 
people with common ideas, signs, association, ways of behaving and communicating (i.e. 
culture) who recognize other members of the group as its members. At the same time, nations 
are a result of industrialization process as traditional centralized society transforms into a 
modern decentralized one. The existence of industrialized society is dependent upon 
cultivation of a homogenized body of uniformly educated individuals who become the 
nationals of their state. For Gellner, nations are constructed by nationalism (Gellner 1983). 
For Miroslav Hroch, nation comes into existence as a result of primarily economic changes 
and is defined by common historical, economic, territorial, political, religious, cultural, 
linguistic and other ties and also by a sense of equality of its members. Modern nations arise 
as an outcome of two main kinds of nation building process – either within the boundaries of 
one ethnic culture, when the old feudal system is transformed into civic society composed of 
more or less equal citizens, or when an ethnic community dominated by ethnically 
heterogeneous exogenous elites successfully establishes itself not only against the internal, 
old and feudal ruling class, but also against the external rule (Hroch 1996; Hroch 2000). For 
Benedict Anderson, nations, or imagined, limited and sovereign communities, are formed as a 
result of secularization and rise of print capitalism (Anderson 1990). Mainly Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation demonstrates a powerful correlation between the modernization trends, and thus 
also between the emergence of national identities, in early modern Ottoman Empire and 
Russian/Soviet Turkic communities and analogous phenomena occurring within Turkic 
Muslim communities in Xinjiang. 
 
 The dissertation also elaborates on Anthony Smith‘s ethno-symbolist approach that 
stresses the significance of common symbols, myths, memories, values, rituals and traditions 
in modern nation-forming processes. Smith argues that modern nations have their origins in 
pre-modern ethnic categories, which are groups that outside people perceive as a distinct body 
of people but which can themselves have a very low degree of communal consciousness. 
Ethnic categories can gradually evolve into ethnic communities (ethnie), which already prior 
to the emergence of modern nations possess a number of common characteristics, specifically 
a collective name, a common myth of descent, a shared history, a shared culture, an 
association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity (Smith 1986: 22-31). Apart from 
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these criteria, Smith‘s more recent definition of a nation increasingly considers legal, political 
and territorial dimensions – a nation is ‗…a named and self-defining human community whose 
members cultivate shared memories, symbols, myths, traditions and values, inhabit and are 
attached to historic territories or “homelands,” create and disseminate a distinctive public 
culture, and observe shared customs and standardized laws…‘ (Smith 2009: 29-30).  
 
  Thus, Smith holds that modern nations and nationalism are born of pre-modern ethnic 
categories and ethnic communities and their symbology. This dissertation, however, shows 
that even the symbols themselves can be a modern emergence. As Eric Hobsbawm argued, 
the national phenomenon cannot be adequately studied without due attention to invented 
traditions, because much of what constitutes a modern ‗nation‘ consists of constructed and 
invented components and also draws on recent national symbols (Hobsbawm 1983: 14). In the 
case of modern Uyghur nation and nationalism, it was often the symbols of modern Uyghur 
nation themselves, which subsequently became the foundation of Uyghur nationalism, that 
were the invented traditions, or newly emerged ‗ancient‘ heritages. This argument also 
clarifies Rudelson‘s previously mentioned thesis of ancient Uyghur identity as of ‗symbolic‘ 
ancient repertoire that could be tapped into in early twentieth century. While the existence of 
the pre-modern repertoire of national practice is confirmed by this research, partially Chapter 
2 and mainly Chapter 3 of this dissertation show that the ‗primordial‘ symbols of the ‗ancient 
Uyghur nation‘ emerged only in early modern era. 
 
 The dissertation strives to preserve an eclectic approach and does not to treat the 
primordialist, modernist and ethno-symbolist perspectives on emergence of nations as clearly 
distinct, contradictory or mutually exclusive trichotomial correlatives. In other words, it does 
not claim that Uyghur nation started to exist at a particular point and does not even treat 
nation as an object, but rather as a mode of perception of social reality. As Rogers Brubaker 
has pointed out, instead of focusing on nation as a substantial and enduring collectivity 
suitable for analysis, we should rather understand it as a category of practice, which is 
constantly in flux. Similarly, nationhood should be grasped as an institutionalized cultural and 
political form and nationness as a contingent event or happening (2000). Therefore, instead of 
asking ‗Which criteria defined Uyghur nation?‘, the first research question should be perhaps 
posed as ‗What was early modern Uyghur national practice like?‘ and ‗What were the main 
features of discourse of Uyghur national practice?‘ 
 
 The examination of nation as a practice and discourse taking place within the broader 
context of modernization process brings us to the third topic of the dissertation – nationalism. 
Here, the most important question this research aims to answer is ‗What was regarded by 
Uyghur intelligentsia as communal interest?‘ Or, again should one choose to cogitate in 
national terminology, the question should perhaps be phrased as ‗What was the context and 
content of Uyghur discourse of nationalism?‘ In other words, the second question aims to 
ascertain, what concepts or institutions were perceived by Uyghur intelligentsia as the aim of 
communal action, or national movement. Again, the assessment of early modern Uyghur 
nationalism relies on several general interpretations and approaches to nationalism. Ernest 
Gellner defines nationalism as a political theory contending that political units should overlap 
with national units. He also defines two other closely related terms. National sentiment is an 
indignation arising when the objectives of nationalism are not fulfilled; in turn, such anger 
triggers a nationalist movement that strives to fulfill those objectives (Gellner 1). For John 
Breuilly, nationalist argument is a political doctrine based on the assumption that there exists 
a unique nation, that national interests and values have priority over all other interests and 
values and that the nation must be politically sovereign. Breuilly‘s research focuses primarily 
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on the three kinds of oppositional relation between an existing state and a nationalist 
movement – separation, reform and unification (Breuilly 2-10). Chapters 3 and 4 of this 
dissertation show that reformist and separatist nationalism, as well as the desired congruity of 
political and national borders, are highly relevant for the Uyghur case. Moreover, Chapter 4 
illustrates that Uyghur nationalist agenda was closely related to negotiation and maintenance 
of ethnic boundaries, the maintenance of which is interpreted as a vital for a nation‘s 
existence (Barth 14-5). 
 
 It appears that Miroslav Hroch‘s chronology of nation-building processes of small 
European nations is very well applicable to the process of modern Uyghur national movement 
and nationalism. Hroch recognizes three key stages of the phenomenon: scholarly interest in 
ethnicity (Phase A), patriotic agitation (Phase B) and mass national movement (Phase C; 
Hroch 1996: 80).). Similarly to some Central or Eastern European nations, in early modern 
era Uyghurs were dominated by an exogenous ruling class; their titular nobility and elite 
existed, but did not wield momentous political power. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this dissertation 
show how, as a reaction to this situation and also following a transfer of modernist thinking 
and nationalist ideology from abroad, a discourse of national identity arose within early 
modern intellectual circles of Xinjiang Turks and was followed by agitation aiming at national 
awakening of to-be Uyghurs (similar to Hrochian Phases A and Phase B in European context). 
As beliefs, lineages, modes of life, customs, habits and other collective attributes were forged 
into national symbols, the largely cultural movement eventually became politicized and 
transformed into national movement, i.e. movement bent on achieving all the attributes of a 
fully-fledged nation (similar to Hroch‘s Phase B). At certain moments, national movement of 
Xinjiang Turks became pointedly nationalist when interests of the nation gained priority over 
all other interests and attracted popular support. However, moments of such deep and broad 
politically-minded nationalist movement, which would resemble Hroch‘s Phase C, are lasted 
for relatively brief moments throughout early modern Xinjiang history. In contrast with some 
of the European nations which are the object of Hroch‘s research, this dissertation outlines an 
emergence of national consciousness and its politicization of a nation which did not succeed 
in resolving the ‗plight of the non-dominant ethnic group‘ (Hroch 1996: 80) in accordance 
with its hopes and desires. Instead, this dissertation tells a story of a failed nationalist 
movement.  
 
Sources and Methodology of Research 
 
 Unlike when researching Xinjiang history from the administration and competition 
perspective, or in other words when examining the topic from the perspective of boundary 
between Uyghurs and Chinese state, or between Xinjiang and other powers, for examination 
of Uyghur history from the content perspective it is necessary that material penned or in other 
ways generated by Uyghurs themselves constitute the essential segment of exploited sources. 
So far such sources have been exploited only in a very modest extent. While Sadri (Sadri 
1984), Forbes (Forbes 1986), Newby (Newby 1986), and Benson (Benson 1990; Benson 1991; 
Benson 1992) have worked with some Uyghur sources mainly in other than Uyghur languages 
(namely Chinese, Turkish and Russian) and Schleussel based his overview on a number of 
secondary titles in Uyghur (Schleussel 2009), so far only Shinjiro (Shinjiro 2000), Shinmen 
(Shinmen 1990, Shinmen 1994, Shinmen 2001), Brophy (Brophy 2005), Bellér-Hann (Bellér-
Hann 2008) and Roberts (Roberts 2010) managed to make a substantial number of Uyghur 
primary sources the core of their research in early modern Uyghur issues. This fact is partially 
due to linguistic demands on such research, partially to the above mentioned scarcity of 
Uyghur written material related to early modern period 1884-1949. 
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 The dissertation strives to improve the low exploitation rate of Uyghur sources. It fully 
espouses Miroslav Hroch‘s observation that at the moment, we have an over-production of 
theories and a stagnation of comparative research in history of national movements. ‗All 
defensible conclusions remain no more than partial findings, and all theories should be taken 
as projects for further research.‘ (Hroch 1996: 78) Along these lines, this dissertation strives 
infer more general conclusions from as many primary sources and textual evidence as 
possible. Based on the widest possible variety of sources, it attempts to reconstruct the 
process and modalities of rise of modern Uyghur national consciousness and nationalist 
ideology, or, in other words, to retrace the process of national awakening of Uyghur 
intellectuals and emergence of their national practice. Adopting the content perspective as a 
chief approach to early modern Uyghur history, the research is primarily based primarily on 
texts written by Xinjiang Turkic (or Uyghur) intellectuals in their native language in early 
modern period between 1884 and 1949. Occasionally, works by Uyghurs in other languages 
(namely Chinese and Russian) are also referred to. A special effort was exerted to refer to 
sources which have not been previously worked with. The sources analyzed by Sadri (Sadri 
1984), Forbes (Forbes 1986), Newby (Newby 1986), Benson (Benson 1990; Benson 1991; 
Benson 1992), Rudelson (Rudelson 1997), Shinmen (Shinmen 2001), Brophy (Brophy 2005), 
Bellér-Hann (Bellér-Hann 2008) and Roberts (Roberts 2010) have generally not been worked 
with again; they are utilized indirectly through reference to the above research. As a whole, 
the research faces a problem of somewhat uneven distribution of sources pertaining to 
respective stages of early modern period – a reality caused mainly by the fact there are no 
more sources known to exist or be available to the particular period in question (relevant 
mainly for Chapter 2). Despite this shortcoming, this dissertation presents the first attempt to 
outline modern Uyghur national awakening in the entire course of early modern era from 
1884 to 1949. At this moment, this dissertation also holds primacy of referring to so far the 
largest numbers of indigenous Uyghur sources, a large number of which have not been 
previously examined. 
 
 One category of utilized sources are historical writings – works by Molla Musa 
Sayrami (T rīkh-i Hamīdī, Sayrami 1988; T rīkh-i Amniyya; Sayrami 2000), Muhemmed 
Imin Bughra (Sherqi Türkistan Tarikhi; Bughra 1987) and Polat Qadiri (Ölke Tarikhi; Qadiri 
1948), none of which have been previously systematically inspected. Another category are 
literary pieces, such as poems by Abdukhaliq Uyghur (Abdukhaliq Uyghur Shé‟irliri, AUP), 
Memtili Tewpiq (Memtili Ependi Shé‟irliri, MEP) and by a writer of whom nothing further is 
known except his pseudonym Uyghur Son (Shé‟irlar, Uyghur Oghli). Of these, only poems 
by Abdukhaliq and Memtili have been previously briefly referred to (Schleussel 2009). An 
important bulk of sources is periodicals issued either directly with governments, or published 
under governmental auspices or by intellectuals affiliated with governments. One such 
category are newspapers published in Kashgar during insurgency, such as Independence of 
1933 (Istiqlal, I); Life of East Turkestan of 1933 (Sherqi Türkistan Hayati, LET); Free 
Turkestan of 1933-4 (Erkin Türkistan, LET), or after restoration of provincial authority, 
particularly New Life of 1934-1937 (Yéngi Hayat, NL). Of these newspapers, the first three 
have been used by Shinmen in his article (Shinmen 2001). Previously unresearched articles 
published in periodicals run by intellectuals affiliated with the central government, 
particularly Voice of Chinese Turkestan of 1934 (Chiniy Türkistan Awazi, VCT) or with 
second insurgent administration, specifically Revolutionary Eastern Turkestan of 1947-8 
(Inqilabiy Sherqiy Türkistan, RET) are also extensively worked with. Several separately 
published shorter essays, journal articles, political speeches, pamphlets and other 
miscellaneous documents by Nezerghoja Abdusémet (Yoruq Sahillar, Abdusémetov 1991), 
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Memet Emin Bughra (Yurt we Millet Heqqide Qelem Kürishi, Bughra 1948), Mes‘ud Sabiri 
(Bir Nutuq, Sabiri 1947; Türklük Orani, Sabiri 1948) and Polat Qadiri (Erk Shoari, Qadiri 
undated) or by anonymous authors (Kashgher Wilayet Hökümet Qurulushining Bayannamesi, 
PFK 1933: 9; Kashger Wilayitining Shin Jin Jang Mehkimiside Turghuchi Sherqi Türkistan 
Millet we Dölet Khizmetchisi Abdulrahman Efendi, PFK 1935: 12; Muhterem Duben 
Janabliridin Tiligram, PFK 1937: 10; Sherqiy Türkistandiki Barliq Musulmanlirimizgha 
Sherqiy Türkistan Merkiziy Dinniye Nazaritidin Muraji‟et, RS; Qan Bedelige Kelgen 
Hoquqimizni Himaye Qilishqa Teyyarbiz, ETRYO) are also analyzed; of these, only articles 
by Abdusémet have been analyzed before (Brophy 2005; Roberts 2009). The study of these 
primary sources is complemented by reference to existing scholarship in Uyghur, Chinese and 
English. At the same time, the data acquired during the case study of modern Uyghur ethnic 
identity and national consciousness are related to several existing general theories on rise of 
nations and national movements. Due to space limitations, extensive Japanese and Russian 
scholarship has not generally been worked with. 
 
 A special kind of sources used by this dissertation is memoirs of participants to the 
events, namely of Emin Wahidi (Inqilab Khatirisi, Wahidi 1938), Burhan Shehidi 
(Shinjangning 50 Yili, Burhan 1986), Seypiddin Ezizi (Ömür Dastani. Eslime Bir. Zulum 
Zindanida, Ezizi 1997a; Ömür Dastani. Eslime Ikki. Tengritaghda Güldürmama, Ezizi 1997b), 
Seydulla Seypullayov (Men Shahid Bolghan Ishlar, Seypullayov 2005) and Yolwas (堯樂博
士回憶錄 Yáolè bósh  huíy l ; Yaole Boshi 1969). Of these, the text by Burhan, Seypiddin 
and Yolwas have been previously consulted by other researchers. As a whole, the above 
memoirs are treated in this dissertation with certain caution. Besides from a generic problem 
with ‗undisputable‘ eye-witness accounts, it is possible to directly doubt the authenticity of at 
least some of the views expressed in them. In fact, Emin Wahidi‘s rendering of southern 
Xinjiang insurgency in 1930s seems to be the most authentic from among the above memoir 
sources, because it was written mere three years after the described events took place. 
Moreover, Wahidi wrote his record in politically unconstrained conditions of his exile in 
Afghanistan. Another case are the memoirs of Seypiddin Ezizi and Burhan Shehidi, senior 
figures of pre-1949 events in Xinjiang who themselves made many of contemporary 
highest-level political decisions, which are likely to be fabricated to an unknown degree by 
Communist authorities – in a way not dissimilar to the ‗memoir‘ of Puyi (溥儀), the last 
emperor of China, generally believed to be highly fictional. On the other hand, some 
specialists argue that both Ezizi and Burhan were after 1949 high enough in the PRC power 
hierarchy to be themselves aware what things were tolerable to be put into writing, and to 
have the authority to write what they themselves considered tolerable. This would make both 
memoirs rather reliable. Similarly, the memoir of Seypullayov, another high-ranking official 
in the second East Turkestan Republic of 1944-9, surely passed the careful scrutiny of the 
efficient PRC censorship and propaganda system and therefore cannot by default contain any 
undesirable information. On the other hand, the account is acclaimed by today‘s Uyghur 
historians as one of the most informative and balanced sources on the second East Turkestan 
Republic. In contrast, the views expressed by Yolwas in his work show an extreme 
ideological compatibility with Chiang Kai-shek‘s theory of nationalities. Also, Yolwas‘ 
contemporaries, some of who are still alive today in Taiwan, recall him to be nearly illiterate. 
Therefore, it seems unlikely for him to be able to physically write the memoir himself. In sum, 
Yolwas‘ ‗memoir‘ is likely to be rather a representative articulation of Kuomintang‘s version 





Note on Terminology and Transcriptions 
 
 A clarification should be made here of several terms used throughout the dissertation. 
Firstly, several terms related to historical periods should be elucidated. The fact that during 
the initial period of Uyghur early modern history (1880-1911) Xinjiang was part of the Qing 
empire is reflected in the use of the term ‗late imperial‘ for reference to Xinjiang Turkic 
affairs, even though no historiography recognizes a period of Uyghur history that would be 
known as ‗imperial‘. Similarly, the term ‗early modern‘ is used in the dissertation for the 
period under research, i.e. for the era spanning between Qing dynasty‘s proclaiming Xinjiang 
a province in 1884 and Chinese Communist Party‘s taking control over republican Xinjiang in 
1949. This usage clearly does not correspond to terminology used in historiography of other 
regions. For instance, in European historiography the term ‗early modern‘ refers to period 
from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, while in historiography of China the term refers 
to period from late Ming (明) dynasty in late sixteenth century to military clash of Qing 
dynasty with Western powers in mid-nineteenth century. However, as will be illustrated in the 
following chapters, in Xinjiang it was only in the period 1884-1949 that the first features of 
modernity started to come about. However, in this period the extent to which modernity 
spread throughout Xinjiang remained only partial and indigenous Turkic milieu remained to 
figure as ‗a basically pre-industrial, agrarian social structure‘ (Bellér-Hann 11). The term 
‗early modern‘ as used in this dissertation therefore mainly reflects the fact although 
numerous modern concepts appeared and evolved in unique Xinjiang context before 1949, it 
was only after founding of the People‘s Republic of China that Xinjiang Turkic society 
underwent a strong transformation, some aspects of which can be perhaps termed 
modernization. 
 
 Another special mention should be made here about the pivotal concept of this 
research. In primary sources stated invariably as a loanword from Arabic millet, its meaning 
in English evolves from that of ‗religious community‘ (Chapter 1) through ‗nation‘ (Chapter 2 
and 3) to ‗minority nationality‘ or ‗ethnic group‘ (Chapter 4). In other words, Uyghur 
language uses the term millet to denote an ethnic group, which can have varying political 
status, and can therefore be designated in English by several equivalents. For instance, it will 
be demonstrated that insurgent leaders of the first East Turkestan Republic (1933-4) regarded 
their community as a millet (in this context most aptly translated into English as ‗nation‘) 
intent on founding a nation-state. On the other hand, Xinjiang Turkic nationally minded 
figures of 1940s perceived their community as an ethno-cultural millet (here most 
appropriately translated as ‗nationality‘) which, along with other millet, formed the political 
millet of China (‗nation of China‘). The practice of using a single term millet that can 
comfortably acquire a wide range of contextual connotations and translations (‗nation‘, 
‗nationality‘, ‗ethnic group‘, ‗ethno-cultural community‘ and others in English, similarly 
‗natsia‘, ‗natsional‟nost‟‘, ‗narod‟, ‗etnicheskaya gruppa‘ and others in Russian) is also 
common in other Central Asian Turkic languages with close ties to Xinjiang Turkic milieu 
(namely Tatar and Uzbek). It also exists in Chinese, where the term 民族 mínz  can acquire 
various meanings according to context, and thus also several translations into English 
(Leibold 166). However, in contrast to recent trend in English studies on China to directly 
introduce the Chinese term 民族 mínz  into English for denoting concepts such as ‗nation of 
China,‘ ‗Chinese minority nationality‘ or ‗ethnic group of China‘, the author of this 
dissertation chooses to translate the term millet into English by contextually suitable, albeit 
varying, terms.  
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 Although the title of this dissertation promises its contents to be devoted to ‗Uyghur 
ideas of nation and nationalism‘, the author is aware that the use of the word Uyghur in the 
title is at least partially anachronistic and is employed mainly for the sake of simplifying. 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 will demonstrate that the term Uyghur appeared only very sporadically in 
Xinjiang in 1920s, was officially introduced only in 1930s and remained marginal within 
certain circles of Xinjiang Turkic intellectual milieu until 1949. On the contrary, this 
dissertation will show that throughout the entire early modern period, significant portion of 
Xinjiang Turkic intelligentsia described their community by autonyms such as ‗Musulman‘ 
(in English ‗Muslim), ‗East Turkestani‘, ‗Turkestani‘ or ‗Turk‘. Therefore, the most correct 
term to refer to indigenous Xinjiang Turkic Muslim oasis-dwellers throughout early modern 
period should be ‗early modern ancestors of a nationality today classified as Uyghur‘. In 
general, the text of this dissertation strives as much as possible to avoid this unattractive 
expression by respecting the use in contemporary primary sources. Therefore, Chapter 1 tends 
use the term ‗Musulman‘, Chapter 2 uses the neutral term ‗Xinjiang Turkic Muslims‘, Chapter 
3 features the term ‗East Turkestanis‘ and ‗Uyghur‘ and Chapter 4 employs the term ‗Turk‘ 
and ‗Uyghur‘. All these various terms, however, point unanimously to the single object of this 
research: forefathers of today‘s Uyghurs. 
 
 The language, in which primary sources for this research are written, also deserves 
special explanation. The language of the sources substantially evolved during the period under 
research, i.e. between 1880s and 1949. Chapter 1 draws on historical chronicles written in 
Chaghatay, a once spoken Turkic tongue stemming from ancient Uyghur imbued with Persian 
and Arabic vocabulary, which from fifteenth until early twentieth century functioned as an 
elite literature language of Central Asian Turko-Islamic milieu. Similarly, Chapter 2 relies on 
poetry pieces written in Chaghatay that starts to be, however, less or more close to vernacular 
of the time. In contrast, Chapters 3 and 4 inspect newspapers articles and political essays that 
already show a substantial extent of vernacularization. Here, it is important to remain aware 
that throughout the entire early modern period, the language spoken by Turkic Muslims of 
Xinjiang remained very similar to languages spoken by other sedentary Turkic nationalities of 
Central Asia (mainly to Uzbek) and mirrored the persistent common Turko-Islamic identity of 
Central Asians. Thus, as the eastern variety of closely related Turkic languages of sedentary 
oasis-dwellers of Central Asia, this language can be referred to by the term ‗Turkic,‘ ‗Turki‘ 
or ‗East Turki‘ (which is an expression commonly used by foreign specialists throughout the 
entire early modern period).  
 
 On the other hand, the vernacularization of Xinjiang sources also increasingly reflects 
specific traits of the language spoken exclusively by indigenous Xinjiang sedentary Turks. In 
fact, some inspected texts from 1930s and 1940s are so close to vernacular that when read out 
loud, they sound as if spoken today on the streets of Kashgar. In other words, 
vernacularization and endowing common Central Asian Turki with local Xinjiang traits 
reflects the nationalization of communal identity of Xinjiang sedentary Turks and emergence 
of modern Uyghur nation. Therefore, since 1930s the language of people today called 
Uyghurs can be also referred to by the, again partially anachronistic, term ‗Uyghur‘. In this 
process of Uyghurization of East Turki, the once massive proportion of Persian vocabulary 
gradually decreased and was replaced by either Turkic words or Russian or Chinese 
loanwords (which is also demonstrated in the dissertation). As for the sources themselves, 
only those examined in Chapters 3 and 4 specifically name the language, which they are 
written in, as ‗Turkic‘ or ‗Uyghur.‘ Language of the Taranchis, who were in 1930s 
temporarily recognized as a separate nationality of northern Xinjiang, can in fact also be 
considered a variety of Uyghur, as the Taranchis can be (and in today‘s Xinjiang indeed are) 
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regarded as a subaltern community of Uyghurs. Finally, a similar situation can be observed in 
orthography of the examined sources. As Central Asia was historically one of the core regions 
of Islamic culture, Chaghatay was written in Arabic script containing several graphems 
reflecting its phonetic specifics. Until early twentieth century, this script contained only minor 
differences throughout the region of its use from the Caspian sea to Komul in eastern Xinjiang. 
From 1920s to 1949, the sources under research in this dissertation are written in an 
increasingly phoneticized script, which contains a growing number of graphems appearing in 
modern Uyghur.  
  
 Also in a slightly anachronizing way, for the sake of simplification this dissertation 
transcribes numerous Uyghur/Turki terms contained in early modern sources into Latin 
alphabet according to transcription of modern Uyghur as used in an influential anthology of 
studies in modern Xinjiang edited by Frederick Starr (Starr 2004). If not stated otherwise, the 
original terms and phrases stated in parentheses are in Uyghur (written in the text of the 
dissertation in Latin letters; e.g. dölet) or Chinese language (written in the text in Chinese 
characters [e.g. 民族 ] followed by the transcription in the Pīnyīn system [e.g. mínz ]). 
Chinese proper names are generally transcribed without tone marks; similarly, tones are not 
marked when a term appears repeatedly. In cases when terms are adopted from languages 
other than Uyghur and Chinese, the original language is specified as for instance Russian, 
Turkish or Arabic. Unlike other chapters in the dissertation, Chapter 1 chooses to transcribe 
the title of several sources according to Arabic transcription used by Kim Ho-dong (Kim 2004) 
because these sources have been written in Chaghatay, for which such transcription is more 
suitable. The overwhelming majority of nouns (e.g. musteqil) or noun-derived expressions 
(e.g. musteqilliq) contained in the original Uyghur expressions also come from Arabic; this 
fact is generally not pointed out. Toponyms contained in the sources are written in the 
dissertation according to today‘s use (i.e. ‗Yangissar‘ as today instead of ‗Yéngi Hissar‘ as 
used in sources). Some toponyms are moreover written in a commonly known and slightly 
simplified way, instead of their entirely correct forms (i.e. ‗Kashgar‘ instead of ‗Keshqer‘, 
‗Urumchi‘ instead of ‗Ürümchi‘). This principle is also applied to some commonly known 
terms in Chinese (i.e. ‗Kuomintang‘ instead of ‗Guomindang‘). Similarly, Chinese terms and 
loanwords in the sources are transcribed according to today‘s pīnyīn (i.e. ‗Huijiao‘ as used 
today instead of ‗Khuyjo‘ as used in sources). Chinese characters are used throughout the text 
in their traditional forms when pertaining to pre-1949 concepts and in their simplified forms 
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 The initial chapter of this dissertation briefly introduces history of pre-modern 
Xinjiang, including late imperial Qing conquest and policy in the region. Referring mainly to 
History of Hamid (T rīkh-i Hamīdī), a remarkable historical record of an anti-Qing Muslim 
uprising in Xinjiang in 1864-1877 written by historian Molla Musa Sayrami in 1908, this 
chapter further describes the shape of ideas of communal identity and interest among Xinjiang 
Turkic Muslims as the close of imperial era. Such initial scrutiny is important as it introduces 
the pre-modern basis of modern Uyghur national identity and nationalism which were to 
appear in subsequent stages of early modern era between 1884 and 1949. 
 
 This chapter will show how elite strata of Xinjiang Muslim society viewed their 
communal identity and interest at the close of pre-modern era in late nineteenth century. 
T rīkh-i Hamīdī reveals that Sayrami perceived himself as a member of a clearly defined 
community of indigenous sedentary Turkic Muslims of Xinjiang, for which he uses the name 
Musulman. In Sayrami‘s view, the Musulman shared not only common religious affiliation to 
Islam, but also descent, language, mode of life, locus of residence, culture, mythology, 
historical past or political tradition. By mere being aware of sharing such group identity 
markers, at least some strata of late Qing Musulman exhibited a firmly consolidated sense of 
communal consciousness. Comparison of Xinjiang indigenous Turkic Muslims‘ communal 
consciousness to several modern current definitions of nation (mainly Barth 1969; Smith 1986; 
Smith 2009; Gellner 1983; Anderson 1991 and Hroch 1996) will establish that in late imperial 
era the Musulman existed as a proto-national ethnic category bound together by many 
principles that form modern nations. The chapter will also illustrate that in late imperial era, 
Xinjiang Musulman occasionally managed to transform their awareness of communal identity 
into coordinated and large-scale movement intent on defending their communal interest. 
Xinjiang indigenous sedentary Muslims‘ centripetal sense of communal identity and their 
ability to act as a single whole solely due to awareness of this communal identity are in this 
chapter termed the community principle.  
 
 Finally, this chapter will also illustrate that Musulmans‟ pre-modern sense of 
communal identity and ability to jointly defend their communal interest was often of 
secondary importance. The description of factual unfolding of events during the uprising 
described by Sayrami in T rīkh-i Hamīdī shows that although the Musulman were aware of 
having in common a large number of specific identity markers and interests, it eventually 
happened that they allied and took action together with non-Musulman groups. Often, the 
non-communal alliances were established on the basis of common locus of residence or social 
stratum. The fact that the Musulman eventually resigned on pursuing their communal interest, 
defined by the fact of sharing their Musulman identity, and instead chose to defend 
cross-communal interests of social or local factions, shows that Musulman communal identity 
and interest did not take up a primary importance in thought and action of Xinjiang 
indigenous Turkic Muslims in late imperial era. The sense of communal unity, solidarity and 
alliance that figure in several current definitions as important traits of national movement and 
nationalism (mainly Smith 1986; Hroch 1996; Anderson 1991; Gellner 1983 and Breuilly 
1986) were conspicuously absent in communal action taken late Qing Xinjiang indigenous 
sedentary Turkic Muslims. For these reasons, this chapter asserts that despite the fact that in 
late imperial era Musulman possessed a number of traits of proto-national ethnic community, 
their uprisings did not fully follow the pattern of national movement and nationalism. The 
centrifugal prominence of Musulmans‟ local and social interests and the resulting inability to 
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take action bent on defending communal interests is in this chapter termed the disparity 
principle. 
 
Politics and Ethnicity of the Today’s Xinjiang in Pre-Modern Times 
 
 In Eurasian Crossroads, the first comprehensive history of what is today called 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (新疆维吾尔自治区  Xīnji ng Wéiw ‟ěr z zh qū; 
Shinjang Uyghur Aptonom Rayoni), its author James Millward has argued that the term 
‗Chinese Turkestan‘ is an apposite way to refer to the passionately contested area. On the one 
hand, the word Turkestan conveys the fact that the place has long been home to 
Turkic-speaking peoples of whom Uyghurs, as we call them today, constitute the majority. On 
the other hand, its attributive ‗Chinese‘ also embodies the fact that the territory, unlike the 
western part of Turkestan today partitioned into the five independent Central Asian republics, 
has a long history of contact with China, including periods of direct political control. ‗In this 
way, Xinjiang is indeed both Turkic and Chinese.‘ (Millward 2007: ix) Its function as a 
bustling hub of ideas, religions, cultures and doctrines, as well as the immense variety of 
social and political structures stemming from its medial position, are only two of the main 
themes of Millward‘s excellently written book. As the findings of this dissertation corroborate 
the continuation of the region‘s historical role of pivot of ideas and ideologies in early modern 
era, it is useful to outline briefly several relevant subjects of Xinjiang‘s pre-modern history.  
 
 Presently available archeological evidence suggests that the earliest population of 
today‘s Xinjiang in the second millennium BC were groups who were both pastoralist and 
agriculturalist and spoke Tokharian and other Iranian languages. From the late first 
millennium BCE, it is possible to indentify these populations with historical names of peoples 
as preserved in material and written sources. Thus, it is assumed that from about 1000 BC, 
parts of Xinjiang were inhabited by Iranian-speaking Sakas (sometimes identified with the 
Scythians), who formed the first city states in southern Xinjiang. Other groups known in 
Chinese sources from the second century BCE were the Yuezhi (月氏; generally identified 
with the Tokharians) living in parts of the Ili Valley, or the Wusun (烏孫) inhabiting other 
parts of northern Xinjiang. The Yuezhi were later dispersed by the Xiongnu ( 匈奴 , 
presumably indirectly related to people known as Huns in Europe) who were the dominant 
proto-Turkic nomads exerting control over large areas of inner Asia, including Xinjiang, at 
the turn of the two eras. The Yuezhi eventually settled in the area of today‘s Uzbekistan and 
Afghanistan. After forming the Tokharian-speaking Kushan empire, they also periodically 
established their control over parts of southern Xinjiang. Such cases of domination by an 
outside power were the first historical instances of a pattern that was to repeat itself 
throughout the following millennia: an external and confederated inner Asian nomadic power 
(which occasionally could be based even in northern Xinjiang, i.e. the Ili Valley or Zungharia) 
controls and economically exploits the sedentary population of southern Xinjiang (i.e. the 
Tarim Basin, or the oases around the Taklamakan Desert) and/or eastern Xinjiang (i.e. the 
Turfan Basin and Qomul; Millward 2007: 13-5). 
 
 Along this model, from around 500 BC the Xiongnu started to collect tribute from the 
city states of the Tarim Basin and even instituted direct political control over substantial 
number of them by 130 BC. At the same time, the Xiongnu challenged ascending Western 
Han (西漢; 206 BC – 9 AD) dynasty based in China proper. Western Han were by the 
Xiongnu coerced it into a set of diplomatic relationships known in Chinese historiography 
under the euphemism heqin (和親  héqīn), which on the Han part included recognizing 
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Xiongnu rulers (單于 chány ) as equal to Han emperors, marrying off royal princesses to 
Xiongnu aristocracy and paying tribute to the Xiongnu court. After this strategy failed to 
secure peace, a more assertive approach to Xiongnu affairs was taken up by Han emperor 
Wudi (武帝; ruled 141-87 BC). Under Wudi‘s patronage, General Zhang Qian (張騫) carried 
out a diplomatic mission to the Yuezhi in 139-125 BC, which aimed at forging a Han-Yuezhi 
military alliance against the Xiongnu. Not knowing that the Yuezhi had in between migrated, 
Zhang Qian ventured through the present-day Xinjiang, Ferghana, Sogdiana and Bactria until 
he found the Yuezhi by the Oxus (Amu) River. Although he failed to enlist the Yuezhi‘s 
support (and later also that of the Wusun), he brought to Han court an enormous amount of 
intelligence on previously mostly unknown western regions. It was also owing to Zhang 
Qian‘s mission that the Han were able to wrestle the control over varying portions of Xinjiang 
from the Xiongnu since 120 BC, temporarily establishing the Western Regions protectorate 
(西域都護府 Xīy  dūh f ) lasting from 60 BC till the first decade AD. Han control over parts 
of the Western Regions was renewed during the Eastern Han dynasty (東漢; 25-220 AD) 
between 70s and 150s AD. During this time, Western Regions became a prosperous region 
along the famed Silk Road. After that, the control over the south of the region swayed back to 
the Kushans. In this period, the noteworthy pattern to recur in Xinjiang's history is the 
phenomenon of a China-based power striking preemptively at a hostile nomadic people 
beyond the empire‘s northwestern frontier by conquering the fertile city states in eastern and 
southern Xinjiang and thus disrupting the nomads‘ economic base. In another words, Han 
dynasty‘s control over Western Regions was a result of its war with the Xiongnu, not of a 
quest for new territory or trade routes. Another notable principle was the traditional Chinese 
strategy of ‗using barbarians to control other barbarians‘ (以夷制夷 yǐ Y  zh  Y , also 以夷治
夷 yǐ Y  zh  Y ), in particular the Yuezhi against the Xiongnu. Similarly, the Han were the first 
China-based power to deploy in the Western Regions affairs a strategy that had been 
originally used by the Qin (秦) state during the late Warring States period (戰國 Zh nguó, 
475-221 BC) of gradual military and economic expansion by commissioning military troops 
to establish agricultural colonies known as 屯田 t ntián. The colonies were later extensively 
reintroduced in Xinjiang by the Tang (唐) and Qing (清) dynasties (Millward 2007: 17-25). 
 
 Between the third and sixth century, the city states of the Tarim Basin came under the 
domination of Kushans and Sogdians or were ruled independently by local Iranian-speaking 
monarchs, maintaining only loose political and somewhat stronger cultural affiliation to China 
proper. Run largely by Sogdian elites, the region prospered materially and became an 
important centre and conduit of Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Manicheism and Nestorianism. 
Since late sixth century, northern and partially also southern Xinjiang found itself under the 
control of Western Turkic kaghanate, while the Turfan Basin and eastern portion of the Tarim 
Basin were under the control of the Sui dynasty (隋; 581-618). Expansion of China-based 
power continued under the Tang dynasty (唐; 618-907), which despite constant warfare with 
Turks and Tibetans managed to establish its protectorate in significant parts of the region 
under the name Pacified West (安西 Ānxī) between 640s and 750s (Millward 2007: 25-39; 
Soucek 51-3).  
 
 Subsequently, control over the territory passed into Turkic hands. In particular, the 
region was subdued by the Uyghurs, a tribal confederation associated with a broader term 
Toqquz Oghuz (Nine Oghuz; in Chinese 九姓  Ji x ng; Nine Surnames) who between 
mid-seventh and mid-ninth century had formed a prospering dynasty in today‘s Mongolia 
along the Orkhon River (Mackerras 317-20). As of today, there is not a definitive scholarly 
accord on the etymology of the term ‗Uyghur‘ (in Tang sources also transcribed in a wide 
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variety of ways, for instance Huíhé 囘鶴 or 囘紇). On the other hand, ethnic origin of 
Uyghurs is one of the most contested topics among Chinese and Uyghur scholars, as well as 
among Western specialists. Different theories describe the Uyghurs as descendants of 
different proto-Turkic tribes of inner Asia, for example formations known in Chinese sources 
as Dingling (丁零), Gaoju (高車, also known as Gaoche) or Tiele (鐵勒; Tursun 92; Millward 
2007: 42-3). Various theories interpret the word as meaning ‗unity‘ or ‗civilization‘ (Muti‘i 
1990: 382) or expressing the fact of ancient Uyghur tribal confederations inhabiting river 
valleys (from Turkic on ghur, ‗ten rivers‘ or on ghul, ‗ten gorges‘; Hebibulla 52).  
 
In any case, after the Orkhon Uyghur state collapsed in 840 after attacks by the 
Kyrgyz, Uyghurs migrated south and settled in portions of Xinjiang territory (as well as in the 
Hexi corridor in Gansu province
2
). Here, a complex interaction started of sedentary and 
nomadic civilizations, during which Iranian-speaking oasis agriculturalists would accept a 
vague sense of political suzerainty, and eventually also the language, of the Turkic nomads. 
At the same time, the Turks would adopt become ethnically intermixed with the oasis 
dwellers, eventually adopting the sedentary mode of life, as well as large number of cultural 
and political institutions. A marked consequence of this dynamic was linguistic Turkicization 
of the Xinjiang region. In the northeastern portion of the Tarim basin, the newly arrived 
Turkic Uyghurs mixed with the predominantly Iranian population of the local city states, 
whereas in eastern and northern Xinjiang they formed a Buddhist and Manicheist kingdom 
with Beshbaliq (Pentapolis; in Iranian Panjkent, near today‘s Urumchi) and Qocho (near 
today‘s Turfan) as seasonal capitals. This culturally and economically advanced Uyghur state, 
or Uyghuristan
3
, ruled the area from Qomul to Kucha and existed throughout the twelfth 
century, when it accepted the Qarakhitay suzerainty, until it was finally incorporated into the 
ascending Mongol empire in 1370s. At the same time, southern and southeastern part of the 
Tarim Basin had heretofore found itself periodically under Tibetan and Tangut domination 
(Millward 2007: 40-50; Soucek 55-6, 77-82; Golden 2009: 16-7).  
 
 Meanwhile, a confederation of Turkic tribes called the Qarakhanids emerged in the 
western part of Tarim basin, Semirechie and Transoxania in the ninth century. In mid-tenth 
century in Kashgar, the Qarakhanids initiated the process of conversion of the Xinjiang region 
to Islam and continued by the conquest of Buddhist and Saka-speaking Khotan around 1000. 
The Qarakhanid period experienced a massive cultural development when scholars such as 
Mahmud Kashgari (1005-1102) and Yüsüp Khas Hajib (1019-1085) composed some of the 
greatest works of Turkic Islamic culture, the Compendium of the Languages of the Turks 
(Türkiy Tillar Diwani) and Happiness-Bringing Wisdom (Qutadghu Bilig) respectively. It was 
in Kashgari‘s Compendium that the term ‗Turkestan‘, or ‗Land of the Turks‘, first appeared 
(Millward 2007: 50-6; Soucek 83-92; Golden 1990: 354-8). As evidenced by numerous 
references, there existed bitter hostility between the Muslim Qarakhanid state and Buddhist 
Uyghuristan (Geng 11). In the twelfth century, the whole of today‘s Xinjiang passed under the 
control of the Qarakhitay, and in late thirteenth century the whole region found itself in the 
realm of descendants of Chaghatay, the second son Chinggis Khan (lived probably 1167-
                                                 
2
 Uyghurs settled in the Hexi corridor, sometimes referred to as the Yellow Uyghurs (Sarigh Uyghur), 
eventually formed today‘s Yugur (裕固) minority.  
3  It was observed that the geographical proximity of Uyghuristan to China and the fact that the 
character Hui (囘) denoted both ‗Uyghur‘ and ‗Islam‘ has contributed to emergence of notion common 
in modern China, which perceived all the Turks of Eastern Turkestan as Uyghurs (Fletcher 1968: 363). 
Chapter 4 of this dissertation shows that the error led to Republican China‘s total confusion over the 
concepts ‗Uyghur‘, ‗Turkic‘, ‗Turkic-speaking Muslim‘ and ‗Chinese-speaking Muslim‘.  
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1227). During this period, Uyghurs served as scribes and educators and Uyghur culture had a 
unique position within the Chinggisid realm. Uyghur writing, derived from Sogdian, became 
the basis for Mongolian, later also Manchurian, scripts. Chaghataid elites began to convert to 
Islam, while simultaneously adhering their nominally Mongol nomadic heritage. As a result, 
since mid-fourteenth century, the gradually Islamicizing Tarim and Turfan Basin along with 
Zungharia and territory between the Yaxartes (Syr) river and Lake Balkhash became known 
as Moghulistan (Soucek 23-4, Golden 2009b: 116) where the Dughlats constituted the most 
prominent clan. By the end of the fourteenth century, the Dughlats also incorporated the 
Buddhist Uyghuristan (Millward 2007: 56-72; Soucek 121-2). Since the fifteenth century, the 
word ‗Uyghur‘ was used only sporadically, largely in toponyms, and effectively disappeared 
as ethnonym or clan name, only to be revived in the twentieth century to denote modern 
Uyghurs.
4
 Islamization of ‗Moghuls‘ was complete by mid-sixteenth century and the area of 
Tarim and Turfan basins was to a large degree politically unified by early seventeenth century 
(Golden 2009b: 117; Millward 2009: 260-7). 
 
 Throughout seventeenth century, authority of Chaghataids and Dughlats was gradually 
replaced by that of Naqshbandi
5
 Sufi brotherhoods. The Sufi clergy, called the khojas, on the 
one hand widely proselytized in the Tarim and Turfan Basins (and beyond), on the other hand 
also engaged in complex struggle for political control. Along with the region‘s Islamization, 
the significance and prosperity of the ancient Silk Road decreased due to emergence of 
maritime trading routes. Due to these phenomena, the Chaghataid realm decomposed into a 
cluster of more or less autonomous city states ruled by the khoja theocracy vying for political 
influence. This system roughly resembled polis where local and factional rivalries coexisted 
under the name Seven Cities (Alte Sheher; Heptapolis) with common consciousness of 
Chinggisid political and ethnic heritage. Eventually, the main schism emerged between the 
Ishaqiyya (Qarataghliq) and Affaqiya (Aqtaghliq) factions headed by Makhdumzade Sufi 
khojas. This configuration lasted until late seventeenth century, when a new power, the 
Buddhist Zunghars, a branch of Oirat Mongols, emerged in northern Xinjiang and the 
surrounding steppes. Reviving the classic pattern of an external nomadic power preemptively 
projecting its control over the Tarim and Turfan Basin oases, Zunghars subjugated and 
nominally unified the Seven Cities around 1780. Their lordship more characterized by 
extraction than by governance, Zunghars nevertheless managed to develop agriculture and 
commerce in Heptapolis and Zungharia. They also installed some khojas and remnants of 
Moghul aristocracy as so-called begs, local rulers in lower administrative positions 
throughout the Seven Cities (Millward 2009: 267-9; Millward 2007: 78-93; Soucek 165-73; 
Fletcher 1968: 218-220). 
 
Qing Conquest and Administration of Xinjiang 
 
 The Chinggisid era of great Inner Asian empires ruled by khans claiming Mongol 
nomadic origin and Chingissid descent came to its end with the entrée of the Qing dynasty 
(1644-1911) and its victory over the Zunghar Khanate in mid-eighteenth century. The 
projection of Qing imperial mandate into Central Asia was a conclusive moment in a complex 
empire-building process, which started with Manchu ethnogenesis and their military challenge 
to the Ming dynasty early in the seventeenth century and ended in 1759 with the annexation 
of the Seven Cities Region. The result of this ‗unprecedented project of expansion‘ (Perdue 
                                                 
4
 This process is examined in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
5
 The Naqshbandiya is a Sufi order named after Baha‘ ad-Din Naqshband (1318-89), a mystic and 
proselytizer of the Bukhara region. 
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133) was a realm of a grand territorial expanse which massively exceeded those of the 
venerated Han and Tang dynasties. At the same time, due to their non-Han ethnic origin and 
large numbers of non-Han subjects, the Qing were obliged to pay particular attention to ethnic 
affairs within the empire and institute sophisticated ethnic policies. Similarly, both the Qing 
inclusion of the Zunghar khanate and its dominion Heptapolis into the empire and subsequent 
management of ethnic affairs in the newly annexed frontier region are significant agents in the 
process of formation of modern Uyghur national identity and nationalism.  
 
 The Zunghar Mongols under the khanship of Galdan (ruled ?-1697) had been defying 
the Qing authority along the northwestern border since the rule of the Kangxi emperor (康熙, 
ruled 1662-1722). It remained up to the Qianlong emperor (乾隆, ruled 1736-1795) to deal 
ultimately with the Zunghar menace. After power struggle developed among the Zunghar 
nobility after 1745, Amursana (died 1757) emerged as the leader and challenged the Qing 
authority by claiming khanship over all Zunghar tribes. In a series of campaigns north of the 
Tianshan, Qianglong conquered the Zunghar territory and massacred almost all the population 
of Zunghar tribes. Amursana himself fled to Russian territory where he died of smallpox. The 
moment of elimination of Zunghar khanate constitutes the end of Chinggisid legacy of great 
empires dominated by elites of Mongol nomadic origin between late twelfth and mid-
eighteenth century (Millward 2009: 268-71; Di Cosmo 351-2). 
 
 By destroying the Zunghar state, the Qing were suddenly confronted with an 
opportunity to extend their domination south of the Tianshan Range over the Seven Cities 
region, a polity previously controlled by the Zunghars. During the conquest of Ili, the Qing 
got hold of two sons of khoja Mahmut, the last legitimate leader of Seven Cities, who had 
been held in captivity by the Zunghars. According to Qing world view, this moment made the 
young khojas Qing vassals and made a vassal state out their dominion. They released the elder 
khoja and sent him home with the intention to control Seven Cities indirectly through his rule 
and kept the younger khoja in captivity as a hostage. He managed to escape and the two 
brothers claimed sovereignty over Seven Cities and later clashed with the Qing troops in 
Kucha and Yarkend. However, the Qing obtained assistance of some the local factions and 
also of the Kyrgyz and drove the khojas out of Kashghar. The khojas fled to Badakhshan, 
where they were captured and executed. In December 1759, the Qianlong emperor announced 
achievement of ‗eternal peace and security on the borders;‘ by the end of the eighteenth 
century the region has been called Xinjiang (新疆 , in English ‗New Frontier‘ or ‗New 
Dominion; Millward 2009: 271-3; Di Cosmo: 351-2).
6
 Thus, the conquest was ‗a by-product 
of the Zunghar campaigns‘ (Perdue 291-2), as well as yet another more or less preemptive 
projection of a China-based power‘s authority onto inner Asia nomads in a way that was 
structurally identical to the pattern outlined above. Qing annexation Xinjiang finalized the 
empire-building process that availed the dynasty of historically the largest territorial extent of 
Chinese empire. On the other hand, the vastness, remoteness and limited resources of Seven 
Cities were to prove a strong strategic setback for retaining control over the region for later 





                                                 
6
 Other Qing terms were the nostalgic name Western Region (西域), Muslim Frontier (囘疆 Huíji ng), 
Muslim Region or Muslim Tribes (囘部 Huíb ), Zunghar Region or Zunghar Tribes (凖部 Zh nb ) 
etc.  
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Qing Ethnic Policy 
 
 The Qing empire was unprecedented in Chinese history as regards both territorial 
extent and variety of its inhabitants in ethnic origin, religion and culture. In order to deal with 
this diversity, the Qianlong emperor was obliged to institute manifold legitimization measures. 
One of these concepts was ‗universality‘ of imperial power, also termed ‗simultaneous 
emperorship‘ (Crossley 1999: 11). In accord with his era title (meaning ‗Supported by 
Heaven‘), the emperor posed himself as the cultic pivot for each of the five main 
ethnoreligious entities within the empire – Manchu (滿 M n), Mongol (蒙 Měng), Han (漢 
H n), Tibetan (藏 Z ng) and Turkic (囘 Huí). Thus, by performing traditional shamanistic 
rituals and worshipping Heaven, he remained the ruler of Manchus. By adopting the titles Son 
of Heaven (天子 Ti nzǐ) and Sage-King (聖王 Shèngwáng), by adopting neo-Confucian 
orthodoxy and methods of rule, by performing Chinese state rituals, by promoting the worship 
of folk hero/war god Guan Di (關帝) and accepting other institutions of Chinese civilization 
and statecraft Manchu ruler successfully appealed to the Han. Previously, the Qing had also 
procured Yuan imperial seal (‗state-transmission seal‘ 傳國璽 chuánguóxǐ) and the title Khan 
from Chakhar Mongols, thus gaining legitimacy for the Mongols. For both Tibetans and 
Mongols, Qianlong became a legitimate ruler by posing as the reincarnation of bodhisattva 
Avalokiteshvara, Manjushri and king turning the Wheel of the Law (Sanskrit chakravartin, 轉
輪 zhu nl n), by adopting cult of the war god Mahakala and of popular hero Geser, as well as 
by accepting spiritual guidance of Tibetan clergy and presenting himself as the patron of faith, 
which a pattern that existed in Tibeto-Mongol relations since the Yuan dynasty (元, 1271-
1378; Rawski 197-263; Crossley 1999: 225-46; Slobodník 21-2). The complex strategy of 
simultaneous emperorship is also perceptible for example in the use of six kinds of scripts 
(Chinese, Manchu, Mongolian, Tibetan, Oirat and Arabic) in some instances of official 
communication (Perdue 430-1). Such universalist approach elaborated substantially on 
Chinese traditional culturalist perception of the world as one composed of concentric circles, 
where in the center of civilized world stands Chinese culture (Huáxi  wénhu ), which is 
surrounded by non-Chinese ethnic groups whose level of cultural development decreases with 
growing distance from China-proper (Fig. 2). Instead, Qing emperor was to function as a 
center of the universe consisting of five equally civilized ethno-cultural realms (Manchu, 
Mongol, Han, Tibetan and Turkic), each administered under different rules (Millward 1998: 
201; Fig. 3). 
 
 Although modalities of establishing a connection between the Qing emperor and 
Islamic ritual practice have so far not been sufficiently researched, it appears that the case of 
Islam was more complicated. Obviously, the emperor could not proclaim himself God or a 
reincarnation of the Prophet, nor could he convert to Islam. Qianlong‘s title khan boasted 
formidable prestige among the Turkic population of Heptapolis, but this prestige was, strictly 
speaking, unrelated to Islam because its very origin lay in the pre-Islamic title kaghan (Khan 
of khans) held by Turkic and Uyghur rulers in 6-9
th
 centuries. Occasional instances of Qing 
use of Chaghatay language written in the sacred Arabic script, official patronage to build the 
Sulayman mosque (also known as Emin‘s Minaret, Uy. Emin Munar, 伊敏塔 Yīmín t ) in 
Turfan (Millward and Newby 120), tax exemption on the property of religious endowments 
(waqf) or sporadic appointment of guardians of khojas‘ sacred shrines (Fletcher 1978a: 75) 
did not produce significant degree of legitimization of Qing rule through Islam. A more 
significant measure, by which the Qing could gain justification in the eyes of the Muslims, 
was the facilitating peace and prosperity, or so-called ‗rule of justice‘ (adalet; Kim 70). 
Overall, however, the Qing never managed to bridge the religious divide between the dynasty 
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and Muslims of Xinjiang who continuously perceived Qing heteronomy as domination by 
impure and inferior infidel pagans. In time of mismanagement and abuse of power by the 
exogenous ruling class, the religious issue immediately became a powerful factor pouring oil 
to the fire of revolt. After the fall of the empire, the exclusively Han administration in 
Republican Xinjiang was to be perceived in identically unflattering, yet essentially unalterable 
way. 
 
 In accordance with the principle of simultaneous statecraft, the Qing also introduced a 
different system of administration for the five ethnocultural entities (因俗而治 yīns  ér zh ; 
literally ‗rule in accordance with customary practice‘) of the empire. Manchus all over Qing 
empire were organized into banners (旗 qí), supplemented by Mongol and Han banners. 
Tribes of today‘s Inner and Outer Mongolia formed another type of banners (旗 qí). Inner 
China was to consist of eighteen provinces (省 shěng) controlled by governors-general and 
governors. In Tibet, the Qing ruled indirectly via local institutions under the supervision of a 
resident high official (Ma. amban; Ch. 大臣 d chén). Manchuria was to be conserved by 
proscription of Han immigration as an isolated sanctuary of Manchu culture. Some regions, 
e.g. tribal areas in the southwest or Kokonur, were also ruled indirectly through the late Song 
system of local chiefs (土司 t sī).7 An ingenious and sophisticated system of segregation and 
stratification of various ethnic and social groups was instituted, which was palpable in 
virtually all spheres of Qing life. Many elements of this ‗Manchu apartheid‘ originated in Liao 
(遼, 907-1125), Jin (金, 1115-1234) and Yuan practice. This system of rule provided for some 
autonomy of local affairs in frontier areas, while simultaneously instituting distinction and 
separation between the conqueror and conquered and upholding ‗ethnic sovereignty‘ (組群主
權 z q n zh quán) of a conquest elite ‗essential to the vitality of all Inner Asian dynasties‘ 
(Elliott 6, 98-116, 197-216). At the same time, it was these divisive policies that ‗stimulated 
social, cultural, and economic changes in the peripheries that encouraged the growth of ethnic 
identities… Under the Qing rule, the focus of primary identities had begun to shift from tribal 
units to larger social groups‘ (Rawski 301). In similar words, it was argued that negotiation of 
identity in the Qing period shifted from cultural via racial to ethnic arena (Crossley 1990: 8). 
Regardless of particular wording, this chapter will illustrate that the trend was highly 
significant for the rise of modern Uyghur ethnicity and nationalism.  
 
 As in other parts of the empire, the Qing instituted principles of indirect rule and social 
division into Xinjiang. The whole territory turned into a military agency (軍府 jūnf ) and the 
General of Ili (伊犁將軍 Yīlí ji ngjūn) acted as the highest-ranking official for the whole 
territory. Xinjiang was partitioned into three administrative units. Zungharia was named the 
Circuit to the North of Tianshan (天山北路 Ti nsh n běil , also called Northern Circuit), 
oases along the Tarim Basin were called Circuit to the South of Tianshan (天山南路 
Ti nsh n nánl , also known as Southern Circuit or Eight Cities of the Southern Circuit 南路
八城 Nánl  b chéng) and the area from today‘s Urumchi to Komul and Bariköl was called 
Circuit to the East of Tianshan (天山東路 Ti nsh n d ngl , also called Eastern Circuit). All 
three divisions were subordinate to the General of Ili in military matters; he was also the 
                                                 
7
 Until the establishment of Zongli Yamen (總理衙門 Zǒnglǐ yámén) in 1861, relations of the Manchu 
court with rulers and elites of territories located to the north and northwest (such as of today‘s 
Mongolia, Tibet, Xinjiang and also Russia) were under the jurisdiction of Court of Colonial Affairs 
(理藩院 Lǐf n yu n), whereas tributary relations with vassals from east to southwest were managed by 
the Board of Rites (禮部 Lǐb ; Di Cosmo 354-62).  
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highest authority in civil matters for Northern Circuit. Manchu population of the Northern and 
Eastern Circuit was divided into banners. The civilians of Eastern Circuit fell under 
jurisdiction of the governor of Gansu province. Turfan was the only oasis in Seven Cities 
which had its population divided into banners (Perdue 332), while the rulers of Turfan, Komul 
and Lükchün were awarded Qing titles jasak junwang (札薩克郡王 zhás kè jūnwáng) or 
wang (王 wáng) for their merits to the Qing conquest. As mentioned above, the Qing also 
revived the practice of ‗reclaiming land while protecting the frontier‘ (屯墾戍邊 t nkěn 
sh bi n), another expression for founding military-agricultural colonies (屯田 t ntián). In the 
Northern and Eastern Circuit, there existed military colonies (兵屯 bīngt n, 軍屯 jūnt n), 
civilian colonies of immigrants from the interior (戶屯 h t n, 民屯 mínt n), colonies of 
Seven Cities‘ Muslims resettled to the Northern Circuit (囘屯 huít n) and convict colonies 
(遣屯 qi nt n, 犯屯 f nt n). After 1931, the Han were permitted to establish colonies also in 
the Southern Circuit. Han immigrant population of Northern and Southern Circuits was 
administered by magistrates in a system identical to interior China. The remaining non-
colonist population of Xinjiang was also segregated into separate residences – bannermen (旗
人 qírén) and Han (漢人 H nrén) population usually occupied two distinct parts of a newly 
founded municipality called customarily the New City, whereas the original city inhabited by 
local Muslims started to be called the Old City. The Old and New cities often lay kilometers 
apart (Kim 15-7; Di Cosmo 352-3; Millward and Newby 118-23). 
 
 The elements of Qing indirect rule were best evident in the administration of the 
Southern Circuit. The Qing allowed for a substantial degree of autonomy in the initial period 
of their rule. There was no military deployment due to the fact that oases along the brink of 
the Tarim Basin could not support increased population. The Qing also adopted previous 
Zunghar practice and vested all the power on lower levels to indigenous hereditary ruling 
class, begs, thus creating so-called beg system ( 伯 克 制  bókè zh ). There existed 
approximately thirty-five different beg titles, such as the ‗governor of a district‘ (hakim beg), 
‗assistant to the governor‘ (ishikagha beg), ‗treasurer‘ (khazanachi beg) or ‗administrator of 
irrigation and water distribution‘ (mirab beg). Begs were incorporated into the official ranking 
system (品級  pǐnjí) by being granted ranks three to seven. They were also entitled to 
cultivated land, people to work on it, stipends, right to present tribute to the emperor and to 
trade at the border with China proper or in the capital, privilege to braid their hair into a queue, 
wear Qing official attire and prostrate themselves in front of the emperor. Furthermore, the 
Qing also relied on semi-official category of functionaries called ‗heads‘ (bash). Their 
principal task was to assist begs in tax collection – there was the ‗head of a thousand 
households‘ (mingbashi), a ‗head of a hundred households‘ (yüzbashi) or a ‗supervisor of 
agriculture‘ (kökbashi). Apart from that, there were numerous other minor officials, such as 
interpreters (tungchi), couriers (chekchi) or scribes (bichikchi). Finally, the Qing also left the 
system of Muslim religious administration intact. Local educated clerisy („ulama) remained in 
charge of educational and some judicial matters that were decided according to Islamic law 
(shari‟a; Kim 12-4; Newby 1998: 282-4). 
 
 On the one hand, the described pattern of indirect rule allowed for considerable 
autonomy of local affairs and secured tolerance for the Qing domination by the indigenous 
Muslims and vice versa. Along with Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans and the Han, Muslims of 
Seven Cities were considered one the five legitimate constituencies of the empire. 
Immediately after the conquest, the Qing administration dropped the derogative denomination 
of Muslims (character 囘 written with the dog radical; Millward 1998: 194). From then on, 
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Muslims were called in politically correct terms Huimin (囘民 Huímín) or Huizi (囘子 Huízi, 
both meaning ‗Muslim‘).
8
 In its initial stage until early nineteenth century, Qing ‗steppe 
imperialism with Chinese characteristics‘ in Xinjiang did not thus simply promote Chinese 
political and cultural forms for their own sake, nor did it sought to assimilate Xinjiang 
population (Millward and Newby 114-7). The result was a sort of pax Manjurica that availed 
Xinjiang with relative stability and prosperity during the initial sixty-year period after the 
conquest (Fletcher 1968: 220; Millward 1998: 248). 
 
 On the other hand, the complex plethora of indirect rule relationships turned into a 
potent destabilizing factor at the turn of 1820s and 1830s, when descendants of Heptapolis 
khojas exiled in neighboring Khoqand khanate staged several incursions into southwestern 
Xinjiang and challenged Qing authority. After reestablishing their rule, the Qing started 
distrusting local Muslims, reevaluated their universalist ethnic policy vis-à-vis Muslims and 
united their interests with Han settlers. Notably, by allowing establishment of Han civilian 
colonies in Southern Circuit, the Qing took first steps towards closer incorporation of 
Xinjiang into the empire by the means of altering demographic makeup of the region. 
Furthermore, the economic situation in Xinjiang worsened dramatically after a series of 
events in the interior – outbreak of natural disasters in the 1840s and uprisings in 1850s. The 
repercussions for Xinjiang were reduced fiscal subsidy from the central government and 
increased taxation (Millward 1998: 225; Kim 30), which were accompanied by arbitrary 
extortion and rampant corruption of Qing officials and begs. These developments severely 
alienated local Muslims from the Qing administration. The region started brewing with 
trouble that materialized in the outbreak of so-called khoja rebellion in 1864 in Kucha, an 
important oasis on the northern rim of the Tarim Basin. 
 
Life and Works of Molla Musa Sayrami 
 
 The Introduction to this dissertation pointed to problems with the primordializing 
reconstruction of modern collective, particularly national and ethnic, identities into 
pre-modern past, and with the anachronizing projection of modern ethnonyms onto historical 
communities. On the other hand, to argue that in pre-modern era, the populace of what we 
today call Xinjiang had no sense of belonging together, could be also misleading. The 
remaining part of this chapter seeks to address the question of existence, or absence, of late 
Qing period Xinjiang Muslims‘ perceptions of communal identity and interest by examining 
indigenous primary sources. The most authoritative source for such probe is T rīkh-i Hamīdī, 
a history of 1864 anti-Qing rebellion in Kucha and subsequent domination of entire Xinjiang 
by Khoqandi warlord and adventurer Ya‘qup Beg in 1865-77, written by Molla Musa Sayrami 
in 1908. 
 
 The scarce information available today on Molla Musa Sayrami is mainly a result of 
long-time research by contemporary Xinjiang Kyrgyz historian Enwer Baytur. According to 
Baytur, Molla Musa Sayrami was probably born on August 23, 1836, in Sayram near Aksu
9
 
as the first son of a wealthy and educated landowner and religious scholar Molla Eysa khoja. 
                                                 
8
 Sometimes the disrespectful term ‗Turban-head Muslim‘ (纏頭囘 Chántóu huí, 纏頭 Chántóu or 纏
囘 Chánhuí) was also used. This label refers to white headscarves (selle, 散蘭 s nlán) worn by 
Muslims of high religious status or older age. 
9
 Sayram is located in today‘s Toghayli neighborhood (mehelle), Anaqiz village (kent), Toqsun 
Township (yéza), Bay County (nahiye), Aqsu Prefecture (wilayet). 
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Musa attended the Sayram madrasa
10
 from the age of seven. Owing to his outstanding 
learning skills and beautiful handwriting, Musa soon became known as the ‗Baby Scholar‘ 
(Bala Molla) or ‗Musa the Scholar‘ (Molla Musa). From 1847, Musa continued education at 
the Saqsaq madrasa in Kucha, one of the most prominent educational facilities in the Seven 
Cities Region at the time. At the Saqsaq, Molla Musa received complete classical training in 
Qur‘an and hadith,
11
 history, literature, calendar drafting, astronomy, grammar, mathematics, 
agricultural science, Arabic, Persian, Urdu and other subjects. By reading the classics of the 
Turko-Islamic milieu, Molla Musa also indirectly acquainted himself with Greek and Roman 
authors. He returned to Sayram in 1854 and became a senior teacher at the Sayram madrasa. 
After an uprising broke out in Kucha on June 6, 1864, and rebel forces advanced westwards in 
the direction of Aksu and Kashgar, Molla Musa became commander of a rebel unit composed 
of his students, peasants and craftsmen. Later, he became a senior officer in the Üchturpan 
area and functioned as an advisor to several higher commanders. He also served in Ya‘qup 
Beg‘s administration during his control of Xinjiang (1865 - 1877). After the Qing reconquest 
(1878), Molla Musa travelled widely for several years throughout the whole territory of Seven 
Cities in order to collect sources for a history of the preceding events. In 1879, he settled in 
Aksu and began his career of a historian and a poet. He lived in dire poverty and when his fell 
ill in March, 1917, his relatives transported him on a donkey cart back to his hometown 
Sayram where he passed away in April, 1917. A domed tomb with blue tiles and a mosque, 
which were built at the site of his burial within three months after his death, were destroyed 
during the Cultural Revolution in 1967 (Sayrami 1998: 3-11; Ömer 1321-8; Ekhmidi 279-83). 
 
Molla Musa Sayrami wrote the overwhelming majority of his works between 1879 and 
1917. In Qeside-i Sidiq (1903), he describes contemporary social life through peculiar images 
seen by a fictional character called Sidiq. His other literary works include Diwan Mesnewi 
(Compendium of Masnawi, 1907), Ghezeliyat (Ghazels) and Ferhad we Shirin (Ferhad we 
Shirin). However, it is Sayrami‘s historical works that are regarded as highly significant, and 
it is mainly owing to his innovative methodology of combining thorough textual research with 
extensive fieldwork that Sayrami is considered a superb historian and one of the founders of 
the modern Uyghur literature. Sayrami also often included large pieces of oral history and 
folklore into his texts. This approach is exemplified by Tadhkirat-ul Ewliya fi Muftah-ul Iman 
(Biografies of Holy Men; 1885) and Tadhkira-i Eshabul Kehif (Biography of Eshabul Kehif; 
1898). Both of these works narrate the expansion of Islam into the region of Seven Cities, list 
biographies of most important saints and describe their sacred shrines and burial sites. At the 
same time, they refute some of the false contemporary beliefs and rumors about the expansion 
of Islam in the Seven Cities region disseminated by texts such as Tadhkira-i Sultan Qurmish 
(Biography of Sultan Qurmish). Molla Musa Sayrami‘s other historical works include 
Salamname (1916) and Tadhkira-i Khoja Afaq (Biography of Apaq Khoja). Several other 
anonymous texts are attributed to him (Sayrami 1998: 3-11; Ömer 1321-8; Ekhmidi 279-83). 
 
Another important approach of Sayrami is well perceptible in the T rīkh-i Hamīdī 
(History of Hamid). Sayrami took part in the Kucha rebellion of 1864 and then served for over 
ten years as an official in the Ya‘qup Beg administration (1865-1878). In T rīkh-i Hamīdī, a 
record of these tumultuous events, the historical methods Sayrami had used previously are 
supplemented by the priceless fact that he had been a direct participant and an eye-witness to 
the historical events he later described. He also made use of extensive interviewing many 
                                                 
10
 Madrasa was Islamic institution of secondary learning. For more information on Islamic education, 
see Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
11
 Al-hadith – actions and statements traditionally attributed to the Prophet and regarded an important 
instrument of Islamic jurisprudence. 
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other participants and witnesses of the events. As a result, the work is marked by rigorous 
impartiality and broadness of opinion. This approach makes T rīkh-i Hamīdī a uniquely 
valuable historical source unmatched by any other contemporary text.
12
 Kim Hodong, who 
extensively drew on T rīkh-i Hamīdī in his brilliantly researched analysis of the khoja 
rebellion and Ya‘qup Beg‘s incursion, aptly calls Molla Musa Sayrami ‗one of the best 
historians that Central Asia has ever produced‘ (Kim xvi), while the T rīkh-i Hamīdī itself has 
been called ‗cornerstone of modern Uyghur historiography‘ (Tursun 88). The text of T rīkh-i 
Hamīdī is also the initial source of research in modern Uyghur national consciousness in this 
dissertation. 
 
The predecessor to T rīkh-i Hamīdī, the T rīkh-i Amniyya (History of Peace), was 
written by Sayrami in 1903 and printed in the Medrise-i Ulum printing house in Kazan, 
Tatarstan, in 1904. As it was Sayrami‘s only work to be printed, T rīkh-i Amniyya became 
widely distributed in the Seven Cities region. Its title referred to the fact that from the Qing 
reconquest of Xinjiang (1878) until the time of writing, ‗enmity, hatred and turmoil ended 
and peace and tranquility prevailed‟ in Seven Cities (Sayrami 2000: 6). Eventually, Sayrami 
corrected and substantially expanded T rīkh-i Amniyya and rewrote it as T rīkh-i Hamīdī. The 
new work was finished in 1908, and circulated only in the manuscript form. Sayrami 
specifically stated the purpose of writing T rīkh-i Hamīdī: to record the events of war and the 
following insurgent administration so that they are not forgotten by in the future. He also 
mentioned that history is an invaluable discipline of science and that the very act of recording 
events of holy war against infidels engenders God‘s appreciation and causes ordinary people 
to remember the occurrences of the time. Finally, Sayrami‘s choice of title of T rīkh-i Hamīdī 
also stressed the need for ordinary people to be aware of high political affairs of their time 
(Sayrami 1988: 33-5, 40). 
 
In choosing the title of the text, Sayrami alluded to the work of the influential Sayyidid 
historian Mirza Muhammad Haydar (1499-1551). Haydar wrote his extensive historical work 
between 1541 and 1546 and named it T rīkh-i Rashīdī in commemoration of Abdulreshid 
Khan (1533-1570), the ruler of the Yarkend-based Seyyidid dynasty (1514-1680) who was 
then in power.
13
 Similarly, Sayrami dedicated his T rīkh-i Hamīdī to the Ottoman Sultan 
Abdülhamid II (1876-1909), whom he calls ‗the Supporter and Sustainer of Muslims in our 
epoch‘ (Sayrami 1988: 39).
14
 Both, T rīkh-i Amniyya and T rīkh-i Hamīdī are structurally 
similar. However, T rīkh-i Hamīdī contains a far larger amount of information based on a 
more thorough research. Therefore, of the two texts it is the T rīkh-i Hamīdī, which is 
considered a more valuable historical source and a monumental work of scholarship. The 
presently existing translation of T rīkh-i Amniyya from Chaghatay into modern Uyghur is 
based on the Kazan edition (Sayrami 2000: 2). Enver Baytur‘s transcription of T rīkh-i 
Hamīdī from Chaghatay, upon which is this chapter based, was made from a manuscript, 
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 Other historical works on this period include Jang-nam  (Book of War) by Umīdī, Ghuljaning 
Waqī‟atlarining Bäy ni (Story of Ghulja Events) by Qāsim Beg, Ghaz t al-Muslimīn (Holy War of the 
Muslims) by Muhammad Sālih Yārkendī, Ghaz t dar Mulk-i Chīn (Holy War in China) by Mullā Bilāl, 
Zafar-n ma (Book of Victory) by Mullā Shaqīr and T rikh-i n ma-i Ya‟qūb Kh n (History of Yaqub 
Khan) by Mahmud Shaykh Gharīb (Sayrami 1988: 4; Kim 263-266). 
13
 Mirza Muhammad Haydar binni Mirza Muhammad Muhammad Hüseyin Dughlatī (1499-1551) was 
an official at the Seyyidid court. His T rīkh-i Rashīdī combines personal memoir with account of the 
history of Turkic tribes, mainly the Dughlat, from the mid-14
th
 century until 1546 (Elias 1895). 
14
 Under Abdülhamid II, pan-Islamism became an official policy of the Ottoman Empire. For more on 
the theme of pan-Islamism, see Chapter 6 of this dissertation.  
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which was copied by Sayrami himself in 1911 and is presently kept by the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences (Sayrami 1988: 1). 
 
The main content of T rīkh-i Hamīdī is divided into four parts. In the ‗Introduction‘ 
(Muqeddime Iptidasi), Sayrami recounts mythical past by narrating legendary origins of the 
world and humanity, the origins of Turkic tribes, their conversion to Islam and other 
legendary events. He then proceeds to description of historical past of the Seven Cities region 
and surrounding areas since the moment of Chinggis Khan‘s birth, rule and conquest. The 
narrative also covers further partition of Chinggis Khan‘s empire and rule of his descendants, 
the establishment of the Dughlat tribe as the ruling elite in Moghulistan, the Seyyidid dynasty, 
the rule of the Makhdumzade khojas before the Qing conquest and the period of Qing control 
until 1864. In this part, genealogies of local ruling elites are a strong concern of the narrative. 
The following part, the so-called ‗Former Epic‘ (Awalqi Dastan), accounts the Kucha uprising 
led by religious aristocracy, the so-called khojas, which quickly spread to other parts of Seven 
Cities. The ‗Second Epic‘ (Ikkinci Dastan) documents the invasion of Ya‘qup Beg into the 
Seven Cities region, his subjugation of the khojas and other rebel regimes, his rule over Seven 
Cities in 1865-1877 and reconquest of Xinjiang by the Qing in 1877. The ‗Conclusion‘ 
(Khatime) consists of brief description of each of the Seven Cities, typical characteristics of 
their inhabitants and important local pilgrimage sites and places of worship. Contents of the 
previously mentioned texts Tadhkirat-ul Ewliya fi Muftah-ul Iman and Tadhkira-i Eshabul 
Kehif are also included in the Conclusion. 
 
Boundaries of Ethnicity in Tārīkh-i Hamīdī 
 
 Sayrami‘s T rīkh-i Hamīdī provides a fairly detailed picture of the perception of 
communal identity and interest of the inhabitants of Heptapolis as perceived by an indigenous 
elite intellectual at the end of pre-modern era. For an introductory example, it is useful to refer 
to the following passage which is highly typical of the whole text in terms of vocabulary used 
to label various groups residing in Seven Cities, as well as in terms of author‘s general 
understanding of communal identity and interest: 
 
‗…The city of Kucha revolted. Khoja Ishaq Khan Khojam was enthroned and had the 
sword of Islam publicly applied to the infidels‘ (kapir) throats. The pleasing news 
and grand celebrations of these events spread to all directions throughout the Seven 
Cities region to those with power (wali) and to commoners (ahale). As a result, 
Muslims (Musulman) and Tungans (Tungani) in every city united for the purpose and 
delight of drinking the nectar of Islam and applying the sword to the necks of cruel 
infidels (zalim kapir). After Kucha, the Tungans and Taranchis (Taranchi) of Seven 
Cities in Ili became rid of subjection to the infidels and made the scholar (elem) 
Shewket Akhun their leader and sovereign. He was a very virtuous and pious man. 
Then, even the people (ehl) of Khotan slipped from the hands of the Chinese (Khitay). 
The people (khelq) of Yarkend and Kashgar also severed the thread of submission 
and servitude. Because Kucha stands like a gate to the other six cities, thus, when the 
soldiers from the interior (Bijin) came and were not able to raid Kucha, they were 
also not able to proceed anywhere else. People (adem) in Seven Cities were aware of 
this and revolted in one city after another. Everywhere, they chose a military 
commander and another person to whom they submitted, thus establishing state 




                                                 
15
 If not stated otherwise, terms and passages throughout this dissertation were translated by Ondřej 
Klimeš. 
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 In the passage, Sayrami uses two types of labels used to denote communities residing 
in Seven Cities at the time. The first type distinguishes in a very clear manner between and 
among communities according to several criteria. When defining these communities, it is 
useful to refer to definition of ethnic identity employed by Fredrik Barth. According to this 
perspective, it is the ethnic boundary itself that constitutes the most significant marker of 
ethnic identity of a particular group, and not the cultural substance enclosed within the 
boundary (Barth 15). In other words, an ethnic group is distinct because and by what it differs 
from other ethnic groups rather than because it bears certain characteristics. Notably, Barth 
uses the term boundary in a sense of a social boundary, not a territorial one. For the purpose 
of analysis of communal consciousness of inhabitants of the Seven Cities region, it is initially 
possible to apply Barth‘s social boundary approach to three main constituents of their identity 
– religion, descent and mode of life. 
 
 Religion was arguably the most prominent identity marker of the residents of 
Heptapolis at the end of the Qing dynasty. The key autonym, which resounds throughout the 
whole text of T rīkh-i Hamīdī, is Musulman, meaning ‗Muslim.‘ This loanword from Arabic 
denotes identity based on the religion its bearer follows. Indeed, Islam and related cultural and 
social practices were factors sharply differentiating the Musulman from ‗infidels‘ (kapir, e.g. 
Sayrami 1988: 262) or ‗polytheists‘ (mushrik; e.g. Sayrami 1988: 263), which are terms also 
frequently used in T rīkh-i Hamīdī. The religious impurity of infidels is sometimes 
emphasized by further attribution of the term – ‗an infidel without religion‘ (dinsiz kapir, e.g. 
Sayrami 1988: 185), nizamsiz kapir, ‗an infidel without moral principles‘ (e.g. Sayrami 1988: 
632) – or by other terminology, such as biseremjan, ‗a person in moral disorder‘ (ibid.). As 
the events related by Sayrami in both T rīkh-i Amniyya and T rīkh-i Hamīdī illustrate, Islam 
was the strongest element which at least temporarily unified the numerous rebelling and 
campaigning factions under the khojas‘ leadership during the Kucha uprising. This was partly 
caused by the fact that, unlike the conservative and corrupt clergy (Ar. „ulama) and begs, the 
khojas were the only indigenous elite group who retained credibility in the eyes of common 
Muslims of the Seven Cities region. In fact, due to their noble descent from the 
Makhdumzade ruling class and Moghul aristocracy, they possessed ‗a tremendous religious 
charisma‘ (Kim 14). The prominence of religion as a guiding principle of Musulman society is 
further evinced by strong religious overtones of T rīkh-i Hamīdī. Sayrami specifically stated 
that one of the reasons he wrote the account was his desire to fulfill a divine moral imperative. 
Throughout the text, Sayrami also frequently expresses his devotion to God and principles of 
religious piety, acknowledges God‘s guidance of worldly occurrences, hopes for God‘s 
counsel and assistance in writing and in numerous other ways demonstrates that he is proper 
Muslim. 
 
Sayrami commonly refers to the insurgency by the term ‗holy war‘ (ghazat; e.g. 
Sayrami 1988: 185). In a pattern common in the revered ‗Golden Age‘ of Islam during the 
rule of the four initial rulers of the Muslim realm (Hourani 22), after overthrowing the Qing 
administration the Kuchean khojas also adopted honorary titles that declared unity of political 
and religious power, such as Seyyid Ghazi Rashidin Khan Khojam (Honorable Holy Warrior 
Rashidin King Priest; e.g. Sayrami 1988: 197) or Khojam Padishah (Cleric-Ruler; e.g. 
Sayrami 1988: 233). As ascertained by Kim, the leader of the uprising, Rashidin Khan, was a 
descendant of respected Central Asian Sufi clan; similarly, the leaders of revolts in the other 
cities were mostly people of high religious status (Kim 61-6). Institution of local rebel 
regimes was often followed by vigorous promotion of Islamic practice – implementation of 
Islamic law (Ar. shari‟a), compulsory public prayer, construction of mosques etc. (e.g. 
Sayrami 1988: 208, 230). In the same way, after Ya‘qup Beg invaded Heptapolis, defeated the 
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khojas and declared a single Islamic realm, he appealed for support to the Ottoman Sultan 
Abdülaziz (ruled 1861-1876), who indeed did proclaim him the ‗Commander of the Faithful‘ 
(Ar. Amir al-Muminin), a title previously reserved to the ruler of all Muslims (caliph; Kim 
153). In turn, Ya‘qup Beg minted coins with Abdülaziz‘s name inscribed on them (Zhu 71). 
Both the Kuchean and Ya‘qup Beg‘s regimes had strong religious inclinations and resembled 
the Makhdumzade theocracy from before the Qing conquest. At the same time, Ya‘qup Beg‘s 
diplomatic efforts also reveal that he was very well aware of contemporary international 
politics and the changing nature of the imperial world order. Thus, Ya‘qup Beg‘s negotiations 
with Great Britain represented an effort to address the difficult position of his state between 
imperial China and czarist Russia (Kim 138-58). 
 
In practice, the term ‗infidel‘ as used by Sayrami in T rīkh-i Hamīdī is synonymous 
with the term Khitay meaning ‗Han Chinese.‘
16
 Their homeland was designated as Bijin 
(presumably from ‗Beijing‘ 北京), a term which in Sayrami‘s work denoted either the capital 
or the interior provinces of the Qing empire. Sayrami notices that the Han in Seven Cities 
were soldiers, administrative officials and merchants (e.g. Sayrami 1988: 262). The Han 
residing in whole Xinjiang at the time consisted of four main subgroups. First were members 
of Qing garrison, namely Green Standard troops ( 綠營  Lǜyíng; Millward 1998: 33), 
numbering approximately 12.000 in mid-eighteenth century (Kim 16). However, this force 
was composed of the Han and Chinese-speaking Muslims (ancestors of today‘s Hui 囘
nationality) in an unknown ratio. The other three subgroups were administrative officials 
(including the higher officials who were almost invariably Manchus and Mongols), merchants 
(who had established themselves in the region prior to Qing conquest and whose numbers 
swelled dramatically between 1759 and 1864, which made the Han, along with the Khoqandis, 
the most influential business circle in Xinjiang at the expense of indigenous Musulman 
businessmen; Millward 1998: 113-168) and settlers residing in civilian agricultural colonies. 
Thus, apart from being an object of holy war waged by Muslims against infidels, due to their 
privileged status the Han also personified the oppressive and invasive Qing domination in 
Xinjiang. These two factors often made the Han victims of brutal annihilation during the 
insurgency, which, after its initial outburst in Kucha, erupted practically simultaneously in all 
of the Seven Cities. T rīkh-i Hamīdī contains numerous descriptions of horrid atrocities 
committed by revolting Muslims. 
 
Notably, Sayrami does not use the term Manchu in his text description of the khojas-
Ya‘qup Beg insurgency. This might be due to weakening Manchu occupational and language 
identity already by early eighteenth century (Elliott 278-9, 294). In fact, Manchus constituted 
76,6% of 619 high officials serving in Xinjiang before 1884 and there were approximately 
12.000 Manchu bannermen deployed in Xinjiang in mid-eighteenth century (Kim 16). 
Similarly, Sayrami disregards several other groups living in north Xinjiang, e.g. the Shiwe 
and the Daghur who were moved to Xinjiang from today‘s Manchuria in order to protect the 
border and quell uprisings. Thus, the term Khitay as used by Sayrami could have actually 
                                                 
16
 According to Baytur, the name Khitay comes from the ethnonym Kitan, an ethnic group who 
constituted the main element of the Liao dynasty (遼, 907-1125). After its devastation by the Mongols, 
the Kitans migrated west and founded the Kara-Khitay empire (西遼 Xi Liao, 1124-1218) in Central 
Asia. During their reign over China (1271-1378), Mongols used the term Khitay to denote northern 
China and northern Han population (the corresponding Chinese term being 漢人 H nrén), whereas 
southern China and southern Han population were classified as Chin (南人 Nánrén; Sayrami 1988: 
722-3). 
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included several disparate ethnic elements clearly perceived by the indigenous Musulman as a 
homogenous group of infidel intruders. 
 
Sayrami further distinguishes two other indigenous non-Musulman ethnic 
communities that fall under the category of infidel. The first were the Qalmaq (e.g. Sayrami 
1988: 200). These were the Torghut Mongols who in late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries migrated from today‘s eastern Zungharia westwards to escape Khalkha and Zunghar 
expansion. They settled north of the Caspian Sea, where they indeed came to be called 
Kalmyks. However, in 1771 about 70.000 Kalmyks came back to the Qing, seeking refuge 
from the Russian taxes. They were permitted resettlement in Zungharia and eastern part of 
Southern Circuit of Xinjiang (Millward 2001: 91-2). The second group recognized by 
Sayrame, the Solon (e.g. Sayrami 1988: 199), was a Manchu tribal formation resettled from 
the Heilongjiang province. Finallly, Sayrami also designates as infidels the foreign nationals 
of Caucasian origin, namely the Urus (‗Russians,‘ e.g. Sayrami 1988: 324), and the Fereng 
(from Arabic, originally the word Franc, meaning ‗Westerners‘; ibid.). 
 
Importantly for this research, besides religious identity of its bearer the term 
Musulman also conveyed several other patterns of self-identification by the Heptapolis 
population. These covert connotation become clear as the term Musulman is juxtaposed with 
other names applied by Sayrami to communities residing in Seven Cities. First, we can infer 
that the term Musulman means Turkic Muslim. There were numerous other Islamic 
communities living in the region, which Sayrami identified by distinct terms. The most 
prominent of these were the Tungani,
17
 Chinese-speaking Muslims or Tungans, ancestors of 
today‘s Hui. Similarly to the Han, the Hui were present in the region already at the moment of 
Qing annexation of Seven Cities (Millward 1998: 113). In Qing sources, they are generally 
not considered a separate ethnic category, and are included into the Han under terms 
‗Han-Muslim‘ (漢回 H nhuí) and ‗interior Muslim‘ (内地回民 nèid  Huímín). Therefore, 
similarly to the Han population, their exact number in Xinjiang at that time is not certain. As 
mentioned above, after the conquest, the Hui formed an unknown portion of the 12.000-strong 
Green Standard troops stationed in Xinjiang and lived in agricultural colonies in Eastern 
Circuit and Zungharia. In the Seven Cities region, they formed sizable military and merchant 
communities in Urumchi and Yarkend (Kim 41-6). Apart from residing in agricultural 
colonies, Tungans also made living by activities related to supplying the Qing garrison. In fact, 
Qing conquest of Xinjiang availed Tungans of the opportunity to escape strained living 
conditions in Gansu (Lipman 94-5). 
 
During the khoja-Ya‘qup Beg insurgency, Tungans were second most powerful 
element in the Kucha insurgency. In reality, it appears that with the exception of Khotan, it 
was Tungans who started the rebellion in each of the Seven Cites (Kim 37-57). The 
Musulman and Tungans were capable of forming a military alliance, such as during the 
outbreak of the khoja rebellion in Kucha (Sayrami 1988: 182-83) or joint attack of both 
groups on Urumchi (Sayrami 1988: 277). However, generally there was strong distrust 
between the two groups that frequently resulted in bitter animosity, such as when the Tungans 
controlled Yarkend (Sayrami 1988: 219). Occasionally, even Tungans‘ adherence to Islam 
was disputed by the Musulman, who perceived the Tungans as equally ‗infidel‘ as the Han 
                                                 
17
 There are several theories on the origin of the name Tungan. Some Tungans in today‘s Xinjiang are 
convinced that it reflects their alleged origin in eastern Gansu province (Dōnggān 東干; field research, 
Xinjiang 2000). For other theories, see e.g. Dyer 1977.  
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and indiscriminately massacred both groups, such as during the revolt in Khotan (Sayrami 
1988: 380). 
 
 Apart from the Tungans, Sayrami identifies other communities adherent to Islam in 
Heptapolis. The above excerpt takes note of the Taranchi,
18
 the descendants of a disputed 
number of Turkic Muslim, or in other words Musulman, families from Seven Cities first 
resettled to Zungharia by the Zunghars in the beginning of seventeenth century (Kim 52) and 
then in larger numbers shortly after the Qing conquest (Millward 1998: 50). The purpose of 
the resettlement was to engage the Turkic Muslims in farming and soil cultivation, which 
were skills in high demand north of the Tianshan due to mostly pastoral nature of local 
economy, and after the region was depopulated by decimation of Zunghars. Other Islamic 
communities residing in Seven Cities recognized by Sayrami are the Hindi, Muslims from 
India (e.g. Sayrami 1988: 641), the Keshmiri (ibid.), the Afghani (ibid.) and the Bedekhshi, 
‗Badakhshanis‘ (ibid.). Sayrami is further aware of the existence of the Ereb, ‗Arabs‘ (e.g. 
Sayrami 1988: 43), the Ejem ‗Persians‘ (ibid.) and the Tajik (e.g. Sayrami 1988: 188). Thus, 
the use of the term Musulman as contrastive to Tungan, Taranchi and other Muslim groups 
emphasizes the Turkic origin of the inhabitants of Seven Cities. 
 
 Further, the term Musulman clearly denotes sedentary population of Seven Cities. 
Other Islamic groups native to the region were the Qyrghyz (Kyrgyz; e.g. Sayrami 1988: 211) 
and the Qazaq (Kazakh; e.g. Sayrami 1988: 264). These nomadic tribal formations were 
clearly differentiated by Sayrami from the majority (sedentary and agriculturalist) population 
of sedentary Musulman owing to their different (nomadic and pastoral) mode of life. Finally, 
the term Musulman pointed to the indigenous population of Seven Cities. During his rule over 
Seven Cities, Ya‘qup Beg relied predominantly on his own Muslim troops brought from 
Khoqand, which were, in perception of Sayrami, composed of two main elements. Apart from 
the nomadic Qipchaq (Kipchak; e.g. Sayrami 1988: 215), it was the Turkic sedentary 
population of Khoqand, which was a community very similar to the Musulman of Heptapolis 
in terms of religion, culture, history and other characteristics. However, the Musulman of 
Seven Cities viewed the newcomers as a distinct and alien group and called them Enjanliq, an 
‗Andijani‘ (e.g. Sayrami 1988: 224). This sharp distinction was exacerbated by the Andijanis‘ 
higher social and economical status, namely commercial and tax privileges granted by the 
Qing even prior to the rebellion, as well as by the fact that high posts in Ya‘qup Beg‘s 
military and administration were also held by Andijanis (Kim 106-7). The entrée of Ya‘qup 
Beg, who was himself also a Muslim from Andijan, into the Seven Cities region is by 
Sayrami often referred to as ‗occupation‘ or ‗raid‘ (istila; e.g. Sayrami 31). 
 
Dynamics of Accord 
 
In short, building on Barth‘s boundary approach makes it possible to determine that 
Sayrami‘s term Musulman, when posited contrastively to labels denoting other communities 
of Qing Xinjiang, pointed specifically to sedentary Turkic Muslims indigenous to Seven Cities. 
In other words, apart from religious identity, the collective name Musulman also distinguishes 
its bearer according to descent, mode of life and place of residence. Judging by the text as 
well as by factual unfolding of the insurgency, the boundary of the Musulman group was 
delineated quite firmly – the Musulman were clearly aware that they belonged into their 
                                                 
18
 One theory traces the origin of the name Taranchi to the Chaghatay word taranchi, meaning 
‗farmer‘ (Millward 1998: 271). Uyghurs today believe the term comes from the Uyghur word térimchi, 
meaning ‗harvester.‘ (Field research, Xinjiang 2004). 
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community, and not to another. This assumption is confirmed when we expand method of 
analysis from the boundary focus to examination of the cultural substance enclosed within the 
boundary set by the name Musulman, or in other words when we explore the dynamics of 
accord, which cemented notions of communal identity as felt by the Musulman.  
 
Perhaps the most evident example of the notion of common Musulman identity is 
Sayrami‘s use of the toponym Yette Sheher (from Turkic and Persian), meaning ‗Seven 
Cities‘, the ‗Heptapolis.‘ Ildikó Bellér-Hann remarks that while the term Seven Cities itself is 
very suitable because it conveys the reality of both difference and similarity of the individual 
cities, it tends to emphasize ‗if not exactly territorial unity, at least features that these 
settlements had in common‘ (Bellér-Hann 39-40). Administrative unification and other Qing 
measures seeking to run Xinjiang as a single polity had their predecessors in past 
homogenization patterns, such as Turkicization starting in the ninth century, Islamization 
starting in the tenth century or subjugation of the whole area by the Zunghars in the 
seventeenth century. But it was only after the Qing annexation in 1759 that the previously 
rather loosely bound poleis of the Tarim Basin were forged into a single administrative unit 
and the seven respective cities turned into a factual ‗Heptapolis,‘ a translation of Yette Sheher 
which would be perhaps more suitable than the term ‗Seven Cities.‘ Even though the local 
power rested in the hands of begs who were appointed for each city separately and enjoyed a 
high degree of local autonomy in their action, Sayrami understood the overall political and 
social situation in Seven Cities under the Qing as a single phenomenon. Events taking place in 
Turfan-Komul-Barköl and Ili region were included by Sayrami into his description of the 
insurgency, although these regions were part of Eastern and Northern Circuit respectively. 
Evidently, in Sayrami‘s perception the Musulman and Taranchi population of Xinjiang 
formed a group with common religious, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, occupational and other 
characteristics.  
 
The factual unfolding of the insurgency also testifies to a considerable strength of 
notions of common identity of the Musulman of the Seven Cities region. After the practically 
simultaneous outbreak of revolts in all of the Seven Cities, as well as in Ili, the local rebels 
established largely autonomous rebel regimes in each city. However, the Kuchean khojas 
almost immediately campaigned against the other cities in order to bring them under unified 
Kuchean administration. Similarly, the Musulman often fiercely resisted Ya‘qup Beg‘s 
invasion because they perceived it as an occupation by an alien force. Similarly, after Ya‘qup 
Beg conquered southern and eastern Xinjiang,
 19
 he turned the territory into a single polity 
united under centralized administration system and military command. 
 
Sayrami‘s focus on cohesiveness of the Musulman community is further testified by 
the description of the individual cities given in the Conclusion to T rīkh-i Hamīdī. Sayrami 
specifically lists Kashgar, Yarkend, Khotan, Aksu, Üchturpan, Kucha and Turfan as the 
respective seven cities
20
 and describes typical traits of the people living in each city. We can 
for example learn that Kashgar cannot be competed with in terms of skillfulness of local 
craftsmen, knowledge of scholars and trading abilities of merchants – for this reason, Kashgar 
is nicknamed ‗second Bukhara‘ (Sayrami 1988: 639). People of Yarkend are known to respect 
travelers on journey, but travel rarely themselves (Sayrami 1988: 641). Similarly, people of 
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 Northern Circuit, i.e. the Ili Valley reaching to Lake Balkhash, was annexed by Russia in 1870. Its 
eastern part was returned to the Qing after conclusion of the Treaty of St. Petersburg in 1881. 
20
 There are several variants of list of the seven cities of the Heptapolis (for a useful summary, see 
Bellér-Hann 39). A large portion of Western scholarship refers to the region by the name Altisheher, 
Six Cites (e.g. Millward 1998), a term neither used nor mentioned by Sayrami.  
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Khotan are extraordinarily stingy (Sayrami 1988: 642), people of Kucha have reasonable 
intellectual and manual capabilities but are not too happy about outsiders coming to the city 
(Sayrami 1988: 659), people of Turfan are honest, sincere and know no treachery (Sayrami 
1988: 660) etc. Notably, Sayrami interprets the special characteristics of people from 
respective cities as local dissimilarities within one entity. Another important attribute of 
common cultural identity of inhabitants of Heptapolis is the description of sacred tombs and 
burial sites (mazar) of Sufi saints, masters and patrons located in each city. These shrines 
constituted important identity sites and were visited and venerated by the Musulman of the 
whole Xinjiang (Sayrami 1988: 668; Bellér-Hann 349-50). In some cases, several pilgrimages 
to such local site could even be equivalent to one pilgrimage to Mecca, which is one of the 
pillars of Islamic practice. The mazar worship is a strong marker of Uyghur identity which 
retains its large significance until today (Dawut 2007). In short, Sayrami does not mention 
any local differences in culture, language or customs of the Musulman in respective oases and 
describes Heptapolis as a homogenous cultural realm with a common heritage and symbology 
of religion, language, political tradition, culture and other identity markers.  
 
Similarly, Sayrami‘s narrative of the early history of the Seven Cities region and its 
residents also tends to highlight the aspect of commonality. He sees Seven Cities as a region 
which has been culturally and religiously compact since the Islamization of Uyghuristan by 
Khizir Khoja, son of Tughluq Temür (ruled 1347-63; Sayrami 1988: 119). Sayrami even 
anachronistically refers to the region by the name ‗Seven Cities‘ when narrating the region‘s 
ancient myths and legends. Another term used by Sayrami throughout the text is Moghulistan, 
which is portrayed as a unitary realm located between Bariköl and Komul in the east, Lake 
Balkhash in the north, Ferghana valley in the west and the Karakorum Range in the south, 
which had been ruled by the Moghuls, descendants of Chinggis Khan (Sayrami 1988: 67-97, 
636-7). When recounting the myths of creation of man and Turkic peoples, Sayrami traces the 
genetic origins of all the inhabitants of Seven Cities to Moghul, who was a fifth-generation 
descendant of Türk, who was a son of Yapheth, who was a son of Prophet Noah, who was a 
son of Adam, the first human (Sayrami 1988: 41-46, 52-53). The conversion of Turkic 
peoples to Islam occurred during the life of Oghuz, grandson of Moghul (Sayrami 1988: 53-4). 
Thus, Sayrami views the inhabitants of the Seven Cities region as genetically related by 
having the same ancestry. 
 
The above expressions of the notion of communality of the sedentary Turkic followers 
of Islam indigenous to Seven Cities, as articulated in by Sayrami in T rīkh-i Hamīdī, 
articulated by Sayrami in T rīkh-i Hamīdī can be compared to several theories which point to 
the existence of pre-modern common proto-national identities, or in other words foundations 
of future nations. The above paragraphs demonstrated that the Musulman constituted a clearly 
defined community as understood by Barth‘s boundary approach. Further, Sayrami‘s 
perceptions of Musulman communal identity resemble some of the dimensions used by 
Anthony Smith to characterize an ethnic community (ethnie). In particular, the Musulman 
possessed common myth of descent (Oghuz-Moghul-Türk-Yapheth-Noah), shared history 
(the Moghul legacy), distinctive shared culture (no major differences among respective 
oasis-based identities), association with a specific territory (the Seven Cities region and 
northern Xinjiang) and, at least in the upper stratum of the society, a sense of solidarity 
(Sayrami‘s focus on common aspects of Musulman identity; Smith 1986: 22-31; Smith 2009: 
27). 
 
The above criteria even enable us to compare the Musulman to some definitions of a 
nation, which consider the fact of sharing certain characteristics by a group of individuals as a 
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decisive criterion of communal, or national, identity. In Sayrami‘s understanding, the 
Musulman definitely possessed memory of common past and were bound together by 
linguistic and cultural ties facilitating social communication easier within than beyond their 
group – one of criteria that define a nation according to Miroslav Hroch (Hroch 1996: 79). 
Ancient myths of common descent related by Sayrami are a basis for Musulmans‘ sense of 
kindredness or sameness, or in another words sense of belonging to a group resembling a 
nation (Connor 1984: xiv). Shared culture as a system of ideas, signs, associations and ways 
of behaving and communicating is one nation‘s characteristics as proposed by Ernst Gellner 
(Gellner 7). The spread of khoja-Yaqup Beg‘s insurgency signals the fact that the Musulman 
carried a certain imagined unity within geographical limits of Xinjiang – two traits of a nation 
according to Benedict Anderson (Anderson 7). Sayrami‘s emphasis on the notion of 
communal identity of the people of Seven Cities indicates his feeling of belonging to the 
community and willingness to be included in the group Musulman (Seton-Watson 5; 
Anderson 6; Connor 1978: 156; Barth 15).  
 
In the same way, the khoja-Ya‘qup Beg insurgency also bears some traits of emerging 
national movement. Some factors behind the outbreak of the rebellion remind of John 
Breuilly‘s definition of mobilization and urban communal conflict – the Muslims of Seven 
Cities rebelled because they were subject to imperial rule and domination by new indigenous 
ruling elite (begs). Also, the immigrant Han and autochthonous Turkic Muslim merchants and 
settlers, or in another words two groups markedly distinguished by religion and language, 
were in competition over resources, namely market and land (Breuilly 20, 22). We can also 
observe that the khoja rebellion embodied social tension that could be mapped onto linguistic 
and religious division and as such resembled an impetus to national movement (Hroch 86). 
The khoja insurgency also generated a pattern not dissimilar to ethnicism as defined by 
Anthony Smith – acts of ethnic resistance and cultural restoration, namely the specific 
conditions of a socio-economic challenge and a culture contact of two reactive communities 
(Smith 1986: 50, 55-6). 
 
As indicated in the Introduction to this dissertation, by drawing on texts written by 
Uyghur intelligentsia and politicians, this research outlines views of indigenous elites. Due to 
Sayrami‘s social status and educational background, we can only speculate about the degree 
of social penetration of his notions of Musulman communal identity among common people 
of Heptapolis at the time. On the other hand, given that Sayrami was a superb historian, he 
most probably recorded prevalent and relevant beliefs of the time, not marginal or 
insignificant patterns. Sayrami‘s self-declared intention to write T rīkh-i Hamīdī as a record 
of events for future generations, along with his eventual detachment from political life and 
focus on academic career signal that T rīkh-i Hamīdī was most probably not penned as work 
of political agitation by an activist bent on inventing or fabricating an illusion of Musulman 
communal identity. Instead, T rīkh-i Hamīdī is rather a historical record of events written to 
fulfill a moral obligation imposed by God. Thus, the text likely reveals existent Musulman 
notions of community, which were presumably not limited to elite circles. 
 
Thus, we can conclude that sedentary Turkic Muslims native to Xinjiang at the close 
of imperial era were well aware of their belonging to a clearly defined category called 
Musulman. In other words, the Musulman possessed a definite feeling of communal identity 
defined mainly by shared name, religion, language, mode of life, place of residence, ancestry 
and culture. These identity markers, when shared, clearly defined their bearer as Musulman; 
when not shared, they transparently signaled that their bearer belonged into another 
community. Thus, the idea of Musulman communal identity constituted the basis of the idea 
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of modern Uyghur nation whose emergence is examined in subsequent chapters of this 
dissertation. The dynamics fortifying Musulman perceptions of commonality, which I call the 
community principle, is one of two major forces that affected the rise of modern Uyghur 
national consciousness in early modern period between 1884 and 1949. 
 
Dynamics of Discord 
 
 The above section gave examples of common identity of the Turkic sedentary Muslims 
native to Heptapolis at the end of pre-modern period. The following section examines the 
opposite principle – dynamics of discord, which generated behavioral disunity and 
factionalism of the Musulman, regardless of their common identity. Again, the first passage of 
T rīkh-i Hamīdī translated above is indicative. Besides employing terms that reveal quite an 
advanced degree of distinct Musulman, Tungan and Taranchi identity based on shared religion, 
descent, mode of life, language and other markers, the excerpt contains a second type of terms 
used to label the region‘s population. Such denominations identify the bearer according to 
social status and function. This mode of identification is represented by several words 
meaning ‗people‘ or ‗populace‘ – ahale, ehl, khelq and adem. Other synonymous terms 
frequently appearing in T rīkh-i Hamīdī are puqra (e.g. Sayrami 1988: 182) and khalayiq (e.g. 
Sayrami 1988: 266). Apart from their general meaning ‗people‘, these terms often imply 
‗common people‘ or even ‗poor people,‘ as shown by the usage of the term ahale in the above 
quoted excerpt. Another term for common people at the time was alban-kash, the payer of 
alban, the head-tax. The head-tax payers could be further divided into landowning peasants, 
tenants on government lands and tenants of private landowners (Fletcher 1978a: 73). 
 
Sayrami‘s use of terms denoting ‗people‘ or ‗common people‘ is contrasted by 
terminology denoting members of the hated Qing administration, such as the term ‗tyrant‘ 
(zalim) used in the excerpt. Another synonymous term used in T rīkh-i Hamīdī is ‗person 
indulging in oppression‘ (zulumkhor; Sayrami 1988: 185). Combined traits of cruelty and 
religious infidelity are also quite frequent when characterizing the Qing officials, such as the 
expression ‗infidel tyrants‘ (mushrik zalim; Sayrami 1988: 255). However, Sayrami declares 
on several occasions that it was the corruption and tyranny of the Qing administration that 
was the most significant underlying reason of the khojas‘ rebellion (e.g. Sayrami 1988: 182, 
632). Although not specifically mentioned by Sayrami, we know that another factor 
contributing to the outbreak of the rebellion was the previously mentioned conflict over 
resources between the Musulman and the Han. Furthermore, besides the emotionally tinged 
expressions, T rīkh-i Hamīdī also contains numerous neutral references to Qing 
administration apparatus, represented in the above excerpt by the word wali meaning 
‗governor,‘ here rather in the general sense of ‗high official.‘ 
 
 Nevertheless, it is the references to divisions and antagonisms within the ethnic 
category Musulman which are more significant for this research. Judging from the text and 
content of T rīkh-i Hamīdī, it appears that there existed several kinds of discord among the 
Musulman at the end of pre-modern period. The first kind was fragmentation according to 
territory and locus of residence. Although Sayrami portrayed Hexapolis as a single territorial, 
cultural and political entity, it is evident that local identities continued to play important role 
in a way only slightly altered since the pre-Qing times. This fact was due to the previously 
described physical layout of the Seven Cities region – a string of more or less isolated and 
distant poleis around the Taklamakan Desert, several self-sufficient oases in the Turfan Basin 
and steppe-covered Zunghar Basin separated from each other by demanding mountain ranges. 
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Not only during the late Qing did this trying geographical layout impede the emergence of 
unified political organization. 
 
 The persistence of local identities in Seven Cities is also obvious from the factual 
events of the khoja-Ya‘qup Beg rebellion. Immediately after the rebels overthrew and 
massacred the Qing garrison and the Han population of Kucha, the newly enthroned ruler, 
Rashidin Khan Khoja, sent troops to subjugate other parts of Seven Cities that rose shortly 
after Kucha. But the local rebel leaders in the other oases put up a fierce resistance against the 
intended unification under the Kucha regime. For example, the Kuchean army campaigned 
against Khotanese forces, but was badly defeated and fled. The rebel ruler of Khotan, 
Hebibula Khan, reprimanded the Kuchean regime for slaughtering good-hearted officials of 
the Chinese emperor and subsequent allying with malevolent elements and Tungans. Hebibula 
Khan himself had previously sought military assistance against Kucha from Khoqand; in 
exchange, he even preferred submission to Khoqandi rule to recognition of Kuchean authority 
(Sayrami 1988: 380-1). Later, when Ya‘qup Beg‘s invasion of the Seven Cities was imminent, 
some Musulman factions collaborated with the Khoqandis while other factions resisted (e.g. 
Sayrami 1988: 305-10). Local factionalism and disunity within the Kuchean regime itself was 
the main cause of the defeat of the khoja rebellion and subsequent control of the whole 
territory by Ya‘qup Beg (Kim 58-9).  
 
 Similarly, even though Sayrami did not specifically mention so, we can assume that 
there also existed several inner sub-boundaries within the Musulman category. Good 
description of internal disparate communities included by Sayrami into the Musulman 
community can be found in the account of expedition by Russian scientist Nikolay 
Mikhaylovich Przhevalskiy (1839-1888) from Kyakhta to springs of the Yellow River in 1885. 
En route, Prhzevalskiy traversed the territory of the newly founded Xinjiang province and 
took note of ethnic self-perception of the local population. He records that  
 
 ‗…in entire eastern Turkestan, there is not a universal type of inhabitants. Various 
nationalities, which have migrated into the region, have intermingled here… Along 
with the isolated location of the oases of eastern Turkestan, their mutual rivalry and 
grudge have obstructed the unification of the inhabitants, which until today are only 
called by the towns and oases which they live in, without the denomination of 
common nationality.‘ (Prževalskij 304)  
 
 In the except, Przhevalskiy refers to at the time common means of identification of a 
person by employing the name of the oasis of the person‘s residence and attaching to it the 
suffix –lik (phonetic variations –liq, -luq and –lük; meaning ‗coming from‘ or ‗living in‘ a 
certain place), producing forms such as Qeshqerlik (a Kashgari) or Khotenlik (a Khotani). 
Interestingly, Sayrami does not use this way of identification in his works, neither does he use 
the terms ‗Turk,‘ ‗Turki,‘ ‗eastern Turkestan‘ or ‗eastern Turk,‘ does not appear in Sayrami‘s 
T rīkh-i Hamīdī. Przhevalskiy‘s account further identifies the Loplik living near Lop Nor, the 
Machin living in the area between Cherchen and Khotan and in Yarkend, the Ardbul living in 
Kashgar and Aksu, the Khorasan living in Bay, Kucha and Korla, the Qul living in Chire and 
Yarkend and the Dolan living in the Maralbeshi and Merkit area. It was the Machin who 
considered themselves indigenous to the region (Prževalskij 242-57, 303-4, 368, 385). These, 
and most probably also other ethnocultural groups living in the Seven Cities region, were by 
Sayrami simply included under the grouping Musulman. 
 
 Furthermore, Sayrami‘s text suggests that there also existed severe disunity among 
inhabitants of the same oasis. Again, Conclusion to T rīkh-i Hamīdī can be taken as an 
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example. One of the principal issues Sayrami examined in the description of mentality of the 
people of a particular city was their sense of unity. He tells us that for example people of 
Khotan are united in words, actions and goals, whereas people from Aksu or Üchturpan have 
no concept of partnership or community (Sayrami 1988: 642, 649, 656). As the following 
passage illustrates, this factionalism and disunity again contributed to the smooth reconquest 
of Southern Circuit by Qing troops: 
 
‗…Mirab Ehmet Beg was appointed governor of Khotan and yüzbashi Tokhti Niyaz 
was appointed governor of Yarkend. Because when the beg was returning after he 
had conquered Khotan, he wanted to fight with the imperial soldiers. So he ordered 
his secretary to take hay, fodder, flour and rice to Maralbeshi. Tokhti Niyaz was put 
in charge and sent with the provisions. When he came to Maralbeshi and waited, 
suddenly a Qing commander arrived there. Yüzbashi Tokhti Niyaz took the 
provisions, donated them to the soldiers of the Great Emperor and declared: ―When I 
heard that many soldiers of the Great Emperor came from far away to call on such 
worthless people as us, and that they arrived in Aksu, I took the grain, which I had 
myself planted, along with some of my own animals and went ahead to welcome the 
soldiers of the Great Emperor.‖ The commander was very happy, praised the good 
heart of Tokhti Niyaz and, because of this merit, appointed him the governor of 
Yarkend…‘ (Sayrami 1988: 607-8) 
 
 Numerous passages of T rīkh-i Hamīdī seem to indicate that the disunity of the 
Musulman native to a single city was a result of social stratification and sharp divide between 
common people and indigenous ruling elites. As described earlier, the lower levels of power 
in Southern Circuit were entrusted to begs, who were appointed by and received substantial 
benefits from the Qing administration. Begs‘ substantial autonomy in ruling practices resulted 
in corruption, namely various kinds of illegal taxes and surcharges imposed on the common 
taxpayers. In other words, in the eyes of ordinary Muslims, begs became integral part of the 
Qing administrative system and as such were despised in much the same way, regardless of 
their Musulman identity and religious creed. In a way, the begs were caught between ‗two 
worlds‘ of the religious mandate of Islam and the political mandate of the Qing (Newby 1998). 
Sayrami states that the oppression by begs was a reason behind the khoja rebellion equally 
significant as the oppression by the Qing (Sayrami 1988: 182). During the outbreak of 
rebellion in Kucha, the crowd murdered a former beg who refused to become the leader of the 
uprising on the grounds of loyalty to the Qing (Sayrami 1988: 183-4). 
 
 The divide between common people and ruling stratum was not surmounted even after 
the Kuchean regime took power. Sayrami makes an uncompromising evaluation of khojas, 
stating that they were different neither from begs nor from Qing officials in terms of 
mismanagement, corruption and extortion. Sayrami even opines that during the thirty-seven 
months of their rule, khojas amassed an enormous amount of wealth, but have not used it for 
the welfare of the people. At the same time, they were utterly incompetent in running state 
affairs:  
 
‗…They neither found relief for themselves, nor created peace for the common 
people. During the time they were in charge of the realm, difficulties and 
inconveniences arose for the common people. Therefore, after the khojas were gone, 
no one missed them nor wished for their return and no one thought in good terms of 
them. All the families, clans and people of the land were dissatisfied with them…‘ 
(Sayrami 1988: 324-5) 
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 Sayrami‘s explicit listings of khojas‘ misgovernment further disclose his motivation 
for writing T rīkh-i Hamīdī – to record events in order for future generations to be aware of 
the lot of common people and to be better able to establish efficient and humane government. 
Interestingly, diction of this appraisal of Kuchean khojas is almost identical with Sayrami‘s 
criticism of the pre-Qing khoja theocracy (Sayrami 2000: 25-6). Thus, Sayrami reveals his 
concern with the khoja insurgency not from the perspective of Musulman holy warrior, but 
from the point of view of an enlightened intellectual who extols virtues of good government 
regardless of its religious creed and genetic origin. Indeed, Sayrami‘s deep concern with the 
fate of common people makes his work transitory between the classical approach of 
Turko-Islamic histories, which perceived events mainly through the prism of religion, and 
modern historiography, which was concerned with progress and welfare of mankind (Duara 
33-4). This quality of Sayrami‘s approach is well exemplified in one of the final passages 
T rīkh-i Hamīdī‘s Second Epic: 
 
‗…To sum up, the poor and weak who could no longer withstand the bitter 
oppression of immoral and deluded infidels, sought comfort and hope from God, the 
Lord of Life, till their eyes were full of tears. God heard their prayers and 
lamentations and bestowed the Kuchean khojas upon the tyrants. The people rejoiced 
as if they had been salvaged from the tortures of hell and as if they had entered the 
paradise and the world of eternal delight. Cries of joy rose all the way up past the 
blue dome of Heaven. But khojas soon opened the doors of tyranny, forgetting about 
their previous nature. The people burst into anger and turned to God again. The 
mighty God gracefully and kindly fulfilled their prayers and imposed Muhammad 
Ya‘qup Beg upon the khojas. The people prayed and chanted in gratitude for being 
saved from the despair under the rule and taxation of the Kuchean khojas, and 
celebrated merrily. But eventually Ataliq Ghazi Bedölet‘s character changed and he 
began to commit improper deeds. The patience of the people was depleted once again 
and they became fed up with the taxation by the state. Shedding tears, they turned to 
God the Creator and as they demanded and called for the Emperor of China, their 
cries went past Heaven. In the end, with the consent of God, Lord of Life, the 
officials of the Emperor of China stepped into Seven Cities. They brought this land 
under their domination and appended it for the second time to the realm and heritage 
bequeathed by their great ancestors. All the people, even former officials, cheered 
like blooming buds as if their own relatives and parents were resurrected back to 
life… But in this moment of history, again the imperial officials surrendered their 
conscience and discarded their policy of righteousness, and in a wink of an eye 
increased their despotism. Once again, the eyes of the poor and miserable filled with 
tears. Oh God, may your supreme might grant sense of justice to the kings and 
gracefully show the right path to common people!...‘ (Sayrami 1988: 632-5) 
 
In sum, Sayrami‘s interpretation of the khoja-Ya‘qup Beg insurgency reveals that 
there existed sharp inner boundaries within the category Musulman. These boundaries 
delineated differences mainly according to locus of residence and according to social status. 
Local and social factionalism, or the combination of both, was the main factor that prevented 
the Musulman from attaining their communal interests during the insurgency. At first, 
Kuchean khojas and other local insurgent regimes in Seven Cities did succeed in 
overthrowing the Qing administration under the banner of Islam. But after this primary 
objective was accomplished, they failed to move forward – to form a coalition and establish 
effective administration uniting all local and social elements throughout Heptapolis. Islam, 
despite initially being a strong unifying factor for the numerous factions involved, eventually 
turned out to be only a secondary issue. Religion became prominent only after oppressive 
Qing heteronomy had become unbearable, but quickly lost its centripetal appeal and building 
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potential once the Qing administration and Han population was annihilated. Moreover, the 
elites of both the Kuchean and Ya‘qup Beg‘s administration formed a sharply distinguished 
social stratum which did not represent interests of lower social strata. Eventually, the khojas 
and Ya‘qup Beg‘s administration became as oppressive as the infidel Qing system against 
which the insurgency was originally aimed. Indeed, the oppressive Musulman administrators 
during the insurgency were not infrequently labeled by exactly the same terms as the previous 
Qing officials. The fall of Ya‘qup Beg‘s realm was even marked by defections of Musulman 
soldiers to the Qing troops whose return into the Seven Cities region was often welcomed by 
local Turkic Muslim population. Different ethnicity and religion suddenly did not matter 
anymore for ordinary Musulman in the case of the Qing troops. T rīkh-i Hamīdī contains 
many powerful passages similar to the one above, which emphasize the difficult fate of 
common people plagued by oppressive administration and war atrocities. It seems as if Molla 
Musa Sayrami, after what he witnessed himself during the insurgency, put down the sword of 
political activism and picked up the historian‘s pen to wage war against social injustice. 
 
Although Sayrami does not use the modern term ‗nation‘ (millet) nor he refers to the 
national idea itself, the communal action of the Musulman as portrayed in T rīkh-i Hamīdī 
can be related to several theses and interpretations of national movement and nationalism. It 
has been mentioned that Smith considers one of the dimensions of an ethnic community 
(ethnie) ‗a strong sense of belonging and an active solidarity, which in time of stress and 
danger can override class, factional or regional divisions within the community‘. In this sense, 
the Musulman would more resemble a pre-ethnie group, such as an ethnic category (Smith 
1986: 30). According to Hroch, a nation must show ‗a conception of equality of all members 
of the group organized as a civil society‘ (Hroch 1996: 79). In Anderson‘s assumption, a 
nation must be imagined as a ‗deep, horizontal comradeship,‘ regardless of the actual 
inequality and exploitation that occurs within the community (Anderson 7). In Gellner‘s view, 
nationalism demands cultural homogeneity and school-transmitted nature of culture (Gellner 
39). As hypothesized by Breuilly, nationalism requires that the interests and values of the 
nation ‗take priority over all other interests and values‘ (Breuilly 2). Sayrami‘s account 
showed that the ultimate communal action taken by the Musulman during the khoja-Ya‘qup 
Beg insurgency lacked the principle of solidarity and comradeship generated by shared 
communal identity, described by various formulations in all of the above definitions. Thus, 
although the Musulman of Seven Cities did manifest a strong sense of communal identity in 
the initial stages of the revolt, they eventually did not regard their communal interest as 
superior to interests of local and social factions. 
 
Actions of the Musulman in late Qing can also be tentatively related to some 
definitions of pre-modern societies. If we adopt Gellner‘s definition of agro-literate society, 
we can see that the society of insurgent Heptapolis was topped by clerisy (khojas) and other 
religious notables. The geo-political arrangement of Seven Cities prior to the insurgency was 
a fusion of large empire and partially self-governing communities. During the insurgency, the 
khojas had no interest in promoting cultural or social homogeneity (Gellner 8-14). If we refer 
to Anderson‘s approach, we can see that the Musulman society had some characteristics of 
both religious community and dynastic realm. There existed sacred language and script 
wielded by the elite (Arabic in religious affairs and Persian and/or Chaghatay in 
administrative matters), there was a strong divine mandate for the ruling elite and the rebel 
regimes displayed firm unity of sacral and secular power. The khoja-Ya‘qup Beg insurgency 
was an effective rejection of another form of state form as offered by the Qing, while the 
proclamation of theocratic realms by khojas and Ya‘qup Beg (even though he was well aware 
of the changing world order in international relations) signaled a nostalgic restoration of the 
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original lost paradise of timeless and perfect Islamic social order. Common people subscribed 
to the central divinity of religious leadership and submitted to the hierarchy demanded by it, 
and were subjects rather than citizens in the sense that they clearly had no capacity to control 
the state affairs (Anderson: 13-9; Armstrong 16). Parallels of unity of political and religious 
power of khojas as Sufi insurgent leaders can be found elsewhere in the Islamic world, such 
as in the mahdi insurgency of Muhammad Ahmad in the Sudan in 1881-1898 (Hourani 313). 
Breuilly observed that religious organizations are ‗important for ethnic identity because in 
pre-modern conditions such organizations penetrate the masses of a population to a degree 
that few administrations of large polities can attain‘ (Breuilly 238). The overemphasis on 
religious issues, albeit in accord with Islamic universalism, which strives to eliminate ethnic 
identity, caused the gradual loss of credibility of the khoja-Ya‘qup Beg leadership for 
common people – they eventually started to desire Qing restoration that paradoxically 
terminated the existence of the insurgent Islamic realm. 
 
We can conclude that despite the existence of a clear notion of communal identity 
among indigenous sedentary Turkic Muslims of late Qing Xinjiang, conflicting interests of 
Musulman local groups and social strata inhibited transformation of their common identity 
into unified action intent on forwarding Musulman communal interests. In the moment of 
crisis, the awareness of communal identity, itself of an unknown degree of social penetration, 
yielded to varying interests of subgroups within the Musulman category. The inner boundaries 
within the community became more prominent than its outer boundaries and factionalism 
prevailed over common objectives and shared identity to a degree that caused the collapse of 
the joint Musulman cause. The centrifugal dynamics of diverging particularisms is the second 
of the two most prominent forces that molded modern Uyghur national consciousness in early 
modern period – I will call this pattern the disunity principle. Subsequent chapters of this 
dissertation will relate more instances when, despite firm awareness of communal identity and 
clearly defined communal interest, indigenous sedentary Turkic Muslims of Xinjiang did not 





2.  Transfer of National Idea and National Agitation (1880s – 1920s) 
 
 
 The second chapter of this dissertation explores how the patterns of Musulman 
communal identity and interest of pre-modern era, outlined in previous chapter, evolved into 
nascent notions of Uyghur national identity and nationalism in Xinjiang in the very late 
imperial and early republican period (1880s-1920s). It will be again pointed to Xinjiang‘s 
immemorial position as a crossroads of ideologies and trends stemming from both the East 
and the West, as the emergence of modern Uyghur national consciousness was directly 
inspired by modernization and nation-formation processes that were at the time occurring in 
several other regions and cultural milieus. Particularly, ideas of Han anti-Manchuism and 
nationalism spreading in China proper laid foundations for republican China‘s official 
ideology of ‗five-nationalities‘ republicanism‘ (五族共和 w z  g nghé), which included the 
Musulman of Xinjiang under the term Hui (囘) and therefore was later to have a direct 
influence on their ideas of nation and nationalism. A more significant stimulus for formation 
of Xinjiang indigenous sedentary Muslim elites‘ national consciousness in the period between 
1880s and 1920s was modernism of the Ottoman empire. There, reforms of late nineteenth 
century, which originally aimed at modernizing the Ottoman state, were provided a basis for 
some elites and intelligentsia campaigning towards transformation of pre-modern Ottoman 
subjects into modern Turkish nation, defined most importantly by language. Some activists 
were also supporters of pan-Turkism, which championed the idea of unity of Turkic peoples, 
including the Turkic population of Xinjiang. Comparable identity-formation and 
modernization trends took place within Turkic communities of Czarist Russia. This process 
was spearheaded by Tatar enlighteners seeking to improve the status of Muslims within the 
Russian empire. The main avenue to this goal was a reform of obsolete religious learning 
facilities into modernized, vernacular-based education system that would be capable of 
turning the students into nationally-conscious individuals. Another arena of Tatar activism 
was publishing of newspapers and other periodicals printed in vernaculars, which were 
intended to inform their readership about contemporary developments in surrounding world. 
It will be shown that Tatar modernism, also referred to as Jadidism, had a strong impact on 
formation of national consciousness of all Turkic communities in Czarist Russia. The course 
lasted for some time as a result of affirmative action taken by the Soviet state toward 
formation of national identities Central Asian Muslim communities. 
 
 Further, the chapter will show how Turkic modernism of the Ottoman and Russian 
empire reached Xinjiang in late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The transfer occurred 
through affluent Xinjiang Turkic entrepreneur and merchant families, whose members 
travelled or lived in the Ottoman empire, in Turkic areas of Russia or in Europe. There, they 
came into contact with contemporary modern trends and imported them into their home 
milieu. As a result, in southwestern part of Xinjiang in the cities of Kashgar and Atush, local 
Musabay family promoted and sponsored first modern schools in the 1880s. In 1910s, the 
Musabays even contracted several Ottoman teachers for their schools in Xinjiang, which put 
the area under direct influence of Ottoman nationalist ideology. Northern Xinjiang was in a 
similar way strongly influenced by Russian Tatars, who settled and founded first modern 
schools in cities of Ghulja, Chöchek, Tarbaghatay and Urumchi since late nineteenth century. 
In 1910s and 1920s, enlighteners headed by members of the Muhiti family started modern 
schools in the Turfan region, for which they contracted Tatar teachers from Russia. Thus, 
northern and eastern Xinjiang was under impact of modernist trends of Turkic Jadidism in 
Russia, later also of early Soviet policy. Consequently, the period from 1880s to 1920s 
experienced a gradual spread of modern education and first attempts at founding Turkic 
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periodicals and cultural societies. As pointed out by other specialists referring to 
developments in other regions (Seton-Watson 1977; Gellner 1983; Smith 1996; Hobsbawm 
1996; Anderson 1991), it was mainly these three symptoms of modernity that gradually 
ushered modern Xinjiang Turkic intelligentsia into perceiving their community as a modern 
nation. 
 
 The chapter will also argue that analogously to modernity as such, the idea of modern 
Uyghur nation was probably imported to Xinjiang context from Turkic communities in 
Russian Central Asia. Namely, it will be shown that Jadids of Central Asia became acquainted 
with studies of European Turkologists of the nineteenth century, who were the first to draw a 
linguistic, genetic and cultural connection between ancient Uyghurs inhabiting the Xinjiang 
region and the community which Molla Musa Sayrami in his works termed the Musulman. As 
will be illustrated by journalistic articles written by Nezerghoja Abdusémet assembled in the 
anthology Bright Shores of Knowledge (Yoruq Sahillar), the idea that Xinjiang indigenous 
sedentary Turkic Muslims are in fact a nation (millet) descended from ancient Uyghurs 
appeared in Central Asia at least as early as in 1910s. From there, enlightened entrepreneurs, 
Jadidist teachers and modernist activists brought this concept to Xinjiang.  
 
 Despite the fact that sufficient research of this historical period is restrained by lack of 
contemporary primary sources and field research, it will be demonstrated on works of two 
enlightened poets and activists, Abdukhaliq Uyghur (Abdukhaliq Uyghur Shé‟irliri) and 
Memtili Tewpiq (Memtili Ependi Shé‟irliri), that throughout 1920s at least some Xinjiang 
Turkic elites arrived at perceptions of communal identity and interest that were markedly 
different from those of traditional intellectuals, such as Molla Musa Sayrami. Abdukhaliq 
Uyghur and Memtili Tewpiq did not anymore see their community as a group of Musulman. 
Instead, they envisioned their people as modern ‗nation‘ (millet) of famed ancient Uyghur 
ancestry bound tightly to their homeland by shared national decline and interest in national 
well-being. Similarly to other cases of nation-formation processes (Hroch 1996), one 
important goal of their writings and actions was agitation of their community toward national 
awakening. In this way, Abdukhaliq Uyghur and Memtili Tewpiq articulated a fundamental 
shift from late imperial elite perceptions of communal identity, which was based to a 
substantial degree on religion, social stratum or locus of residence, to modern identification 
with a community defined in national terms. In their imagination, nation fully replaced 
religion as the fundamental concept of worldview. 
 
 It will also be exposed how the modern and nationally conscious Xinjiang Turkic 
Muslim intelligentsia defined a new set of communal interests for their nation. Abdukhaliq 
Uyghur‘s, Memtili Tewpiq‘s and other similarly minded activists‘ efforts were bent on 
mobilizing their nation to self-improvement and eventual uplifting of its status in Xinjiang. In 
their perception, the interest of their nation outweighed the interest of a particular social 
stratum or local faction. Ideas of first modern Xinjiang Turkic intellectuals thus displayed a 
sense of communal solidarity and image of national interest that sought to trigger a 
coordinated national mobilization. Similarly to some general patterns illustrated elsewhere 
(Smith 1986; Breuilly 1993; Hroch 1996), it will also be pointed out that although throughout 
1920s Xinjiang Turkic elites saw the goals of mobilization and national movement primarily 
in cultural arenas and did not generally articulate political objectives, it was the nationally 
conscious stratum of society cultivated in modern Jadidist schools established from 1880s to 




End of Qing Dynasty (1878-1911) and Early Republican Administration (1911-1933) 
 
 Simultaneously with gradual collapse of Ya‘qup Beg‘s regime after mid-1870s in 
Xinjiang, a debate over the profitability of Xinjiang reconquest resounded in Qing military 
circles in China proper. The side in favor of giving up the vast, barren and restive region, 
which moreover required regular central subsidy, was represented by Li Hongzhang (李鴻章, 
1823-1901), the Governor-General of Zhili (直隸) province and one of the leading promoters 
of maritime defense of China. The opposing side represented by Zuo Zongtang (左宗棠, 
1812-1885), another leading figure of modernizing Qing army who gained merit by 
suppressing Taiping (太平), Nian (捻) and Tungan rebellions in 1860s and 1870s, argued for 
reconquest of Xinjiang in order to use the territory as a buffer against territorial expansion of 
Great Britain and Russia in the direction of the capital (Millward 2007: 125-7). Ultimately, 
the reconquest faction won the dispute. Following several years of preparations, Zuo 
Zongtang‘s well armed, trained and supplied forces under field command of Liu Jintang (劉
錦棠, 1844-1894) were able to take advantage of decomposition of Ya‘qup Beg‘s regime and 
indigenous Muslim defense and reconquered Xinjiang by January 1878. Under the provisions 
of Treaty of St. Petersburg of 1881, the Qing also recovered eastern part of the Ili valley that 
had been annexed by Russia in 1870. Subsequently, Xinjiang‘s administrative status and 
division was changed from militarily managed region to regular civil province in 1884 (建省 
ji nshěng). The new province was divided into prefectures and counties (郡縣  jūnxi n) 
staffed by exclusively Han magistrates selected through state examination system. Newly, the 
highest ranking official was the Governor (巡撫  x nf ) based in Urumchi, although he 
formally answered to the Governor-General of Shaanxi and Gansu (陜甘總督 Sh n-G n 
zǒngdū) provinces based in Lanzhou (蘭州; Millward 2007: 124-48).21 
Apart from saving funds previously needed to maintain sizeable military garrison, 
instituting provincial administration in Xinjiang also brought about other substantial changes. 
The new system terminated the principle of indirect rule through begs and wangs. In order to 
repopulate the region and expand its taxation base, provincial government also facilitated Han 
immigration by the means of resettlement-stimulation packages. New administrative division 
generated the need to establish institutes of Confucian learning throughout the province, 
which was in turn expected to enable cultural change of indigenous population (化風 
hu fēng). Through these measures, Xinjiang was to eventually become culturally and 
demographically homogenous with China proper and hence easier to rule. In other words, 
provincialization aimed at tighter incorporation of Xinjiang into Chinese politico-cultural 
realm through mainly sinification of administrative system and acculturation of indigenous 
population (Millward 2005: 265-6). It has been pointed out that this fundamental shift of 
Xinjiang administration policy was parallel to extension of the inner China system of rule to 
                                                 
21
 Similarly to reconquest of Xinjiang, its provincialization was a measure which had been debated 
previously within imperial policy-drafting circles. In an essay of 1820, Qing reformist scholar Gong 
Zizhen (龔自珍 , 1792-1841) first stressed eventual financial benefits of initial investment into 
infrastructure, resettlement of populace from China proper, abolition of military rule and introduction 
of the provincial system. Wei Yuan (魏源, 1794-1856), another influential Qing literatus, was also an 
advocate of administrative unification of Xinjiang with China proper by the means of Han resettlement 
and reclamation of land in the Southern Cirquit (Millward 1998: 241-4, Newby 159-60). Zuo 
Zongtang himself was convinced of the need to provincialize Xinjiang long before the reconquest 
(Millward 2007: 132).  
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other frontier regions, which materialized for instance in establishment of Taiwan (臺灣, in 
1887), Fengtian (奉天), Jilin (吉林) and Heilongjiang (黑龍江, all three in 1907) provinces. 
Even though the Qing dynasty did not manage to solve the problem of Xinjiang‘s dependence 
on central budget, to acculturate local population or to meet other objectives, provincialization 
was nevertheless a moment of great significance for Xinjiang and is considered one of 
markers of beginning of its early modern era (1884-1949; Millward 2007: 148-58). 
 
 The uprising in Wuchang (武昌) in 1911 and subsequent proclamation of Republic of 
China (中華民國 Zh nghuá mínguó, ROC) quickly influenced events in distant Xinjiang. 
Revolts broke out at the turn of 1911 and 1912 in Urumchi and Ghulja. In the provincial 
capital, the movement was swiftly suppressed by the last Qing governor, Yuan Dahua (袁大
化, 1851-1935). The rebellion in Ghulja was more successful. Discontent and revolt had been 
stirred there mainly by two forces. One was the Ghulja branch of Revolutionary Alliance (同
盟會  Tóngméng hu ), an all-China secret society aiming to overthrow Manchu rule and 
establishing the republic. The other was Elder Brothers‘ Society (哥老會 Gēl o hu ), an 
underground anti-Qing brotherhood which was founded during uprisings in 1851-1874 in the 
middle and lower Yangzi (長江 Chángji ng) region and which infiltrated Xinjiang with the 
arrival of Zuo Zongtang‘s troops. In the course of Ghulja rebellion, officers of modernized 
provincial New Army forces, who were often simultaneously members of both of the two 
subversive organizations, managed to mobilize their ranks, a certain part of civil officials, 
local Han and Tungan settlers and even some Turkic Muslims, and succeeded in establishing 
a revolutionary administration. Meanwhile in Urumchi, Yuan Dahua transferred his authority 
to his subordinate official Yang Zengxin (楊增新, 1859-1928). Yang immediately declared 
allegiance to the Republic of China and was confirmed by president Yuan Shikai (袁世凱, 
1859-1916) in the post of Civil Governor (都督 dūdū) and Military (督軍 dūjūn) Governor of 
Xinjiang and in May 1912. 
 
 During his rule over Xinjiang until 1928, Yang Zengxin proved to be a superb 
strategist capable of eliminating a great number of various security threats and challenges to 
his power. He brought the Ili region back under provincial jurisdiction by awarding the 
uprising‘s leaders with government posts. Soon after, he charged them with treason and had 
them executed. He dealt in the same way – co-optation into provincial power structure and 
subsequent liquidation – with bosses of Elder Brothers‘ Society, which challenged his power 
in southern Xinjiang, and with leaders of Muslim Turkic uprisings against wangs of Komul 
and Turfan, which broke out several times around the Qing-Republic transition. He also 
successfully avoided a full-scale military conflict with Outer Mongolian troops which raided 
northeastern border of Xinjiang. By 1918, he managed to disarm and repatriate around 
300.000 Kazak refugees streaming into the province in the wake of Russian misrule and also 
some thirty to forty thousand White Russian troops running away to Xinjiang from the 
repercussions of the October Revolution, to suppress Turkic Muslim uprising in Kucha and 
mutiny of provincial troops in Altay. It is remarkable that Yang scored these victories largely 
through the means of negotiation or plot and that he was able to maintain control of Xinjiang 




                                                 
22
 If we accept growth of military personnel and investment into combat technology and infrastructure 
as elementary traits of warlordism and militarism (Van de Ven 353, 360), then Yang Zengxin should 
not be classified as a warlord. As with other personages of China politics in the Republican era, it is 
more apt to regard him a relict of imperial statecraft that survived into modern era.  
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 Yang was equally ingenious in maintenance of his power. He terminated working 
relationship with Beijing and established the practice of merely notifying the central Beiyang 
government (北洋政府 Běiyáng zhèngf ; 1912-1928) about his actions. At the same time, he 
deployed sizeable garrison along the eastern border of Xinjiang to limit and control traffic 
with China proper and Inner Mongolia. These measures led to the loss of central 
government‘s factual control over Xinjiang. Yang also relied on majority of imperial 
administration mechanisms. On the lowest administrative level, he preserved the authority of 
begs. In Turfan, Komul and Lükchün, he kept local wangs in position to rule over their 
fiefdoms. Finally, he also left intact customary authority of clergy and landowners. In 
exchange, indigenous power elites supported Yang‘s rule and were also instrumental in 
enforcing his policies (Ezizi 1997a: 124; Shehidi 158). This tactic was combined with a range 
of totalitarian and violent practices, such as assassinating opponents, creating efficient 
intelligence and censorship system, appointing functionaries exclusively on the basis of strong 
personal ties, restricting travel within, in and out of the province etc. In managing ethnic 
affairs, Yang employed the traditional strategy of controlling barbarians by other barbarians 
and created interest clashes between nomadic Mongols and Kazaks, and between sedentary 
Musulman and Huis (Forbes 15; Burhan 171). Yang‘s economic policy, on the one hand, 
succeeded in dealing with termination of subsidy from central budget after the fall of the Qing. 
On the other hand, it also meant harsh exploitation of provincial resources, developing only 
those aspects of indigenous economy and infrastructure which were instrumental in 
maintenance of his power and wide-spread corruption (Forbes 14-5, 28-32; Lattimore 1950: 
56-60). 
 
Yang‘s cultural policy was conceived in accordance with his belief that ignorant and 
uneducated people are easier to rule than cultured and knowledgeable population. He 
implemented a set of measures, termed the ignorant people policy (khelqni nadaliqta 
qaldurush; 愚民政策 y mín zhèngcè), which relied on blockading all political and cultural 
influences from east and west, including obstructing modern education, press and other 
attributes of modernity. As will be illustrated in the following sections of this chapter, Yang‘s 
isolation policy did not succeed all the way. Nonetheless, the period of his rule is notorious 
for complete absence of the government‘s contribution to cultural progress. There existed no 
provincial press, bookshops, theaters or other cultural institutions. Bringing any printed 
material into Xinjiang and discussing political matters in public was illegal. Befriended 
indigenous clerisy and landowning circles gladly cooperated with Yang on this project. Thus, 
Yang Zengxin‘s thoroughly autocratic government and elaborate efforts at preserving general 
overall status-quo had a twofold effect. For one, during the initial period of republican era 
(1911-1928) Xinjiang remained politically and economically stable and thus was spared the 
chaos and inflation of civil war raging in China proper. On the other hand, Yang‘s politics of 
isolation resulted in detrimental stagnancy in all walks of life. Contemporary sources relate 
that conditions in Yang‘s Xinjiang showed only minor differences from society of pre-modern 
era (Ezizi 1997a: 129, 131; Shehidi 182-3, 214; Abdusémetov 70, 94-6). 
 
 Jin Shuren (金樹仁, 1879-1941), who came out victorious from the power struggle 
after Yang Zengxin‘s assassination in 1928,
23
 sought to follow the course set by Yang. He 
                                                 
23
 The coup to overthrow Yang‘s rule was designed by his subordinate, a reform-minded official Fan 
Yaonan (樊耀南, 1879-1928). The actual murder took place during a banquet in Urumchi on July 7, 
1928 (or on the seventh day of the seventh month of the seventeenth year AR; hence name of the event 
in Chinese – Triple Seven Coup, 三七政變  S nqī zhèngbi n). There exist several eye-witness 
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continued to declare Xinjiang‘s adherence to the Republic of China while maintaining de 
facto independence on the Nationalist government‘s (國民政府 Guómín zhèngf ,  1928-1949) 
jurisdiction.
24
 Similarly, using autocratic and draconian ruling practices, depleting local 
resources for personal benefit, maintaining economic and cultural isolation remained the 
fundaments of governmental practice under Jin (Forbes 38-42, Millward 2007: 189-91). 
However, it soon became clear that Jin lagged far behind his predecessor in talents and skills. 
Economic and social conditions deteriorated rapidly and Jin‘s rule was challenged by 
mutinies and rebellions which started erupting as soon as in 1929. Furthermore, he alienated 
indigenous Turkic Muslims by a series of acculturating measures such as terminating the 
power alliance with local elites and appointing Han officials to junior administrative posts 
previously staffed by begs and wangs. Turkic Muslim discontent eventually erupted in the 
form of Komul uprising in 1931 and quickly threw the whole province into turmoil and 
bloodshed. Jin Shuren was unable to deal with the situation and was overthrown in a coup in 
1933. 
 
 Apart from provincialization, another distinguishing characteristic of the onset of 
modern era in Xinjiang was the emergence of influences from the territory of Russia/Soviet 
Union. One area where the trend was clearly visible was economy. Russian commercial 
involvement in Xinjiang had begun already in the 1830s and grew steadily as Russia was able 
to negotiate instruments to propel her interests. By the end of Qing rule in Xinjiang in 1911, 
Russia enjoyed such privileges as duty-free commerce in cities where consulates were located 
(Chöchek, Ghulja, Kashgar, Urumchi and Sharasume), extraterritorial judicial status of her 
subjects or the right to station security personnel to protect her business interests. Easy 
marketing of Russian products (mainly sealskins and furs, velvet, gold and silver embroidery 
thread, house and agriculture tools, smelted copper and steel, loafsugar etc.) was possible due 
to geographical and logistical proximity of Russian Central Asia to Xinjiang in comparison 
with inner China.
25
 By the end of Yang Zengxin‘s administration, Soviet trade constituted 
23% of provincial income, and by the end of Jin‘s era, Soviet Union became the only trading 
partner of Xinjiang (Fletcher 1978b: 325-32; Huang 2003: 5). The actual protagonists of the 
trade from Russian/Soviet were mostly Tatars and Uzbeks, who, due to their close cultural 
ties with Xinjiang Musulman, formed a bridge between Xinjiang and the West, over which 
modern trends could penetrate the province. Following sections and chapters of this 
dissertation will illustrate that cultural and political influences stemming into Xinjiang from 
Russia and Soviet Union proved a potent factor in formation of modern Uyghur concept of 
nation and nationalism.  
  
Contemporary Nation-Formation Processes in China and the Ottoman Empire 
 
Before we approach the topic of cultural and political stimuli from Russia and Soviet 
Union, it is necessary to focus on two other phenomena contributing to emergence of modern 
Uyghur national consciousness. In China proper, anti-Manchuism, republicanism and 
                                                                                                                                                        
accounts of the assassination (for example Wu 45-52). Fan‘s scheme misfired - Yang loyalist Jin 
Shuren had him arrested and executed the next day. 
24
 Nationalist government introduced new terminology for official posts: Jin was appointed provincial 
Chairman (主席 zh xí) and Commander-in-Chief (總司令 zǒng sīl ng). Yang Zengxin had pledged his 
allegiance to the new central authority shortly before his assassination. 
25
 Logistical proximity of Russian and Soviet Central Asia was mainly due to construction of a set of 
railways through western Central Asian territory between 1879 and 1931. As a result, in the beginning 
of 1920s, the journey from Kashgar to Beijing took around five months, whereas to Andijan it was 
seven days (Rudelson 42). 
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nationalism were the most significant intellectual movements of late 19
th
 century. These 
trends gained prominence as the Manchu-dominated dynasty rule proved to be incompetent in 
ruling China and defending it from foreign incursion and economic subjugation. Anti-
Manchuism (排滿 pái M n) had its origins in thought and works of intellectuals of the Ming-
Qing transition, such as Gu Yanwu (顧炎武, 1613-1682) or Wang Fuzhi (王夫之, 1619-
1692), who bitterly opposed Manchu rule, arguing that alien ethnic groups can never become 
fully acculturated and thus are unfit to rule culturally superior China. Late Qing proponents of 
anti-Manchuism such as Zhang Binglin (章炳麟, 1868-1936) or Zou Rong (鄒容, 1885-1905) 
argued for annihilation or expulsion of Manchus from China (Dikötter 97-119; Rhoads 11-8). 
However, excluding Manchus and denouncing the Qing imperial heritage would mean that the 
new Chinese state would be expected to relinquish vast border regions previously conquered 
by the Qing. Therefore, the leading activists who demanded overthrowing the dynasty by the 
means of revolution soon realized the problematic aspect of anti-Manchuism and dropped the 
radical creed from their rhetoric. Shortly after the emergence of the Republic of China on 
January 1, 1912, a new theory of ethnic relations embodied in the theory of nationalism was 
designed (Leibold 167-183).  
 
 Nationalism was by far the most formative thought throughout the whole period of 
republican China (1911-1949). As mentioned in the Introduction to this dissertation, the term 
nation (民族 mínz ) was incorporated into Chinese revolutionary discourse at the turn of the 
nineteenth and twentieth century (Crossley 1990: 19; Dikötter 97). Early Chinese nationalists 
were on the one hand inspired by modernization and reforms in Japan during the Meiji era (明
治 ; 1868-1912), which adopted nationalism and concept of ‗nation‘ (in Japanese 民族 
minzoku) from European thinkers and politicians. On the other hand, Chinese nationalists also 
encountered the term directly in Chinese translations of English and American works. 
Leading revolutionary activist Sun Yat-sen (also known as Sun Zhongshan, 孫中山; 1866-
1925), who is revered as the ‗Father of the Republic‘ (國父 Guóf ), is also regarded as the 
foremost theorist of Chinese nationalism (民族主義  mínz  zh y ; literally ‗doctrine of 
people‘s lineage‘). Albeit not systematized, seemingly contradictory and often purely 
utilitaristic, Sun‘s nationalism became one of his ‗Three People‘s Principles‘ (三民主義 
s nmín zh y ; the other two being ‗doctrine of people‘s authority‘ 民權主義 mínquán zh y ; 
and ‗doctrine of people‘s livelihood‘ 民生主義 mínshēng zh y ), the definition of fundaments 
of republican revolutionary administration. Under this theory, Chinese republic was 
constituted by unity of five distinct and legally equal ethno-cultural communities (i.e. Han, 
Manchu, Mongol, Muslim and Tibetan), which in turn formed the political ‗nation of China‘ 
(中華民族 Zh nghuá mínz ) delimitated by the boundaries of the Qing empire, and thus 
ideally also of the Republic of China. It was understood that the Han were to make up the core 
nationality. This principle of five-nationality republicanism (五族共和 w z  g nghé) was a 
leading ethnic theory of the very early Chinese republic in 1910s and early 1920s. Three 
People‘s Principles later became official state ideology of the Republic of China after Chiang 
Kai-shek‘s (蔣介石, 1887-1975) nominal unification of China (the Northern Expedition, 北伐 
Běifá, 1926-8) and the subsequent decade of the Chinese Nationalist Party‘s (Kuomintang, 中
國國民黨 Zh ngguó guómín d ng, KMT) administration (Leibold 183-203; Rhoads 274-5; 
Dikötter 123-31).
26
 Apart from KMT‘s ideology, nationalism was also a potent ideological 
element in the influential May Fourth Movement (五四運動 S w  y ndòng, 1919), which 
                                                 
26
 The KMT‘s interpretation of nationalism is examined in greater detail in Chapter 4 of this 
dissertation. 
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emerged as a negative reaction of Chinese students and intellectuals against the Treaty of 
Versailles‘ transferring the former German concession in Shandong (山東) under Japanese 
jurisdiction. May Fourth Movement subsequently had an enormous impact on formation of 
modern Chinese thinking, culture and politics. At the same time, nationalism also became one 
of the basic tenets of the Chinese Communist Party (中國共産黨 Zh ngguó gòngch n d ng, 
CCP), founded in 1921 in Shanghai. Indeed, it is possible to say that the impact of 
nationalism on modern Chinese politics and thought does not decrease even today in the 
twenty-first century. Nevertheless, the following sections of this chapter will show that during 
the period 1884-1933, the influence of ideological developments in China-proper on 
intellectual evolution of Turkic Muslims of Xinjiang and on emergence of modern Uyghur 
ethnic identity was rather minor. 
 
In contrast, intellectual currents flowing into Xinjiang from western direction proved 
to be powerful stimuli to Xinjiang Turkic Muslim intellectuals. Initially, the most relevant 
role was played by the wave of reformist movement which surged within the Islamic world 
since the latter part of 19
th
 century as a reaction of Muslim elites to the advance and strength 
of European nations over the Islamic community (Ar. „umma). In the Arab regions of the 
Ottoman empire, reformist trends were to a certain extent sanctioned by the state. Mainly in 
Cairo and Tunis, schools with curricula modeled after European examples were being 
established which trained officials, officers, doctors and engineers for government service. At 
the same time, modern schools were also started by indigenous bodies and foreign missions, 
particularly in Lebanon, Syria and Egypt. Arab newspapers and periodicals introduced 
Western culture, science and technology to their growing readership as did the translations of 
Western literature, manuals and textbooks. New literary genres were created according to 
Western models (such as drama, short story or novel) and new vocabulary implanted into 
Arabic. The combined effect was emergence of new progressive intelligentsia, who were 
strongly aware of their ethno-cultural identity and eventually capable of articulate expression 
of their political demands of increased national autonomy (Hourani 302-10, 326-8). Even in 
the new social context of modern era, Islam remained a defining trait of modern culture. Arab 
intellectuals drew upon the thought of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897) and Muhammad 
‗Abduh (1849-1905) who believed that Islam was fully compatible with the bases of modern 
civilization such as reason, progress and social solidarity (Hourani 302-7). The closely related 
doctrine of pan-Islamism, which stressed the importance of overall Muslim unity in political 
and economic aspects, became one of the leading lines of imperial foreign policy vis-à-vis 
Muslim realms under sultan Abdülhamid II (ruled 1876-1909; Zürcher 81; Hourani 314; Kim 
150; Landau 46-8). 
 
In the core Turkic parts of the Ottoman empire, modernization began in 1826 during 
the reign of sultan Mahmut II (ruled 1808-1839). The ultimate purpose of all his policies was 
to centralize power relying on support of strong and modern army. To achieve his objective, 
he instituted a wide range of policies in administration, finance, legal system, communication, 
education and diplomacy. The reforms continued through the so-called Tanzimat era (En. 
reorganization; 1839-1876) and to a certain extent also during the reign of Abdülhamid II 
(1876-1909; Zürcher 39-45, 56-66). Later, reform ideals were also carried by intelligentsia 
and elites who opposed the sultanate and advocating patriotic, constitutional and 
parliamentarian system, such as  ‗Young Ottomans‘ (Tu. Yeni Osmanlılar, since 1865) or 
‗Ottoman Unity Society‘ (Tu. İttihad-i Osmani Cemiyeti, since 1889), later renamed the 
‗Committee for Union and Progress‘ (Tu. İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti, CUP). This 
organization, also known as ‗Young Turks‘ (Tu. Yeni Türkler) was a radical and nationalistic 
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political association which had a dominant influence on Ottoman, later also Turkish politics 
long into 20
th
 century (Zürcher 68-70, 86; Landau 45-56).  
 
Even though the Young Turks were initially exponents of ottomanism (Tu. Osmanlılık 
or Osmanlıcılık), or ideal of equality of all religious communities (Tu. millet) within the 
Ottoman empire and their patriotic loyalty to it, later they became ardent advocates of modern 
Turkish nation defined most importantly by common language (Hourani 309). Turkish 
nationalism was even projected into a series of reforms by the CUP politicians in 1910s. The 
ideology was closely related to the concept of pan-Turkism, an initiative toward cultural 
or/and political union of all peoples or proven or alleged Turkic origins, living within or 
outside the Ottoman empire, or subsequently Turkey (Landau 1).
27
 Prominent theoreticians of 
pan-Turkism were Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935), Ziya Gökalp (pseudonym of Mehmed Ziya, 
1876-1924) and Tekin Alp (pseudonym of Moise Cohen, 1883-1961; Zürcher 123, 127-32; 
Landau 29-45). However, both the Ottoman empire and Turkey, the only sovereign Turkic 
territory in late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century, failed to transform the idea of pan-Turkism into 
political action aimed at physical unification of Turkic territories. But although the ideology 
of pan-Turkism remained a largely cultural phenomenon with only marginal influence on 
political affairs of the time, it did carry strong appeal to some intellectual strata of Muslim 
Turkic communities in other parts of Islamic cultural space, such as Xinjiang. 
 
Turkic Nation-Formation Movements in Russia/Soviet Union 
 
 The initial stimulus for the process of modern Uyghur ethnic identity formation 
stemming from Russian territory was Islamic modernism of Turkic communities of late 19
th
 
century. Its first protagonists were Tatars of the Volga region and Crimea, whose activities in 
fact predated those of Ottoman modernists. The khanates of Kazan and Crimea had been for a 
long time subjected to Russian rule (since 1552 and 1783 respectively) and were thus strongly 
influenced by Russian developments. One of the effects was a considerable level of Tatar 
cultural development and literacy when compared with other Muslim communities throughout 
the Islamic world. In the second half of the 19
th
 century, Russian Tatars encountered the 
doctrine of pan-Slavism, which was one of the fundaments for Russian foreign policy and a 
model for pan-Turkism. Finally, they also profited from geographical proximity to the 
Ottoman Empire (especially that of the Crimean Tatars) that enabled them to follow Ottoman 
trends. Tatar intellectuals were the first to realize several important facts. In spite of common 
ethnic origins and close linguistic relation of Turkic nations, attainment of their unity was 
impeded by geographical incontiguity of the regions they inhabited. This reality resulted in 
deficiencies in communication between the Turkic regions. Moreover, individual Turkic 
languages and their written and spoken forms differed markedly. Finally, the overwhelming 
majority of Turkic population was illiterate. The rare cases of literacy were reserved for men 
educated in traditional religious institutions. Thus, education and press were the two most 
important arenas of activity of Russian Turkic Muslim modernists. 
 
 The two issues outlined above – lack of communication and insufficient education – 
were first systematically addressed by Crimen Tatar Ismail Bey Gaspirali (also called 
                                                 
27
 Another related term is pan-Turanism, or Turanism, which seeks to unify all the peoples originating 
from Turan, a mythical land lying among China proper, Tibet, India, Iran, the desert of Dasht-i 
Kipchak and the Caspian Sea. Turanism strived to appeal to even non-Muslim nations such as 
Hungarians, Finns and Estonians. Concepts of pan-Turkism and pan-Turanism were formulated by 
Hungarian orientalist Hermann Vambéry in his title Sketches of Central Asia (1868; Landau 2). 
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Gasprinskiy; 1851 – 1914). In 1883, he started publishing a Turkic/Russian bilingual 
newspaper Interpreter (Terjüman/Perevodchik) with the motto Unity in Language, Thought 
and Action (Tu. Dilde, Fikirde, Işte Birlik) in mast. Turkic contributions to the paper were 
written in so-called ‗common language‘ (lisan-i umumi), an artificial language devised by 
Gaspirali to breach languages differences within Turkic milieu. The common language was 
based mainly on Crimean Tatar and Ottoman Turkish, but it was deprived of Arabic and 
Persian vocabulary. The practice of publishing in a sort of Turkic lingua franca spread and 
later other periodicals were issued which used such a language, for example Time (Waqit) in 
Orenburg, Voice (Sada) in Baku, Kazan Correspondent (Kazan Muhbiri) or Turk (Türk) of 
Cairo.
 
Apart from these, there existed yet a larger number of periodicals in local Turkic 
languages which circulated in all parts of Turkic world, including Xinjiang, especially after 
the Russian 1905 revolution brought some liberal policies, such as increase in freedom of 
speech and press. Thus, spread of printed matter improved communication within the Turkic 
milieu and was instrumental to rise of Turkic Muslim national consciousness (Landau 9-13).  
  
 Gaspirali achieved significant breakthroughs also in the realm of education. In 1884, 
he opened the first school which taught modern curriculum modeled on Western system. In 
exchange for traditional Arabic, the language of instruction was native Turkic. The amount of 
classes on Islam was reduced and supplemented by secular subjects taught, such as Turkic 
language and history, Russian, French, German, world history, geography, natural history, 
physics, chemistry, psychology, logic or accounting. In the remaining religious courses, a 
modernized form of Islam reflecting current trends was taught. Gaspirali‘s language classes 
used so-called ‗new method‘ (usul-i jadid), or in other words phonetic way in teaching the 
Arabic alphabet (Khalid 89). This term gave name to Jadidism, signifying modernist approach 
to education and to the whole social and cultural reform movement pioneered by Russian 
Turkic Muslims. Apart from new education, Tatar Jadids also advocated general fostering of 
knowledge, creation of new civic institutions, and improvement in the position of women in 
Muslim society and other progressive measures. These ideas and practices quickly spread to 
other Muslim territories in Russian empire, where they simultaneously combined with local 
progressive trends and inspired an intense wave of modernism. Apart from areas with strong 
Tatar (Kazan, Ufa, Orenburg, etc.) and Azeri (Baku) presence, Jadidist movement was the 
strongest in Central Asia, an area with largely Turkic population that had been only recently 
incorporated into Russian empire (1865-1895). Prominent figures of Central Asian Jadidism 
were for example Behbudi (pseudonym of Mufti Mahmud Khoja, 1874-1919), Munawwar 
Qari (1878-1931), Abdurrauf Fitrat (1886-1938) or Fayzullah Khojaev (1896-1938). By 1905, 
the number of modern schools throughout Russian Muslim communities reached 
approximately 5.000 (Allworth 61-70). 
 
 In his thorough analysis of Central Asian Jadidism, Adeeb Khalid (Khalid 1998) aptly 
summarizes its traits and its impact on the traditional Muslim society. He underlines the fact 
that Jadidist intelligentsia were primarily concerned with adaptation of Islam to modernity, 
mobilization of their Muslim compatriots to national awakening, and uplifting their status 
within the Russian empire. For this purpose, they successfully employed current technical 
innovations, such as newly built roads and railways, postal system, telegraph or press, as 
vehicles for more intensive spread of information and thought. As a result, new forms of 
social organization and cultural practice emerged – publishing houses, philanthropic societies 
and eventually also political parties. By far the most important concern of the Jadids was 
modern education system, a crucial means to Turkic self-perfection which taught both 
religious and secular knowledge in native Turkic vernaculars enriched with progressive 
neologisms. The main difference from the traditional education system was that in the new 
 61 
curriculum, and ideally also in the whole of new society as envisioned by Jadids, Islam 
constituted only one of several components of identity. The natural result of this approach was 
loss of monopoly on social leadership by traditional clergy. The ideal alumnus of a Jadidist 
school was a practitioner of Islam, who was well educated and skilled in contemporary 
secular matters. Despite recurrent conflicts with conservative clergy, by 1917 the Jadids 
managed to establish themselves as a new social class of patriotic Muslim progressive 
enlighteners. In a way, Jadids‘ emphasis on modern education, infatuation with print and 
publishing, markedly urban tint or antagonistic relationship with the power monopoly of 
traditional clerisy, its approach to cultural and religious matters make their initiative 
comparable to Islamic Protestantism, which through cultivation of progressive elites strongly 
stimulated the emergence of national identity and nationalist movement in Islamic cultural 
sphere (Gellner 40-1; Anderson 39; Breuilly 48-9). 
 
 Jadidist approach had a strong effect on the process of formation of Central Asian 
Turkic Muslim ethnic identities. Even though the Muslims of Central Asia generally defined 
boundaries of their community in religious terms, in some instances they based their identity 
on Turkic fundaments. The prominence of Turkic aspects of ethnic identity even briefly 
increased after 1917 due to relaxed Russian censorship on one side and the support of pan-
Turkism by the Ottoman Empire on the other side (Khalid 291-2). A good example of 
embrace of Turkic identity by Jadids is a statement made by Tashkent Islamic Council (Ar. 
Tashkand Shura-yi Islamiya), a committee of Muslim representatives, in 1917:  
 
‗Muslims! All hopes, all goals of us Turks are the same: to defend our religion and 
our nation, to gain autonomy over our land and our country, to live freely without 
oppressing others and without letting others oppress us. Turkestan belongs to the 
Turks.‘ (Khalid 293) 
 
 Khalid points out that the Czarist and Soviet authorities mistook Jadidism for a sort of 
separatism, but that such concern was rather exaggerated. There were two main reasons to this, 
namely because in Czarist and Soviet power structure, there existed no mechanisms for the 
Muslims to effect independence, and because Jadids themselves failed to recruit support of 
Muslim conservative strata (Khalid 228-9). However, after the Russian 1917 revolution Jadids 
did to a certain degree manage broaden the scope of their activities from cultural to political 
arena. The fact that were sometimes involved in projects which strongly compromised Soviet 
authority
28
 and subsequently played leading roles in Central Asian Turkic until 1930s 
suggests that there was a close correlation between Jadidist ideology and increased political 
participation followed by articulate demands for political autonomy. This relation is further 
discussed in following sections of this chapter. 
 
 Apart from the Jadidist movement, after 1917 it was also the Soviet nationality policy 
that built on previous Jadidist nation work and contributed strongly to formation of ethnic 
identities of Central Asian Muslims. The chief strategy during first stage of Soviet minority 
policy (1922-1929) was a complex affirmative action in the form of so-called ‗indegenization‘ 
(Ru. korenizatsiya), or providing the newly defined nationalities of the Soviet empire with 
national attributes. The newly introduced criteria of communal delimitation were based 
predominantly on ethnicity and language, and were to replace the previously existent religious, 
                                                 
28
 Separatist Central Asian statelets with Jadid participation were for example Khoqand autonomy 
existing in Ferghana Valley in 1917-18 and Alash Orda with capital in Semey in 1917-1920. 
 62 
regional and occupational identities of Central Asian Muslims.
29
 In a process lasting until 
1936, indigenization led among other to abolition of Czarist administrative division of Central 
Asia and to gradual creation of Soviet republics with borders delimited according to ethnic 
boundaries which formally had the right to secede from the Soviet Union. Other measures 
intended to stimulate national identities of newly defined ethnic groups were for example 
standardization or creation of national spoken and written languages, compilation of national 
histories or epics, founding of national Academies of Sciences, opening schools in native 
languages or training of native Communist cadres. Naturally, defining of national traits of 
Central Asian ethnic groups accelerated the growth of national consciousness among Central 
Asians and led to rise of new class of secular, often fervently Communist, Central Asian 
intellectuals who were strongly aware of their ethnic identity (Connor 1984: 201, 213-4; 
Martin 1-2, 125-6; Wimbush 1985: 73; Bruchis 1984: 132). A representative example of the 
new Soviet secular elite was Mirza Sultan-Galiev (1892-1840), a prominent Tatar communist. 
However, an undesirable consequence of indigenization for the Soviet authorities was 
increase in articulation of political demands by new Muslim intelligentsia. Thus, the 
affirmative action experiment was terminated after J. V. Stalin (1878-1953) commenced his 
drastic power-consolidation campaigns in mid-1930s and set a new course of Soviet ethnic 
politics. Sultan Galiev and other Soviet Muslim figures, along with leading Jadids, eliminated 




Origins of Modernity in Xinjiang  
 
The above described Turkic nation-forming processes in the Ottoman empire/Turkey 
and Czarist/Soviet empire provided a model pattern which profoundly influenced, and 
sometimes even directly steered, the emergence of modern Uyghur national identity and 
nationalism. Similarly to Tatar society, the most significant contribution to this process was 
done by enlightened educators and publishers affiliated with merchant circles. Since the late 
19
th
 century, a certain portion of Xinjiang Musulman elites were able to greatly increase their 
physical mobility. Some families ran extensive commercial networks in Czarist Russia/Soviet 
Union and even managed to expand their entrepreneurial activities into the Ottoman empire, 
occasionally venturing as far as Austria-Hungary or Germany. Other reasons for travelling 
abroad were education or religious pilgrimage to Mecca (Khushtar 2000a: 210-5; Janishif 39; 
Bellér-Hann 349). During these stays, Xinjiang Turkic business elites observed foreign 
contemporary cultural and political trends and were also stunned by the difference in degree 
of development in comparison with Xinjiang. Upon return to Xinjiang, they strived to 
introduce foreign practices into their own society. Thus, despite potent factors inhibiting 
cultural interaction of Xinjiang with the outside world (mainly geopolitical distance and Yang 
Zengxin‘s isolationist policy), in the initial stage of early modern era (1884-1933) Xinjiang 
Turkic society experienced first instances of modern progressive trends. Similarly to other 
Islamic regions discussed above, mainly modern education, press and new social structures 
provided conditions for emergence of progressive Xinjiang Turkic intelligentsia, who 
subsequently played a key role in formation of modern Uyghur national consciousness.  
 
 
                                                 
29
 The absence of ethnic criteria of self-identification of Central Asian Muslims during the czarist era 
was similar to the situation in Xinjiang at the end of the Qing dynasty, as described in previous chapter. 
Also similarly to Xinjiang, judging for example by existence of some ethnic categories in Russian 
censuses of 1897 and 1911 (Matley 104), it is evident that proto-national consciousness did to a 
certain degree exist prior to Soviet indigenization. 
30
 Soviet ethnic policy is further discussed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
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Chinese and Traditional Islamic Education 
 
The most powerful impact on emergence of Uyghur national consciousness was 
generated by modern education. But before we examine this process, it is useful to summarize 
briefly other types of educational facilities available to Xinjiang Muslims in the period 1884-
1933. First type of educational institutions, the so-called y sh 義塾 (literally ‗compulsory 
school‘), was established by the provincial authorities and used Chinese language as a 
medium of instruction. Immediately after the reconquest of Xinjiang in 1878, Zuo Zongtang 
started founding free Confucian schools in order to acculturate local Muslim elite children and 
to train them as interpreters and clerks. Future job of these bi-lingual Turkic officials was to 
facilitate communication between the Qing empire and its subjects. In addition to standard 
teaching materials used in schools in China proper, there were special bilingual 
Chinese-Turkic materials in use that were expected to bridge the language barrier between 
Turkic students and Han or Hui teachers. Muslim students were given Chinese names (such as 
Aì Xuéshū 愛學書, in English ‗Loves Learning,‘ Bì Démíng 必得名, in English ‗Must 
Acquire a Reputation‘ or Tuī Dàlùn 推大論, in English ‗Promotes the Great Theory‘), were 
obliged to wear Chinese attire, to shave their heads and to braid their hair. For a number of 
reasons, these schools remained largely unpopular among Turkic population (Millward 2005: 
265-6; Millward 2007: 142-3; Schleussel 385). 
 
 Since 1904, the Qing court implemented policy of replacing traditional Confucian 
schools with founding modern schools, the so-called 學堂 xuétáng (literally ‗hall of learning‘). 
Their curricula were drawn upon Japanese and Western models and included natural sciences, 
mathematics, foreign languages, world geography, physical education and other subjects 
which gained importance due to the changing geopolitical status of China.
31
 Modernized 
education system was also implemented by the Xinjiang provincial authorities. By 1911, there 
were approximately six hundred new schools with about fifteen thousand students throughout 
the province. Modern schools were intended to educate children from all social backgrounds 
and their attendance was theoretically mandatory for boys. But although the new system did 
contain some attractive local specifics (for example emphasis on teaching technical subjects 
instead of facilitation of cultural change, initial instruction in Turkic or inclusion of Qur‘an 
classes into the curriculum), it remained largely unpopular among the indigenous Muslim 
population. One reason was economic – additional taxes were levied by the provincial 
administration in order to fund schools. Another reason was cultural – similarly to traditional 
Confucian schools, modern schools also required students to wear Chinese dress and style the 
hair like Qing subjects. This measure incurred bitter opposition of local Muslims. For this 
reason, the practice of sending substitute children, mostly belonging to poorer neighbors, to 
Chinese schools instead was quite a frequent phenomenon (Millward 2005: 268-271; 
Millward 2007: 143-6).  
 
The situation in the sphere of Chinese education underwent only minor changes during 
early republican administration of Yang Zengxin and Jin Shuren. The modern elementary 
schools continued to exist as theoretically mandatory and their overt purpose again became 
educating elite Muslim children with the aim of fostering loyal civil servants. As such, the 
modern Chinese schools were rather unpopular among local Muslims and purchasing 
                                                 
31
 The degree of modernity of the new schools has been put into question by assertions that the 
primary purpose of new education system was to strengthen loyalty of students to the Qing dynasty. 
Confucianism, seen as one of crucial instruments to promote this goal, was therefore an essential part 
of the ‗new‘ curriculum (Chuzo 180, 182). 
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substitutes for school attendance remained a frequent practice (Ezizi 1997a: 132). Secondary 
schools existed only in Urumchi and Ghulja. In 1920, Yang established a school for training 
Mongol and Kazak civil servants and in 1923, ‗Xinjiang Russian School of Law and Politics‘ 
(新疆俄文法政專門學校  Xīnji ng Éwén f zhèng zhu nmén xuéxi o, Shinjang Rusche 
Qanun-Siyasi Mektiwi) was founded in Urumchi. The only official vocational school in the 
province was technical school for drivers, also in Urumchi. During Jin Shuren‘s era, a school 
for instructing women administrative officials was established (Burhan 214, 271; Ezizi 1997a:  
129-30). 
 
 Traditional Islamic learning institutions available to Muslims of Xinjiang prior to the 
emergence of modern Turkic schools functioned in essentially the same way as in Russian 
Central Asia (Khalid 22-34). Elementary school (maktab) was affiliated with mosque in a 
particular neighborhood (mehelle) of a town or city and was run by the imam or another 
religious notable. There was no standardized curriculum or a central supervising authority and 
the teacher (akhunum or khelpitim) taught according to his individual knowledge and skills. 
The arbitrarily fixed curriculum was based on studying Arabic religious and Chaghatay 
literary works. Students were expected to memorize and recite the texts fluently, often without 
understanding their meaning or being able to explain it in Turkic. Except for writing and 
simple math, no technical subjects or skills were taught, because subjects such as simple 
counting, astronomy, chemistry, history or geography were by clergy considered anti-Islamic. 
All students shared one classroom regardless of their proficiency level and each proceeded 
according to his own pace under the supervision of the teacher or one of the older classmates. 
There was no fixed examination or grading system. No specific time was set for the beginning, 
duration and end of classes – instruction unfolded according to needs of teacher‘s daily 
agenda. Corporal punishment was frequently used – the parents would turn the child over to 
the teachers saying ‗the child‟s bones are mine, but his flesh is yours‟ (balining ustikhini 
méning, göshi silining). Tuition was paid every Thursday in cash or kind such as clothes, 
fabric or food.  
 
 Secondary learning institutions (madrasa) worked in a similar way. The curriculum 
was broadened to memorization and reciting of the whole Qur‘an, Arabic, counting, Persian, 
philosophy, Qur‘anic exegesis (tafsir), more Chaghatay literary works and other subjects. As 
was the case in other Islamic regions, madrasas trained experts in Islamic law and education 
and thus served as locus of reproduction of fundaments of Islam (Janishif 89-93; Bellér-Hann 
326-33). By the end of Qing dynasty, the traditional, by Jadids and other progressives labeled 
as old, way of education (Ar. usul-i qadam) in Xinjiang utterly failed to respond to objectives 
of nascent modern era. On the contrary, it augmented the position of conservative religious 
dignitaries (qedimchi) and thus also the power alliance with Qing and Yang anti-modernist 
establishment. As observed elsewhere, ‗(t)he maktabs and madrasas of Central Asia were the 
clearest sign of the stagnation, if not the degeneracy, of Central Asia‘ (Khalid 20). 
 
Modern Education in Southern Xinjiang 
  
 The earliest promoters of modern Turkic education (penniy ma‟arip, literally 
‗scientific education‘) in Xinjiang were the wealthy and influential Musabay clan of Atush-
Kashgar area. Musabays‘ first known involvement with education dates from mid-nineteenth 
century, when Abdurusul Akhun Bay (?) and his son Musabay Haji (1809-1895) sponsored 
reconstruction of schools and accumulated a large private collection of books. Musabay‘s 
sons - Hüsenbay Haji (1844-1926) and Bawudun Bay (1851-1928) are credited with the 
pioneering introduction of supplementary secular subjects to the curriculum of the prominent 
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Khanliq madrasa in Kashgar in 1870. The structure of classes was modeled on European 
examples intercepted via Tatar and Ottoman modern schools and included math, mother 
language, geography, physical education, art, poetry and other subjects. However, these 
courses were soon discontinued due to pressure from conservative circles. The Musabays 
therefore decided to relocate the centre of their activities to their home village Éqsaq near 
Atush located approximately forty kilometers from Kashgar, where they launched a modern 
school and pedagogical institute called the Hüseyiniye in mid-1880s. 
  
 The school taught a number of secular subjects, as well as Qur‘anic classes (Table I). 
On the elementary level, the children started school attendance at the age of nine or ten years 
and studied for six to seven years, while at the teachers‘ college, education took four years. In 
the first year, there was enrolment of 105 students, including 25 girls. The school had separate 
classrooms and a system of examination and grading - grades were divided into four degrees: 
‗excellent‘ (elyol‟ela), ‗good‘ (ela), ‗medium‘ (ewse) and ‗failed‘ (edna). During graduation, 
students could receive four kinds of trophies – Certificate of Honor (Tehsinname), Certificate 
of Commendation (Apirinname), Certificate of Praise (Teqdirname) or Certificate of 
Enrolment (Shahadetname). Students could also apply for scholarships or accommodation. 
The school compound and teaching equipment was luxurious at the time and included 
performance stage, library, showers, classrooms with windows, chairs, desks and blackboards. 
Subsequently, physical education classes based on Ottoman model were also implanted into 
the curriculum. In 1907, the name of the teachers‘ college school was changed to Hebib Zade 
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Table 1. Schedule at the Hüseyiniye school in early years (Khustar 2000: 221). 
 
 
 A remarkable trait of modern education in Kashgar area was the strong inspiration by 
Ottoman practice and ideology. In 1913, the Musabay brothers in cooperation with several 
other progressive scholars managed to contract in Istanbul several Ottoman pedagogues to 
come to teach at their school in Xinjiang. The leading figures of the Ottoman group was 
Ahmet Kemal İlkul, other members were Ababekri Ependi, Imir Molla, Abdurakhman Ependi, 
Mukerrem Qari, Sami Ependi and Amrulla Ependi. All were members of the above mentioned 
nationalistic and partially pan-Turkist organization Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) 
and were also affiliated with its paramilitary arm called Special Organization (Tu. Teşkilat-ı 
Mahsusa). Kemal and his colleagues were active in Atush and Kashgar since 1914 and 
implanted principles of pan-Turkism and nationalism into their teaching, such as instruction in 
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Ottoman Turkish, pledging allegiance to the Sultan, marching, singing of nationalistic 
marching songs etc. Their activities incurred opposition of the qedimchi supported by the 
provincial administration. The result was swift closure of several modernist schools and 
proscription of the Ottoman Turks‘, as well as all other foreign teachers‘, activities in 
Xinjiang, on the charges of fomenting pan-Turkism and separatism. Kemal continued contacts 
with his students in secrecy until 1917, when he was arrested and deported via Shanghai back 
to the Ottoman empire.
32
 This ominous clash revealed that modernist activities directly 
violated the interests of both the Yang administration and conservative clergy (Ezizi 1997a: 
146; Burhan 172; Khushtar 2000a: 224; Khushtar 2000b: 252; Shinjiro 25-7; Schleussel 386-
7). Vice versa, resistance of influential Islamic establishment to modernism was a recurrent 
impediment to spread of new education and other attributes of modernity in Muslim 
communities (not only) in Xinjiang (Ezizi 1997a: 144-5; Janishif 71; Abdusémetov 58; 
Khalid: 4). One of foremost Uyghur historians and linguists Ibrahim Muti‘i relates that 
bicycles were called ‗devil‘s vehicles‘ (sheytan harwa) by the conservatives and that his older 
brother Jamal, who was the first person to bring a bicycle from the Soviet Union and ride it on 
the streets of Urumchi, was hence nicknamed ‗Jamal the Devil‘ (Jamal Sheytan; Muti‘i 1990: 
387). Similarly, the noun ‗modernist‘ (jedid) was sometimes used in a derogatory sense (MEP 
21). 
 
Hüseyiniye was the most progressive institute of learning in southern Xinjiang in the 
initial stage of early modern era (1884-1933). Its graduates were able to make use of 
relatively vast knowledge and skills and enjoyed high social prestige. They were the first 
generation of secular teachers who in turn established modern schools in the whole province. 
Most of educated prominent Turkic intellectuals and politicians of the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s 
and later obtained their education at the Hüseyiniye or its sequel schools. Due to the Ottoman 
pan-Turkist influence, the students at these schools also came in contact with ideas of national 
awakening and national movement. The Musabay clan also provided material support to 
anti-Qing Ili revolutionaries in 1911 (Schleussel 387). Thus, the Hüseyiniye education had a 
strong impact on emergence of indigenous progressive intelligentsia and Musabay brothers 
are revered as founders of modern Uyghur education and foremost Uyghur enlighteners.
33
 The 
progressive spirit of Hüseyiniye education is well illustrated by the following Ottoman-style 
marching song sung by the school‘s athletes on the field during sport events in 1910s: 
 
 ‗Fellow fighters, let us group up to overthrow the smothering ideology, 
To rip the curtains of darkness which are covering the eyes of motherland, 
Knowledge is what will deliver our people from ignorance, 
And also we shall be today delivered by knowledge.‘ (Khushtar 2000a: 227) 
 
Modern Education in Northern and Eastern Xinjiang 
 
Emergence of modern education in northern and eastern parts of the province was 
strongly influenced by their geographical proximity to Russian Central Asia. It was easy for 
prosperous Muslim entrepreneurs to travel from Xinjiang cities such as Ghulja, Chöchek, 
Urumchi and Turfan to Russian territory and experience local progressive trends. The contact 
functioned also in the other direction – Russian nationals involved in commerce were 
                                                 
32
 Ahmet Kemal İlkul‘s own account of his Xinjiang and China experience is available in his memoir 
republished in modern Turkish (Kemal 1997).  
33
 High rate of education and cultural standard in the Atush area, undoubtedly caused by long lasting 
influence by progressive trends, is reflected even today by the high percentage of Atush people among 
contemporary Xinjiang elites. 
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increasingly present in northern and eastern Xinjiang since the end of the nineteenth century.  
This interaction was accelerated by the presence of Russian consulates, all of which, with the 
exception of Kashgar, were located in northern Xinjiang. As in western Central Asia, the 
mediators of contact between Russia and Xinjiang Muslims were predominantly Tatar 
merchants who simultaneously imported their progressive ideas and institutions into Xinjiang. 
Tatar businessmen started settlling in northern Xinjiang cities since 1851 mainly in Ghulja, 
Chöchek and Urumchi and gradually extended their activities to culture and politics. Hence 
these cities, expecially Ghulja, became cosmopolitan arenas of bustling with commercial, 
cultural and political interaction of Chinese and Russian Turkic subjects (Burhan 175).  
 
Tatar role in formation of modern Turkic education in Xinjiang was thoroughly 
analyzed by Xinjiang Tatar scholar Malik Janishif (Janishif 2001). Tatar communities in 
Xinjiang soon developed practice of founding mosques with affiliated schools as a cultural 
center of the community. First Tatar madrasa was founded in Urumchi in 1880. Traditional 
Tatar schools started transforming into modern ones around 1900. Owing to close ties of 
Xinjiang Tatars with their relatives in Russian territory, Tatar schools were able to directly 
and quickly intercept institutes of Jadidism, which were themselves based on Russian and 
European models. In particular, Tatar schools in Xinjiang directly adopted curriculum, 
textbooks and teaching staff from Jadidist schools in Tatar centers such as Kazan, Ufa or 
Orenburg. Since 1914, Tatar schools for girls were coming into existence. Some of Jadidist 
schools would also run teacher training courses or libraries on their premises, such as the 
important Miryusup library in Chöchek or the Hüseyin Taratov library in Ghulja (Muti‘i 1990: 
385). Apart from Tatar children, the education of Xinjiang Tatars was available also to other 
ethnic groups, including Turkic Muslims. Many prominent Xinjiang Turkic intellectuals, such 
as the aforementioned Ibrahim Muti‘i, were educated at Tatar Jadidist schools (Janishif 53-76; 
Schleussel 387).  
 
 Tatar teachers contracted from Tatarstan often constituted the core of teaching staff at 
schools founded by Xinjiang Jadids. A model example of this phenomenon is the cooperation 
of affluent Turfan businessman and enlightener Mekhsut Muhiti (1885-1932) with Tatar 
teacher and progressive intellectual Heyder Sayrani (1886-1943), both of whom had been 
mentioned earlier. The two became acquainted in 1909 during Muhiti‘s trip to Kazan. Later 
that year, Sayrani arrived in Turfan and became the family teacher of the Muhiti family. The 
first Jadidist teachers‘ college with Sayrani as the main teacher was launched in the Turfan 
area in 1913 and used teaching materials published in Kazan. In 1918-9, six other Tatar 
teachers from Russia arrived and started teaching at Jadidist schools founded by the Muhiti 
family and their associates in the Turfan region. Heyder Sayrani was also involved in other 
forms of cultural activism, such as secret distribution of Central Asian Jadidist and/or 
communist periodicals or lobbying for government sponsorship of student exchange between 
Xinjiang and Soviet Central Asia (Sayrani 58-66).
34
 Other Tatar Jadids taught at new schools 
in Ghulja, Chöchek, Qomul, Süydung, Altay, Bortala and other places in northern and eastern 
Xinjiang in 1910s and 1920s. Tatar Jadids were also present on the Hüseyiniye teaching staff 
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 The Turfan group eventually became strongly politicized. Since 1922, both Muhiti and Sayrani took 
part in actions of secret political societies. Mekhsut Muhiti was killed during the Qomul rebellion of 
1931 and his body was dismembered on the battlefield near Lükchün. He is remembered as one of the 
most influential and accomplished leaders of early modern Uyghur national movement (Ezizi 1997a: 
211). His brother Mahmud Muhiti (1887 – 1944) took part in the rebellion as well. After 1933, he 
became a military officer of provincial army in Kashgar region, where he also promoted modern 
education. Heyder Sayrani had to move to Chöchek in late 1930s for personal safety reasons, but was 
arrested in 1938 and together with other political prisoners executed in Ürümchi in 1943. 
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(Janishif 93-110). In sum, analogously to developments in southern Xinjiang, in the north and 
east the Tatar Jadidist influence combined with indigenous Turkic progressive initiative and 
enabled the rise of modern education system that was in turn the key factor behind emergence 
of new nationally conscious intelligentsia of Xinjiang Turkic Muslims. 
 
Nascent Turkic Periodicals and Social Organizations 
 
Turkic Muslims of Xinjiang first encountered modern printing technology via 
activities of foreign Christian mission workers. The most extensive efforts were undertaken 
by the Swedish Mission Society (Sw. Svenska Missionsförbundet) which had branches in 
Kashgar, Yengissar and Yarkend in 1892-1938. Due to the limited success of their 
proselytizing activities among local Muslims, the missionaries also pursued a number of 
philanthropic activities, such as medical care, education, training of vocational personnel, 
gathering of Turkic folklore and literature, compilation of dictionaries etc. Notably, they 
launched Xinjiang‘s first printing machine in 1905. Materials printed on this press included 
firstly missionary materials, such as translation of the Bible into local Turkic. Other type of 
products were related to the mission‘s philanthropic activities. A publication title of enormous 
cultural significance was the missionaries‘ translation of Holy Qur‘an into Turkic in first 
years of 1900s. They also printed Turkic textbooks for mission-run school on subjects such as 
natural sciences, mathematics, Turkic grammar and spelling, world geography and Central 
Asian history, translations of western fiction or the region‘s first Turkic calendar. Lastly, the 
mission also printed in trust materials for provincial or insurgent authorities, such as 
banknotes, leaflets, political pamphlets or nationalist periodicals.
35
 The Swedish mission‘s 
printing, publishing and other activities strongly stimulated cultural development of Turkic 
Muslim society in southern Xinjiang, and thus also contributed indirectly to the emergence of 
modern Uyghur ideas of nation and nationalism. 
 
 One of the earliest publication enterprises run in Xinjiang by indigenous Turkic 
Muslims was a lithographic printing house established by the Musabay brothers even earlier 
that missionary presses. In the 1890s, they reportedly founded a printing house called 
‗Sunshine Press, Source of Light‘ (Persian Metbe-i Khurshid, Metel-i Nuri) in Atush or 
Kashgar. The modest project was associated with leading modernist intellectuals and poets of 
the time, Tejelli (1850-1930), Abduqadir Damolla (1862-1924) and Qutluq Haji Shewqi 
(1976-1937). Qutluq Haji Shewqi was an illustrative example of early modern Xinjiang 
Turkic modernist. As a child, he acquired classical education in Kashgar and then continued 
his studies in Egypt, the Ottoman Empire and Bukhara. He became influenced by Ottoman 
modernist ideals and pursued them after his return to Xinjiang, becoming a promoter of 
modern education publishing and author of poems and articles advocating progress and 
reform. Since 1910 (according to other sources from 1918), Qutluq Haji Shewqi was the 
editor-in-chief of the Awareness Newspaper (Ang Géziti) which was published by the 
Musabay brothers‘ Sunshine Press.
36
 Its publication had to be discontinued soon due to 
economic hardship and pressure of conservative circles. Nevertheless, the Sunshine Press 
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 For more information on Swedish mission‘s activities in southern Xinjiang, see for example PFK 
1991. Printing of Christian religious material in Uyghur language was also to a lesser degree 
undertaken by the British China Inland Mission branch based in Ürümchi (Cable and French 244-7; 
Himit 44). 
36
 Qutluq Shewqi‘s activities are further mentioned in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
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continued to produce books and textbooks for modern education throughout the 1920s 




Other early publishing attempt in Turkic was the Ili Vernacular Daily (伊犁白話報 
Yīlí báihu  b o), which was issued by the aforementioned Ili revolutionaries in Ghulja since 
March 25, 1910. The main language of the daily was Chinese; however, the paper also 
appeared in Turkic, Manchu and Mongol mutations.
38
 Publication of the Ili Vernacular Daily 
was discontinued by Manchu General of Ili (伊犁將軍 Yīlí ji ngjūn) Zhi Rui (志銳) shortly 
after he took office on November 15, 1911. In February 1912, the paper was succeeded by the 
New Daily (新報 Xīnb o), which also ran a Turkic mutation. Existence of the New Daily 
came to an end shortly after Yang Zengxin eliminated the Ghulja faction in December 1913 
(Wei 50-5). The articles published by Ghulja revolutionaries with the aim of targeting 
Xinjiang Turkic Muslims advocated unity of the all nationalities against Manchu rule. One of 
their arguments was that the Qing had several times in history resorted to massacres of 
indigenous populations, be it Hans during the conquest of southern China or Xinjiang Turkic 
Muslims during post-Ya‘qup Beg reconquest (Millward 2007: 166). The revolutionaries also 
espoused the principle of equality of five Xinjiang nationalities (Han, Mongol, Hui, Turkic 
and Kazak, 漢蒙囘纏哈 H n Měng Huí Chán H ) and denounced derogatory labeling of 
Turkic Muslims used at the time even in official documents (‗Turban-Head‘ Muslim or 
‗Rag-Head‘ Muslim, 纏頭 Chántóu, or Dog-Muslim, written by the character 囘 with the dog 
radical). Therefore, the Ghulja revolutionary cause is said to have enjoyed a fairly high 
credibility among Xinjiang non-Han nationalities (Ezizi 1997a: 83, 86-7). Through the Ili 
Vernacular Daily and New Daily, Xinjiang Musulman for the first time encountered 
revolutionary ideals and principles of modern Chinese republicanism, which forwarded the 
idea of a multi-national state comprising several ethnic groups equal in rights and obligations. 
During Jin‘s era, there further existed the Chinese language Tianshan Daily (天山日報 
Ti nsh n r b o) published in Urumchi (STH 1:1), which rhetorically embraced ideology of 
Chinese republicanism. Nevertheless, until 1930s such instances of ideology transfer from 
China proper to Xinjiang Turkic milieu were isolated and the influence of Chinese republican 
statecraft on the emergence of modern Uyghur nationalism was therefore limited. It is 
moreover possible to argue that ideology from China proper spread only in areas of Xinjiang 
with sizeable Han presence (such as the heavily garrisoned northern Xinjiang or eastern 
Xinjiang neighboring on China proper), and therefore smaller Turkic presence. On the other 
hand, the following sections of this chapter will show that some Turkic intellectuals were 
familiar with ideology of Chinese republican nationalism. 
 
Information on other early printing and publishing attempts by Xinjiang Turkic 
enlighteners in the period 1884-1933 is scarce. Burhan Shehidi (1894-1989), originally a 
Russian Tatar who was later to become one of the most influential and remarkable figures of 
modern Xinjiang history, and his close friend Mirzajan clandestinely published a Turkic 
language magazine New Life (Yéngi Hayat) in 1922. Burhan contributed under the pseudonym 
Küntughdi.
39
 The magazine propagated self-perfection by the means of reading literary works 
and healthy lifestyle. In total, Burhan and Mirzajan produced mere two issues of over ten 
                                                 
37
 At the moment, issues of the above mentioned periodicals are not known to be preserved for 
research. It is possible that they are kept in regional archives in Xinjiang. 
38
 According to another source, the Uyghur version of the Ili Vernacular Daily was published in 1912 
(Burhan 33). 
39
 Küntughdi was a name of one the characters in ancient Uyghur classic Qutadghu Bilig 
(Happiness-Bringing Wisdom) written by Yüsüp Khas Hajib in 1069/1070. 
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pages each and secretly distributed about one hundred copies of each issue in shops of 
Urumchi (Burhan 226). Further, a newspaper called Our Voice (Bizning Tawush) was 
published from around 1920 in Chöchek (Sayrani 65; Tashbayof 58-9). Another figure active 
in publishing and printing was Hösiyinbeg Yunusov who purchased printing equipment from 
western Central Asia and established a printing house in the Ili region in 1918. In 1920, the 
enterprise was relocated to Ghulja, where it was used for printing schoolbooks. Abduqadir 
Damolla (1862 – 1924), one of the most influential Turkic modernist intellectuals, installed a 
lithographic printing machine in Kashgar at the beginning of twentieth century and used it for 
publishing his essays and school textbooks. The enterprise was destroyed after his 
assassination in 1924. Another Kashgari, Muhemmet Akhun Khelpitim, used self-carved 
wooden type to print religious materials. Another person involved in printing activities at the 
time was Haji Nurhaji in Yengissar (Himit 43-4; Abduljan 175-6). 
 
It is likely that the impact of early publishing and printing attempts by Xinjiang Turkic 
intellectuals from 1880s to 1920s was rather limited. One reason was their restricted 
circulation; in fact, several contemporary sources specifically remark on total absence of 
periodicals in Xinjiang at the time (Abdusémetov 95; Ezizi 129; Burhan 214). Another factor 
was high rate of illiteracy of Turkic Muslim population in early modern era. Nonetheless, the 
early publishing and printing attempts, augmented by much stronger impact of Turkic 
periodicals occasionally smuggled into the province from Russia/Soviet Union, did play a role 
analogous to previously discussed nation-formation processes in Russian Turkic communities 
– contributing to spread of modernity in Xinjiang, improving cultural standard of local 
readership, cultivating indigenous progressive intelligentsia and accelerating emergence of 
national identity of Xinjiang Turkic Muslims. 
 
 Another form of nascent modernity in Xinjiang were emerging new social structures 
and forms of organization. In particular, it was various cultural associations and philanthropic 
organizations, which promoted cultural activities and thus contributed to emergence of 
Uyghur national consciousness. One of such structures was a philanthropic Charity 
Association (Kheyr-Ihsan Birleshmisi) established in Kashgar in 1914 in relation with 
modernist activities of Abduqadir Damolla (Shinjiro 25). Another secret reformist 
organization was established in August 1922 by Burhan Shehidi and several other 
progressives, for instance Mekhsut Muhiti, Yunus Beg, Tahir Beg or Heyder Sayrani (who 
became Shehidi‘s brother-in-law in 1925; Burhan 226-7, 307-9; Sayrani 64). However, in 
contrast to modern education, new publishing and organizational initiatives emerged 
sporadically and clandestinely, as such phenomena were even more closely watched over by 
Yang then new schools or publications. Turkic progressive organizations‘ limited impact in 
Xinjiang was similar to the situation in Soviet Central Asia (Khalid 133-4). 
 
 Previously, several scholars researching nation-formation processes taking place 
elsewhere in the world pointed to the correlation between emergence of modern education, 
press and social organizations on the one hand, and nation-formation processes on the other 
hand. Specifically, Ernest Gellner has argued that education generally plays an essential part 
in effective working of modern society (Gellner 27-7) and Eric Hobsbawm aptly equated the 
progress of schools throughout the world with spread of nationalism (Hobsbawm 1996: 135-
6). Clearly, Xinjiang between 1880 and 1930 the modern Turkic education was by no means 
wide-spread, standardized or disseminated by state administration. Instead, first progressive 
education projects were launched by private enthusiasts at their own expenses and intended to 
culture a society which, despite their efforts, remained largely pre-industrial and agricultural 
at least until 1949 (Bellér-Hann 11). Similarly, early Turkic printing and publishing in 
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Xinjiang can by no means be called print capitalism producing hundreds of thousands of 
volumes and generating financial profit as posited by Benedict Anderson (33-6). On the 
contrary, first Xinjiang Turkic periodicals circulated most probably free of charge and only 
within a very limited scope of literate and mutually acquainted readers, while the information 
contained in the periodicals was further transmitted orally. The impact of modern social 
structures, such as enlightenment societies and charitable unions, was equally limited.  
 
 Nevertheless, the progressive Turkic schools and the albeit sporadic, yet existent, 
attempts at issuing periodicals and forming philanthropic organizations were the most 
significant stimulus for the spread of modern knowledge and cultural enlightenment within 
Xinjiang Musulman society between 1880s and late 1920s. Xinjiang modern schools, 
periodicals, societies and other structures also cultivated and provided organizational basis for 
activities of progressive activists. Subsequent sections of this dissertation will show that local 
modern Turkic intelligentsia and elites educated by or affiliated with these structures played a 
leading role in local Turkic politics and in various ways generated modern Uyghur national 
consciousness and nationalism. In accordance with John Breuilly‘s general theory and 
so-called ‗intellectual interpretation‘ of national movement and nationalism, which views 
these phenomena as a search for cultural identity and a product mostly of intellectuals who are 
building on common language, cultural and political heritage, and who are actively designing 
educational system in order to inculcate nationalist values into the youth, it will be illustrated 
later in the dissertation that Xinjiang Turkic progressive intelligentsia‘s literacy, education, 
awareness of modern developments and other skills acquired in the first wave of new 
Xinjiang Turkic schools later enabled these figures to become outspoken communal political 
leaders (Breuilly 48, 149-52). The role of Xinjiang progressive intelligentsia and local 
correlation between modernism and political aspirations was thus parallel to patterns traced in 
Arab or other Turkic Muslim communities (Hourani 310, 328-9; Khalid 252-8) or to cases of 
transition from cultural to political nationalism in non-Islamic regions as exemplified 
elsewhere on the case of Czech enlightener František Palacký (1798-1876; Breuilly 59-61, 
132-3). 
 
Birth of the Idea of Modern Uyghur Nation in Russo-Soviet Central Asia 
 
 Besides intercepting contemporary cultural and political trends, Xinjiang Turkic 
enlighteners were also directly inspired from Turkic milieu in the Ottoman and Russian 
empire in starting to perceive their community as a modern nation. In fact, they could directly 
appropriate even the idea of Uyghur modern nation, for it was first in Russo-Soviet Central 
Asia that this concept came into being. The above passages showed how after founding of the 
Soviet empire in early 1920s, the Soviets build to a certain degree upon Jadidist cultural 
reform initiative and took affirmative action of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU) towards creating national identities of Central Asia Muslims. This complex strategy 
also targeted Turkic population of Xinjiang. Soviet propaganda regarded Xinjiang Turkic 
Muslims as a client group which was supposed to be liberated by communist movement. Such 
efforts also augmented Xinjiang Turkic Muslims‘ sense of own ethnic identity and position in 
Xinjiang power hierarchy.  
 
 Initially, the primary target of such Soviet propaganda were seasonal workers from 
southern Xinjiang who went to work across the border mainly in agriculture, mining or oil, 
cotton and timber industry. The number of these migrant workers was approximately fifty-two 
thousand in 1913, while in the 1920s it was estimated at 10-20% of southern Xinjiang Turkic 
population, or over 200.000 people (Brophy 166; Ezizi 1997a: 151; Bellér-Hann 63). Apart 
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from these Xinjiang workers directly witnessing the wooing effects of post-1917 
indigenization of Central Asian life, they were also subjected to direct communist propaganda. 
Some even became members of the Communist Party of the USSR and continued work in 
Xinjiang (Ezizi 1997a: 151). First communist cell in Kashgar was established around 1917
40
 
(Khushtar 2000a: 227). Another Soviet-sponsored organization was the Xinjiang Liberation 
Organization (Shinjangni Qutuldurush Teshkilati) established in Soviet Central Asia (Ezizi 
1997a: 152). Soviets also published periodicals in Xinjiang Turkic language that specifically 
addressed the situation in Xinjiang, such as the Liberation (Qutulush) issued in Taskent in 
1920s (Burhan 148). 
 
 Soviet ideological workers were also dispatched from the Soviet Union to carry out 
pro-communist activities in Xinjiang. These were for example Tatars associated with modern 
schools in northern Xinjiang. In particular, the Tatars brought news of the Soviet revolution 
and the allegedly improved living conditions in Soviet Central Asia, clandestinely distributed 
Soviet press and organized demonstrations (Ezizi 1997a: 149-50; Janishif 67-80). As the 
Soviets strengthened their ties with the Chinese Communist Party around 1925, the main line 
of Soviet propaganda in Xinjiang shifted from espousing national liberation to calls for 
establishing unity of the budding Xinjiang Muslim communist movement with that of Hans 
and Huis in China proper. That way, a united communist front within the territorial extent of 
the entire Republic of China would be created. Early Xinjiang communists were thus urged to 
forge working relationship with Han communists under training in Moscow. Not surprisingly, 
Yang Zengxin tenaciously opposed infiltration by socialist and communist activity (Ezizi 
1997a: 152; Roberts 372-4; Burhan 182-3, 215). 
 
 However, a phenomenon of greater interest for research in formation of modern 
Uyghur national consciousness and nationalism was the emergence of the concept of modern 
Uyghur nation. The initial stage of this process was the revival of ancient name ‗Uyghur‘, 
which, since fifteenth century gradually fell out of use for a community of people, as showed 
in Chapter 1 of this dissertation. In the nineteenth century, the name ‗Uyghur‘ was revived for 
labeling Xinjiang indigenous sedentary Turkic Muslims, who at the time actually referred to 
themselves as Musulman, as showed also in Chapter 1. First instances of use of the revived 
name ‗Uyghur‘ are found in works of Western and Russian scholars. Notably, German 
linguist Julius Heinrich Klaproth (1783–1835) in 1820 and Kazakh explorer Chokan 
Valikhanov (1835-1865) in 1850 pointed to direct genetic, linguistic and cultural connection 
between ancient Uyghurs and inhabitants of early modern southern Xinjiang (Brophy 169-70). 
As Central Asian Turkic Jadids and progressives were interested in culture and history of all 
Turkic nations and ethnic groups, they also became acquainted with this thesis and introduced 
it into their discourse and activities. This idea also gained popularity among intellectuals of 
immigrant communities from the territory of Xinjiang. These were firstly those with roots in 
southern Xinjiang called Kashgaris or Altisheheris (in English ‗inhabitants of Six Cities‘), 
who lived predominantly in urban areas of today‘s Uzbekistan. The second group was the 
Taranchis, who originated in northern Xinjiang and migrated mainly to the western part of the 
Ili valley (also called Yettisu, Ru. Semirechiye, in English ‗Seven Rivers Region‘) and 
Almaty. At least from early 1910s, some intellectuals and progressive from these two 
communities increasingly started perceiving Xinjiang indigenous sedentary Turkic Muslims 
as a single ethnic group called Uyghur. 
                                                 
40
 The communist party cell in Kashgar was thus founded earlier than the Chinese Communist Party, 
which was established in 1921 in Shanghai. This was again due to the geopolitical proximity of 
Xinjiang to the Soviet Union. 
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 A good example of a modernist Taranchi intellectual who subscribed to the idea of 
southern Xinjiang Turkic inhabitants‘ descent from ancient Uyghurs was Nezerghoja 
Abdusémet (1887-?), who published under a pseudonym Uyghur Balisi (‗Uyghur Child‘). The 
details of his personal life are not well known. He was a son of an educated participant in the 
Taranchi-Tungan uprising in Ghulja in 1860s, mentioned in Chapter 1. Their family migrated 
to the western part of the Ili valley in the wake its eastern part being returned to the Qing 
under provisions of the Treaty of St. Petersburg 1881. Abdusémet attended traditional maktab, 
but gradually became involved in Jadidist movement by contributing articles to Jadidist 
periodicals, such as the very influential progressive Orenburg-published Tatar paper Council 
(Tat. Shura), which circulated throughout whole Turkic world including Xinjiang. After 1917, 
Abdusémet supported the communist movement and wrote for Turkic Soviet periodicals of 
Central Asia. Besides, he also wrote poetry and prose. He reportedly fled to Xinjiang in the 
early 1930s after the Soviet ethnic policy shift following Stalin‘s ominous shift in ethnic 
policy in 1930s and nothing is further known about him (Roberts 367-8, 374; Brophy 170-1). 
 
A selection of Abdusémet‘s articles and literary pieces was republished under the title 
Bright Shores (Yoruq Sahillar; Abdusémetov 1991). It is namely the journalistic works, 
authored between 1911 and 1923, which provide considerable insight into Taranchi society 
and mindset of Taranchi progressives in early 20
th
 century. Significant space is devoted to 
historical issues. In the longest entry in the anthology, the Taranchi History (Taranchi Tarikhi; 
Abdusémetov 9-62), Abdusémet attempted to draw up a complete history of Taranchis in Ili, 
the „all-time residence site of Taranchi people‟ (Abdusémetov 10). Similarly to traditional 
Turko-Islamic historical works, in his initial narrative Abdusémet covers mythical origins of 
Turkic ethnicity – ancient tribes (including Uyghurs) living in Ili and the Six Cities
41
 region 
and Chinggisid era with Chaghataid and Zungharid periods. Large space is also dedicated to 
the historical past of Taranchi community. Interestingly, Abdusémet does not mention the fact 
that the first power to resettle agriculturalists from Six Cities to the north was the Zunghars. 
Instead, he identifies the origins of Taranchi people with the relocations initiated by the Qing. 
According to him, Chinese emperor entrusted a certain Emin Wang with the project. Emin 
Wang sent his son Musa Gong
42
 who had six thousand households of farmers moved to the Ili 
valley in 1765. Thereupon, these migrants were named ‗Taranchi‘, meaning ‗a peasant, 
cultivator‘ (Abdusémetov 20-21). The narrative then continues through the 1860s anti-Qing 
rebellion in Ili and the regions‘ annexation by Russia to Taranchi migration westwards after 
the eastern part of Ili was returned to the Qing in 1881. 
 
 Other parts of Taranchi History and other entries in the anthology deal with 
contemporary conditions of Taranchis and disclose Abdusémet‘s modernist ideas with 
typically Jadidist educative overtones. An illustrative example the following statement: ‗We 
have composed this handbook entitled “Taranchi History” in order to acquaint Taranchi 
children with events of their own history…‟ (Abdusémetov 10). Having in mind that 
Taranchis were a moderate and not a particularly well-known community within the Turkic 
world, Abdusémet dedicated a great part of his journalistic articles to descriptions of 
contemporary life, social issues and dissonances within Taranchi society. One article 
describes Taranchi people as ‗generally civilized‘ (umumen medeniy), living in clean 
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 For Abdusémet, the Six Cities were Kashgar, Yarkend, Aksu, Kucha, Turfan and Khotan 
(Abdusémet 132).  
42
 The title gong probably originated from the rank 公 g ng (prince), which was as a part of indirect 
rule granted by the Qing to local officials in Turfan and Qomul area. 
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buildings arranged in straight streets. Villages are very peaceful and youth occupy themselves 
with study. However, since Taranchis did not establish the custom of educating women, the 
household upbringing of children is deficient and Taranchi women are susceptible to 
superstitions. Some pre-modern practices also survived in medical care and religion, such as 
‗shamanism‘ (pére oyuni) or ‗Sufism‘ (ishanliq). However, according to Abdusémet, owing to 
the spread of periodicals after 1905, Taranchis became more knowledgeable of the world 
around them, started to notice their ‗various social deficiencies‘ (türlük ijtima‟iy kemchilikler), 
criticized the old order and worked towards reform. This ensued in tension between the 
‗young‘ (yashlar, i.e. the reformists) and ‗old‘ (qérilar, i.e. the traditionalists). The latter used 
to derogatively call the former ‗short coats‘ (kalte chapan) according to Western-style suit 
worn by the progressives, as opposed to traditional ‗long coats‘ (uzun chapan) worn by 
conservatives. However, as modernity gradually spread throughout the Taranchi society, the 
term ‗short coat‘ actually acquired positive connotations, so the traditionalists stopped using it. 
Eventually, all maktabs transformed to ‗Jadidist schools‘ (usul-jedit mektiwi) without 
encountering any opposition within Taranchi society (Abdusémetov 99-106). Abdusémet 
specifically states that the ‗awakening‘ (oyghinish) of Taranchis occurred in the twentieth 
century, as opposed to that of the Tatars which took place in the nineteenth century: 
  
‗…We have said that the Taranchi Turks have entered the stage of awakening. The 
reason is that after 1905, they started associations bent on reforming maktabs and 
madrasas, opening Muslim (musulmanche) printing houses, sending children for 
education to government schools, welcoming national (milliy) periodicals, observing 
other developing nationalities (millet), learning from them and caring more about 
their own situation. In other words, these are some of the signs of their awakening…‘ 
(undated; Abdusémetov 110) 
 
 At the same time, Abdusémet did not hesitate to criticize the shortcomings of new 
educational system. For instance, he identified the absence of standardized curriculum and 
lack of trained teachers as the two main problems of Taranchi Jadidist education: 
 
‗…It has been written in the newspaper Ili Prefecture (Ili Wilayiti) published in the 
past in Taranchi dialect: ―Once a nation enters the world of progress (tereqqiyat) and 
civilization (medeniyet), in order to attain knowledge (ilim) and education (ma‟arip) 
it is primarily in need of elementary school teachers. This is a basic principle. The 
standard of life, wealth, knowledge and education is measured according to the size 
of their elementary education system. If a nation does not have elementary school 
teachers, then this nation is considered ignorant and uneducated….‖ This means that 
without elementary school teachers, a nation cannot develop… But at the moment, 
are there any teachers familiar with teaching methods and procedures of modern 
education in our Ili prefecture? If we think about it, alas, for sure there are not even 
five or ten of them…‘ (1911; Abdusémetov 121-2) 
 
 Abdusémet‘s writings feature many other modernist concepts. Indications of his own 
religious affiliation are rare, neither does he refer to Westerners by the term ‗infidel;‘ instead, 
he uses the emotionally neutral term ‗foreigners‘ (ejnabiyler; Abdusémetov 26). He also uses 
Christian calendar, as opposed to Islamic, and system of longitude and latitude coordinates for 
determining geographic location of the Ili valley (Abdusémetov 11). Abdusémet‘s language 
contains Russian loanwords, such as moda (fashion) or microb (microbe; Abdusémetov 103). 
Western and Russian civilization is regarded as advanced and inspiring, whereas Qing 
administration is described as obstructive to development (Abdusémetov 105, 108-9). 
Abdusémet frequently uses the old vocabulary in new context. Notably, the word millet, 
which had been previously used by Turkic writers and historians in the sense of an ethnically 
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undistinguished religious community of an empire (Sayrami 1988: 42, 76), or simply ‗a 
community‘ (Zürcher 68), acquired the meanings ‗nation‘ or ‗nationality‘ in Abdusémet‘s 
modernist discourse. The word khelq, which in late-imperial era texts had the connotation of 
‗common people‘ (Sayrami 1988: 247), is by Abdusémet used in the sense of ‗a people‘ or 
‗nation‘ (Abdusémetov 32, 42). Similarly, the term puqra, which had also meant ‗common 
people‘ in pre-modern texts (Sayrami 1988: 32, 42, 182, 266), starts to be used by Abdusémet 
in the sense of ‗citizen‘ (Abdusémetov 32). 
 
 Abdusémet‘s texts included in Bright Shores illustrate well that their author‘s 
perception of communal identity and interest was very different form that existent in 
pre-modern era. Abdusémet clearly viewed his people as an ethnically defined nation with 
clear ethnic boundaries, common name, myth of descent, history, culture, territory, sense of 
solidarity, political aspirations and other defining traits typical for era of nations. He even 
retroactively perceived Taranchis as a nation all the way against the current of history up to 
the Qing resettlement in 1865. By the alternative and frequent use of the label ‗Taranchi 
Turks‘ (Taranchi Türkler or Taranchi Türkliri; for example Abdusémetov 69, 99, 108, 110 
and elsewhere), Abdusémet also simultaneously recognized that Taranchi national community 
belonged into the broader family of Turkic nations. It is therefore likely that at the moment of 
communist takeover of Central Asia by mid-1918, the identity of Taranchi nation in the 
Yettisu-Almaty region was firmly consolidated in minds of Taranchi intellectual elites. This is 
also attested by the fact that some Taranchis opposed the Bolsheviks by forming autonomous 
administration and publishing their own paper called Taranchi Voice (Sada-i Taranchi; 
Brophy 167). 
 
 Apart from articles describing Taranchi contemporary social reality in the territory of 
Czarist Russia, Abdusémet also authored pieces dedicated to problems of Xinjiang. His close 
attention to the fate of his Turkic compatriots across the border was perpetuated by general 
Jadidists interest in history and culture of Turkic nations, by the Taranchi origins in Xinjiang 
and by the remarkable fate of his father during late Qing insurgency. Abdusémet‗s knowledge 
of Xinjiang and enthusiastic advocacy of local Turkic people‘s cause increased especially 
after his journey to Aksu in 1914. Again, Abdusémet‘s writings about Xinjiang feature typical 
Jadidist discourse, namely history lessons and condemnations of social problems. Xinjiang, or 
in Abdusémet‘s terminology Chinese Turkestan (Chiniy Türkistan; Abdusémetov 67, 70 and 
elsewhere) or East Turkestan (Sherqiy Türkistan; Abdusémetov 94, 96 and elsewhere), is 
portrayed as a very backward territory lacking even the most basic cultural institutions and 
practices. In Abdusémet‘ view, this is naturally because of mismanagement by Chinese 
administration. In an article written in 1911, Abdusémet notes that affairs of East Turkestanis 
are run by religious establishment and that there are no Turkic schools or press. Modern 
Chinese schools founded by the Xinjiang government are too few and the instruction is in 
Chinese, therefore the schools are largely useless for Muslims (Abdusémetov 69-70). He also 
remarks that the condition of education in Chinese Turkestan did not change since Noah‘s 
times, that the people in East Turkestan are living as they lived a thousand years ago and that 
their future is dark and hazy (Abdusémetov 94-5). He also notes the smothering authority of 
clergy, wide-spread prostitution and isolation from changes taking place even in inner China 
(Abdusémetov 132-42). In Abdusémet‘s depiction, when compared to the situation of 
Taranchis living in Russia, Xinjiang Turkic Muslims are living in a whole different world: 
 
‗…One Uyghur owed 15 som to a Han and was not able to repay, so he gave up his 
child instead of the money. This is our life… This is the situation all over the place. 
Whoremongers, vagabonds, beggars and gamblers have the strongest say in the 
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society. Patriots and modernists are second-class people…‘ (undated; Abdusémetov 
96) 
 
Similarly to efforts at fostering Taranchi ethnic identity and national consciousness, 
Abdusémet also articulated the idea of modern Uyghur nation. David Brophy‘s and Sean 
Roberts‘ research (Brophy 2005; Roberts 2009) suggests that Abdusémet is one of the very 
first Turkic enlighteners known to intercept the academic thesis of direct connection between 
the ancient Uyghurs and contemporary Turkic sedentary population of eastern and southern 
Xinjiang oases. Throughout his works, Abdusémet views Turkic Muslims of Seven Cities as a 
distinct community who, despite the fact that they do not possess their own ethnic name, are 
genetic descendants of ancient Uyghur people: 
 
‗..Above we have said that the Uyghurs of East Turkestan used to be called 
―Uyghurs‖ in the past and that they became nameless afterwards. Why is that? If you 
ask a local Turk who he is, he will answer: ―A Kashgari‖ or ―A Khotani.‖ If you tell 
him that this is a toponym, he will immediately say: ―I am a Muslim.‖ If you tell him 
that you were not asking about his religion, he will say with a fright: ―I am a 
Rag-Head.‖ The ones who come to contact with Kazaks and Kyrghyz will tell you 
they are Sarts.
43
 It means that they do not know who they really are. What 
ignorance!..‘ (undated; Abdusémetov 96) 
 
‗…In the past called ―Uyghur,‖ now nameless Turkic people of East Turkestan, are 
very unfortunate and miserable as regards their lives. We have seen it during our 
journey to Aksu in 1914...‘ (undated; Abdusémetov 94) 
 
Although Abdusémet predominantly uses labels ‗Six Cities Turks‘ (Altisheher Türkliri; 
Abdusémetov 25 and elsewhere), ‗Six City residents‘ (Altisheherlik; Abdusémetov 54 and 
elsewhere), ‗Kashgar Turks‘ (Kashgar Türkliri; Abdusémetov 117 and elsewhere) or ‗Chinese 
Turkestan Turks‘ (Türkstan Chiniy Türkliri; Abdusémetov 84 and elsewhere) for south 
Xinjiang Turkic population, on several occasions he directly calls the contemporary Turkic 
inhabitants of southern Xinjiang by the name ‗Uyghur,‘ which actually somewhat contradicts 
his own claim of their namelessness. Nevertheless, such instances in Abdusémet‘s early 
1910s‘ writings are the first known instances of a progressive Turkic intellectual wielding the 
ancient ethnonym ‗Uyghur‘ with the aim of disseminating the idea of modern Uyghur nation:  
 
‗…Ninety-nine percent of people living now in the province of Six Cities in Chinese 
Turkestan are Uyghurs...‘ (undated; Abdusémetov 62) 
 
‗…The Turks (Uyghurs) of East Turkestan use the name ―Chinggis‖ until now, 
meaning ―strong,‖ ―thorough,‖ ―persevering,‖ ―tough‖ or ―joyous…‖‘ (1912; 
Abdusémetov 84) 
 
‗…We noticed that future prospects of East Turkestan‘s Uyghurs are dark, hazy and 
scary…‘ (undated; Abdusémetov 95) 
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 Sart was a name used in pre-modern period to refer to sedentary inhabitants of Central Asian oases. 
In Xinjiang, it invariably designated Turkic population, while in Russian Central Asia it also pointed 
to non-Turkic, i.e. Persian speaking urbanites. The term Sart is today still occasionally used in 
Xinjiang by pastoral Turkic nationalities (i.e. Kazaks and Kyrgyz), to refer to sedentary Turkic 
nationalities (i.e. Uyghurs, Uzbeks and Tatars). Sometimes the term carries slightly derogatory 
connotations, such as in the Kazak saying ‗There is poison in the last bite of Sart‟s meal‘, which 




‗…After Uyghurs in Russia developed their printing and various newspapers were 
published, Taranchi Turks also started reading newspapers in greater numbers...‘ 
(undated; Abdusémetov 104) 
 
‗…Where is the motherland of our ancestors, the homeland of our cultured Uyghur 
forefathers? The great and strong Uyghur khanate established by Islamic holy 
warriors vanished so quickly only because of the shadowy steps taken by traitors…‘ 
(1914; Abdusémetov 132) 
 
‗…When the official found out that we were Russian citizens, he immediately let us 
enter. Inside the fortress, a Uyghur official came forth…‘ (1914; Abdusémetov 136) 
 
Additionally, as the choice of his penname ‗Uyghur Boy‘ suggests, Abdusémet also made a 
point articulating that Taranchis are also descendants of ancient Uyghurs: 
 
‗…Forty-five percent of people in Zungharia and Ghulja region are Taranchi 
(Uyghur)…‘ (undated; Abdusémetov 62) 
 
‗…For us, descendants of Uyghurs, it is very important to know this...‘ (undated; 
Abdusémetov 116) 
 
 Apart from using the name ‗Uyghur‘ as a modern ethnonym and depicting significant 
aspects of current social reality of the Uyghur nation, Abdusémet also covered the topic of 
Uyghur history in his articles. He calls the Qing mismanagement of Heptapolis in early 19
th
 
century ‗Chinese oppression of Uyghur people‘ (Uyghur khelqi üstidiki Khitay zulumi; 
Abdusémetov 25). In the same way, the set of late nineteenth century uprisings in Xinjiang is 
portrayed as an Uyghur undertaking and even Ya‘qup Beg‘s administration is labeled 
‗Uyghur khanate‘ (Uyghur khanliqi; Abdusémetov 70-1, 76, 79, 148). Similarly, Turkic 
Muslims active in the Ili rebellion in 1911 are called ‗Uyghurs‘ and native Turkic officials in 
1910s are called ‗Uyghurs begs‘ (Abdusémetov 60). In these and other similar instances, 
Abdusémet retroactively applied the modern ethnonym ―Uyghur‘ on a community which at 
the time used a different autonym and did not consider itself a modern nation. 
 
 Abdusémet‘s slight inconsistency in labeling south Xinjiang Turkic population and 
unclear degree of ‗Uyghurness‘ of Taranchis in his perception foreshadowed the vigorous 
discussion within Soviet Taranchi and Kashgari communities about the meaning of the 
ethnonym ‗Uyghur‘, as well as negotiation of the meaning of the ethnonym with Soviet 
authorities during the 1920s. This intriguing process has been described in path-breaking 
article authored by David Brophy (Brophy 2005), later also by Sean R. Roberts (Roberts 
2009). One of the main perpetrators of discussion was Abdulla Rozibakiev (1897-1938), one 
of the first Taranchi communists and a foremost Uyghur activist, who first used the term 
‗Uyghur‘ to name a revolutionary organization in Almaty in 1918 or 1919. Another activist, 
Ismail Tairov, founded a ‗Uyghur‘ association (Uyghur uyushmisi) in Tashkent in 1920 for 
the purpose of fund-raising and supporting approximately two-hundred students from 
Xinjiang. In 1921, a meeting of the ‗Revolutionary Union of Altishahri-Zungharian 
Workers‘
44
 took place in Tashkent where it was proposed that its name be changed to ‗Uyghur 
Revolutionary Union of Altisheheri and Zungharian Workers,‘ later shortly ‗Uyghur 
Revolutionary Union‘ (Uyghur Revsoyuz).  However, as David Brophy persuasively 
                                                 
44
 The organization is elsewhere called ‗Organization of Workers and Peasants of Altisheher and 
Zungharia‘ (Altisheher-Junghar Ishchi Déhqanlar Teshkilati; Millward and Tursun 2004: 73). 
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demonstrated, the term ‗Uyghur‘ in the body‘s title did not point to a homogenous ethnic 
composition of its members, among whom there were Taranchis, Kashgaris, Tungans, Han 
Chinese, Kyrgyz, Tatars and one unspecified Turk. Rather, here the name ‗Uyghur‘ denoted 
common origin of the members in Xinjiang (Brophy 173-4). 
 
 Disputability of ethnic content of the label ‗Uyghur‘ was not satisfactorily clarified for 
over a decade. On the pages of Uyghur language periodicals and publications published in 
Soviet Central Asia, such as Voice of the Poor (Kembegheller Awazi; issued 1921-1932), 
Salvation (Qutulush; 1927-?), Young Uyghur (Yash Uyghur; 1922), First Step (Birinchi 
Chamdam, 1924), Literature of Uyghur Country (Uyghur El Edebiyati; 1925) or Red Dawn 
(Qizil Tang; 1931-1932), Taranchi and Kashgari activists staged a turbulent debate about their 
ethnicity and national identity. The main point of dispute was whether these two groups 
formed a single Uyghur nationality. In particular, vibrant argumentations occurred over the 
issue of linguistic differences (or similarities, depending on the point of view) between 
Taranchis and Kashgaris. Furthermore, apart from disagreements within the Taranchi and 
Kashgari community, the third party having a decisive say in the debate was the Soviet 
administration. For example, despite the fact that in 1922 the CPSU instituted a body called 
‗Provincial Bureau of Uyghur Communists in Yettisu‘ with Abdulla Rozibakiyev as its 
general secretary, which was a measure suggesting that the administration perceived 
Taranchis and Kashgaris as a single nationality (Brophy 173-81), the census of 1926 listed 
Taranchis, Kashgaris and Uyghurs as three separate ethnic groups (Matley 106). This was 
arguably because the Soviet authorities were not yet fully convinced that Taranchis and 
Kashgaris could technically form one ethnic group. At the same time, Soviets made clear that 
they would not support the idea of independent Uyghurstan across the border in Xinjiang 
(Roberts 372-3). The ‗Uyghur question‘ (Brophy 163) was solved only after 1930 at a 
convention of Uyghur intellectuals in Almaty where Abdulla Rozibakiev strongly advocated 
the idea of unified Uyghur nation and a new Uyghur modified Latin script was adopted that 
remained in use until 1940s. Uyghurs were officially designated as a Soviet ethnic group in 
1935. Subsequently, all discussions were silenced by Stalin‘s late 1930s‘ crackdown on all 
issues smacking of ‗nationalist deviations‘, which sent a number of Central Asian Uyghurs 
fleeing to Xinjiang, to gulags or to execution ground (Roberts 373-5). 
 
Thus, delimitation of Uyghur nationality in Soviet Central Asia was obviously neither 
a single-step nor a top-down move made by Soviet authorities, and the 1921 Tashkent 
conference did not mark the moment of emergence of modern Uyghur nation, as previously 
argued by some scholars (Gladney 1990). Rather, it was a complex process which spanned 
from resuscitation of the ancient ethnonym ‗Uyghur‘ by nineteenth century academicians 
through discussions about its contents within Taranchi and Kashgari communities in 1920s up 
to official recognition of Uyghurs by Soviet authorities in 1935. What is, however, certain is 
that the Taranchi and Kashgari embrace of the notion of modern Uyghur nation provided a 
crucial external impetus for subsequent formation of modern Uyghur national consciousness 
in Xinjiang. 
 
National Agitation by Enlightened Turkic Intelligentsia in Xinjiang 
 
The above sections of this chapter showed how in late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century Turkic Muslim awakening spread from Russo-Soviet Central Asia to Xinjiang. In the 
same way, Xinjiang Turkic Muslim intellectuals were inspired by emergence and construction 
of national identities of Central Asian Muslims, including the concept of Uyghur nation of 
Xinjiang. As a result, some Xinjiang Turkic intellectuals and activists also embarked on 
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agitation which directly aimed at awakening national consciousness of Musulman in Xinjiang. 
These enlighteners also sought to uplift cultural and social standing of their nation, and thus to 
form grounds for its eventual mobilization into political movement. The following sections of 
this chapter illustrate such national agitation on lives and works of Abdukhaliq Uyghur and 
Memtili Tewpiq, two Xinjiang Turkic intellectuals who were among the very first indigenous 
individuals to view the Musulman community through the national prism and to call their 
nation to stand up for its national interest. Due to the scarcity of indigenous Turkic primary 
sources on Xinjiang history from 1880s to late 1920s, this part of the dissertation is 
unfortunately obliged to draw on examination of Abdukhaliq‘s and Memtili‘s poems; this 
being in spite of the fact that poetry as a traditionally very elite discipline of Central Asian 
Turko-Islamic cultural is not the most suitable genre for articulating modern ideas of nation 
and nationalism. 
 
 Abdukhaliq Uyghur, by his own name Abdukhaliq Abdurakhman Oghli, was born in 
an educated merchant family in Turfan in 1896 (Muhemmed‘imin 375) or in 1901 (AUP 1; 
Ekhmidi 346). He acquired classical education and mastered Arabic, Persian and Chaghatay. 
In 1916, he traveled with his grandfather to Semey in today‘s Kazakhstan where he learned 
Russian. After return to Xinjiang, Abdukhaliq studied at a modern Chinese school where he 
learned classical and modern Chinese; he chose a Chinese name Hā Wéncái (哈文才, in 
English ‗Abdukhaliq – Literary Talent‘). In 1923, Abdukhaliq traveled with the 
aforementioned enlightener Mekhsut Muhiti and other activists to the Soviet Union where he 
stayed for three years. During this stay, he studied Russian and Tatar literature. Education in 
several languages and cultural environments, as well as exposure to modernist trends in 
Russia/Soviet Union, later greatly benefited Abdukhaliq in his role of an intellectual and 
educator who agitates his community to national consciousness and national movement. 
 
 In 1926, Abdukhaliq returned to Turfan and became a publicly active figure. He 
cooperated with the Muhiti family and Heyder Sayrani in introducing modern education into 
the Turfan area. In some instances, Abdukhaliq‘s house would be used as the teaching facility 
for Sayrani‘s classes. He also founded a well supplied library that became one the most 
influential source of knowledge in eastern and northern Xinjiang. In 1927, he and several 
other local activists founded a philanthropic modernist organization called the ‗Enlightenment 
Union‘ (Aqartish Birleshmisi), which assembled funds and used them to open modern schools 
around Turfan. Abdukhaliq‘s plan to establish a printing shop and publish a newspaper in 
Turfan was not unfortunately granted official permission. He also attended a Sun Yat-sen‘s 
Three People‘s Principles workshop held in Karashahr in 1928, about which unfortunately 
nothing is known besides the fact that it existed. Eventually, Abdukhaliq also participated in 
political and insurgent activities. After the Komul uprising breakout in 1931, he successfully 
arranged for a Tatar mechanic to travel to Komul to teach the rebels how to operate and repair 
modern rifles. In November 1932, Abdukhaliq wrote the text of his poems ‗Awaken!‘ and 
‗Open!‘ on cloth banners and brandished them while marching through the streets of Turfan 
in protest against government oppression. In December 1932, an uprising broke out in Turfan 
during which the insurgents seized the seat of Turfan government. At the beginning of 1933, 
Abdukhaliq Uyghur, along with seventeen of his associates, was arrested and imprisoned. On 
March 13, 1933, the group was paraded in shackles through Turfan to the execution ground. 
Shouting the slogan ‗Long live the liberation!‘ in both Uyghur and Chinese, Abdukhaliq and 




 Even though only about sixty of Abdukhaliq‘s poems survive today, his contribution 
to Uyghur literature is enormous. He was the first writer to remold classical literary tradition 
into modern Uyghur poetry. He wrote his poems in vernacular, although he retained many 
non-colloquial words from Chaghatay which were probably not used in spoken language of 
the time. Although he wrote many pieces in classical genres, such as the metre arzu wezni or 
ruba‟i, he implanted many elements of popular culture, such as folk songs, saws, fairy tales or 
popular myths. At the same time, his works are strongly committed to relevant social issues 
and show deep concern about the fate of his people and homeland. He was the first Xinjiang 
Turkic Muslim author to reflect on contemporary social, political and cultural issues and to 
implant features of modernity into poetry. His familiarity with current affairs and ideas in 
Russia/Soviet Union and China proper enabled him to disseminate ideas of Jadidism, the May 
Fourth movement and Three People‘s Principles by his works. Similarly to his personal 
activities, Abdukhaliq‘s poetry had an enormous communal impact. A large part of his poems 
became popular by first circulating in oral form among people and only eventually being 
recorded in written form. Abdukhaliq is rightfully famed as the founder of modern Uyghur 
literature, whose work and ideas are comparable to figures such as the Tatar poet Abdulla 
Tuqay (1886-1913), Uzbek writer and activist Mustafa Choqay (1890-1941) or Chinese writer 
and thinker Lu Xun (魯迅, 1881-1936). Abdukhaliq‘s poetry is exemplified by the below 
translations. Notably, the first poem that follows is one of the most influential and beautiful 




Hey awaken, miserable Uyghur, enough of your slumber, 
You own nothing! The next thing to lose would be your life. 
If you don‘t deliver yourself from the decline, 
Oh, your situation will be troublesome, so troublesome. 
 
Rise! I said, raise your head! Awaken! 
Cut off your enemy‘s head, spill his blood! 
If you don‘t open your eyes and look around carefully, 
One day you will die helpless with your wishes. 
 
Your body still looks as if lifeless, 
Is that why you are not worried much about your death? 
I shout and you keep lying still, 
Do you want to die asleep? 
 
Open your eyes wide and look around you, 
And ponder long on your future. 
Should this precious chance slip out of your hands, 
Problems, only problems are there for you to come. 
 
My heart worries about you, oh Uyghur, 
My fellow fighter, my brother, my family. 
I care about your situation; I call to wake you, 
But you still don‘t hear, what‘s wrong with you? 
 
One day your regret will come, 
That day you will understand the point. 
You will curse, but it will be too late, 






Because of our ignorance we suffer many hardships every day, 
Say, which one of us benefits from today‘s situation? 
 
We keep lagging behind the current trends, 
We elect officials, and then we file allegations. 
 
We are not devoted to knowledge and studiousness, 
Thinking about study or teaching while chewing on pinesap. 
 
Where there is no unity, difficult is the dispute over the benefits for the motherland, 
Wherever there is a celebration, we feel like joining and spending an evening. 
 
Even in a hundred years, we will not understand the common benefit, 
When it comes to doing harm, amazingly dexterous we are. 
 
Whenever someone does a good deed, he is not remembered, 
Whenever we feel like it, we expose the bodily parts we should not expose. 
 
For the nation we aren‘t able to donate a penny, 
We don‘t think it‘s necessary, and keep on building our eaves. 
 
Our aim is neither brotherhood nor comradeship, 
And if we are originally friends, we will still pursue our own goals. 
 
If a friend of ours accidentally happens to make a mistake, 
Openly we find and point out ten more flaws. 
 
We don‘t long for fame or for strength of our ancestors, 
Illiterate and ignorant with blindfolded eyes we brag. 
 
We devote our lives to useless and laudable favors, 
But when it comes to collecting the hajj tax, off we flee. 
 
When we become infuriated at each other during games and jokes, 
Reconciliation is nowhere to be seen and flames keep burning among us. 
 
In flattery there is none above us, 
Sly and tricky, we tell all kinds of lies. 
 
There used to be a saying: ‗A dog remembers the one who beats it.‘ 
We feed all our dignitaries, officials and magistrates fat. 
 
Those who are after knowledge are soaring in the sky and floating in the stream, 
We don‘t even have a mangy donkey, on foot we are walking. 
 
When a car comes grunting, ‗oh God, what is this?‘ we say, 
Not using our brains, we are standing dumbfounded. 
 
In technology and craftsmanship we say that ‗we‘ve done enough,‘ and that is it for us, 
We sit in our kilns and pour porridge in our clay bowls. 
 
There is none to make the mountains and rivers a paradise on Earth, 
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We mold our pillows and lay care freely. 
 
Instead of astronomers, engineers and scholars 
We have greedy clergy and aristocracy. 
 
When we want something, we pretend not to see or not to be able to accomplish it, 
We slander with thousands names those who are determined and say ‗I‘ll do it.‘ 
 
We don‘t care a bit about our homeland and land, 
A day will come since when worries will be pointless. 
 
‗Shush now, Abdukhaliq, enough, don‘t worry, stop grumbling,‘ 
Then we will be remorseful because we made ourselves suffer. (1921; AUP 13-5) 
 
 
Gog – Magog  
 
Manchus are down,  
Ended up with empty hands. 
The cruel became the rulers 
Laughing from all around. 
 
Military governors in every province, 






Sanmin zhuyi was shut off, 
Without real actions and effect. 
At the end China (Zhongguo) 
Separated into twenty-two parts. 
 
One of the parts 
Was our motherland Xinjiang.  
Its population was Uyghur, 
But this notion did not exist. 
 
We didn‘t notice anything, 
From summer until winter, 
Yang Zengxin became the Governor 
And began to massacre. 
 
There were judges and mollas, 
Clad in ceremonious turbans and coats. 
‗To abide by his orders is a duty,‘ 
Was their religious ruling. 
 
Yang was very skilled 
At various schemes 
And at creating 
All kinds of contentions. 
 
This fact was good for Yang, 
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 Refers to Sun Yat-sen‘s name Sun Zhongshan. 
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Exceptionally useful. 
As if for a wolf that had seized a lamb 
And began to devour it with its skin. 
 
Seven headed monster 
Sat permanently in his post. 
Stole gold and silver, 




The homeland‘s fame was gone,  
So was the gold and silver ore. 
Monsters multiplied, 
In number day by day. 
 
They stationed troops at Qomul 
And sealed shut the Xingxing Gorge.
47
 
‗Should companions rise they‘ll be afraid, 
Hurry, this is simple.‘ 
 
The army lay at Qomul, 
Wasting all the taxes. 
Annoyed the people of Qomul 
Till they said ‗Enough!‘ 
 
More soldiers – thieves 
Came to Qomul, 
Finally became in charge 
The murderer of Fan Yaonan. 
 
Uyghur wrote songs, 
Unveiling his hearts and souls. 
In which the arrogant general, 
Was compared to a monster. (1928; AUP 40-3) 
 
 
I can see 
 
The sun‘s long risen 
The whole world is lit, 
But only our Xinjiang 





In what a state this nation, 
Uyghurs‗ grandsons, open your eyes 
Use your strength and do a good thing. 
                                                 
46
 This line refers to the fact that a vast majority of successful Chinese merchants operating in Xinjiang 
originated in Tianjin (天津) and came to the province following the Qing reconquest (Lattimore 1950: 
51, 140). 
47
 The Orangutan Gorge (猩猩峡 Xīngxīng xiá), located at the western end of the Hexi Corridor (河西
走廊 Héxī zǒuláng), is the gate from China proper to Xinjiang. 
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Stand up! Stop all useless talk. 
 
By enduring unprecedented abuse, 
We reached today‘s state of affairs. 
Strangers come and run our affairs, 
Acting with cruetly towards these mountains. (undated; AUP 90-1) 
 
 Abdukhaliq‘s poems reveal his dedication to promoting modernity and progressive 
institutions. His vivid imagery depicting desolate sceneries of Xinjiang landscape or rough 
weather conditions points to the oppressive political reality of Xinjiang and to the difficult 
fate of Xinjiang Turkic Muslims. Similarly, Abdukhaliq widely employs a theme of an 
abandoned lover who weeps for his partners who had abandoned him/her. As one traveler‘s 
report from 1905 shows, such folk songs were quite common around Turfan at the time (Le 
Coq 69). In Persian literature and Sufi poetry, this theme was a metaphor for a believer‘s love 
for God. Abdukhaliq uses this device in a modernized way, when love for the departed one 
articulates his people‘s desire for improvement of conditions, reform, progress and 
development, e.g. in poems ‗Shattered Heart‘ (AUP 6), ‗Longing‘ (AUP 10-2) or ‗Where Are 
You?‘ (AUP 23). The poem ‗Memorial of Hope‘ (AUP 63-4) compares the abandoned lover 
to a nightingale in cage.  
 
 Abdukhaliq also espoused the principles of cultural enlightenment by often featuring 
metaphors of darkness (symbolizing Xinjiang Turkic Muslims‘ decline, illiteracy and 
oppression) and light (meaning progress, modernity and development) – the poem ‗Lamp‘ 
uses the metaphor of light for knowledge that guides the poet on his path through darkness of 
ignorance (AUP 80). Modern inventions and technology are regarded as means to soar high in 
the sky and float in water (‗We‘, AUP 13-5). Abdukhaliq also introduced Russian loanwords 
into poetry, such as ‗engineer‘ (inzhénér; AUP 15), ‗train‘ (poyiz; AUP 67), ‗steamboat‘ 
(parakhot; AUP 67) or ‗automobile‘ (aptomobil; 88). Many pieces directly describe Yang 
Zengxin‘s dysfunctional administration, openly call for a rebellion or extol revolutionary 
victories, such as ‗Anger and Lament‘ (AUP 34-5), ‗Untitled‘ (AUP 86), ‗Lamentation‘ (AUP 
88-9), ‗Curses to You, Brutes!‘ (AUP 99), ‗Disillusioned‘ (AUP 106-8) or ‗Frost‘ (AUP 100-
2). Even though the path to progress and change is portrayed by metaphors of rough nature as 
arduous and often makes the author feel disturbed and unsure, Abdukhaliq often expresses his 
hope that the situation in Xinjiang will eventually change, e.g. ‗Mountains in Sight Are Not 
Far‘ (AUP 69), ‗Endless Hope‘ (AUP 36-7). The poem ‗Shouts before Death‘ contains 
Abdukhaliq‘s hopes that the flowers of his efforts will bloom after his death (AUP 112). 
 
 Importantly for research in emergence of Uyghur national consciousness and 
nationalism, Abdukhaliq is the first known Xinjiang Turkic Muslim intellectual who 
perceived his community as a modern nation. Many of his poems feature the words ‗nation‘ 
(millet) or ‗people‘ (khelq) used in modern sense, for example in pieces ‗Endless Hope‘ (AUP 
36-7), ‗Hope‘ (AUP 67-8) or ‗Untitled‘ (AUP 90-1). This concept also appears in works of 
acerbic admonition when he reprimands and mocks his nation for being ‗asleep‘ or ‗blind,‘ i.e. 
acquiescent and passive in their decline – ‗Soon to Come‘ (AUP 51-2). The poem ‗To Molla 
Rozi‘ (AUP 65) denounces Xinjiang Turkic elites collaborating with Chinese administration, 
or in other words, do not represent interests of their nation. These references in Abdukhaliq‘s 
poems point to persistence of the dynamics of discord examined in previous chapter of this 
dissertation. 
 
 Abdukhaliq‘s poems are also the first currently known record of an indigenous 
Xinjiang Turkic Muslim referring to himself and his nation by the name ‗Uyghur‘. It was 
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probably during contact with Russian Turkic intellectuals in 1910s, explained in previous 
sections of this chapter, when Abdukhaliq became acquainted with the idea and practice of 
calling the indigenous Turkic Muslim oasis dwellers of Xinjiang by the name ‗Uyghur‘. 
Following the re-appearance of the term as a modern ethnonym, some progressive Xinjiang 
Turkic intellectuals, such as Abdukhaliq, realized that this construct could be used to awaken 
national consciousness of their proto-national Musulman community. Abdukhaliq‘s choice of 
this term as his penname (tekhellus) and inclusion of this idea into his poems were instances 
of such agitation toward new ‗Uyghur‘ national consciousness. Besides the need for 
unification and establishing a common name for a nation, Abdukhaliq‘s adoption of the term 
‗Uyghur‘ as his penname also alluded to one interpretation of the name‘s meaning as 
‗cultured‘, ‗civilized‘,
48
 and reflected the modernist embrace of knowledge and science as key 
to national well-being (Muti‘i 1990: 379-82). At this moment, it is not clear precisely when 
Abdukhaliq started to use the term ‗Uyghur‘ in his works. The first currently known poem to 
feature this word is ‗Uyghur Girl‘ (Uyghur Qizi; AUP 1-2) written in 1917; however, it 
appears only in the title, the authenticity of which has been disputed. The first undisputed 
instance of the use by a native Xinjiang Turkic intellectual of the term ‗Uyghur‘ in the sense 





 In his poems, Abdukhaliq also clearly defined several traits of the Uyghur nation. In 
his view, one shared characteristic was the national decline and misery caused by the 
dysfunctional Chinese rule over Xinjiang indigenous Turkic Muslims in combination with 
their own passivity and indolence (‗The Anguish of the Era‘, AUP 75-6). Abdukhaliq further 
pointed to shared and special lineage of his nation by calling it ‗Uyghur grandsons‘ (Uyghur 
ewladi; ‗Untitled‘, AUP 90-1). He referred to ancient Uyghurs as to people of ‗fame‘ (shöhret) 
and ‗vigor‘ (gheyret; ‗We‘, AUP 14), and also regarded highly the ethnonym itself as ‗Uyghur 
– our renowned and famous name in world history‘ (jahan tarikhida meshhur atalghan 
namimiz Uyghur; ‗Disillusioned‘, AUP 106). Uyghurs are also said to be as distinct from the 
Han as ‗white from black, which will never become white; let pure gold separate from copper 
and let it withstand fire‘ (‗Mountains in Sight Are Not Far‘, AUP 69). The concept of 
homeland (el, yurt, weten) as one of national traits also appears in Abdukhaliq‘s poems – 
(‗We‘, AUP 15; ‗My Wish‘, AUP 98; ‗Untitled‘, AUP 87). Homeland is sometimes called by 
the term ‗mountains‘ (taghlar; ‗Untitled‘, AUP 90-1), referring to tall mountain ranges 
surrounding eastern and southern Xinjiang. In places, the homeland is referred to by Chinese 
loanword ‗Xinjiang‘ (Shinjang; ‗Gog – Magog‘, AUP 40-3; ‗Untitled‘ AUP 72). 
 
 Abdukhaliq was also the first indigenous Xinjiang Turkic thinker to ponder Uyghur 
national interests. He specifically used concepts such as ‗common benefit‘ (omumning paydisi; 
‗We‘, AUP 13), ‗for the nation‘ (millet üchün; ‗We‘, AUP 13), ‗happy future of Uyghur 
nation‘ (Uyghurning iqbali; The Anguish of the Age‘, AUP 76), ‗to speak of the nation‘ 
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 For more on the meanings of the name ‗Uyghur‘, see for Chapter 1. 
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 There are other instances of the early use of the term ‗Uyghur‘. Abdukhaliq frequently used the term 
‗Uyghur‘ in the last stanzas of his poems. However, in these cases the word referred to the author 
himself. This practice, typical for Persian poetry and originating probably in pre-Islamic times (Rypka 
84), was designed to cause the audience listening to an orally recited poem to better remember the 
author‘s name. It is also known that the aforementioned Tatar enlightener Heyder Sayrani, who was 
closely acquainted with Abdukhaliq and involved in many progressive activities in Turfan, Urumchi 
and Chöchek, named his son ‗Uyghur‘ in 1919 and further propagandized the use of the term as a 
nation name for Xinjiang Musulman throughout the 1920s in the newspaper Our Voice (Sayrani 65). 
 
 86 
(millet démek; ‗Untitled‘, AUP 87), or ‗disappearance of the nation‘ (millet yoqalmaq; 
‗Endless Hope‘, AUP 37). However, Abdukhaliq did not primarily concentrate on 
propagandizing political national interest. His poems and activities reveal that the 
overwhelming part of his effort aimed at agitation of his fellow nationals from detrimental 
passivity to proactive pursuit of national interest – hence his frequent use of metaphors of 
awakening from sleep, opening one‘s eyes, looking around at the progress of surrounding 
world, urgency of realizing the needs of the age etc. The above translated poem ‗Awaken!‘ is 
the best example of such poetics. Similarly to dictum of Jadids in Russia, for Abdukhaliq 
modern knowledge and education (pen ma‟arip) are among highest priorities and serve as a 
‗key to awakening‘ (oyghinish achquchi) of ‗my Uyghur‘ (Uyghurum; ‗Greeting Letter‘, AUP 
49-50). Abdukhaliq made it very clear that under oppressive Chinese heteronomy, his nation 
has to exert its own effort to uplift its status and regain national prestige. Abdukhaliq 
specifically regarded passivity as the chief cause of national misery (‗Disillusioned‘, AUP 
106-8). He also reflected to factionalism within the Musulman society, previously in this 
dissertation called the disparity principle, by extolling the virtues of ‗unity‘ (jem‟iy bolush), 
‗brotherhood‘ (ikhwan) and ‗fellowship‘ (buraderlik) of the nation as one important 
preconditions of national well-being (‗We‘, AUP 14). 
 
 Even though Abdukhaliq‘s poems and actions largely sought to promote cultural 
national values and economic mobilization, he also occasionally discussed and propagandized 
political aspects of national interests. Some of these were for instance ‗freedom‘ (hürlük) of 
the ‗homeland‘ (weten), to enable Uyghurs‘ descendants to catch up on the progress of the 
surrounding world, to become rid of slavery just like European nations, to restore the 
connotations of ‗glory and honor‘ (sherep-shan) the ancient name Uyghur used to have in the 
past or the ‗homeland‘s fame‘ (yurtning dangqi; ‗We‘, AUP 13-5; Gog – Magog, AUP 40-3; 
‗Hoping‘, AUP 67-8; ‗Untitled‘, AUP 87, ‗Untitled‘ AUP 93). Abdukhaliq‘s poems also show 
influence of Chinese republicanism and Kuomintang ideology stemming from China proper – 
they contain passages endorsing Sun Yat-sen‘s Three People‘s Principles, i.e. ‗nationalism‘ 
(khelqchil), ‗people‘s authority‘ (hoquq, literally ‗law‘) and ‗people‘s livelihood‘ (turmush, 
literally ‗living‘). In one piece, Abdukhaliq specifically referred to Three People‘s Principle 
as to a precious ‗star of hope‘ (ümid yultuzi) which unifies Uyghurs, Mongols and Tungans 
(‗Greeting Letter‘, AUP 49-50). Abdukhaliq declared his devotion to struggle for his ideals 
even at the price of life (‗My Wish‘, AUP 98). His execution for participation in revolution 
shows that those were not empty words. Abdukhaliq Uyghur‘s life and work is therefore a 
highly illuminating case study of a progressive cultural activist who did not hesitate to 





                                                 
50
 Although Abdukhaliq‘s poems are widely read and officially published in Xinjiang today, he 
remains to be a controversial figure of modern Uyghur history. The stance of his life and work 
continues to carry a strong appeal to today‘s national-minded Uyghurs. In 1981, several Uyghurs 
wrote the text of Abdukaliq‘s poem ‗Awaken!‘ in the wall in Kashgar. The police then spent a lot of 
energy in trying to find the author of the subversive poem, not realizing it had been written sixty years 
ago. Stanzas of this poem were also chanted by Uyghur protesters during demonstrations in Urumchi 
in late 1980s. Official representation of Abdukhaliq ranges from that of a patriotic figure to a 
dangerous nationalist (Rudelson 149-153). As in the case of Lu Xun, by post-humous glorification of 
Abdukhaliq as the founder of modern literature, the PRC authorities are striving to eliminate his 
anti-totalitarian message: ‗Suppress those you can and stand those who remain on a pedestal. By 
lifting them up on a pedestal, you can rein even them.‘ (Lu  Xun: ‗On Great People.‘ Lu 273) 
 87 
 Another Xinjiang Turkic intellectual involved in national agitation was Memtili 
Tokhtaji Tewpiq,
51
 whose life and work bears a lot of similarities to those of Abdukhaliq 
Uyghur. He was born in 1901 in Boyamet village in Atush county in southwestern Xinjiang in 
a family of a doctor and a progressive activist. He attended the Hebib Zade modernist school 
in Éksaq village, where he was a student of the Ottoman activist Ahmet Kemal. The cultured 
and well educated milieu of Kashgar-Atush area made Memtili realize the importance of new 
education and modern trends. He started writing poetry, composing songs and playing 
musical instruments already in early childhood. In 1920, he accompanied his father on 
professional travels throughout northern Xinjiang and made a living as a barber.  
 
 During these travels, he was able to witness the poor material conditions of his people 
and homeland. At this time, he wrote a poem ‗Studied and Surpassed‘ commemorating the 
assassination of progressive activist Abduqadir Damolla (translated below). Because of the 
critical tone of the poem and because it immediately became widely popular among widest 
strata of people, Memtili was placed under government surveillance. Upon advice of his 
friends, he left for the Soviet Union in 1921. There, he learned Russian and studied for one 
and a half year at a pedagogical institute in Moscow. After that, he left Moscow and made a 
living as a cook and kebab seller in the ports along the Black Sea coast, performing Xinjiang 
folksongs. With the help of Turkish acquaintances he made during this period, he arrived in 
Istanbul around 1927 and took up a job of janitor at a pedagogical institute. He eavesdropped 
on classes and studied in his free time, and eventually was allowed to take the entrance tests. 
He was accepted as a student and studied at the institute with superb performance. After 
graduation, he was a teacher at an elementary school on the outskirts of Istanbul. At the same 
time, he affiliated himself with a Turkish nationalist organization Turk Youth Union (Tu. Türk 
Genciler Birliği). 
 
 In 1932, the news of Turkic uprising in Xinjiang reached him in Istanbul, which upon 
he promptly returned to Xinjiang. He immediately became involved in promoting and 
organizing modern education in Atush and Kashgar. He founded the ‗County Education 
Council‘, an organization involved in fundraising and founding schools. He also launched a 
two month‘s pedagogical course which trained some sixty teachers. Albeit modest in scope, 
Memtili‘s activities nevertheless triggered a wave of modern education in Atush and strongly 
contributed to nation-formation process in southwestern Xinjiang. Within six months, some 
twenty-four modern schools were allegedly founded by Memtili and his associates, which in 
total educated several thousand students who were the first of several successive generations 
of Xinjiang elites. 
 
 Memtili also gradually became closely involved in political activities. In 1935, he 
formed a so-called ‗Scout Force‘ (Izchilar Etriti) out of about one hundred students. The 
group somewhat resembled an army unit – they dressed in light-green uniforms and carried 
military-style bags. Under Memtili‘s leadership, the Scouts marched through villages and 
towns around Kashgar and sung marching songs propagandizing modern education. The 
group enjoyed support of Turfan enlightener Mehmut Muhiti, who after installation of new 
government in Urumchi in 1934 ended up being a military commander of Turkic army forces 
stationed in Kashgar.
52
 Muhiti sent military personnel to protect the Scouts‘ marches and 
modern education activities, and also effectively lobbied on all levels of provincial 
                                                 
51
 ‗Tewpiq‘ is a penname meaning in Uyghur ‗one who chooses the right path‘ (MEP 11). 
52
 For more on the events leading to Jin Shuren‘s fall and on Turkic insurgency in 1930s, see Chapter 
3 of this dissertation. 
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administration in favor of new Turkic education. The spread of modern education in southern 
Xinjiang is to a large degree due to Muhiti‘s support. 
 
 Memtili‘s dedication to education and modernity was also similar to Abdukhaliq‘s. On 
one occasion, Memtili allegedly declared: ‗In order to free the people of my motherland from 
shackles of enslavement, I have chosen the noblest of professions – teaching. Maybe one day 
a lead bullet worth some six cents will send me off to the netherworld. But I am ready for such 
a day. Walking the path of the motherland and the path of knowledge, I will not yield one bit 
from shedding my hot blood.‘ Memtili‘s national agitation and involvement in affairs 
bordering on politics gradually became viewed unfavorably by the provincial authorities. In 
April 1937, Memtili was arrested during teaching a class and imprisoned in Kashgar. In his 
cell, he continued to write nationalistic poetry on the walls. He was executed probably 
sometime later that year along with several relatives and other intellectuals (MEP 1-14; 
Ekhmidi 350-4; Ezizi 1997a: 396-420; Schleussel 388-9). 
 
 Although Memtili‘s poems are not as innovative and ground-breaking as Abdukhaliq‘s 
from the literary point of view, the message of his national agitation had a very strong social 
impact in the Kashgar area and contributed strongly to the emergence of southern Xinjiang 
Turkic Muslims‘ national consciousness. The tone of Memtili‘s poetry is well exemplified by 




Plague has come to Kashgar, 
The irrigation ditches are without water, 
Oppression covers everything like a cloak, 
Faces are as yellow as wax. 
 
To move freely around is impossible, 
The fierce stench of decay is everywhere, 
Craving for food overlaid the land, 
No millet to eat is left. 
 
Taxation and toil grew heavy, 
Breaths and sighs are strangled in throats, 
People‘s turned into wounds, 
Do you see that, Täwpiq? 
 
The mercy of God will come, 
Faces will light up enthusiastically. (1920; MEP 1) 
 
 
Studied and Surpassed 
 
The others have studied and surpassed us, oh brothers! 
It looks as if their conscience was firing up their perseverance. 
 
Other nations are fluttering like falcons in the air,  
Think, disciples of Muhammad! We are lagging far behind! 
 
Scholars who know the words of truth don‘t teach us, 
Our cruel rulers are selling out virtues for lousy money. 
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Where there is religious teaching, to there they rush restlessly like light grapes, 
Turbans on their heads, rosaries in hands, they are shunning the truth. 
 
Think! To whom go all the taxes and levies, who takes them? 
Those who committed so many treacheries and hide in respectable attires. 
 
They gained some knowledge in other countries, 
And God gave them their good reputation. 
 
We read but don‘t understand Arabic which is difficult for us, 
They have left us not a speck of knowledge. 
 
Orphans lie in the ashes beneath the public baths in Kashgar, 
Without education, they gamble and smoke hashish. 
 
Late Abduqadir Damolla is gone unjustly. 





Small you are, Sayram Lake, but your distress is immense, 
Even if your waters surge, they still cannot overflow the banks, 
Tall peaks surround you, 
Even though you wish to, you cannot surpass these slopes. (1921; MEP 5) 
 
 
We Are Uyghurs‟ Children 
 
We are Uyghur children, our hearts are bright, 
We‘ve lived long lives and come along a noble path. 
 
In many eras we found ourselves under domination of tyrants, 
We shed rivers and rivers of blood on our way to freedom. 
 
Now our motherland‘s become a hell for us, 
We became prisoners and captives, our situation is grave. 
 
A century has passed in wars, our glory is immense, 





Awaken, people! It‘s you, who will liberate the motherland, 
By the means of schools light the lamps and fill it with brightness. 
 
Let the era of oppression and cruelty be over now,  
Be free from fatal destiny and dark times. 
 
Be diligent and strive for your well-being, 
And work towards enlightening children. 
 
Stand up straight and start walking the path of work, 




On the Path to Liberation 
 
For you, oh our homeland, we sacrifice our lives to you, 
On the path to liberation, our blood has flowed like a river. 
 
We shed blood and gave lives; finally we set you free, 
There was faith in liberation in our hearts. 
 
We cleaned the face of our homeland with blood, 
Perhaps our name too was cleansed by blazing flames. 
 
Our good deeds became companions to you, 
Our forefathers were reputable for such merits. 
 
Our fathers‘ wars will not disappear from pages of history, 
Their brave pedigree will continue – we are their descendants. 
 
The militarists collapsed, the country is in peace, 
Live, long live our beautiful future prospects. (undated; MEP 28) 
 
 
I Am Little 
 
I am little, my words are sweet, 
I am a refined blossom, which is blooming. 
Those who do not study are empty and useless, 
Their vigor often goes out. 
 
I am a little Uyghur son, 
I am so good, so good. 
As I go to school my face shines brightly, 
Immorality is something distant to me. (undated; MEP 20) 
 
 The above and other Memtili‘s poems articulate many ideas discussed in Abdukhaliq‘s 
case. In poetics and symbology, Memtili‘s depictions of desolate natural sceneries are 
metaphors for suffering of his nation and motherland. The poem ‗Not Coming‘ contains 
description of desolate southern Xinjiang in dry, snowless and freezing winter, which 
symbolized the stuffy political climate (MEP 15). Similar metaphors are used elsewhere – the 
poem ‗Homesick‘, written presumably abroad, recalls Xinjiang as a land of eternal winter clad 
in haze (MEP 10-1), whereas ‗Telke Mountains‘ depicts a parched and forbidding range 
around Atush (MEP 2). Other poems also use rich vocabulary of darkness in portrayals and 
denunciations of oppressive government, negative national traits and corrupt Turkic elites, 
such as poems ‗Fragment‘ (MEP 6) or ‗Fragment‘ (MEP 8). Analogously, vocabulary of light, 
for instance in the poems ‗At Dawn‘ (MEP 17) or ‗Brothers‘ (MEP 23), expresses hope for 
better future symbolized by bright sun shining over the homeland and oppressed people. 
 
 Many of Memtili‘s poems convey his perception of his community as a ‗nation‘ 
(millet) or ‗a people‘ (khelq), defined mainly by noble and famed ancient Uyghur ancestry, 
possession of a ‗homeland‘ (yurt, el, ana diyar, ana yer, ana makan or weten) and communal 
interest of ‗well-being‘ (sa‟adet; ‗Studied and Surpassed‘, MEP 4; ‗Homesick‘ MEP 10-1; 
‗We Are Uyghurs‘ Children‘, MEP 12; ‗At Dawn‘, MEP 17; ‗For the Homeland‘, MEP 21-2; 
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‗Surpassed‘, MEP 27; ‗On the Path to Liberation‘, MEP 28; ‗Awaken People!‘, MEP 37). The 
primary communal interest articulated by Memtili is national awakening and action eventually 
leading to revival of freedom, prestige and prosperity of the nation and its homeland, and thus 
also to equal position with other modern nations. For Memtili, a radical way to forward such 
national revival is by action aiming at political goals. Many of his poems call for 
overthrowing the dysfunctional Chinese administration (‗Not Coming‘, MEP 15; ‗Let Us Set 
Slavery on Fire‘, MEP 24) and even specifically advocate the use of force in struggle for 
freedom of the homeland (‗Whose Son Are You?‘, MEP 19). ‗Revolution‘ (inqilab) is seen as 
a shining flower (‗At Dawn‘, MEP 17) or an erupting ‗volcano‘ (wolqan) which melts down 
the ‗chains of slavery‘ (qulluq kishen-zenjiri; ‗Cries‘, MEP 18). ‗Unity‘ (birlishish) in 
strength and action will result in the nation becoming again the master of its homeland 
(‗Surpassed‘, MEP 27). 
 
 Owing to his profession of a teacher, in his poems Memtili frequently emphasized the 
role of modern education and knowledge in national revival, which he perceived as avenues to 
freedom and prosperity of the nation (‗Knowledge‘, MEP 9). Knowledge and progress is 
compared to wings with which developed nations are able to fly high in the air (‗Studied and 
Surpassed‘, MEP 20). Memtili also stressed the importance of a teacher in society – teachers 
and activists in education who establish schools radiate the light of knowledge, whereas 
people without education are blind. Education is portrayed as a means to attain national 
well-being, while teachers are flowers of the homeland and Atush is the ‗source of education‘ 
(érpan menbesi; ‗We Teachers‘, MEP 38). The work of teachers was regarded difficult 
because promotion of modern knowledge is obstructed by conservative Turkic clergy (molla), 
Sufi aristocracy (ishan) and native officials collaborating with provincial administration 
(begs). Teachers‘ and women teachers‘ work is occasionally even despised and the word 
‗modernist, progressive‘ (jedid) is used as a curse. Yet for Memtili, the meaningfulness of 
teaching shines as the truth in the darkness of oppression. Therefore, it is in the homeland‘s 
interest for the teachers not to go astray from the path of ‗modern knowledge‘ or ‗science‘ 
(pen; ‗For the Homeland‘, MEP 21-2). Notably, the above translated poem ‗I Am Little‘ 
translated above is in fact a nursery rhyme and excellently illustrates how the concept of 
modern Uyghur nation was being disseminated among children in Memtili‘s classes.  
 
 In sum, the message of Memtili‘s activities and poems, as well as his untimely arrest 
and execution, suggest that his impact on social life of Turkic Muslims of Kashgar was 
arguably both strong and inflamatory.
53
 But apart from the fact that Memtili Tewpiq was 
another enlightened activist willing to pave way for his nation towards modernity and 
progress by sacrificing his own life, his ideas also reveal that throughout 1920s at least some 
of Xinjiang Turkic Muslim new intelligentsia perceived their community as a modern nation 
defined by shared descent from ancient Uyghurs, national homeland and a set of interests that 
eventually aimed at reviving national prestige. 
 
 Both Abdukhaliq Uyghur and Memtili Tewpiq started their activities at the turn of 
1910s and 1920s, i.e. within months after they could have personally met Molla Musa 
Sayrami, the accomplished representative of classical Turko-Islamic literary tradition who 
passed in 1917. Yet their writings and mindsets are very different from those of Sayrami and 
signify a marked intellectual departure of Xinjiang Turkic elites from the era of religion and 
                                                 
53
 Similarly to Abdukhaliq‘s case, Memtili‘s timeless message retained relevancy for the future and 
inadvertently addressed very well the situation of Uyghurs after 1949. The location of burial of 
Memtili‘s remnants was kept secret by the authorities until 1986. After it became widely known, it 
immediately started to be frequented by Memtili‘s admirers (Ekhmidi 354). 
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empire towards the modern era of nation and state. In other words, Abdukhaliq‘s and 
Memtili‘s activities present an excellent case study of how new progressive Turkic 
intelligentsia with an extensive foreign experience played a key role in emergence of 
modernity in Xinjiang and national consciousness of indigenous sedentary Xinjiang Turkic 
Muslims in late imperial and early republican era.  
 
 As pointed out by Anthony Smith in his general theory of nation-formation, in the 
sphere of culture the new class of intellectuals tends to eliminate the knowledge monopoly of 
traditional clergy and to become the ‗new priesthood‘ associated around new schools which 
disseminated notions of modernity. Even though Xinjiang Turkic progressive intellectuals did 
not produce systematic and extensive historical, philological and anthropological research in 
their communal identity, their enlightenment activities and artistic achievements in poetry 
generated national awakening (Smith 1986: 157-1). Similarly, Abdukhaliq Uyghur‘s and 
Memtili Tewpiq‘ promotion of mother-tongue education and introduction of vernacular into 
the high genre of poetry also inculcated national consciousness in a way pointed previously 
by several scholars in other settings (Seton-Watson 11; Anderson 71-5). In fact, as language is 
one of primary criteria of national identity, Abdukhaliq‘s and Memtili‘s use of vernacular 
embodied their will to be part of nation, which is a model also ascertained in other contexts 
(Gellner 43). The foreign inspiration of Xinjiang Turkic intellectuals‘ ideas and activities also 
resembles the importance of foreign models for nation-forming processes traced elsewhere 
(Smith 1986: 142). Finally, activities and writings of early modern Xinjiang Turkic 
intellectuals correspond to some principles ascertained in phases A and B of some 
nation-formation processes researched by Miroslav Hroch – namely scholarly dissemination 
of awareness of linguistic, cultural, social and other attributes of a proto-national community, 
and dedicated agitation towards awakening its consciousness (Hroch 1996: 81, 85). 
 
 Xinjiang new intelligentsia‘s and progressive strata‘s efforts were a formidable 
stimulus to later emergence of modern Uyghur national consciousness. Writings of 
Abdukhaliq Uyghur and Memtili Tewpiq show how in late imperial and early republican era, 
sedentary Xinjiang Turkic elites increasingly started to perceive their community not as a 
group defined largely by religion but as a modern nation. In this way, the nascent national 
idea was able to build on previously existing notions of Musulman identity as community 
defined by shared religion, descent origin, place of residence, mode of life, culture, political 
tradition and other markers valid in late imperial era, which altogether defined the community 
as indigenous Turkic Muslim oasis-dwellers of southern and eastern Xinjiang. However, in 
perception of progressive Xinjiang Turkic elites influenced by foreign models, the national 
criterion gained prominence over the religious one – they increasingly started to see their 
community as ‗nation‘ (millet). Sometimes, the community was envisioned as a nation of 
‗Uyghurs‘ descendants‘ (Uyghur ewladliri) or ‗Uyghurs‘ children‘ (Uyghur baliliri), thus 
invoking images of a common ancient ethnonym, culture and prestige. Indeed, according to 
some interpretations, due to the Ottoman and Tatar Jadidist connection with certain 
pan-Turkist inclinations Xinjiang Turkic Muslim elites rather perceived themselves as 
belonging to trans-state Turkic nation than to nation of exclusively Xinjiang Turks (Millward 
2005: 275-7). 
 
 It was also shown that between 1880 and 1930, Xinjiang Turkic elites also 
commenced the process of creating modern Uyghur national symbology and inventing 
national traditions. They articulated several defining features of their nation, some of which 
were either entirely missing or not as prominent during the late imperial era. One of the 
identity markers which gained prominence was the concept of ‗homeland‘ expressed in a 
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variety of ways (e.g. by words yurt, el, ana makan, ana yer, ana diyar, weten or by portrayals 
of homeland‘s natural sceneries), to which the nation was indigenous since time immemorial. 
Notably, the homeland is not referred to by these intellectuals by a specific name, or even by 
the name ‗Turkestan‘ or ‗East Turkestan‘, i.e. the homeland of speakers of East Turki 
language, a term known in this period to be used by the Swedish missionaries to denote 
southern and eastern Xinjiang (as illustrated for instance by the title of Turkestan Calendar 
[Teqwiyim Türkistan] of AH 1327 [AD 1909]; PFK 1908: 1, Fig. 4). Occasionally, Xinjiang 
Turkic intelligentsia even used the Chinese ‗Xinjiang‘ to name their homeland. Often, the 
beloved homeland was depicted as natural sceneries and landscapes, such as mountains or 
lakes, which is a technique traced in other nation-formation processes (e.g. Smith 1986: 183). 
Portrayals of desolate Xinjiang landscape, harsh weather and climatic conditions and frequent 
references to darkness and night were wielded by the authors to articulate another new 
important national symbol – national misery caused by the oppressive Chinese administration 
and exploitation of Uyghur homeland. This way, common name, homeland, glorious past and 
current misery newly emerged as ‗primordial‘ attributes and invented ‗traditions‘ of nascent 
Uyghur nation (Hobsbawm 1983: 14; Smith 1986: 177). In this way, Nezerghoja Abdusémet, 
Abdukhaliq Uyghur, Memtili Tewpiq and other late imperial and early republican Xinjiang 
Turkic activists took the first steps in genesis of modern Uyghur national symbology. 
 
 At the same time, new Xinjiang Turkic intelligentsia‘s idea of national well-being 
gradually replaced religious virtue in the position of fundamental social value and primary 
communal interest. In fact, Abdukhaliq Uyghur, Memtili Tewpiq and other early modern 
Uyghur enlighteners were the first indigenous intellectuals to clearly formulate communal 
interests in national vocabulary. In contrast to e.g. Tatar or Kazak Jadids, Xinjiang Turkic 
elites were not concerned with physical survival of their community. Instead, their primary 
aim activity was to mobilize their fellow compatriots to movement eventually aiming at 
rehabilitation of national prestige in their homeland. By bitter criticism of negative national 
characteristics, such as passivity, disunity and inadequate drive toward modernity and 
education, they were trying to awaken their nation from sleep and darkness into enlightened 
effort at self-improvement. Embracing modern education, technology and information were 
the most significant keywords of such progressive discourse. Importantly, the national 
agitation and call to action advocated proactive self-improvement by the nation itself. This 
was due to the fact that the progressive initiative clearly collided with the interests of Chinese 
heteronomy and conservative clergy. Therefore, the state and traditional society not only 
could not be counted by the progressives for defending national interests – they were even 
severely obstructing the modernization efforts.  
 
 Beyond doubt, modern Xinjiang Turkic intelligentsia‘s modernization initiative was 
ultimately pointed toward restoring political rights of a previously advanced but gradually 
declined nation of Uyghur descendants. In other words, the enlighteners‘ goal was to 
effectively remold their nation from imperial subjects into citizens of a modern republic that 
exercises representative government and defends national interests. However, from rhetoric 
by Abdukhaliq Uyghur and Memtili Tewpiq‘s writings it appears that from 1880s to 1920s 
sovereignty and other political objectives were at least as important as (if not outright 
secondary to) main cultural and social objectives, such as modern education and technical 
progress. In other words, for the most part their actions and writings did not suggest that 
political objectives prevailed over other national interests (such as culture and welfare). Due 
to this low degree of politicization of majority of their efforts, Abdukhaliq Uyghur, Memtili 
Tewpiq and other early Xinjiang Turkic modern elites‘ modernist enterprise should perhaps 
not be called a nationalist movement. However, as the enlighteners‘ actions strived to endow 
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their nation with all characteristics of a full-fledged nation, their national agitation 
commenced a potent national movement similar to phenomena illustrated elsewhere (Hroch 
1996: 80-1; Smith 1986: 162-3). It was in the following decade that this national agitation 
massively spilled into political arena. 
 
 Although there are currently no data available from which we can reliably assess the 
extent and manner of social penetration of Xinjiang Turkic elite notions of national identity 
and interest in this period, it is reasonable to argue that such ideas were not shared by a 
significant portion of southern and eastern Xinjiang population. Several reports by foreign 
travelers to the region in 1910s and 1920s do not contain any mention about the local Turkic 
population referring to themselves as ‗Uyghurs‘ or ‗Uyghur descendants‘. On the contrary, 
there are numerous accounts of the people referring to themselves as ‗Turkic‘ or by toponyms 
(Abdusémetov 1991; Stein 1992; Cable and French 1927; Lattimore 1930; Lattimore 1995; 
Schomberg 1996). Thus, the term Uyghur wielded by the Turkic enlighteners reflected more 
of an envisioned mode of communal perception by nationally-conscious intelligentsia than an 
actual national practice. All of the above sources also describe contemporary Xinjiang as an 
underdeveloped region lacking means of mass communication and transportation 
infrastructure, by which such ideas could be spread. Even if such means had technically 
existed, large-scale dissemination of ideology would have been impossible due to restrictions 
of Yang Zengxin‘s ‗ignorant people policy‘. Of the three aforementioned attributes of 
modernity, i.e. progressive schools, press and organizations, only the first one did to a certain, 
yet unknown extent penetrate Xinjiang Turkic society. However, as the following chapter of 
this dissertation will illustrate, the nascent Xinjiang modernity and national agitation by 
Xinjiang Turkic enlighteners potently accelerated the community principle that acted towards 
formation of modern Uyghur national consciousness and emergency of politicized national 
movement. Moreover, the nationally conscious Turkic elites which were educated in new 
schools that appeared after 1880 were to play a leading role in cultural and political life of 






3.  Politicization of National Movement (1930s) 
 
 
 The third chapter shows how the national agitation of early modern Xinjiang Turkic 
intelligentsia and nascent national consciousness of indigenous sedentary Turkic Muslims of 
late imperial and early republican period, scrutinized in previous chapter, transformed into a 
turbulent and highly politicized national movement that swept through the region in 1930s. 
The first line of ideology under research in this chapter originated from Turkic insurgency and 
secessionist movement that broke out in 1931 in the easternmost Xinjiang oasis of Komul. 
The movement spread throughout the entire southern Xinjiang and culminated in the 
proclamation of the first East Turkestan Republic in Kashgar in late 1933. The insurgency 
was accompanied by a wave of Turkic nationalist publications that provide us with a 
comparatively rich spring of first-hand information on contemporary Turkic elites‘ ideas of 
nation and nationalism. In particular, sources exploited in this chapter are magazines Life of 
East Turkestan (Sherqiy Türkistan Hayati), Free Turkestan (Erkin Türkistan) and 
Independence (Istiqlal), an unpublished text Memoir of the Revolution (Inqilab Khatirisi) of 
Emin Wahidi, who was an eye witness to contemporary events, and History of East Turkestan 
(Sherqiy Türkistan Tarikhi), the first modern history of the region written by Muhemmed 
Imin Bughra, a very important figure of early modern intellectual and political history of 
Xinjiang Turks. 
 
 It will be explained that intellectuals and politicians associated with the Turkic 
insurgency of the early 1930s perceived their community as East Turkestani nation (millet), 
defined by a number of shared characteristics, such as religious denomination, ancestry, 
homeland or language. In a much greater extent than their predecessors in the previous period, 
Turkic activists engaged in complex construction of national attributes and symbology of their 
nation. In this way, they wrote history of their ‗primordial‘ East Turkestani homeland, 
formulated rich discourse of national misery inflicted by Chinese oppression and established 
other important national symbols, such as national flag, admired figures of national liberation 
movement or national capital. Also, Turkic intellectuals and politicians articulated in great 
detail national interests of East Turkestanis. The highest goal of the Turkic nationalist 
uprising was naturally winning political independence from China and founding a nation-state 
– the East Turkestan Republic. This state was to be based on religious law, but also on 
principles of modern representative government and republicanism. East Turkestani 
nation-state was also entrusted by nation with following a so-called modernization directive, 
or introducing into lives of East Turkestanis attributes of modernity, such as new education 
and knowledge, publishing and printing, new social organizations, modern technology, public 
healthcare system, hygiene norms or care for disadvantaged members of society. Altogether, 
the nation-state was responsible for satisfying East Turkestanis‘ need of progress and 
well-being. 
 
 The second stream of ideology under research in this chapter is the concept of nation 
and national interest devised by the Xinjiang provincial administration of Sheng Shicai, who 
suppressed the Turkic insurgency in mid-1934 and thus became the ruler of the province. The 
primary source of this section is the periodical New Life (Yéngi Hayat) published in Kashgar 
from July 1933 to May 1937. It will be described that upon inspiration by socialist nationality 
policy enforced in Soviet Central Asia, Sheng replaced the concept of East Turkestani nation 
with the theory of several Turkic nationalities (millet) of Xinjiang, namely Uyghurs, Kazaks, 
Kyrgyz, Taranchis, Uzbeks and Tatars. This measure effectively fragmented the united front 
of Turkic opposition to Chinese rule. In a similar way, Sheng replaced the primary insurgent 
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goal of political independence of East Turkestan with the idea of unity of all Xinjiang‘s 
nationalities and unity of Xinjiang with the homeland, i.e. with the Republic of China. 
Emulating the Soviet model, Sheng‘s discourse eventually refrained from verbatim mentions 
of respective ethnic groups and instead propagandized anonymous ‗Xinjiang nationalities.‘  
 
 This section will also assert that as a legitimization measure, Sheng incorporated a 
large part of Turkic insurgents‘ ideas of nation and national interest into his policy. Namely, 
he embraced the Turkic nationalist concept of East Turkestan as homeland of all Turkic 
nationalities. He also promoted other recently designed national symbols (such as history, 
identity sites, national misery and liberation struggle) of Turkic nationalities, as well as the 
discourse of representative government and modernization directive. Despite the fact that 
Sheng‘s nationally oriented rhetoric eventually proved to be a mere legitimization measure 
and was soon terminated to the disadvantage of Xinjiang Turkic Muslims, Sheng‘s initial 
dictum articulated numerous ideas of nation and national interest that were directly 
intercepted from the previous national discourse of East Turkestani insurgent theoreticians. 
 
 Due to lack of primary sources and field research data pertaining to the time period 
between 1880s and late 1920s, it is again difficult to show how exactly the national agitation 
of early progressive activists, researched in Chapter 2, spread through and affected Turkic 
society. However, this chapter will suggest that judging by Xinjiang Turkic Muslims‘ 
extensive insurgency in eastern and southern Xinjiang, proclamation of East Turkestani 
nation-state, coordinated defense of national interests even during Sheng Shicai‘s renewed 
heteronomy in 1930s and other mass phenomena, it is obvious that the seemingly modest 
progressive efforts of Xinjiang Turkic modernizers explored in previous chapter had 
considerable effect and that the idea of nation and national interest did apparently take roots 
among substantial numbers of sedentary Turkic Muslims of Xinjiang. Similarly to patterns 
illustrated by specialists on nation-forming processes elsewhere, the 1930s‘ politicization of 
previously largely culturally and socially defined interests of Xinjiang Turkic Muslims aimed 
in an organized manner to endow their nation with all attributes of a modern nation. In 
wording of general theories, the politicized national interest had a markedly higher priority 
than other, non-national (such as for instance local or social objectives pointed out in Chapter 
1) communal interests (Hroch 1996: 80; Breuilly 2). As explained on other models, the 
politicized national movement of Xinjiang Turkic Muslims prevailed over dynamics of 
discord sown by local and social ruptures, and generated a sense of broad and deep solidarity 
within the nation as large numbers of Turkic society were ‗invited‘ by the elite strata to 
actively join in creating history (Smith 1986: 137). In other words, mobilization and 
politicization of Xinjiang Turkic Muslims‘ movement in 1930s generated strong popular 
support that was crucial for nationalist movement (Breuilly 19, 132; Smith 1986: 154-6). At 
the same time, the fact that a significant role in the insurgency was played by a new class of 
modern intelligentsia points yet again to the validity of the aforementioned ‗intellectual 
interpretation‘ of nationalism (Breuilly 149-50) for the case of modern Uyghur national 
identity and nationalism. 
 
3.1.  Native Turkic Insurgency (1930 – 1934) 
 
 The mismanagement of Xinjiang affairs by Jin Shuren, outlined in previous chapter, 
caused grave deterioration of relations between the provincial administration and native 
Turkic Muslims. The situation was especially tense in Komul, one of the last remaining 
semi-autonomous Muslim khanates ruled by autochthonous aristocracy and also a 
strategically important location at the gate to China proper. After abolition of even the formal 
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political power of the Komul khan in 1930, and after the city was receiving waves of Han 
refugees from neighboring Gansu province, Jin imposed direct taxes on local Muslims and 
expropriated, or compensated with land, number of Turkic Muslim families in order to 
accommodate the Gansu newcomers. The Han settlers were to be exempt from taxation for 
two years while one year‘s tax amount was to be levied retroactively from local Muslims. The 
growing popular discontent of Muslims was ignored by Jin and even grew due to misconduct 
of a local Han official. As in the case of the late Qing Turkic uprising in Xinjiang, economic 
disparity and communal conflict between indigenous Turkic and exogenous Han population 
and ruling strata, in which both sides were distinct as regards religion, language, culture and 
other identity markers, quickly bred a large-scale native Turkic insurgency. The spark of 
rebellion was struck in the village of Shopul in early April, 1931, when local Han 
administrators, their bodyguards and some Gansu Han immigrant families were massacred by 
local Turkic Muslims. The rebels then fled to nearby mountains and Khoja Niyaz Haji (1889-
1937) and Yolwas (1888-1971) became leaders of the uprising. 
 
 Pressed hard by provincial troops, the rebels were by a coincidence assisted by troops 
of a young and ambitious Gansu Tungan warlord Ma Zhongying (馬仲英; 1910). As a result, 
the rebels held out and during 1931 and 1932 the uprising gradually spread throughout the 
whole Heptapolis region. In the Turfan area, a large portion of insurgent activities were 
carried out by a secret organization led by Mahmud Muhiti (1887-1944), the brother of the 
Jadidist activist Mekhsut, who himself was killed in the warfare and his body was 
dismembered on the battlefield near Lükchün. Later, Tungans and Kazaks in northern 
Xinjiang also rebelled. In winter of 1932, some rebel troops were preparing an attack on 
Urumchi. One of the two most powerful factions there were White Russians, who made up a 
small but influential minority after the 1917 Bolshevik revolution and were paradoxically 
supported by the Soviets by 1930s. Another major power in the provincial capital were 
Chinese troops originally based in northeastern China, who arrived in Xinjiang via Siberia 
after Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931. This well trained Chinese force was 
commanded by Sheng Shicai (1895-1970), a graduate of military academies who was charged 
by Jin Shuren with suppressing the Turkic rebellion in eastern Xinjiang. However, Jin was 
deposed in a coup by White Russians on April 12, 1933, and eventually Sheng Shicai took 
over Jin‘s postition. At the same time, he pleaded for Soviet help against Ma Zhongying‘s 
Tungan troops who were pressing Urumchi from both east and north. The Soviet military 
intervention in early 1934 cemented Sheng Shicai‘s position of the ruler of Xinjiang (Forbes 
52-62; 97-106). 
 
 Meanwhile, the situation in southern Xinjiang was complex. The most significant 
events occurred simultaneously along the southern and northern edges of the Taklamakan. A 
set of uprisings erupted in the Khotan area in spring of 1933 and was eventually brought 
under leadership of the three Bughra brothers – Muhemmed Imin (1901-1965), Abdulla (?-
1934) and Nur Ahmadjan (?-1934). The Bughras were a clan of Muslim notables with 
hereditary political power; hence they are in some sources referred to as the Khotan emirs. 
The Bughra brothers established themselves as leaders of the Khotanese rebellion and even 
proclaimed an independent government in Khotan in March 1933. After that, Khotanese 
forces advanced westwards, where they allied with simultaneously erupting local risings and 
took control of Yarkend and Yangissar. At the same time, other Tungan and Turkic troops 
from Komul and Turfan advanced from the Urumchi region westwards along the northern 
road around the Taklamakan and, jointly with rebelling Kyrgyz forces, arrived in Kashgar 
where the two chains of uprisings merged. Fighting ensued among various Tungan and Turkic 
factions, while Khoja Niyaz Haji, who had stayed behind his forces at the northern section of 
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the Taklamakan, formed an anti-Tungan alliance with provincial forces. Eventually, in May 
1933 the events ended up in stalemate as the Kashgar New City was in hands of well armed 
and trained Tungan troops of Ma Zhongying, whereas Turkic forces held Kashgar Old City. 
Moreover, Khotan, Aksu and Kucha regions were administered by separate Turkic factions. 
As a result, the whole eastern and southern Xinjiang slipped out of Han Chinese control 
(Forbes 38-121; Millward 2007: 192-8; Shehidi 278-82, Ezizi 1997a: 292-7). 
 
 Thus, the Kashgar Old City became the center of native Turkic insurgency, in which 
the Khotan faction gradually gained supremacy over other groups. Abdulla Bughra and Sabit 
Abdulbaqi Damolla (1883-1934), the Prime Minister and supreme religious authority (Ar. 
shaykh ul-Islam) of the Khotanese government, arrived in Kashgar in July 1933 and founded a 
‗Kashgar Affairs Office of the Khotan Government‘ (Khotan Idarisi), which subsequently 
transformed into an ‗East Turkestan Independence Association‘ (ETIA, Sherqiy Türkistan 
Istiqlal Jemi‟iti; Millward 2007: 198). Finally, the insurgency culminated in proclamation of 
the ‗East Turkestan Republic‘ (Sherqiy Türkistan Jumhuriyiti, ETIR)
54
 on November 12, 1933 
(AH 24 rajab 1352;), a move allegedly initiated mainly by Sabit Damolla (Istiqlal 12; Bughra 
1998: 426). 
 
 The Turkic insurgency of 1930s and establishment of the ETIR have so far not been 
sufficiently researched. Nevertheless, all presently available scholarship agrees that the new 
republic struggled in virtually all fields of its existence. The administration failed to extend its 
factual influence beyond oases along the southwestern rim of the Taklamakan and even to 
take control of the nearby Kashgar New City where Tungan armies continued to hold out. The 
ETIR‘s economy was plagued by lack of resources and high inflation. In international 
relations, despite its manifest anti-Chinese and anti-Soviet orientation, the ETIR failed to 
enlist even rhetorical support of Great Britain or Turkey, who both recognized the Republic of 
China‘s sovereignty over Xinjiang. The promised support of Afghanistan also did not 
materialize (Millward 206; Forbes 112-6). The existence of the ETIR in Kashgar Old City 
lasted only for several weeks before it was run over by the Tungans in early February 1934. It 
is the failure of the state that is one of the bases for dismissals of the ETIR by PRC‘s 
scholarship. As a whole, the movement is vilified as an originally legitimate peasant uprising 
that unfortunately turned into ‗separatist power‘ (分裂政权  fēnliè zhèngquán) soiled by 
narrow nationalism, pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism, religious extremism and foreign 
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 It is worth stressing that both independent states declared by Xinjiang indigenous Turkic Muslims 
prior to 1949 are consistently termed in primary historical sources by the same official name – ‗East 
Turkestan Republic‘ (Sherqiy Türkistan Jumhuriyiti). In order to distinguish between these two 
authorities, the acronym ‗ETIR‘ (East Turkestan Islamic Republic) is used in this dissertation for the 
first one (existed in 1933-4 and was centered in Kashgar), while the acronym ETR is used to refer to 
the second one (existed in 1944-9, was centered in Ghulja and is approached in greater detail in 
Chapter 4 of this dissertation). The acronym ‗ETIR‘ refers to the occasional term used in primary 
sources for its authority as ‗Islamic government‘ (hökümet Islamiye; I 54, 59; NL 3) and is adopted in 
this dissertation due to higher prominence of religion in the first East Turkestan Republic (or ETIR) 
than in the second East Turkestan Republic (or ETR). However, it is worth re-emphasizing here that 
the official and widely used official name for the ETIR appears in all primary sources as the ‗East 
Turkestan Republic.‘ In other words, terms such as ‗Turkish Islamic Republic of East Turkestan‘ 
(TIRET; Forbes 112; Wang 467), or ‗East Turkestan Islamic Republic (Sherqyi Türkistan Islam 
Jumhuriyiti, 东突厥斯坦伊斯兰共和国 D ng Tūjuésīt n yīsīlán gònghéguó; Burhan 430; Chen 277;) 
or even ‗East Turkestan Independent Republic‘ (Sherqyi Türkistan Istiqlaliyet Jumhuriyiti; Ezizi 
1997a: 298), which are used by a large number amount of currently available literature, do not exist in 
any of the indigenous primary sources examined in this dissertation. 
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imperialists‘ intrigue (e.g. Chen and Chen 277-85; Li 172-91; Ezizi 1997a: 216-220; Burhan 
492-503, 605). Providing an excellent example of republican China‘s official view of the 
affair, Zhang Dajun disregards the fact of proclamation of the ETIR and describes the 
insurgency in relatively brief manner as ‗turmoil‘ or ‗chaos‘ (變亂 bi nlu n; Zhang 2727-
812). 
 
 From among the few Western works dealing with the insurgency, Andrew Forbes 
interprets the ETIR (which he calls ‗TIRET‘, Turkish-Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan), 
as a state committed to application of Islamic law with an apparent preparedness to adapt or 
reform Islamic custom to fit contemporary political and social conditions. Thus, besides the 
Islamic law, the ETIR also sought to institute educational, economic and social reforms. As 
regards foreign affairs, Forbes opines that the state was anti-Soviet, anti-Han, anti-Tungan and 
had, in contrast to its spiritual predecessor (i.e. Ya‘qup Beg‘s emirate), considerably smaller 
success at lobbying for support of great powers and Islamic countries. In fact, by adopting ‗an 
uncompromisingly‘ Turkic-Islamic stance, the ETIR made enemies of all the major players in 
the region (i.e. the provincial government, the central government, the Tungans and the 
Soviets), and was therefore ‗doomed from the moment of its inception‘ (Forbes 112-6). Laura 
Newby opined that the republic was shaped by the two forces of ultra-nationalism and 
Islamism. Despite the fact that the administration apparently intended to modernize schools, 
the state was plagued by lack of competent leadership, absence of binding ideology, persisting 
tribal loyalties and social fragmentation. Nevertheless, according to Newby, in founding the 
ETIR Islam was for the first time in Xinjiang employed as a modern mobilizing force 
endowed with a view to creating the basis of national identity of East Turkestanis (Newby 
1986: 74, 78, 84, 187-96, 220-3). Shinmen Yasushi‘s excellent research supports the 
intellectual interpretation of nationalism, mentioned in Chapter 2, and shows how the 
nationalist insurgency of the 1930s stemmed from Turkic cultural modernism from late 
nineteenth to early twentieth century: ‗…the proclamation of Eastern Turkistan Republic 
should be considered as the direct result of nationalistic movements carried on under the 
leadership of those intellectuals and merchants who had devoted themselves to reformist 
activities with the promotion of the New-Method educational system as its central axis.‘ 
Founding of the ETIR is by him regarded as a remarkable consequence of social 
modernization in East Turkestan brought about by transfer of ideas from west to east of 
Central Asia (Shinmen 154-5). Similarly, Eden Naby‘s article pointed to the connection 
between emergence of Turkic national identity and Turkic periodicals mushrooming in 
southern Xinjiang in 1930s (Naby 1987). 
 
  The following sections of this dissertation will attempt to outline how the native 
Turkic insurgency and proclamation of the ETIR generated an enormous impact on the 
evolution of Xinjiang Turkic perceptions of national identity and nationalism. This impetus is 
well traceable in periodicals that were published during the brief autonomy of eastern and 
southern Xinjiang in 1933-4 mainly by activists concentrated around the secessionist faction 
in Kashgar. The periodicals were printed by the Swedish Mission Press, which was the 
printing house established in 1905 by Swedish missionaries who were active southwestern 
Xinjiang from 1892.
55
 After the missionaries were expelled from the province in 1938, they 
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 It was already mentioned in Chapter 2 that the extent of the mission‘s printing activities was 
substantial. At the same time, as implied in the Introduction to this dissertation, there are considerable 
grounds to believe that had this archive remained it Xinjiang, today it would have been either 
destroyed or not accessible to researchers. Saving of Swedish Mission‘s archives is undoubtedly an 
event of extraordinary significance for contemporary study of Xinjiang‘s early modern history. Today, 
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luckily managed to take their archives with them to Sweden, where the collection is today 
kept by the Lund University. Chronologically, the first source under research is the Life of 
East Turkestan, (Sherqiy Türkistan Hayati; LET) a two-page weekly which started 
publication on July 21, 1933, or in other words around the time of Sabit Damolla‘s and 
Abdulla Bughra‘s arrival in Kashgar Old City, which likely provided a stimulus for 
nationally-minded activists. Proclamation of the ETIR on November 12, 1933, was reflected 
in the change of name of the weekly – the following issue came out on November 15 as Free 
Turkestan (Erkin Türkistan; LET).
56
 Its last issue of was published on February 1, 1934, i.e. 
shortly before the ETIR leadership left Kashgar Old City on February 5 (Forbes 122). 
Throughout the whole period of its existence, the editor in chief of this periodical was Qutluq 
Haji Shewqi, a prominent modernist intellectual of Kashgar (whose activities were already 
mentioned in Chapter 2 of this dissertation). Although as a rule the articles in Life of East 
Turkestan and Free Turkestan are never signed, it is reasonable to assume that a large number 
of them were written by Qutluq, or a similarly minded activist with Jadidist background. 
 
 Another significant source is the biweekly journal Independence (Istiqlal; I; Fig. 5), 
published for the first time by the ETIA on December 18, 1933. The first issue of 
Independence had seventy-four pages and in fact consisted of numbers 1 and 2. Independence 
is an especially valuable primary source because it contains, among other material, the ETIR 
constitution. However, as no other issues are currently known to be preserved in the Swedish 
archive, Independence seems to have come out only once. The editor-in-chief of 
Independence was one Sufizade, of whom nothing certain is known.
57
 Similarly, other articles 
in Independence are undersigned by pseudonyms and authors of whom nothing is currently 
known. Life of East Turkestan, Free Turkestan and Independence were all periodicals directly 
or closely affiliated with insurgent administration and thus can be considered its press organs. 
It is notable that Independence has stronger religious overtones that Life of East Turkestan. 
 
 A source of major significance is History of East Turkestan (Sherqiy Türkistan Tarikhi; 
Bughra 1998), penned by the aforementioned Muhemmed Imin Bughra who was undoubtedly 
one of the most important personages of modern Uyghur history. Due to his background in a 
Khotanese aristocratic family where he was born in 1901, he received religious education at a 
madrasas in Khotan and nearby Qaraqash, where he afterwards also became a teacher and 
principal in 1922-1933. At this time, he became an advocate of modern education. After the 
Komul rebellion of 1931, Bughra organized an uprising in Qaraqash and gradually became 
one of the leading figures of the Khotan rebellion and of the whole Turkic insurgency in 
southern Xinjiang. After the collapse of the movement, he managed to escape from Khotan to 
Leh and Srinagar, eventually ending up in the Xinjiang Turkic refugee community in 
Afghanistan. There, he functioned as a revered leader until 1943, when he left for India and 
eventually for China (Benson 1991: 90; Forbes 124).
58
  
                                                                                                                                                        
the missionary archive is well preserved and made available for research by the Lund University 
library. 
56
 Despite the change in title, numbering, editorial staff and contents of this periodical did not change. 
Therefore, this research considers it a single source and despite the change in title refers to Free 
Turkestan as to Life of East Turkestan (LET). 
57
 A man named Sufizade is by communist historiography said to be a member of a group of 
anti-Bolshevik and anti-Soviet rebels called the Qasimovists who had fled Soviet Central Asia around 
the time of proclamation of the ETIR (Ezizi 1997a: 305). It seems unlikely that this person would be 
able within such a short time to hold an influential post of an editor-in-chief of a major propaganda 
organ. 
58
 Muhemmed Imin Bughra‘s further activities are examined in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
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 Bughra finished his History of East Turkestan in Kabul in 1940. Since then, this text 
has been republished several times by Uyghur exile organizations.
59
 It is the first modern 
history of the region, moreover written by a highly educated individual who was also a 
personal protagonist of core events and highest political decisions. Bughra was the first 
Uyghur historian to integrate classical Turko-Islamic historiographic tradition with findings of 
modern archeology, ethnology, epigraphy, linguistics and other fields (Tursun 89). This also 
means that, in contrast to e.g. Molla Musa Sayrami‘s works, Bughra‘s narrative is the first 
general history of the region to distinguish between historical and mythical past of the region 
and its people. At the same time, the nationalistic overtones History of East Turkestan make it 
a text highly acclaimed by many Uyghur historians, intellectuals and also ordinary Uyghurs 
who had a chance to read it. A western specialist has recently called the work ‗a foundational 
text for Uyghur independence activists‘ (Bovingdon 2010: 138). It is also a text continuously 
vilified and strictly banned by PRC‘s authorities and politicized scholarship. At the same time, 
History of East Turkestan exists in Chinese translation in the form of internal material
60
 and 
Chinese historians are well familiar with it. Zhang Dajun also refers to Bughra‘s work, 
interestingly calling it Modern History of Xinjiang (新疆近代史 Xīnji ng j nd i shǐ; Zhang 
2811). Undoubtedly, Bughra‘s History of East Turkestan is one the most influential works of 
modern Uyghur historiography and nationalism.  
 
 Finally, the first section of this chapter refers to an unpublished memoir of the 
insurgency written by Emin Wahidi in Lahore in 1938 (Wahidi 1938). Nothing is further 
known about Wahidi except facts specifically mentioned in the memoir itself, such as that 
Wahidi was probably a direct witness of the insurgency in southwestern Xinjiang and that, 
similarly to many other Xinjiang Turkic families, after the collapse of the ETIR in 1934 he 
fled via the Karakoram to northern India. The authenticity of Wahidi‘s memoir is 
corroborated by History of East Turkestan (Bughra 1998: 446), which mentions its existence 
under the name Memoir of the Revolution (Inqilab Khatirisi). Another work refers to a man 
called Emin Wahidi, who was in 1936 dispatched by Mahmud Muhiti to report to the central 
government on Sheng Shicai‘s flawed policy. After this mission failed, on the way back Emin 
allegedly remained in Lanzhou due to worsened situation in southern Xinjiang (Ezizi 1997a: 
461-2). It is possible that this Wahidi could have somehow travelled from the Xinjiang Turkic 
expatriate community in Lanzhou to join the main body of diaspora in India. In any case, the 
memoir, itself slightly over twenty pages of typed text, briefly summarizes the main events 
and context of the Turkic insurgency and contributes the author‘s commentaries on the events, 
as well as his views of nation and nationalism. Therefore, Wahidi‘s memoir is a remarkably 
personal insight into thoughts and feelings of a Xinjiang Turkic Muslim who in 1930s opted 
for exile after his homeland lost its brief freedom.
61
 Altogether, Life of East Turkestan, 
Independence and works of Emin Wahidi, Muhemmed Imin Bughra are good exhibits of 
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 Known editions are in 1941 (Kashmir; publication completed in 1947), 1970 (Kashmir; not 
complete edition), 1987 (Ankara), 1991 (Almaty; in Cyrillic script) and 1998 (Ankara; in modern 
Uyghur script). This dissertation refers to the 1998 Ankara edition. 
60
 Internal material (内部发行资料 nèib  f xíng zīli o) are publications commissioned by the Chinese 
Communist Party that examine politically sensitive topics and are therefore intended only for 
exclusive use by Party officials. Technically, internal material should not be legally accessible to 
non-Party academics or reading public; however, it is relatively easily purchasable on black market. 
61
 Emin Wahidi‘s memoir was edited and transcribed into contemporary Uyghur script in May 2002 by 
Prof. Abdujelil Turan of the Taklamakan Uyghur Publishing House (Teklimakan Uyghur Neshriyati) 
in Istanbul. I am deeply thankful to him for supplying me with this unique source, as well as with 
other valuable materials related to Uyghur history. 
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secessionist political activism of 1930s, as well as a rich source on the authors‘ perceptions of 
Xinjiang Turkic Muslims‘ communal identity and interest. The following section examines 
main patterns in these perceptions. 
 
Discourse of East Turkestani Nation 
 
  Similarly to Molla Musa Sayrami‘s portrayal of the Musulman category examined in 
Chapter 1 of this dissertation, 1930s‘ Turkic insurgent activists considered religion one of the 
main defining communal markers of indigenous Turkic oasis dwellers of eastern and southern 
Xinjiang. Religion was specifically considered a pillar of happiness of human life (I 53). 
Accordingly, the insurgent administration strongly professed its religious piety. The 
constitution of the ETIR was drawn up in the name of God, the top figure of its apparatus bore 
the traditional religious-administrative title ‗Commander of the Faithful‘ (Ar. amir al-
mu‟minin; I 23) and its legislature was based on the Islamic law (Ar. shari‟a). ‗As the state is 
based on the superior fundaments of Islamic law, Ministry of Religious Affairs and Justice is 
instituted. The Minister of Justice will act as the Supreme Religious Authority.‘ (Ar. shaykh 
ul-Islam; I 28) Khoja Niyaz Haji became the head of state and was frequently referred to as 
‗holy warrior‘ (Ar. ghazi). The Qur‘an was considered primary vehicle of knowledge while 
non-compliance with religious principles was to be severely punished. The ETIR itself was 
the goal of the ‗path to the independence of Islamic state‘ (dölet Islamiyening istiqlal yoli; I 4, 
5, 17, 21-3, 28, 53, 55). The insurgency itself is also often referred to as the holy war of 
Islamic warriors and true Muslims against the infidels (LET 3; Newby 1986: 240-1; Wahidi 6, 
7). The state was also clearly intended to unite other Muslim brethren in the region 
(Musulman qérindashliri; LET 3, 19; I 4): ‗…Ninety out of a hundred people living in the 
region of East Turkestan are us Muslims. We are of the same religious faction...‘ (LET 15) 
Issues of Life of East Turkestan from before declaration of the ETIR also reveal that ‗Islamic 
government‘ (hökümet Islamiye) was the insurgents‘ goal from at least summer of 1933 (LET 
3). Similarly, after the Khotan insurgency declared independence in March 1933, the territory 
between Cherchen in the east and Yarkend in the west fell under the administration of the 
‗Islamic Government of Khotan‘ (Khoten hökümiti Islamiye; Wahidi 14). Abidance by 
religious rules was perceived as a reason for development of other Islamic countries, about 
which the insurgent press frequently brought news (LET 2, 14). 
 
 In other aspects, however, the discourse of communal identity in 1930s was altogether 
different from Molla Musa Sayrami‘s thinking and clearly showed the impact that the transfer 
of the national idea and other features of modernity, described in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, 
had on the thinking of Xinjiang Turkic intellectuals. In particular, the community is newly 
and most importantly perceived as a nation that is bound by common descent and other 
features. The following passage is illustrative of this pattern: 
 
‗…Our East Turkestani nation (Sherqiy Türkistan militi) is a world-known Turkic 
nation (Türk millet) of noble descent and pedigree. In the old times, just like other 
Turkic nations, we have pursued a nomadic livelihood in tents, raising herds of sheep 
and horses in the Altay mountains and pastures of Moghulistan. We have been a 
noble nation governed by our own khans and leaders of the homeland. Several 
centuries from the hijra, our mighty khan Oghuz with all Turkic nations saddled 
horses and conquered all China, also subduing East and West Turkestan, Iran and 
India. We are the children of Oghuz Khan‘s soldiers who settled in East Turkestan at 
that time. The state assembled by Oghuz Khan stretched from the Chinese sea in the 
east to Qipchaq villages in the west…‘ (LET 4) 
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 The term nation (millet, qewm) or national (milliy, qewmiy) is used very frequently in 
the texts in a wide variety of contexts. The nation has a distinct ethnonym – ‗Turki‘, ‗Turkic‘ 
(Türk) or ‗East Turkestani‘ (Sherqiy Türkistanlik; I 60; Wahidi 1, 2, 7, 13, 21, Bughra 1998: 
296). The nation also possesses a clearly defined ‗homeland‘ (weten) – East Turkestan 
(Sherqiy Türkistan; I 57; LET 9), or ‗Great East Turkestan‘ (Sherqiy ulugh Türkistan; I 60): 
‗…As regards our lineage and kinship, we are all descendants of the same Turks. Our 
language is the same Turkic. Our common homeland is East Turkestan, inhabited by Turkic 
tribes...‘ (LET 15) Common ancestry is also shared by other Turkic communities, e.g. the 
Kyrgyz (Wahidi 8, 19), who are also generally included in the category East Turkestani. 
Analogously, the population of southern and northern Xinjiang is sometimes referred to as 
‗Turk‘ (Türk; Bughra 1998: 304-5). The periodical Life of East Turkestan, which in July 1933 
started publication as a ‗religious, national, educational, literary, ethical and political 
newspaper‘ (LET 2), became a ‗national, political, educational, ethical and literary 
newspaper‘ after proclamation of the ETIR in mid-November 1933 (LET 13). The Turkic 
term for God (Tengri) is sometimes preferred to Arabic or Persian word (I 3, 4, 66), which 
shows to emphasis on Turkic aspect of identity as opposed to Arabic or Persian influence. The 
lack of national feeling is specifically criticized as a negative trait of some East Turkestanis 
(Bughra 1998: 367-8). It is also clear that the ETIR activists were aware of distinctly Uyghur 
identity. The Independence uses the word yighiliq, while it is footnoted that it is a ‗Uyghur 
word‘ (Uyghurche söz) meaning ‗uprising, struggle‘ (I 41). On the early edition of the ETIR 
coins, the state is referred to as the ‗Republic of Uyghuristan‘ (Uyghuristan Jumhuriyiti; Zhu 
225). At this moment, these two instances constitute the first known official usage of the term 
‗Uyghur‘ as a modern ethnonym. 
 
 The national segment of communal identity had at least the same importance as the 
above discussed religious segment. In many instances, the words ‗religious‘ and ‗national‘ are 
used next to one another throughout the text. For example, the Constitution of the ETIR 
declares the state as both ‗religious and national Islamic government‘ (diniy milliy Islam 
hökümeti; I 22) or ‗religious and national rule‘ (diniy we milliy hakimiyet; I 57-8), coming 
about as a result of ‗religious and national revolution‘ (ibadiy milliy inqiliab; I 61) and 
intending to administer religious, national, social and economic affairs of the nation 
(milletning diniy, milliy, medeniy we ikhtisadiy ishliri; I 23). According to a saying featured in 
another text, ‗the success [of the new state] is granted by God as long as the nation 
contributes proactively‘ (LET 14). The people of the ETIR are called ‗children of Islamic 
Turks‘ (Islam Türk balisi; I 60-1). A ‗Turko-Islamic spirit‘ (Türk Islam rohi) was a 
specifically mentioned concept of East Turkestani history (Bughra 1998: 315). In another 
place, the establishment of Islamic government is hailed as much as national awakening (LET 
13). The ‗Islamic nation‘ (millet Islamiye; LET 2:1,), the ‗path of religion and nation‘ (din we 
millet yoli; I 11) and ‗religious and national virtue and honor‘ (dinniy we milliy nomus we 
izzet; I 45) are other frequently used concepts. Dates in articles in Life of East Turkestan and 
Independence, which were both religious and national journals, are given to Muslim calendar 
(AH), but also according to Western calendar (AD). Khoja Niyaz Haji and Mahmud Muhiti 
were referred to by both their honorary religious and modern political/military function titles 
– ‗President Holy Warrior Honorable Khoja Niyaz Haji‘ (janab re‟is jumhur ghazi Niyaz 
Hajim; LET 16) and ‗Commander Mahmud Holy Warrior‘ (qomandan Mahmud ghazi; LET 
14). The banknotes of the ETIR were called ‗national Islamic notes‘ (milliy Islam akchesi; I 
64). However, as the concept of national identity is referred to more frequently than that of 
religious identity in the examined sources, it is possible to argue that nation replaced God as 
the basis of world-view, partly at least.  
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 Another extremely prominent pattern of community principle was a shared homeland 
– East Turkestan – which in the national discourse becomes an important national treasure. 
The terminology used is ‗homeland‘ (weten; LET 1:1; Wahidi 20), ‗place of origin‘ (yurt; 
LET 1: 1; I 31), ‗our homeland East Turkestan‘ (wetenimiz Türkistan Sherqiy; LET 1: 1, LET 
3), ‗our great and holy homeland of East Turkestan‘ (ulugh we muqeddes yurtimiz Sherqiy 
Türkistan; LET 3) or ‗great homeland‘ (ulugh weten; Bughra 1998: xiii). In this way, referring 
to East Turkestan as to the homeland of East Turkestanis revived for indigenous use the term 
‗Turkestan‘, wielded for the first time by Mahmud Kashgari in the eleventh century, and also 
introduced the modern idea of nation as a legitimate owner of its homeland. East Turkestan 
started to be seen as a primordial geographical entity which was the home to Eastern Turks, or 
in other words East Turkestani nation. In contrast to other names, such as Xinjiang or Chinese 
Turkestan, the name ‗East Turkestan‘ was also seen as a term devoid of ephemeral political 
connotations, and thus the only historically and scientifically correct name unbound by the 
‗chain of politics‘ (siyaset zenjiri; Bughra 1998: xiv).  
 
 According to the sources, national homeland belonged exclusively to East Turkestanis 
who had the right to rule it by themselves. East Turkestanis were perceived as a member of 
the ‗family of Turkic peoples‘ (Türk qewm a‟ilisi) or a ‗Turkic race‘ (Türk erqi), and East 
Turkestan is portrayed as a ‗homeland of Turks‘ (Türk ana yurti; Bughra 1998: xiv). The term 
‗East Turkestani‘ referred in majority of instances to indigenous sedentary Muslim Turkic 
population of Xinjiang, or the Musulman, but sometimes also comprised other Turkic 
indigenous groups (in southern Xinjiang it was mainly the Kyrgyz; I 57-8; Wahidi 7, 8). In 
turn, origins in the same homeland generated a sense of vertical solidarity and fraternity 
necessary for existence of national consciousness – the members of the nation are often 
referred to as ‗brothers‘ (burader; LET 13), ‗persons from the same place‘ (yurtdash; I 3, 9, 
55 or 63) or ‗persons from the same homeland‘ (wetendash; I 3, 60). The president of the 
ETIR was explicitly declared to be responsible for the welfare of the religion, nation and 
homeland (I 25). An important aspect was that only local East Turkestanis were able and 
entitled to rule in East Turkestan: ‗…From that day, the people of Komul were fed up with Ma 
Zhongying. They realized that it was only the descendants of the homeland who could save it 
and defend it against enemies. They understood the meaning of our ancestors‟ wise words “A 
stranger stays with you as long as you feed him, a relative until you die...‖‘ (Wahidi 5) 
 
 For this reason, it was seen by the Turkic theoreticians as vitally important to protect 
homeland from enemies and foreign elements. These were primarily the Han people (Khitay, 
Chin, Chinlik; LET 1: 1; I 59; Wahidi 1, 22), as well as the administration of China (Chin, 
Khitay, Khitaystan; I 54, 60), against which the insurgency was targeted: „…Until that day, 
our people clearly wanted to advance Islam and get rid of the Chinese…‘ (Wahidi 11) The 
other significant adversary was the Soviet Union, whose ideology was incompatible with that 
of the insurgency and was therefore viewed by the insurgency with great suspicion (I 59, 
Wahidi 10). Another enemy of Turkic insurgents were Xinjiang Mongols who occasionally 
sided with provincial authorities (I 59). However, by far the most formidable and despised 
foes were the Gansu Tungan troops, who, after initial support to the insurgency, remained 
loyal to the central government of China and seriously challenged the Turkic troops from 
Kashgar New City (LET 13, 16, 18; I 46). Tungans were even regularly referred to in the 
sources as ‗Chinese‘ (Chinliq; Bughra 1998: 304). Even though Tungans were also Muslims, 
East Turkestanis did not hide their bitterness about their alleged betrayal and regarded them in 
much the same was as the Chinese, which again testifies to the demise of traditional 
religion-based world view and its replacement by the national idea: ‗…At the time, it was 
possible to attain the goal of Islamic government by the people of Turkestan only by expelling 
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foreign elements. The fact that the Chinese were there, and also that the Tungans were there, 
was in conflict in reaching our goals. The Tungans were not any different from the Chinese, 
besides the fact that they declared they were Muslim...‘ (Wahidi 11) Altogether, the 
emergence of the national idea in Turkic elite perceptions of communal identity in 1930s is 
perhaps best illustrated by the following passage: 
 
‗…Black Tungans are worse enemies of ours than Chinese. We are safe from the 
oppression of the Chinese, but we are not in the least safe from oppression of 
Tungans. There is now no danger for us from the Chinese, but it cannot be said that 
we are not troubled by Tungans. Therefore, we will carefully prepare ourselves for 
the Tungans, we will fiercely fight them on the battlefield and from now on, there 
will not be the slightest sign of mercy in the hearts of East Turkestanis for the 
Tungans. This is what East Turkestanis learned from their rich experience on the 
battlefields. Yellow Chinese have nothing to claim in East Turkestan, and in the same 
way, black ‗Tungan‘ Chinese do not have anything worth of one dachen
62
 to claim in 
East Turkestan. East Turkestan belongs to East Turkestanis – this is our slogan. From 
now on, East Turkestan does not need any foreigner to act as our parents. Be it 
yellow Chinese or black Chinese, wherever they came from let them go back there 
and take their rulers, dignitaries, magistrates, officials, administrators and the like 
back to Beijing. We need neither them nor their language. Let their ways, customs, 
manners and writing get lost altogether. We have now expelled them forever. Enough 
of yellow and black bastards soiling our homeland for so many years! A handful or 
half-handful of yellow and black dirty slobs remain here. These are like in an opium 
hallucination – they are hoping to retain the government like before and, trying their 
best since they have nothing to lose, they want to continue aforementioned cruelties. 
Their days are coming to an end. Soon, these dirty newcomers, who just somehow 
happened to end up here, will be sent off to their homelands regardless if they want 
or not. From now on, the oppressors who do not recognize the state authority of East 
Turkestan will be given no rights! Let the yellow and black beasts get lost! Long live 
state of East Turkestan and let the political, religious, national, scientific, social and 
economic revolution spread!! Long live our great leader President Khoja Niyaz Haji! 
Long live East Turkestani devoted fighters and heroic soldiers!...‘ (I 47-8) 
  
Construction of National Symbology  
 
 A prominent national symbol emerging in the discourse of 1930s‘ insurgent 
activists was East Turkestani national history. The territory of the ETIR, i.e. eastern 
and southern Xinjiang, started to be perceived as a primordial ‗East Turkestan‘ which 
has since the dawn of history been inhabited by Turks:  
 
 ‗…East Turkestan has a bloody history of two thousand years...‘ (I 50). 
 
‗…Historical books of the Chinese often speak of us Turks as of occupants and 
raiders, and accuse us of troubling their homeland, so that the famous Wall of China 
had to be built for their protection. In contrast, some of us speak of the fact that we 
have been ruled by the Chinese for two thousand years and speculate that things will 
                                                 
62
 A dachen (from Chinese colloquial expression 大錢 d qián), in proper terminology 文 wén, was the 
smallest denomination of Qing imperial monetary system – a round brass coin with rectangular 
aperture, equal to one thousandth of a tael of silver. In republican Xinjiang, ten wen were equivalent to 
one cent of a dollar. The lowest existing denomination was five dachen, or wen, therefore a dachen 
was indeed a very small amount of money. Given the message of the following sentences of the 
excerpt, the use of a Chinese loanword in this particular text is actually quite ironic. 
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also be like this in the future. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Beijing, the long 
time capital of the Chinese, was founded by us Turks...‘ (Wahidi 1) 
 
‗…[New scientific methods] proved that the Turkestani nation (Türkistan milliti) is 
the most ancient and civilized nation in the world. Works written after painful 
exploration and research by European travelers and archaeologists revealed to the 
world that the Turkic nation (Türk milliti) living in Turkestan land (Türkistan éli) has 
continuously existed for more than ten thousand years and that it is an ancient nation 
with surprisingly advanced civilization and glorious history...‘ (Bughra 1998: xiii) 
 
There was a close relation perceived between oppression of the nation and absence of national 
historiography: 
 
‗…The great homeland of Turks, located in central Asia, is called western and 
eastern Turkestan in today‘s terminology. This homeland of Turks is, in every aspect, 
an enormously significant region. Since ancient times at the beginning of historical 
period, this place has been the place and homeland of Turks. Prior to all other places, 
this place disseminated mankind and civilization to the world. Turks, who lived here 
in ancient and middle ages, wrote thousands of pages about their history and 
accomplishments. Regrettably, in later centuries East Turkestan‘s people (khelqi) 
were exploited under oppression of opinion (pikir asariti). In this period, all affairs of 
our nation (militimiz) were subject to ulterior interests. Our historiography also came 
across frightening treachery and our historical works, preserved from ancient times, 
disappeared. They were replaced by subversive fabricated falsehoods and 
superstitions. Although there were great scholars and famous writers excelling in 
Turkestan in this period, they had to succumb to contemporary ways and to the 
influence of political environment around them. For this reason, they did not attach 
importance to their own national history (milliy tarikh) and instead wrote many books 
about other subjects...‘ (Bughra 1998: xii) 
 
 Bughra further claims that because so far no history of East Turkestan has ever been 
published, some people might think that the place is some kind of a mysterious ‗country‘ 
(memliket) and not consider East Turkestanis a nation equal to other nations. In his view, 
national history has also been greatly distorted and misinterpreted by claims such as that East 
Turketanis have never before established an ‗independent state‘ (musteqil dölet), that they 
have always been dominated by other nations and that they were an underdeveloped and 
backward people. Nevertheless, for Bughra such politically motivated efforts at concealing a 
nation‘s history are as futile as attempts to cover the sun during daytime (Bughra 1998: xiii). 
In this way, Bughra sought to establish his nation as a primordial and highly cultured 
community. 
 
 Historiography was indeed by nationalist activists perceived as a patriotic enterprise to 
present ‗dear nation‘s‘ (eziz millet) history, several thousand-year ‗heroism‘ (ezimet) and 
‗greatness‘ (ulughwarliq; Bughra xiii). Indeed, to write national history was seen as a duty: 
 
‗…Through these lines, we hope to tell our people who they are and who their 
enemies are...‘ (Wahidi 3) 
 
‗…The reason for writing the memoir is to remember names of those who sacrificed 
their life for the fatherland, which is a duty of our graceful people… It is the duty and 
debt of each Turkestani to write down the history of past uprisings, to record in 
chapters the past sacrifices, to draw attention to and learn from revolutionary process 
and especially to make sure that our future uprisings are not like this...‘ (Wahidi 21) 
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Turkic insurgent activists‘ writings of 1930s also devoted an enormous amount of 
energy to portrayals of flawed policy and oppression by previous Chinese/Han 
administrations. According to this line of argumentation, East Turkestanis suffered some 
fifty-eight years of hardship, during which they could not sufficiently develop (I 22, 50; LET 
1, 9). The situation did not improve even after founding of the Republic of China in 1911 – 
governors Yang and Jin deprived the East Turkestanis of all rights, political representation 
and means of appeal. They enforced sinification policies and kept the whole region in 
darkness of ignorance, while exploiting it for their own benefit. Local population was treated 
as animals and even called by animal names, such as sinkou (from Chinese 牲口 shēngkǒu – 
cattle, beast of burden) and chentou (from Chinese 纏頭 Chántóu – meaning ‗Rag-Head‘). 
The oppression during republican era was portrayed as even more brutal than during any time 
of history (LET 9, 12, 17, 19; I 62; Wahidi 1-4; Bughra 1998: 292, 358-9). Xinjiang Turks 
were said in the sources to have especially resented the government‘s obstruction of cultural 
development and education, because it in fact aimed at inhibiting the rise of ‗national feeling‘ 
(milliy tuyghu; Wahidi 2). Thus, East Turkestanis lagged behind the world in every aspect 
(LET 17) and, during what was called in one text ‗period of captivity‘ (tutqunluq dewri; I 42), 
suffered miserably under ‗the claws of tyrants‘ despotism‘ (zalimlarning istibdatliq tirnaqliri; 
LET 19):  
 
‗…In all previous periods, East Turkestani nation (Sherqiy Turkistan milliti) was one 
of great reputation and grandeur. We were a nation that possessed national 
independence (milliy istiqlal) and national honor (qewmiy izzet). Then at some point, 
we became plagued by the disaster of disunity and personal motives and by discord 
and difference of opinion. Since then, we experienced occupation and 
authoritarianism of foreign nations (chet millet) and our homeland and nation has 
been trodden into humiliation and abjection. National chastity (milliy nomus) and 
well-being of the homeland (weten sa‟aditi) have slipped from our hands. All this 
disunity came about because everyone started to pursue his own motives and 
neglected and became oblivious of the overall purpose of the homeland and nation 
(yurt we milletning omumiy meqset we menpeeti). Also, we did not pay attention to 
and learn from our history, and we forgot our national independence and grandeur. 
This was the reason of our subjugation, appalling destruction and devastation which 




 when the Chinese again subjugated East Turkestan, they treated 
local people cruelly, humiliated and oppressed them. They insulted them by names 
such as chentou and sinkou. These are Chinese words, chentou meaning ―wrapped 
head‖ and sinkou meaning ―cattle‖. Because the Chinese considered themselves idols 
and masters, and considered others slaves and serfs, they forced all those wanting to 
appeal to government authorities to stoop down and bow to them.  
 The Chinese found joy and excitement in committing decadence and 
licentiousness towards lives, property, chastity, dignity and land of local people. 
They have deprived the miserable local people of all of their rights; nobody could 
utter a single sound of praise or criticism about of injustice. Whenever someone was 
discovered to have committed even the slightest misconduct, he was immediately 
sent to prison. The prisoners were confined with huge wooden boards and massive 
shackles around their necks, hands and feet, beaten with clubs into unconsciousness 
and sentenced to life imprisonment or to banishment afterwards. The prisons were 
old, dirty and hazardous to health, resembling stables for cows. The Chinese have not 
done a thing for prosperity of the homeland (weten) and nation (millet), for education 
                                                 
63
 AD 1875/6, i.e. roughly the time of Qing re-conquest of Xinjiang. 
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and culture nor for commerce and production. All Chinese and Tungan officials 
specialized and excelled in fraud and corruption and those in law-enforcement 
uniforms competed in taking bribes. They forcefully extorted gold, silver, gems and 
other national riches. They monopolized business matters as well as internal and 
external trade. 
 They strained local merchants for their own profit and absolutely did not 
consider local production. They have seriously obstructed national education and 
publishing; they have given grand freedom to prostitution and immoral debauchery. 
On the one hand, they implemented the policy of sanification, giving the fertile and 
fruitful land of Turkestan to Chinese immigrants and making it very easy for Chinese 
immigrants to settle here. They have imposed excessive taxes and levies on locals, so 
that people (khelq) left their land and abodes behind and fled. Land and houses of 
those unable to pay heavy taxes were confiscated, and they sere sentenced to 
banishment or life imprisonment. They have forcibly taken away wives and 
daughters of Turkestanis (Turkestani). In Turkestan, the Chinese have not done one 
dachen worth of anything humane. They have verbatim adopted the kind of 
Russifying policies of Russians in Western Turkestan. Actually, the Chinese have 
brought really greedy beggars to Eastern Turkestan, because such Chinese are only 
concerned with their personal interest, making money and getting rich. There was no 
humanity of conduct. The Chinese have no laws, everyone behaves as he wishes. All 
the officials of government authorities engaged in smoking opium. This was a major 
activity for Chinese officials; whenever you looked, you could see them lying 
stretched out smoking opium. There was not a smallest sign of justice and equity in 
Chinese courts. Whoever gave a bigger bribe, even if he was a heavy criminal, the 
verdict was beneficial for him. The poor who were not able to pay a bribe, even if 
law was on their side, they were hung by their bound feet and beaten with clubs, and 
finally sentenced to life imprisonment or banishment. In reality, money was the 
religion, belief, ideal and merit. Eventually, the Chinese have invented new ways of 
making money. They started to apply Bolshevik policies and infringed upon property, 
lives, chastity and dignity of the nation. Upon this, a revolutionary movement sprang 
up to oppose these cruelties…‘ (I 42-5) 
 
 During the Turkic insurgency, the period of subjugation to Chinese was counted at 
fifty-eight or sixty years roughly from the moment of collapse of Ya‘qup Beg‘s administration 
and Qing reconquest of Heptapolis (1878) to the Komul uprising (1931) or proclamation of 
the ETIR (1933; I 3). Thus, the khoja-Ya‘qup Beg‘s insurgency was often perceived as a 
period of religious and national freedom, which in fact is not in accord with Molla Musa 
Sayrami‘s above examined account of Muslim insurgent administrators‘ exploitation of their 
Musulman brothers in faith, of local and social factionalism and of Xinjiang Musulmans‘ 
dislike for Ya‘qup Beg. In other contexts, Ya‘qup Beg‘s governance was viewed as a 
totalitarian power detrimental to the national struggle of East Turkestanis (Bughra 1998: 324-
5, 341-5). A passage from Sayrami‘s T rīkh-i Amniyya, which relates the Qing oppression of 
Heptapolis, is quoted in Independence (I 42) to illustrate suffering of East Turkestani nation. 
This is despite the fact that Sayrami does not once use the word ‗East Turkestan‘ nor does he 
think in categories of a nation in his texts. This ‗nationalization‘ of otherwise very impartial 
and objective work of Molla Musa Sayrami is a good example of nation work done by Turkic 
activists in 1930s – remolding of existing cultural relics into new national symbology. 
 
 In further narrative of the nationalist thinkers, the ineffective Chinese heteronomy, 
perceived as an ‗injustice done to the whole nation‘ (pütün millet naheqliq; LET 9), 
understandably resulted in an alarming degree of national decline that set stage for righteous 
uprising of Xinjiang Turkic Muslims. Despite the fact that the individual local revolts 
throughout Heptapolis were in fact sparked by mostly economic causes, propagandists of 
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Turkic insurgency promptly framed the whole rebellion into national terminology – ‗national 
revolution‘ (milliy inqilab; LET 13; Bughra 1998: 289, 383), ‗national revolutionary 
movement‘ (milliy inqilabiy hériket; I 41), ‗national liberation revolution‘ (milliy azadliq 
inqilabi; I 63), ‗struggle for independence‘ (musteqilliq kürishi; Wahidi 2) or for ‗national 
independence‘ (milliy musteqilliq; Wahidi 16) or ‗national movement‘ (milliy hériket; Wahidi 
22). Similarly, all uprisings that had in the past taken place in East Turkestan since the Qing 
dynasty were by the insurgent discourse termed ‗national revolution‘ aiming at 
‗independence‘. This interpretation was also applied to the 1930s insurgency: 
 
‗…East Turkestanis had no means to let the government authorities know about the 
various kinds of oppression by the cruel monsters dominating them. No one dared to 
appeal and the grievances of the people did not reach high officials. And even when 
the grievances reached them, they remained unheeded as an unwelcome guest or 
brought bad consequences for those who voiced them. Local people were obliged to 
withstand plundering of the Chinese and their infringements on chastity and dignity 
of wives and daughters. When the local people could not anymore tolerate it, an 
armed uprising burst out against the cruel Chinese, seeking to protect religious and 
national (diniy we milliy) virtue and honor (nomus we izzet)…‘ (I 45) 
 
  In insurgent texts, the state symbology of the ETIR was constructed in a similar way 
to national history. Both Life of East Turkestan and Independence devoted large space to the 
description of the activities during proclamation of the ETIR. In an unprecedented way and 
undoubtedly emulating foreign models, the ETIR leadership successfully instituted the 
practice of making contemporary political events a partially public affair. Several examined 
sources relate the public aspect of the festivities, which were clearly arranged with the 
intention to strengthen people‘s vertical fraternity and national togetherness by demonstrating 
that the ETIR was truly everyone‘s business: the proclamation of founding of the ETIR was 
read out publicly at a meeting of some twenty thousand people on one of Kashgar‘s squares 
on Sunday, November 12, 1933. The newly adopted sky-blue flag with white star and 
crescent chosen for the ETIR, which is in several places called ‗ancient‘ and ‗national‘ (LET 
13; I 14; PFK 1933: 9), was then officially raised and other ETIR flags were also brandished 
throughout the place. The song ‗Our flag is a blue flag, our domain is a Golden Horde, 
Turkestan is a homeland of Turks, of Turks inevitably‘ was sung repeatedly in ‗pure Turkish.‘ 
Forty-one ceremonial shots were fired and military commanders and high official held 
speeches. After that, the figures sung marching songs while the crowd paraded through the 
city (I 12-6, LET 13). Another important step in construction of national symbology was 
swift introduction of national coins and banknotes inscribed ‗East Turkestan Republic‘ (Zhu 
152-3, 224-5).  
 
 The researched sources provide us with many other instances of national symbology 
construction. Close attention was paid by insurgent propagandists to events and figures 
associated with struggle for national freedom. The ETIR was thus reportedly established 
‗under the shadow of blood shed in the struggle of tens and tens of thousands of people who 
rose due to disputes within Chinese, Qalmuq, Russian and Turk nations‟ united opposition 
against the manifold state institutions‘ (I 59). The insurgent leaders were highly revered and 
glorified. For instance, it is reasonable to argue that Khoja Niyaz Haji was granted the 
function of the head of the ETIR for life rather due to courteous reverence for him as the 
initiator of national revolution than to his actual merit, because at the moment when the 
relatively minor skirmish broke out in Komul, he could have in no way foreseen or aimed at 
creation of an independent nation-state. Similarly, an obituary for the ‗enthusiastic 
nationalist‘ Haji Jirjis Ependi emphasized his struggle for the ‗national freedom of East 
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Turkestan‘ (Sherqiy Türkistan milliy azadliqi; LET 18). Nameless ordinary participants in the 
insurgency were glorified (Wahidi 7, 17, 19) as ‗those who raise the flag of Turkestan 
independence‘ (Wahidi 23). The length of the uprising was also often reminded (I 58). While 
the Bughra brothers were the first to declare independence in Khotan, the ETIR established 
its capital in Kashgar, by far most important of the cities of Heptapolis. A lengthy article 
calling for meticulous preservation of ritual and physical cleanliness of the Eid Kah Great 
Mosque in Kashgar illustrates emergence of another national symbol – an ancient place of 
worship in the center of nation-state with potent religious creed (LET 16). 
 
 Similarly, in sources written after the collapse of the ETIR, the failure of the 
insurgency was recast into a symbol of renewed national tragedy. It was referred to as a 
moment when ‗national independence‘ (milliy istiqlal) was overrun and its ‗sacred flag‘ 
(muqeddes bayraq) was torn down. The subsequent administration of Sheng Shicai was 
regarded as disgraceful and unbearable for Turkic blood and conscience, mainly because it 
relied on support of the atheist Soviet Bolshevik regime. The day of April 12, 1933, when 
Sheng came to power and which was subsequently instituted as official holiday, was mourned 
as a national tragedy by Turkic nationalists (Wahidi 10, 18, 19, 20). Another policy of Sheng 
sharply criticized by exiled nationalists was his official division of Turkic population into 
respective nationalities. The insurgent theorists saw this measure as a scheme to implant 
artificial antagonisms into the Turkic nation, since ancient time living peacefully as ‗one kin‘ 
(bir tuqqan) and ‗one nation‘ (bir millet) in Turkestan, and to enslave it in the way Turks of 
Western Turkestan, northern Asia, the Caucasus and Eastern Europe had been enslaved 
(Bughra 1998: 465; Wahidi 19). On the one hand, the diaspora hoped that national revolution 
was by no means over and that it would end only when the ‗gift of independence‘ (musteqilliq 
némiti) was attained (Bughra 1998: 468-70). On the other hand, the renewed subjugation to 
the Chinese added to the historical suffering of East Turkestanis and multiplied their 
immemorial national misery:  
 
‗…Our Turkic nation (Türk millitimiz) is belligerent, boisterous, brave, strong, loyal 
and generous. We especially value honor and reputation. So, after we made numerous 
sacrifices on the way to liberation and suffered in bad times, finally in 1931, a battle 
for independence and fight for freedom began in the entire East Turkestan (Sherqiy 
Türkistan). This struggle continued for five or six years and ended with our flight and 
with tragedy for our homeland (yurt) and people (khelq)…‘ (Wahidi 3) 
 
‗…We are Turks of Turkestan, our fatherland is Turkestan. Slavery does not suit us 
and enemies do not fit into our fatherland. Sadly, our ignorance has thrust us into this 
dark era. But speaking of our exile: even more dangerous circumstances are in front 
of us. If we want to retrieve our Turkestan from enemy hands, it is essential that we 
solve our educational, social and economic problem and unite in one opinion and one 
ideal…‘ (Wahidi 22) 
 
‗…To sum up, when we think about our fatherland, our people and our refugee life, 
there in not another people on the face of the earth that is as miserable, as weak as us. 
We are under oppression of the Chinese, and the Chinese are under oppression of 
Russians. It means that we are under twofold harsh tyranny....‘ (Wahidi 20) 
 
Politicization of Turkic National Movement 
 
 Writings of Turkic activists of the 1930s also explain in great detail, what was by their 
authors regarded as communal interest. Terminology for this concept varies greatly – 
expressions such as ‗common interest‘ (omumiy menpe‟et), ‗future of the nation‘ (milletning 
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istiqbali), ‗happiness of the homeland‘ (wetenning sa‟aditi), ‗benefit of the homeland and 
nation‘ (yurt, milletning paydisi), ‗need of the homeland and nation‘ (yurt millet hajetliri) etc. 
Activities striving towards achieving communal interests were referred to as to ‗work for 
nation and homeland‘ (weten we millet üchün qilghan khizmet; Bughra 1998: 384). It is clear 
from the texts that for ‗nationalists‘ (milletperwer; LET 16), national interest fully replaced 
religious virtues in the place of the highest communal interest. ‗To realize national interest‘ 
(menpe‟et milliye ehmiyet bermek; LET 4), ‗to save the homeland‘ (millet qutulup; I 10), to 
nourish ‗feeling for the homeland and the nation (weten we millet qaygusi; LET 16) and ‗love 
for nation‘ (muhebbet milliye; LET 19) and to promote ‗religious and national virtue and 
honor‘ (diniy we milliy nomus we izzet; I 45) were the ultimate goals of human life: 
 
‗…There is of course not one kinsman (tomurdash) who in his beliefs and conscience 
would not be willing to work for East Turkestan. Wherever there is a brother willing 
to work for East Turkestan asleep let him awake; if sitting down let him get up, if 
standing up let him keep stay standing, if on the road let him fly! Whoever wishes to 
work for Islamic religion and Turkicness, let him come to Great Turkestan!...‘ (I 57-8) 
 
 Unlike in the previous period discussed in Chapter 2, where national interest was 
indentified with largely cultural activities and national awakening, the Turkic activists of the 
1930s primarily sought to achieve political goals. Not surprisingly, in the minds of 
nationalists ‗national independence‘ (milliy musteqilliq; Wahidi 16) of the homeland was the 
most important of all national interests. National revolution was considered the only suitable 
means to attain ‗liberation‘ (azadliq; Bughra 1998: 400). In fact, founding of the ETIR was in 
some texts interpreted as having reached the destination of the ‗path of independence‘ (istiqlal 
yoli; I 50). The exclusive position of independence in the interest hierarchy is illustrated in the 
first passage of the first issue of Life of East Turkestan of July 21, 1933, or in other words 
historically the first written statement Xinjiang indigenous Turkic Muslims made in 
conditions of free expression: 
 
‗Thankfully, nowadays the downtrodden country of East Turkestan (Sherqiy 
Türkistan memliket) was saved from cruel enslavement and national rule (qewmiy 
hakimiyet) was established. In the world, there is nothing as bad and cursed as living 
like prisoners and captives under the domination of a foreign nation (millet). 
Similarly, there is no greater blessing that can be imagined than that of national rule 
(qewmi hakimiyet) and of independence and glory of homeland (weteniy istiqlal we 
izzet)...‘ (LET 1: 1) 
 
 In a similar tune, Wahidi‘s memoir reads: 
 
‗…East Turkestan is a Turkic territory. It is necessary that there are Turks living in 
Turkestan and that there is Turkic government in Turkestan. If there comes a 
foreigner and becomes the ruler, rebellion is a natural thing. Why should there not be 
a rebellion in Turkestan? This is to say that the ideal of the uprising in East Turkestan 
is independence. Factions (partiye) were formed in Turkestan, and their original goal 
was also independence…Our ideal and craving was independence. Communists and 
occupants, who are today plundering our fatherland, are our mortal enemies (jan 
dushmen). Hey evil ravens, let go of our homeland! Where ever you came from, go 
back there! If you do not leave in due time, later you will have a hard time! Hey, long 
live, you blessed East Turkestan! Long live your splendid descendants! Long live 
those who voluntarily sacrificed their lives on the path to East Turkestan‘s 
independence!...‘ (Wahidi 21) 
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 Many other passages explicitly extol the principles of autonomy, or in other words a 
‗nation being true master of its own homeland‘ (wetenning heqiqiy igesi bolghan millet; LET 
3, 9) and ‗independent government‘ (musteqil hökümet; Wahidi 16), as the most important 
goal of human activity. Authors of the texts explicitly regarded as the duty for each member 
of the nation to strive for and preserve the national independence: ‗…So we rightfully learned 
the value and cost of the independent state (musteqil dölet). It is our religious, national and 
political duty to strive for not letting it pass from our hands...‘ (I 59) Freedom and its defense 
is to a nation of the same vital importance as water for the fish (I 11). In turn, ‗our 
independent republic‘ (musteqil jumhuriyitimiz; EW 22) becomes the ‗foundation of national 
people‘s liberation‘ (milliy helq azadliqning asasi; LET 12) and guarantees political, religious, 
national and cultural rights of all our fellow countrymen (PFK 1933: 9). 
 
 A closely related political goal of nationalist authors was the ‗state‘ (dölet, memliket) 
of East Turkestan (I 18, 55), which was claimed to stretch from Komul to Kashgar (LET 3:1, 
4). Occasionally, the old term ‗Six Cities‘ (Hexapolis, Alte Sheher) is also used (LET 2; 
Wahidi 9, 12). In other contexts, the term Sherqiy Turkestan implied also northern Xinjiang, 
because the periodicals closely followed unrest in Altay, Chöchek and Ghulja (LET 16). In 
fact, the term ‗state‘ specifically implies ‗nation-state‘, where the power was in the hands of 
local Turkic Muslims: 
 
‗…The state of East Turkestan (Turkistan Sherqiy memlikiti) is a free, Islamic and 
autonomous region (ölke) stretching from Komul to Kashgar, which does not 
recognize Urumchi as its central authority and in which Muslims themselves 
administer their affairs. The Tianshan mountains are the boundary between the two 
sides. The Chinese must not surpass the Tianshan mountains and stay within their 
limits...‘ (LET 2: 1) 
 
 It was mentioned in the preceding sections of this chapter that for Turkic 
propagandists in the 1930s, religious denomination was a significant segment of East 
Turkestani national identity, but was nevertheless secondary to shared descent and ethnicity. 
The same hierarchy of characteristics was discernible in the discourse of characteristics of the 
state of East Turkestan – even though it was a state of Muslims and was firmly based on the 
principles of religious law, it was also equally firmly founded upon principles of 
republicanism and representative government. The ETIR was founded as a republic that was 
to provide for the needs of the nation (I 23). It was headed by a ‗president‘ (re‟is jumhur; I 
25). It even appears that Khoja Niyaz Haji took up this position prior to proclamation of the 
state (LET 12). The constitution of the ETIR provided for ‗national congress‘ (milliy mejlis; I 
27), even though the principles of its selection and function were not laid out. The figures 
acting in the administration had to pledge their allegiance to the republic (LET 13, 14). ‗Law‘ 
and ‗justice‘ (hoquq, adalet; LET 3, 13) were among the most important ‗principles of the 
state‘ (dölet erkanliri; Wahidi 17) drawn up to protect the rights of the people (LET 13). In 
fact, the ETIR is at least on one occasion referred to as the ‗East Turkestan People‘s Republic‘ 
(Sherqiy Türkistan Khelq Jumhuriyiti; LET 14). After the failure of the insurgency, some 
activities of Khoja Niyaz Haji and Mahmud Muhiti were denounced by exiled nationalists as 
flawed due to their disregard of public opinion. In contrast, the Khotan administration was 
given higher credit because it had a larger public support and strived for ‗creating national‘ 






Modernism in the East Turkestan Republic 
 
 The second most prominent cluster of national interests was also a direct continuation 
of modernist trends which penetrated Xinjiang Turkic community in late Qing and early 
republican period from Central Asian and Ottoman/Turkish Jadidist and reformist milieu. 
During the course of southern Xinjiang rebellion, the insurgent administration itself supported 
these trends and took up the duty of implementing modernization. The periodicals feature a 
rich discourse of modernization, development, progress, improvement, reform, construction, 
awakening and similar dynamic concepts. Enforcement of this modernization imperative was 
for the nationalist authors tightly linked to national well-being and welfare: 
 
‗…East Turkestan finds itself under a great difficulty. We need to carry out many 
reforms. The core and essential motivation of ours is to endow the children of the 
nation with knowledge and education. Thus, it will be possible to make them familiar 
with science and technology. Nowadays it is not possible for any nation to administer 
and defend their however large country without familiarity with education and 
education policy. In the administration, regulations and rules are necessary. In our 
military affairs, military training and regulations are necessary. It is known that ten 
thousand untrained, disorganized and aimless troops cannot compare to one thousand 
trained and organized soldiers…‘ (LET 9) 
 
‗…If in the future we need to improve educational, social and political situation 
(ehwal) and make our lives stable and prosperous, then we need to subject all affairs 
to the needs of the people….‘ (LET 17) 
 
 Such rhetoric and attributes of modernization discloses strong influence of Jadidist 
movement in Russian Turkic communities. ‗Unity‘ (birlik, ittipaq) of East Turkestani nation 
is a principle espoused on numerous occasions in the sources (LET 12, 15, 19; I 11, 12, 48-9) 
and is seen as a precondition of realizing national interest: ‗…All Turkestanis alive were 
united in one feeling, that is they were able to make decisions under the flag of national 
independence and gain their benefit...‘ (Wahidi 16) Similarly to Tatar and Central Asian 
Jadidist press, the mast of both Life of East Turkestan and Independence bore the slogans of 
‗Unity in heart, action and thought‘ (LET 1) and ‗Unity in religion, language, heart, thought 
and action‘ (I 1). The disunity principle, or in other words local and social factionalism 
explored in Chapter 1, was apparently still active in 1930s, as exemplified for example by the 
fact that Abdughupur Shaptul, the highest Kashgar cleric and judge, issued a holy ruling (Ar. 
fatw ) to Kashgar Muslims that to wage war on Khotanese rebels of early 1933 was a 
religious duty (Wahidi 13). It is also clear that, similarly to other Jadidist platforms, the ETIR 
periodicals and activists clearly had in mind a cultural unity of Turkic nations, not a separatist 
objective of political unification of Turkic nations and creating a greater Turkestan. Claims of 
PRC‘s scholarship that the ETIR‘s separatist agenda was motivated by politically oriented 
pan-Turkism (Li 172-4) are thus not substantiated by primary sources.  
 
 In a clear allusion to Gaspirali‘s classic Jadidist bilingual newspaper Interpreter 
(Terjiman/Переводчик), the authors of Independence referred to the journal as to an 
‗interpreter‘ (terjiman) of the ETIA‘s opinions, principles and goals to the people, and also as 
a moderately reformist mirror of modern trends and events. Similarly to Jadidist initiative, 
Xinjiang Turkic insurgent press sounded a loud call on the nation to restore its past grandeur. 
Occasionally, Xinjiang Turkic modernist discourse even made direct use of Jadidist rhetoric, 
such as in comparing the insurgency to a spark of national liberation which lit up the whole 
region as the nation awakened from fatal sleep and nation-state was established (I 63, LET 3, 
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13). The aforementioned Jadidist concept of unity even occasionally refers to desire for 
Turkic insurgents‘ alliance with other rebelling factions, such as Mongols of Karashahr (LET 
14, 15, 16). Analogously, disunity and factionalism during the uprising were viewed as the 
most negative and undesirable phenomenon (I 48-9; LET 4, 19). After the failure of the 
revolution, disunity was described as the direct cause for collapse of the nation-state and 
national decline:  
 
‗…The reason for the collapse of our independence was the seeds of distrust. Each 
one of those Uyghurs, who had been trained in Russia, ran and joined the ranks of 
revolutionaries. These very people then slandered the principles of revolution and 
enabled the birth of treachery and distrust...‘ (Wahidi 17) 
 
‗…The distrust among commanders not only devastated the soldiers, but even the 
very independence of whole Turkestan. It has thrust our fatherland into this tragic 
condition. Even though the Chinese, Russians and Tungans have opposed the 
independence of East Turkestan and to preserve our sovereignty was enormously 
difficult, had all the people united and with rightful intentions sacrificed their lives, it 
would have still been totally possible to preserve our independence. Unfortunately, 
this did not happen...‘ (Wahidi 22) 
 
 Similarly to the Russian Jadidist project, for Xinjiang insurgent theorists by far the 
strongest focus of modernization efforts was education. Non-existence of schools was seen by 
them as a cause of national decline and therefore also one of the strongest impetuses of the 
insurgency. Similarly, modern ‗knowledge‘ (ilim) and ‗education‘ (ma‟arip) was seen as a 
basic precondition to progress and well-being of the nation: ‗...beacon of education and 
knowledge under which children are able to clearly distinguish between black and white 
therefore brings manifold benefits to nations in states all over the world…‘ (LET 12) 
Leadership of the ETIR was respected by common population for being well educated 
(Wahidi 12). Shinmen Yasushi‘s research revealed that many of the ETIR high officials were 
educated in modern secular schools and some were even active promoters and organizers of 
new education (Shinmen 152-5). In a way, the ETIR can be compared to other short-time 
political endeavors with Jadidist participation referred to in previous chapter, such as 
Khoqand autonomy movement or Alash Orda. The high cultural background of the 
insurgency‘s leading figures is acknowledged even by communist PRC materials (Ezizi 1997a: 
216-220, 293). 
 
 Instituting ‗national and scientific‘ (milliy we penniy) schools was thus the most 
immediate objective that the insurgent administration pursued since the very early stages if its 
existence. The very first issue of Life of East Turkestan in July 1933 declares that ‗national 
education‘ (ma‟arip milliye) was instituted in Kashgar with the concern for the ‗future of the 
nation‘ (milletning istiqbali) and in order to establish foundation for the ‗well-being of the 
homeland‘ (wetenning sa‟aditi). At the same time, modern schools were to remain in 
accordance with Islamic principles and continue to convey ‗religious education‘ (diniy 
ma‟arip). Modern schools, pedagogical institutes and education administration organs were 
thus among the first institutions the new state established. The almost sacral significance of 
modern education for the ETIR was underlined by the fact that the ‗pedagogical institute‘ 
(darilmu‟elimin) and ‗national schools‘ (mekteb milliye) in Kashgar were by the 
administration explicitly established, again in the name of ‗benefit of the homeland and 
nation‘ (yurt we milletning paydisi), on the site where a Chinese temple had previously stood 
– this measure clearly aimed to symbolize how previous Chinese political heteronomy and 
religious heterodoxy gave way to justice and modernity of the East Turkestani nation-state 
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(LET 1). From the first to the last issue, Life of East Turkestan is filled with zealous advocacy 
of modern knowledge and education, need for reform of existing religious schools, 
eradicating illiteracy and ignorance, establishing pedagogical institutes, libraries, reading 
rooms, endowments for educational institutions and other similar concepts (LET 3, 4, 9, 12, 
14, 17). The educational mission of the ETIR was also articulated in its constitution, which 
declared instituting regular and reformed education system as one of the duties of the ministry 
of education (I 35-6). Mahmud Muhiti‘s efforts in his position of an influential military 
commander to protect and effect modern education were after the insurgency regarded as a 
formidable contribution to national education (Bughra 1998: 456). Articles in Independence 
also extol virtues of modern knowledge and reformed education as preconditions of national 
development: 
 
‗…Blessed and mighty God has made us powerful by enabling us to establish an 
independent Islamic government. We need to support this government by 
establishing systematic and organized forces of knowledge. Knowledge is a powerful 
weapon. The strength of knowledge cannot be obstructed by any other strength. 
Those endowed with knowledge and learning soar in the air and float in the seas...‘ (I 
54) 
 
 National publishing and printing was another significant modernizing imperative of 
Xinjiang Turkic nationalist administration. The nationalists asserted that similarly to the 
sphere of education, the total absence of printed Turkic periodicals during the Yang and Jin‘s 
rule strongly contributed to national decline. National newspapers and publications were 
regarded as nations‘ representatives, guides, interpreters and promoters of modernity and 
progress. Similarly to Jadidist publications of Russia, ETIR periodicals were to be the eyes of 
the nation and the pillars of ‗national well-being‘ (sa‟adet qewmiye) and ‗national honor‘ 
(izzet milliye; LET 1, 2):  
 
‗...The Independence magazine is a political, social, academic and literary guide on 
the path of defending and extending the freedom and religious and national power 
that became the possession of our fellow country men as a result of countless 
sacrifices and after suffering all kinds of bitter hardships over long fifty-eight years 
of subjugation…‘ (I 3) 
 
 Thus, immediately after the insurgent administration somewhat stabilized in July 1933, 
the objectives of founding national press were realized. The ‗liberty-oriented‘ (azadliqigha 
nishane) Life of East Turkestan was founded as press organ of the ETIR under the auspices of 
ministry of education, which was also in charge of publishing textbooks for national schools 
and other printed matter (LET 1; I 35-6). The editor-in-chief of Life of East Turkestan, Qutluq 
Haji Shewqi had also been previously closely associated with modern education movement. 
Life of East Turkestan and Independence were printed in trust for the ETIR by the Swedish 
Mission Press Kashgar and this fact was even openly stated in them (I 74). Both periodicals 
were inspired by and resembled in structure, content and purpose the Jadidist periodicals 
published in Russia (Khalid 122-3). Moreover, Independence was published by the above 
mentioned East Turkestan Independence Association (Sherqiy Türkistan Istiqlal Jemi‟iti; 
ETIA) that was closely affiliated with the Khotan faction of the insurgency, in which 
Muhemmed Imin Bughra, Sabit Damolla and other figures had been also actively involved in 
new education (Shinmen 139-42). The partially government-funded ETIA also assisted the 
state in opening schools, publishing books, founding printing houses and seeking, training and 
appointing teachers throughout the country (I 5-7, 55). In short, modern schools, periodicals 
and national societies were by nationalists seen as conductive for ‗national awakening‘ (milliy 
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oyghinish), which the Chinese had been trying to suppress with the assumption that ‗the 
awakened ones cannot be forced back to sleep‘ (oyghanghanni zorlap okhlatqili bolmas; 
Bughra 1998: 365-7). 
 
 The ETIR and its periodicals also propagandized other features of modernity. There 
was a new concern for public health – ministry of health of the ETIR was responsible for 
struggle with contagious diseases, establishing hospitals and inspection of their hygiene 
standard, founding insane asylums, orphanages and inoculation facilities (I 36). Eradication of 
opium and hashish use was considered essential for the life of the nation (LET 13). Modernist 
drive was also palpable in reliance of the state structure on Western models and assistance. 
Foreign specialists were to be contracted to assist in administration, education, public health, 
commerce, agriculture and national defense with the specific goals of catching up with 
Western countries (I 29, 34, 36, 55; Wahidi 15-6). The state was to support study of its 
nationals abroad (I 35). The structure of the ministry of religious endowments was modeled 
on the two most progressive Islamic countries – Turkey and Egypt (I 32). The ETIR was 
declared to be specifically modeled on the example of Mustafa Kemal‘s Turkey (I 15, 51; 
LET 12) and it also strived to incur British assistance by espousing principles of Western 
culture (Newby 1986: 244-5). The news section of Life of East Turkestan covered mainly 
events in Germany, Japan and Soviet Russia (LET 9, 13), and also reported on modern 
technological developments such as aviation, which was explained as an activity of flying in 
‗air boats‘ (hawa kéme; LET 14). Notably, such references to technological innovations 
stemming from the Soviet Union suggest that in Xinjiang Turkic Muslims‘ perception, the 
image of Russia as a culturally advanced model for development was not disrupted even 
during the existence of religiously profiled ETIR.  
 
 The language of the ETIR publications also showed signs of modernization. The 
articles were written in a language close to Turkic vernacular containing a certain number of 
modern loanwords. Vernacularization of textual practice was apparently an important strategy 
to incur popular support and to promote national feeling among the population. For that 
reason, national history was also written in ‗East Turkestani dialect‘ (Sherqiy Türkistan 
shiwesi) of Turkic (Bughra xiii). The rising importance of Turkic as national language was 
indicated in the fact that the peace agreement between Khoja Niyaz Haji and provincial troops 
was written in Turkic, Chinese and Russian. Due to strong Russian cultural and economic 
influence in the region, the overwhelming majority of loanwords in the ETIR sources came 
from Russian – fabrika (factory), konfransiye (conference), kontrol (control) qomandan 
(commander), gezite (newspaper), zhurnal (magazine), nomur (number) adres (address), 
zhandarma (militia) tanka (tank), khémiye (chemistry), passport (passport), programa 
(program), forma (form, uniform) or zinkografiye (zincography). Notably, Russian loanwords 
are used even in the more religiously tuned Independence in contexts, where terms from 
Arabic or Persian could have been preferred on grounds of sacral purity of language. Other 
loanwords came from English (names of months in the mast of Life of East Turkestan, the 
word ‗dollar‘ [dolar] etc.), which points to contact of Xinjiang Turkic progressives with 
British culture during their stays abroad, and possibly also to at least certain cultural influence 
of the British consulate in Kashgar. There is also a certain amount of vocabulary from Turkish 
(ögretmek, maya, berge or the lyrics of the song sung during proclamation of the ETIR – 
‗Bayraqimiz kök bayraq, ordumiz altun ordu, Türkistan Türkning yurdu, Türkning olajaq‘ 
translated above), which illustrates both pro-Western and pro-Turkish profile of the ETIR. 
Both Life of East Turkestan and Independence also print poetry and fiction pieces with topics 
similar to those of Abdukhaliq Uyghur and Memetili Tewpiq, as explored in Chapter 2. 
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 As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the brief existence of the ETIR and the lack of 
field research data do not allow us to assess efficiency of the new state. Perhaps the only two 
realms that somewhat reflect the ETIR‘s actual competence were national education, 
illustrated by the modern education wave commenced under the patronage of Mahmud Muhiti 
(analyzed in Chapter 2), and national publishing, manifested by the two newspapers 
researched in the above section. However, despite the fact that the existence of the ETIR 
occurred mainly in sphere of policy formulation and propaganda, it is clear that the 
insurgency had a massive impact on Turkic intellectual notions of community and communal 
interests. In the texts originating in the secessionist milieu of the 1930s, the community was 
distinctly perceived as a primordial East Turkestani nation with an exclusive historical right to 
govern itself in the territory of its homeland East Turkestan. The discourse of nation and 
national homeland also featured a number of newly generated symbols and invented traditions, 
such as national history and historiography, national misery, oppression, righteous revolution, 
national flag, public festivities, history of liberation struggle, glorification of its leaders, 
protection of national identity sites (such as the city of Kashgar or the Eid Kah Mosque) or 
new national tragedy under renewed heteronomy. The highest political interest of East 
Turkestani nation was founding its own nation-state, independent and governed by the people. 
In turn, the nation-state was expected by the nation to fulfill a modernization directive with 
the aim of accommodating other national interests, namely modernity, progress and 
well-being. In particular, these included for instance establishing new national education, 
periodicals and publishing, social, cultural and political organizations, healthcare, 
vernacularization of press and state practice, pro-Western orientation or embrace of modern 
technology. The satisfied national need for well-being was in turn supposed to cultivate 
popular loyalty and support for the new state. Thus, despite the fact that the ETIR did not 
have a chance to live up to its declared objectives, it is beyond doubt that, as aptly asserted by 
Shinmen Yasushi, its proclamation was ‗one remarkable consequence‘ of nationalist 
movement enabled by rise of new indigenous intellectual and merchant strata, as well as of 
the process of migration of new ideas, activities and intellectuals from east to west (Shinmen 
155). At the same time, the 1930s‘ insurgency and proclamation of East Turkestani 
nation-state founded on principles of republicanism and modernism was both a strong impetus 
to and a result of fledgling modern national consciousness and nationalist ideology of 
sedentary Turkic Muslims indigenous to southern and eastern Xinjiang, who were soon to 
become called Uyghurs. 
 
3. 2. Administration of Sheng Shicai (1934 – 1944) 
 
 The ETIR was toppled in early 1934 by Ma Zhongying‘s Tungan forces, which were 
retreating from the Soviet-backed alliance of Chinese, White Russian and Mongol forces 
advancing along the northern rim of the Taklamakan toward Kashgar. When the Tungans 
arrived in Kashgar on February 5, 1933, the ETIR leadership had already fled towards 
Yangissar, while Khoja Niyaz Haji went his own way and concluded peace treaty with the 
Soviets in northwestern Xinjiang. The Khotan faction of the ETIR leadership suffered further 
defeats by Tungans at Yangissar, where Abdulla and Nur Ahmadjan Bughra were killed and 
Sabit Damolla fled to Yarkend. Meanwhile, Khoja Niyaz Haji returned and arrested Sabit 
Damolla, proceeding to Aksu where he handed Sabit over to provincial troops that promptly 
executed him. Provincial forces then continued their advance on Kashgar where they arrived 
around July 21, 1934, ousting the Tungans from Kashgar to Khotan.
64
 Eventually, the whole 
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 Ma Zhongying himself abandoned his army and under unclear circumstances crossed to Soviet 
Union at Irkeshtam. His further fate remains unknown. 
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Xinjiang was under control of Sheng Shicai except the southern rim of the Taklamakan from 
Yarkend to Charqliq, which was held by Tungans remaining loyal to Nanjing government 
(Forbes 121-7). 
 
 Sheng Shicai‘s assumption of power signaled a whole new deal for all aspects of life 
in Xinjiang, a virtual ‗New Xinjiang‘ (Yéngi Shinjang, 新新疆 xīn Xīnji ng), an official term 
used by Sheng since 1934. His program terminated the semi-imperial administration of early 
republican governors and aimed to bring the province in line with contemporary 
developmental trends. The most representative of Sheng‘s policy statements were perhaps the 
‗Six Great Policies‘ (Alte Miqdar Siyaset, 六大政策  Li d  zhèngcè) of 1935, which 
altogether declared a strong modernizing imperative: ‗anti-imperialism‘ (jahangirlikke qarshi 
turush, 反帝 f nd ), ‗kinship to the Soviet Union‘ (Sowét Ittipaqigha yéqilnlishish, 親蘇 qīn 
Sū), ‗equality of nationalities‘ (milletler barawer bolush, 民平 mínpíng), ‗clean government‘ 
(diyanetlik bolush, 清廉  qīnglián), ‗pacifism‘ (ténchlikni saqlash, 和平  hépíng) and 
‗construction‘ (qurulush élip bérish, 建設  ji nshè). In contrast to Yang‘s and Jin‘s 
administration, when Russo-Soviet influence in Xinjiang was result of commercial and 
cultural contact or clandestine operation, Sheng Shicai introduced political pro-Sovietism as 
an official and elaborated policy. The Soviets assisted the whole process of Sheng‘s rise to the 
post of Border Defense Commissioner (督辦 dūb n), de facto ruler of the province, and 
provided military backup for taking control of Kashgar. Sheng‘s administration relied heavily 
on Soviet advisers and material help in military affairs, agriculture, industry, politics and 
other fields. In exchange, Sheng Shicai allowed the USSR to exploit local resources (oil, gold, 
tungsten, manganese, tin, uranium etc.) and capitalize on other benefits. Besides that, Soviet 
Union wielded an enormous political influence in the province and controlled virtually all of 
its affairs. Sheng even proposed to the USSR communization of Xinjiang, which was rejected 
by Stalin because the USSR needed a strong and unified China to rely on against Japan 
(Mirovitskaya and Ledovsky 95). However, the degree of Soviet involvement led some 
specialists to call Sheng a ‗Red Warlord‘ (Whiting and Sheng 138) and Xinjiang a ‗virtual 
territorial extension of the Soviet Union‘ (Forbes 157). Xinjiang‘s approximation to the Soviet 
Union also reflected the region‘s historical function as a globally relevant hub of ideologies 
and geopolitical interests of surrounding major powers. 
 
 Sheng‘s initial policies were drawn up in order for his administration to acquire at 
least some sort of support or tolerance by Turkic Muslims who made up some eighty-five per 
cent of the population of Xinjiang. As inspected above in this chapter, Xinjiang Turkic 
population shared a strong ethno-religious identity and resentment toward Han/China 
administration which, in their perception, caused deep cultural and economic decline of their 
nation. Their memories of insurgency and political independence were still recent after 
Sheng‘s troops entered Kashgar in 1934. This situation and setting was similar to that of 
Central Asia, where the Soviets in early 1920s had to counter potential threat of pan-Turkic 
and pan-Islamic opposition by populace that had theretofore identified itself with either sub-
national (tribe or clan) or supra-national (Muslim, Turkic Muslim or sedentary Turkic Muslim) 
patterns of identity. Therefore, the Soviet state utilized the nascent nation-forming wave, to a 
large degree facilitated by the Jadidist initiative, that was beginning to surge through Central 
Asian Muslim society and resolved to weaken the prominence of pan-religious and pan-ethnic 
Central Asian Muslims by so-called ‗national delimitation‘ (Ru. natsional‟noe 
razmezhevanie), which ultimately sought to establish nationality as the primary mode of 
identification. Stalin‘s definition of ethnicity as a ‗historically formed stable community of 
language, territory, economic life and psychological formation, manifested through a 
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common culture‘ (spelled out in Marxism and the National Question, 1913; cited in Roy 2005: 
62) with language as the most important criterion was used as the exclusive theoretical 
foundation for making the Soviet new order in Central Asia. For the equivalent of the Russian 
terms ‗narod‘ (nation) and ‗natsional‟nost‟‘ (nationality) in Central Asian languages, the 
word millet was adopted and its usage varied according to political status of the particular 
ethnic group. All non-ethnic aspects of identity were swiftly suppressed. Thus, the first Soviet 
census in Central Asia, taken in 1926, listed population groups solely by their ethnicity 
(Matley 1967: 106). Simultaneously, the Soviets took up complex affirmative action towards 
the new national identities by so-called ‗indigenization‘ (Ru. korenizatsiya), or providing the 
‗indigenous nationalities‘ (Ru. korennye natsional‟nosti) with formally autonomous national 
territories, formally claimable right of secession, national languages, cultures, elites, books, 
journals, newspapers, movies, operas, museums, academies of sciences, folk music ensembles, 
histories and other national attributes. In fact, the indigenous nationalities were even to be 
preferred for instance in hiring and admissions to Russians and other western, implicitly more 
advanced, nationalities of the Soviet Union. Initially, the affirmative action and legal equality 
of all nationalities of the Soviet state resulted in a kind of cultural pluralism, in which the 
distinct and unique identities of respective nationalities were to be nurtured by the state 
(Connor 1984: 201, 213-4; Martin 1-2, 125-6; Roy 58-65; Wimbush 1985: 73; Bruchis 1984: 
132). 
 
  The Soviet strategy of dividing larger communities, identified predominantly by 
religion, mode of life, place of residence, tribe and other similar criteria, into smaller groups 
defined as nationalities was adopted by Sheng‘s administration. In order to dissolve the 
common ethno-religious identity of East Turkestanis, Sheng separated them into several 
nationalities, which, along with other non-Turkic nationalities, were to make up the 
population of Xinjiang. Two all-province meetings of people‘s representatives (Ölkilik awam 
kelq qurultiyi) in Urumchi in 1934 and 1935 performed the officially sanctioned act of 
‗determination of names of fourteen Xinjiang nationalities‘ (Shinjang milletlirining namining 
békitilishi), or in Chinese terminology ‗national delimitation‘ (民族識別 , mínz  sh bié; 
Burhan 528; Sayrani 65), which in fact also meant symbolical recognition of their existence: 
‗...Since that meeting, there were fourteen nationalities in Xinjiang...‘ (Burhan 529) It will be 
shown in following sections of this chapter that Sheng subsequently introduced vis-à-vis 
Xinjiang Turkic population other principles of Soviet indigenization and affirmative action. 





   Nationality 
 
 
    Population 
 
 
   Percentage of   
   Xinjiang total 
 
 
   Uyghur (維吾爾 Wéiw ‟ěr) 
   Kazak (哈薩克 H s kè) 
   Han (漢 H n) 
   Hui (回 Huí) 
   Kyrgyz (柯爾克孜 Kēěrkèzī)
65
 
   Mongol (蒙 Měng) 
   Taranchi (塔蘭其 T lánqí) 
   Russian (歸化 Guīhu )
66
 
   Shiwe (錫泊 Xībó) 
   Tajik (塔吉克 T jíkè) 
   Uzbek (烏孜别克 Wūzībiékè) 
   Tatar (塔塔爾 T t ěr)
67
 
   Solon (索倫 Suǒl n) 
   Manchu (滿 M n) 
    
 
    2,900,173 
       318,716 
       202,239 
         92,146 
         65,248 
         63,018 
         41,307 
         13,408 
           9,203 
           8,867 
           7,966 
           4,601 
           2,489 
              670 
 
 
         77,75 
           8,55 
           5,41 
           2,47 
           1,75 
           1,69 
           1,11 
           0,36 
           0,25 
           0,24 
           0,21 
           0,12 
           0,07 
           0,02 
 
     
   Xinjiang total 
 
     
    3,730,051 
        
       100,00 
 
 
Table 2. Estimated population of Xinjiang after 1933 (Lattimore 110; Chinese characters 
according to Du 54). 
 
 
Turning ‘East Turkestani’ into ‘Uyghur’ Nation 
 
 Sheng‘s abandonment of the derogatory term ‗Rag-Head‘ used by Yang‘s and Jin‘s 
administration and adoption of the name ‗Uyghur‘ is a remarkable act of official 
reintroduction into state practice of a name, which has not been used to refer to a community 
of people for some four hundred years. Obviously, Sheng‘s revival of the label ‗Uyghur‘ as an 
ethnonym for indigenous sedentary Turkic Muslims of southern and eastern Xinjiang 
reflected the use of the term by Turkic intellectuals in Soviet Central Asia in 1910s and 
subsequent recognition of the category by the Soviet state throughout 1920s (analyzed in 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation). At this moment, it is unclear to what degree Sheng‘s decision 
was a reflection of Soviet practice and to what degree it echoed demands articulated by 
Xinjiang Turkic intellectual inspired by the case of Russian/Soviet Uyghurs. It has been 
argued that one principal actor behind this step might have been Garegin Abramovich 
Apresov, Soviet Consul-General in Urumchi who might have instructed Sheng (Rudelson 
                                                 
65
 The name was used along with another term for Kyrgyz, Burut (布魯特 B l tè; Burhan 528). 
66
 The term Guīhuà means ‗naturalized person‘ and refers to the fact that most Russians immigrated to 
Xinjiang for religious, economic or political reasons at the turn of the century or after 1917. 
67
 The term Tatar replaced another name for used for Tatars, Nogay (腦蓋依 N og iyī; Burhan 528).  
 121 
149). Another hypothesis speculates that the idea might have been suggested to Burhan 
Shahidi, a very influential delegate to both provincial assemblies that officially sanctioned the 
term, by Abdukhaliq Uyghur who embraced this concept during his travels to western Central 
Asia in 1910s and 1920s (Rudelson 149); however; this fact is not mentioned in Burhan‘s 
own memoir (Burhan 1986). Other Xinjiang Turkic intellectuals led by Tatar activist Heyder 
Sayrani are also said to have propagandized the introduction of the term ‗Uyghur‘ in the 
Chöchek newspaper Our Voice around 1920 (Sayrani 65). Another source argues that Sheng‘s 
decision was a reaction to demands by one Association for the Promotion of Uyghur 
Education (Lattimore 125), a body by which the Chinese term for Uyghur Enlightenment 
Association (whose activities are considered later in this chapter) is probably meant.  
 
 As in the case of Turkic insurgency examined in the preceding section of this chapter, 
Sheng‘s institution of the term ‗Uyghur‘ had an enormous impact on the ideas of communal 
identity and interest Xinjiang Turkic Muslims. Sheng started imposing the concept of Uyghur 
nationality onto population of southern Xinjiang immediately after he took control of the core 
insurgent area around Kashgar. As mentioned above, he needed to eliminate the strong sense 
of Turkic Muslim identity hostile to Han/China administration, as well as to cultivate popular 
support for his government. In order to achieve these goals, he substituted the existing 
concept of East Turkestani nation inhabiting its primordial homeland with the idea of Uyghur 
nationality that shares its homeland with other nationalities. At the same time, Sheng fully 
embraced the modernizing imperative of Turkic insurgency. As a result, although the factual 
political interests of the ETIR were utterly incompatible with those of Xinjiang provincial 
administration, many aspects of public discourse in the initial stage of Sheng‘s rule were 
similar to those of preceding insurgency. However, the seemingly slight differences in fact 
embodied highly significant disparities between conceptions of community and its interest 
during ETIR‘s political autonomy and Sheng‘s renewed heteronomy. 
  
 The publication of the insurgent periodical Free Turkestan, discontinued in early 
February 1934 on the eve of crush of the ETIR by Tungan units, was resumed shortly after the 
provincial troops entered Kashgar in July of the same year. The periodical came out under the 
name New Life (Yéngi Hayat; NL), which symbolized both the start of new era under new 
government and certain continuity with the previous Turkic nationalist papers. Interestingly, 
Qutluq Haji Shewqi remained in the position of editor-in-chief of the new periodical. 
Nevertheless, the regular use of the pronoun ‗we‘ in the articles and omnipresent acclamations 
of new governmental policies make it obvious that the contents of New Life were to a 
substantial degree determined by Sheng‘s administration. The first issue of New Life 
preserved in Lund archives is dated August 30, 1934, and starts with the following passage: 
 
‗The new government now instituted in the country (memliket) is a civilized 
government, which has took up mainly the goals and obligations of devoting itself to 
rightfulness (hoquq) and humanitarianism (insaniyetperwerlik), uniting under equal 
rights and justice Uyghurs, Hans, Mongols, Tungans, Kyrgyz, Kazaks and every 
other such children of the homeland (weten baliliri) residing in the whole region 
(ölke), eradicating factionalism (ayrimichiliq), establishing friendly relations among 
all the people (khelq) and working and acting towards the good and peace of all 
(hemmining yakhshiliq we asayish)…‘ (NL 2:1) 
 
 Since the very first words of New Life, we can notice the immediate disappearance of 
one of the key terms featured by insurgent nationalist authors – the term ‗East Turkestani‘. 
The majority population of the Seven Cities region is instead referred to as ‗Uyghur 
nationality‘ (Uyghur milliti; NL 10, 13, 14, 19, 20, 43, 44, 243: 4 etc.). The Turkic identity of 
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Uyghurs is still widely acknowledged. However, this is done only when referring to the past. 
In the present, the East Turkestani ‗nation‘ (millet) transformed into several ‗nationalities‘ 
(also millet), with Uyghurs forming the largest one: 
 
‗…The children of man in the whole world are divided into numerous religious 
denominations, as well as into many nations and descents. For example, just as there 
are Arabs, Turks, the English, the French, Italians, Russians, Indians or Hans, there is 
us, people of Xinjiang (East Turkestan), most of who are in terms of religion Muslim. 
Concerning nationality (qewmiyet) and descent (uruq), we are a branch of the great 
Turanic nations (Turan aqwamisidin bir ulugh shahche bolgan). All civilized nations 
(medeniy millet), and even ignorant nations (jahil qewm), of the world know of what 
descent they are. Because the overwhelming part of our people is utterly ignorant 
(nadan) and unaware (gheplet), we have also forgotten of what descent we are. When 
someone asks us who we are, we say we are Muslims. Correct, we are Muslims as 
regards religion. But we also need to know about ourselves from the aspect of race 
(nesil) and descent (uruq). Is it not a shame and disgrace when a person does not 
know or forgets the name of his father and runs around asking others about it? 
Enough now – we are children of Uyghurs. Uyghur is our honorable national name 
(shereplik milliy atimiz)…‘ (NL 4: 2) 
 
‗…Most of the people living in Xinjiang belong to Turanic nationalities – Uyghurs, 
Taranchis, Uzbeks, Kazaks and Kyrgyz. Besides these, there are also Hans, Tungans, 
Kalmyks, Shiwes, Manchus and a few Russians and Nogays. Most of the Russians 
are refugees who fled to this place in the wake of the Great Russian Revolution. The 
Hans make up approximately 4.5 per cent of all the people. Uyghurs and Taranchis 
are agriculturalists and horticulturalists in southern districts. They raise silkworms 
and a small portion of them make a living in business and handicrafts. Kazaks, 
Kyrgyz and Kalmyks are involved in animal husbandry...‘ (NL 53: 1-2) 
 
 Similarly to the ETIR activists, Sheng‘s administration also supported the invention of 
history and symbology of Uyghur nation. According to the updated discourse, Uyghur 
‗culture, civilization‘ (medeniyet) came into being a thousand years before Islam with Oghuz 
Khan in contemporary Mongolia and around Tianshan mountains. Uyghurs gradually 
abandoned their nomadic life and developed a high civilization. Its artifacts are on display in 
museums in Paris, London, Berlin, Leningrad, Vienna and other western capitals. Then, after 
Uyghur civilization merged with the Islamic one, learning and education continued to flourish 
and Uyghur became an elite language (NL 91: 1). There are many other articles devoted to 
civilization, music, literature, knowledge, education, arts, crafts, burial customs, language, 
cultural heritage and similar historical and contemporary attributes of the ‗ancient‘ (qedimiy) 
Uyghur people (NL 17, 29: 1, 107: 1, 210, 236: 4), who were, however, only several months 
ago called East Turkestani. Participants of the recent insurgency were glorified as ‗Uyghur 
youths‘ (Uyghur yigitliri, Uyghur baliliri; NL 43:1) despite the fact that the uprising strived to 
establish an independent East Turkestan. 
 
 Sheng sought to dissolve the common ethno-religious identity of majority Turkic 
population of Xinjiang not only by dividing it into Uyghurs, Kazaks, Kyrgyz, Taranchis, 
Uzbeks and Tatars. He also aimed to deliberately sow the seed of direct antagonism among 
and within the individual nationalities. This is well exemplified by his acknowledging 
Taranchis as a separate nationality, even though they shared a number of common 
characteristics with the population recognized as Uyghurs (Lattimore 1950: 126). In other 
contexts, Sheng chose to include several subaltern Turkic communities under the category 
Uyghur. To borrow one apt wording used in an acclaimed study, such ‗stretching the short, 
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tight skin‘ (Anderson 86) of the Uyghur nationality over disparate subaltern subjects occurred 
for instance in the case of Dolans, a community involved in animal husbandry in the 
Mekit-Maralbeshi region in southwestern Xinjiang (Lattimore 1950: 127, 166), in the case of 
Lopliks, a community of fishermen and hunters around the Lop Nor (Svanberg 1987) or in the 
case of Abdals (referring to themselves as Eynu), a heterodox and enigmatic group scattered 
throughout southern Xinjiang (Rudelson 24, 48). This inclusion of such heterogeneous 
communities into one category easily created internal fissures within the Uyghur nationality. 
Likewise, by future adoption of different policies toward respective nationalities, Sheng 
managed to engender disagreements within the entire Turkic population of Xinjiang. This was 
a continuation of ancient Chinese diplomatic strategy of ‗using barbarians to control other 
barbarians‘ (以夷制夷  yǐ Y  zh  Y ; mentioned in Chapter 1). Several distinct and even 
mutually contending nationalities naturally posed a substantially reduced risk to Sheng‘s 
authority than a united East Turkestani nation. This measure also later allowed Sheng to 
utterly omit the use of specific ethnonyms of respective nationalities and to operate only with 
the generic term ‗nationalities‘. Thus, in later issues of New Life, the term ‗Uyghur‘ is rarely 
used and Xinjiang is increasingly referred to as a region inhabited not by Uyghurs, Kazaks, 
Kyrgyz, Taranchis, Uzbeks, Tatars and other groups, but by anonymous ‗fourteen 
nationalities‘ (on töt millet). Similarly, the government later promised to represent the 
interests of ‗nationalities‘ of Xinjiang, and not specifically of Uyghurs, Kazaks, Kyrgyz, 
Taranchis etc. 
 
 Sheng‘s transformation of ‗East Turkestanis‘ into ‗Uyghurs‘ was also accompanied by 
a shift in discourse of homeland. The concept of East Turkestani nation entitled to autonomy 
within its homeland was replaced by the notion of Uyghurs as one segment of the ‗people of 
East Turkestan‘ (Sherqiy Türkistan khelqi) or of ‗people living in East Turkestan‘ (Sherqiy 
Türkistanda yashighuchi khelq; NL 5). As Sheng strived to reconcile his administration with 
unfavorable Turkic popular sentiment, the term of ‗East Turkestan,‘ or even ‗our sacred 
homeland East Turkestan‘ (muqeddes wetinimiz Sherqiy Türkistan; NL 16) remained in use. 
However, several other notions were newly introduced to rhetoric of New Life to diminish the 
memories of the recently independent ETIR. By far the most widely used designation was the 
official name ‗Xinjiang‘ (Shinjang) – Uyghurs along with other nationalities were referred to 
as ‗children of Xinjiang‘ (Shinjang baliliri; NL 19). An alternate neologism ‗Xinjiang person, 
a Xinjiangese‘ (Shinjangliq) started to be employed to designate inhabitants of East Turkestan 
(NL 20). Sometimes the word ‗Xinjiang‘ even newly replaced ‗East Turkestan‘ in a specific 
figure of speech favored by insurgent nationalist writers, such as ‗Great Xinjiang‘ (ulugh 
Shinjang) instead of ‗Great East Turkestan‘ (NL 12). The two names were often used together 
as a parenthetical explanation of one another – ‗East Turkestan (Xinjiang)‘ or vice versa (NL 
2: 1, 10, 12, 29:1, 51: 1; PFK 1935: 12, PFK 1937: 10). Another term officially introduced as 
an alternative to ‗East Turkestan‘ was ‗Uyghuristan‘ (NL 25: 1, 32:2, 43:1; PFK 1935: 3, Fig. 
6; PFK 1936: 5, Fig. 7), which effectively recognized Uyghurs as the master nationality in 
their national homeland. The term ‗Six Cities‘ started to be used during Sheng‘s rule with 
higher frequency than in the insurgent texts (NL 8, 11, 43:1). Occasionally, the name 
‗Chinese Turkestan‘ (Chiniy Türkistan; NL 53: 1) also appeared. All of the above toponyms 
are of course used in the sense of a province (ölke) or district (wilayet) of the country 
(memliket) China (NL 9, 19, 43: 1, 259: 1, 261: 2). 
 
 Sheng also aimed to justify his rule by endorsing religious identity of East Turkestani 
Muslims. His administration formally guaranteed freedom of religious worship (NL 3). 
Uyghurs continued to be perceived as ‗Islamic population of Eastern Turkistan‘ (Sherqiy 
Türkistan ahali islamiyesi; NL 11). Issues of New Life continued to be dated according to 
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Islamic calendar (AH) and contained many features of religious discourse, such as the 
formulation ‗God willing‘ (NL 12) or congratulatory messages to readership on religious 
occasions (NL 239: 1, 245: 3). Uyghur figures collaborating with Sheng‘s administration, 
such as Khoja Niyaz Haji or Mahmud Muhiti, were addressed in religious terms, such as ‗holy 
warrior‘ (NL 3, 5), despite the fact that their alliance with Sheng‘s government had nothing to 
do with religious warfare. On numerous occasions, Sheng stressed that he governed in 
accordance with religious principles (NL 3; PFK 1935: 12; Wahidi 19). Similarly to previous 
Chinese administrations, Sheng also formed an alliance with traditional Islamic establishment. 
The above mentioned Kashgar cleric Abdughapur Shaptul became one of the most prominent 
Uyghur figures collaborating with Sheng‘s administration (NL 4; PFK 1937: 10). At the same 
time, the alignment of Sheng‘s state power with Islamic principles effectively diminished the 
prominence of religion in lives of East Turkestani Muslims, because religious values were by 
the administration suddenly on par with those of Sheng‘s secular government (NL 9). In some 
contexts, the reference to religion is made in a way which inconspicuously, yet hardly 
inadvertently denigrates it, such as in an article that portrays ‗Muslims‘ of East Turkestan as 
deprived of education and unaware of national and state virtues (NL 11). 
 
 Besides incorporating prominent figures and respected personages into his 
administration in order to legitimize his government, Sheng built on other features of Uyghur 
national identity pre-drawn by Turkic nationalists. Sheng and other high officials were 
portrayed in propaganda as fatherly characters protecting all nationalities and struggling for 
their well-being and progress (NL 2, 9, 22, 91). New Life also propagandized the public 
dimension of state affairs under the new administration – public speeches, glorification of 
leaders and officials, announcement of policies and resolutions, exclamation of nationalistic 
poetry and people‘s marches (NL 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 26, 43:1). The occupation of Kashgar by 
provincial troops was interpreted as a symbolical beginning of new era of order and peace 
(NL 2:1). April 12, the date of Sheng‘s rise to power, started to be celebrated as a dawn of 
liberty when all nationalities attained ‗parity‘ (musawat), ‗equality‘ (baraberlik) and 
‗compatriotism‘ (wetendashliq; NL 53:1, 251). Disruption of public festivities was regarded 
as undermining the authority of Urumchi (PFK 1937: 10). Sheng‘s administration also 
instituted a rich symbology of the Republic of China, of which Xinjiang was still formally 
part of – dating of New Life according to the year of the republic (AR), celebrating of October 
10 as a public festival (NL 193: 2), the flag of Kuomintang China (NL 12), praising of Sun 
Yat-sen‘t merits (NL 9), celebrations of unity with Nanking (NL 53: 1, 249: 1), briefings on 
Kuomintang policy (254: 4), demonstrations in support of Chinese soldiers fighting the 
Japanese in Suiyuan (綏遠) province (NL 238: 2) or attaching ceremonial importance to 
republican days in republican history, such as President Yuan Shikai‘s (袁世凱, 1859-1916) 
acceptance of Japanese Twenty-one Demands (二十一個條項 Èrshíyī gè tiáoxi ng) in 1915 
or May Fourth movement of 1919 (NL 258: 1). 
 
 In much the same way, Sheng resumed the Turkic insurgents‘ discourse of national 
decline and national rebellion. On this topic, the articles in New Life are virtually unchanged 
in content, vocabulary and tone from the texts in Life of East Turkestan and Independence. 
We find the same repetitive denunciations of preceding republican governors, who did not 
represent the interests of the people. Instead, they instituted a totalitarian government, 
enslaved the population, neglected social, national and education issues and ignored reforms 
and development etc., which led to national decline (NL 4, 5, 9, 12, 14, 17). In turn, this 
situation justified revolution against Yang‘s and Jin‘s system (NL 3, 19). Thus, the 
independence-minded nationalist Turkic insurgency was portrayed during Sheng‘s era not as a 
struggle against the ‗Han nationality‘ (Khensu, Khitay milliti) or China as such, but as a 
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struggle against the oppressive old order (261:2). Initially, New Life in fact refrained 
altogether from condemnations of the separatist creed of Turkic nationalists. Altogether, by 
intercepting Turkic insurgent activists‘ discourse of national misery and other above 
illustrated attributes of national identity of Xinjiang indigenous sedentary Turkic Muslims, 
newly called Uyghurs, Sheng at least partially succeeded in creating an impression that his 
new government was actually something of a direct continuation of the ETIR‘s agenda. 
 
Interests of Uyghur Nation under Renewed Heteronomy 
 
 Sheng‘s administration also appropriated a large part of insurgent discourse of national 
interest. Similarly to Turkic nationalist publications, New Life devoted large space to 
discussion of well-being of the homeland, interests of the people and needs of the nation (NL 
3, 4, 5, 13, 17, 25: 1). As with the ETIR, it was Sheng‘s state that was to represent national 
interests in conditions of ‗liberty, freedom‘ (azadliq, hürriyet), ‗peace‘ (emniyet, aram) and 
‗stability‘ (asayish) after overthrowing the old dysfunctional order (NL 4, 9, 17, 43: 1). 
Sheng‘s government was even specifically termed ‗Government of New Freedom‘ (Yéngi 
Azadliq Hökümiti; NL 2). However, Sheng‘s line also sought to counter the secessionist ideas 
prevalent among Turkic Muslims. Thus, the new freedom differed substantially from the old 
one: 
 
‗…We the children of Xinjiang, Uyghurs, Hans, Mongols, Kalmyks, Shiwers, Solons, 
Turghuts, Qoshuts, Tatars, Tungans, Kyrgyz, Kazaks and Russians, have become 
children of the homeland with equal rights. None of us is her step-child, we are all of 
her own. Religious and sectarian differences (din we mezheb ayrimichilik) are not in 
conflict with this unity. The nine-point constitution (qanun asasi) announced by the 
new government unites us and pacifies us by the means of reason. Everybody‘s 
freedom in religious and national affairs is safeguarded… It is necessary that for the 
sake of well-being and fortune of our homeland, we, the nationalities of East 
Turkestan (Xinjiang), tightly connect in perfect unity and with genuine and sincere 
hearts on the basis of compatriotic relations...‘ (NL 19) 
 
 Although not overtly formulated, the emphasis on unity of nationalities was a 
substantial departure from the ideal of independent East Turkestani nation-state envisioned by 
Turkic nationalists. Under Sheng, the most important political objective for Uyghurs and 
other Turks was ‗unity‘ (ittipaq, birlik). In a threefold way, the concept of unity pointed to 
inter-ethnic solidarity of all Xinjiang nationalities, to their allegiance to provincial authorities 
and also to Xinjiang‘s territorial integrity with the Republic of China. By emphasizing the 
unity line, Sheng strived to repel the specter of secessionist aspirations still cherished by a 
large portion of Turkic population. Previously, the concept of unity of Turkic Muslims with 
other communities in East Turkestan had occasionally appeared in the insurgent literature. 
However, during Sheng‘s administration the unity of nationalities with each other and with 
the homeland turned into the most prominent political interest of Uyghurs and is articulated 
numerous times in New Life: (NL 2, 3, 4, 5, 19, 259: 1; PFK 1935: 12 etc.): 
 
‗…The new government was formed ….. in order to concentrate on the unity and 
friendship of all people of Xinjiang, to give each nationality justice, rightfulness and 
freedom and to facilitate reforms and development of political, cultural and social 
conditions of each nationality. The leaders of Uyghur people (Uyghur khelqi) headed 
by Khojam Niyaz Hajim and Commander Mahmud formed a close relationship and 
unity with the new government… We all need to unite. From now on, all of you unite! 
Actually, the purpose of forming our today‘s assembly is to unite and protect our 
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rights. Our unity will of course give us great strength and all our affairs will go well. 
We need to be aware of the value of these beneficial things...‘ (NL 3) 
 
 The new government was in some articles referred to as ‗Government of Unity‘ 
(Ittipaq hökümiti; 43: 1). Unity was the essential principle of the newly established provincial 
assembly – in Chinese named People‘s United Congress (民眾聯合會 Mínzhòng liánhéhu ), 
in Uyghur called Nationalities‘ United Congress (Milletler Ittipaq Mejlisi; NL 3). Unity was 
also espoused by Sheng and Han officials, as well as by Uyghur collaborators with Sheng‘s 
administration (NL 3). The recently separatist Turkic nationalities were depicted in New Life 
as holding hands with the new government (NL 53: 1). All the nationalities were to form a 
perfect unity (kemal ittipaq) based on feelings of friendship (dostluq), love (muhebbet) and 
compatriotism (wetendashliq; NL 3, 19). The Hans and Tungans, against whom the Turkic 
Muslims only a few months ago had waged bitter warfare and ethnic cleansing and who were 
recently on the pages of the same newspaper considered ‗mortal enemies,‘ suddenly became 
referred to by New Life as ‗fellow compatriots‘ (wetendash, NL 19). Introduction into Uyghur 
language of a new and emotionally neutral Chinese loanword denoting the Han, Khensu, and 
its use in place of the Turkic term Khitay, which the Chinese for an unknown reason take in as 
derogatory, also strived to augment the feeling of inter-ethnic solidarity (NL 14). Unity of 
nationalities was also propagandized to other Turkic nationalities, who could have possibly 
harbored anti-China sentiment. A page from Tatar primer from 1941 (Fig. 8), i.e. from the 
very late period of Sheng‘s administration, features the text ‗There are Hans, Mongols, 
Shiwes, Manchus, Solons, Kazaks, Kyrgyz, Uyghurs, Tatars, Taranchis, Tunggans, Russians, 
Uzbeks, Tajiks and also other peoples (khelq) living in Xinjiang. Children of Hans, Mongols, 
Shiwes, Solons, Kazak, Kyrgyz, Uyghurs, Tatars, Taranchis, Tungans, Russians, Uzbeks, 
Tajiks and other peoples‟ workers are friends.‘ (Janishif 150) The rhetoric of unity of 
Xinjiang with the homeland, and of the unity of nationalities in the whole Republic of China, 
is also a frequently used concept in New Life (NL 8, 19 etc.). The word ‗republic‘ is even 
translated into Uyghur as ‗republic of people‘s unity‘ (khelq ittipaqi jumhuriyiti; 256: 1, 226: 
1). Turkic secessionist nationalism, the most intimidating challenge to Urumchi‘s authority, 
was by Sheng‘s discourse clad to euphemisms such as disunity, narrow nationalism, 
factionalism, treachery, spreading malevolent rumors and false propaganda. However, these 
were condemned as the most detrimental social and ideological phenomena (NL 2: 1, 19, 43: 
2, 254: 2; 1937: 10 etc.).  
 
 Besides ethnic and political unity, the other most prominent political ideals of Sheng‘s 
power were representative government, equality of nationalities, rights of all the people, 
justice, rule of law and similar attributes of modern republicanism (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 13, 16, 19, 
43: 1, 243: 4, 258 etc.): 
 
 ‗…We, Uyghurs, who for years of slavery and subjugation had been shedding bloody 
tears, have, as a result of several years‘ revolution, acquired all rights. Besides justice, 
the new government declared that it will grant us rights, which are as extensive as the 
amount of blood we had shed and of the sacrifices we had given. It will also give us 
many seats in the government given the majority of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. As for the 
government, it will be a government of every nationality living in Xinjiang. It is not 
so that someone from elsewhere is our leader. Look – besides the vice-chairman of 
the province, in all high positions there are Uyghurs in charge of government work. 
In the same way, in places where Uyghurs form a majority, the county magistrates 
will be also Uyghurs and Uyghur soldiers will be in charge of defense…‘ (NL 25: 1) 
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 As regards the characteristics of the new government, ‗righteousness‘ (adalet) and 
‗law‘ (hoquq) are among the most frequently used words throughout New Life. The 
government is termed ‗people‘s government‘ (khelq hökümiti; NL 15, 16, 21) or even 
‗people-loving government‘ (khelqperwer hökümet; NL 250: 1, 261: 2), which again stresses 
the principle of representing interests of all the people of Xinjiang. The election of delegates 
into Kashgar ‗national congress‘ or ‗people‘s congress‘ (milliy mejlis, khelq qurultiyi) in 
August 1934 took place in front of the Eid Kah Great Mosque in Kashgar in the form of a 
mass rally attended by the leading administrative and military officials; all the elected 
representatives subsequently also held lengthy speeches (NL 2). The newspaper also often 
brought specific descriptions of the process of delegation of local people‘s congresses and 
their relation to provincial assembly, as well as news from the local congresses (NL 5, 44).  
 
 Sheng also incorporated some influential figures associated with the Turkic insurgency 
and nationalist intelligentsia into his power structure. Apart from Khoja Niyaz Haji and 
Mahmud Muhiti, such personage was for example Yunus Beg, a student of the first year of 
the Urumchi Russian School of Law and Politics, a promoter of modern education, leader of 
an uprising in Turpan and a minister of the ETIR, who was appointed into Sheng‘s 
government (I 13; Shinmen 1994: 154; Burhan 226-7, 307-9, Khushtar 2000b: 245-6). 
Another similar figure was Tahir Beg, Yunus Beg‘s fellow progressive activist from 1920s 
and once a supporter of East Turkestani independence, who was appointed by Sheng in charge 
of commission for nationalities and several other positions (Burhan 226-7, 307-9, 569; 
Khushtar 2000b: 245-6). There individuals‘ acceptance of posts in Sheng‘s government 
further testifies to persistence of the centrifugal dynamics of discord, or disunity principle 
within Uyghur society. Sheng also explicitly strived to institute equal legal and social position 
of men and women (NL 3, 52: 2), which was a strategy that covertly undermined the 
influence of Islam and traditional clergy. 
 
 Sheng‘s discourse of representative government also included extensive references to 
attributes and policies of the Republic of China as a symbol of republicanism. Thus, the rule 
of Yang and Jin was portrayed as an era of oppression and corruption, which had nothing in 
common with principles of republicanism. In contrast, Sheng‘s government was interpreted in 
New Life as the true heir of Sun Yat-sen‘s Three People‘s Principles. As mentioned in 
previous chapter, Chinese republicanism had first been propagandized in Xinjiang by the Ili 
revolutionaries in 1911, who endorsed its essentials –  equality of Xinjiang nationalities (in 
their context Hans, Mongols, Huis, Turkic Muslims and Kazaks) and representative 
government (Ezizi 1997a: 83, 87). However, it is only Sheng‘s government that is described 
in New Life as a period when the ideals of republican revolution are to be fully realized: 
 
‗…A new government was formed on the 12
th
 day of 3
rd




 on the 
basis of rights (hoquq) guaranteed by the Three People‘s Principles and legal equality 
for all nationalities of Xinjiang was announced. [The government] conferred with the 
leaders of Uyghur revolution (Uyghur inqilabi) Excellency Khoja Niyaz Hajim and 
Honorable Commander Mahmud and reached an agreement with them on pursuing 
the rule of law (hoquq) and reforms (islahat), and thus united with them in promising 
to make Xinjiang prosperous (awat) by the means of justice (adalet) and civilization 
(medeniyet). The new government and administration is safeguarding political 
(siyasiy) and cultural (medeniy) rights of the people (khelq). Whole Uyghur 
nationality (pütün Uyghur milliti) is declaring and confirming their loyalty and 
                                                 
68
 This slightly erroneously stated date of the Republican calendar points to April 12, 1933, when 
Sheng assumed power in Urumchi. 
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diligence, as well as their sincerity and allegiance, to the new government. Now, 
Mighty God willing, if all nationalities of Xinjiang district (wilayet) want to, 
according to the principles of unity and justice, submit to the regulations of the 
republic, they will surely enjoy the generosities (fazilet) of civilization (medeniyet) 
and lifelong progress (tereqqiy)...‘ (NL 9) 
 
 New Life contains many other such professions of upcoming sincere implementation 
of Three People‘s Principles (NL 3). Xinjiang is perceived as a province firmly integrated into 
China, the largest country in the world (261: 2). The freedom and fate of Xinjiang is closely 
bound to that of China (249: 1). Xinjiang Turkic insurgency, which rightfully ended by 
Sheng‘s assumption of power, is interpreted as an integral part of the revolution in the 
‗regions of all China‘ (pütün Khitay yurtliri) that had been staged by ‗supporters of freedom 
and humanity‘ (hürriyet we insaniyet terepdarliri) and eventually gave birth to the Republic 
of China (NL 4). Sun Yat-sen‘s words were frequently incorporated into patriotic speeches: 
‗Oh nations! Take law and homeland into your own hands!‘ (NL 9) October 10, the day on 
which the Chinese republican revolution began in Wuchang, was celebrated in Sheng‘s 
Xinjiang as a holiday equally important to April 12, the commemoration of Sheng‘s coup. As 
mentioned before, New Life is besides the Islamic calendar (anno hijra, AH) also dated in 
Chinese republican calendar (anno respublica, AR). Chinese language was widely recognized 
in Xinjiang as the ‗state language‘ (dölet tili; 260:2). 
 
Developmental Breakthroughs by the Sheng Administration 
 
 Analogously to defining political objectives of his government in terms often similar 
to those of Turkic insurgency, Sheng also incorporated the ETIR‘s concept of modernism into 
his rhetoric. Progressivism as such was in line with the Soviet models used in Central Asia 
and was also articulated by the last of Sheng‘s Six Great Policies – construction. Sheng 
heralded a ‗new‘ Xinjiang even prior to assumption of power in southern Xinjiang. For 
Kashgar Turkic Muslims, the beginning of a new epoch was symbolically signaled by the 
change of title of the newspaper Free Turkestan to New Life. The expression ‗new‘ and 
celebrations of various aspects of the new life of Xinjiang are used regularly in the 
newspaper‘s texts, sometimes even in the form of poems (NL 2, 4, 6, 57: 1 etc.). The new deal 
for Xinjiang was also articulated by concepts such as reform, progress, development, uplifting 
of national status, facilitation of wealth, industry, prospecting of natural resources (NL 3, 7, 
10, 12, 17, 22, 25: 1, 43: 1, 198: 3 etc). Naturally, all these were to be achieved under the 
caring patronage of Sheng. Other prominent figures of the Urumchi-based authority were also 
dispatched to the south to initiate modernization in order to make the homeland ‗prosperous‘ 
(awat, NL 3). Becoming rich was considered ‗necessary‘ (lazim; NL 22), while the 
nationalities of Xinjiang were all in ethnic unity expected to work toward ‗reforms‘ (islahat; 
NL 7). Sheng‘s administration was literally called a ‗period of reform and progress‘ (islahat 
we tereqqiyat dewri; NL 12). Elsewhere it was stated, that because of progress and 
development, ‗…Uyghur nationality nowadays is not the same Uyghurs as two years ago. 
Instead, it is a nationality which is alive and possesses a homeland with a bright future…‘ 
(NL 10) In other words, the progress was seen as the avenue for the Uyghurs to the new life 
under Sheng (NL 22). Jadidist rhetoric remained in use, namely the metaphors of national 
awakening from sleep and slumber, calls to activity or the portrayals of Uyghur daughters as 
the dawn of the republic (NL 9, 13, 14, 19, 52:2). One article strives to calm down the people 
of Kashgar after an airplane of the provincial government flew over the city, thus symbolizing 
a beginning of a new progressive era: ‗…From now on, government airplanes will keep 
coming. They are our government‟s airplanes....‘ (NL 3) In other contexts, the civilizing 
mission of the Han/China administration was underlined: 
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‗…Most of Hans [living in Xinjiang] are involved in business, some are 
administrators and officials and some make a living by growing vegetables. As 
regards culture (medeniyet), the people of Xinjiang, especially Uyghurs, are very 
backward. To say that ninety-nine per cent do not know how to read and write is 
probably not an exaggeration. The Han are more civilized when compared to others. 
Even though their script is difficult, there are very few among the Han who do not 
know how read and write. Also, there are some people among them who have 
received high education…‘ (NL 53: 1-2) 
 
 Despite Sheng‘s assurances of representative government, political system in the 
province did not change substantially during his rule. However, Sheng was aware that the low 
cultural level and national decline were among significant causes of Turkic insurgency. 
Therefore, his administration did strive to accommodate the interests of Uyghurs in other than 
political spheres. In particular, Sheng allowed for a certain degree of cultural autonomy of all 
Xinjiang‘s fourteen nationalities and thus generated some developmental breakthroughs on 
social and cultural level. In order to implement cultural autonomy, as well as to ensure that its 
modalities are in line with provincial policies, in 1934 Sheng established the so-called 
Enlightenment Association (Aqartu Uyushma), a government-affiliated ‗academic society‘ 
(ilmiy jemiyet) which was commissioned primarily with opening schools and publishing 
periodicals and books (NL 19). In successive steps, branches of the society were to be 
launched for each individual nationality of Xinjiang. Altogether, the national and local 
branches of the association were to promote cultural development of Xinjiang population. 
 
 Besides education and publishing, the Uyghur Enlightenment Association (UEA; 
sometimes also called Uyghur Cultural Enlightenment Association, Uyghur Medeniy Aqartish 
Uyushmisi; in Chinese invariably called the Uyghur Culture Promotion Association, 維吾爾
文化促進會  Wéiw ‟ěr wénhu  c j nhu ) was also massively in charge of various other 
cultural projects, such as societies and venues for Uyghur music, theatre and poetry, opening 
bookstores, reading-rooms, teahouses, cultural clubs or movie and opera staging (NL 17, 32; 
221: 2). These cultural activities were explicitly regarded as means of stimulating, expressing 
and preserving Uyghur ‗cultural awareness‘ (medeniy hés) and ‗national feeling‘ (milliy 
tuyghu) necessary for existing in a civilized world (NL 26). The UEA took over the 
publication of New Life in January 1935, although Qutluq Haji Shewqi still remained the 
editor-in-chief (NL 32: 1). Branches of the UEA were regarded as the hands with which the 
government takes care and supervises awakening of ‗children of the state‘ (memliket baliliri; 
NL 19, 86:1).  
 
 Under Sheng, healthcare, hospitals, training of physicians, protection of public health 
and hygiene remained largely a responsibility of the state (NL 2:1, 16, 27), but the UEA both 
assisted the administration and channeled popular initiative in founding, financing or 
organizing donations for ‗asylums for the disadvantaged‘ (daril‟ajizin), the care for whom 
was by official discourse also explicitly linked to national interest and civilization (NL 12, 14, 
16, 28: 1). From other studies it is known that the UEA was also involved in management of 
religious endowments, urban planning, mediating trade or even manufacturing (Schleussel 
391). The respective national enlightenment associations also promoted Sheng‘s policy of 
unity and equality of nationalities (25:1). Thus, when reading the New Life, Uyghurs were 
regularly informed that there had been cultural associations established also for Hans and 
Tungans (NL 210, 248: 3, 4, 254: 1), whom they in fact had recently hated as mortal enemies. 
Similarly, extensive reporting on the activities of the Kyrgyz Enlightenment Association in 
the region (NL 226: 4, 229: 3, 231:3-4) generated a sense of disunity between Uyghurs and 
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Kyrgyz, who had only recently been able to unite as East Turkestanis in anti-Chinese 
insurgency. In other words, in some the UEA was used by the administration to generate 
tension within the unanimously insurgent Xinjiang. In sum, the UEA was a new and very 
influential social structure which oversaw the implementation of Sheng‘s policies on the 
lowest social level and also aimed to generate public support for the government. At the same 
time, the UEA also incorporated many nationalist or religious figures and thus retained a 
certain degree national autonomy over national affairs. 
 
 Similarly to Turkic nationalist activists, Sheng placed a great emphasis on promotion 
of modern education. Again, education and instruction of children, the future of the nation, 
was to be carried out exclusively by the state. Construction of education system and 
improving knowledge of all Xinjiang nationalities was declared as one of the most important 
objectives of Sheng‘s new government; moreover, the new education was explicitly intended 
to be done in mother tongue of Xinjiang nationalities (NL 3, 17). Education, schools and 
teachers were as some of the indispensable things that the respected Uyghur nationality 
needed for its new life (NL 28: 2). Local people‘s congresses were established simultaneously 
with organs of education administration and branches of the UEA (NL 8, 12, 14, 18, 25: 1, 
44). The civilizing mission of Sheng‘s government was to ignite the beacon of learning and to 
endow the children of the homeland with the virtues of knowledge (NL 2:1). The children of 
the nation needed to be awakened by education; in contrast, ignorance (gheplet) and slumber 
(uyqu) was said to destroy the nation (NL 28: 2, 46:1-2). A nation without knowledge and 
education was doomed; therefore, those toiling for education were considered ‗those doing an 
especially meaningful work for the nationalities of our sacred homeland East Turkestan‘ (NL 
16). New Life contains an enormous number of references to school being opened 
immediately after Sheng‘s takeover of Kashgar (NL 5, 7, 8, 15 etc.). Due to the great haste, 
schools were sometimes based in temporary locations, such as a military commander‘s office 
(NL 8). There are also repeated mentions in New Life of donations to schools by prominent 
Uyghur collaborators with Sheng‘s government (NL 8, 9). Schools were frequently 
established simultaneously with facilities for the disadvantaged (NL 33: 2) and also provided 
for teaching Chinese language (NL 64). The new education was of course to remain in 
accordance with religious principles. At the same time, it was ostentatiously granted also to 
girls and women (NL 8, 11): 
 
‗…We will act in the way which abides by the Holy Qur‘an given to us by Righteous 
God. All the boys and girls of our homeland will go to school and we will give them 
education and schooling. It was said that we will make it compulsory for both 
Muslim boys and girls to study in accordance with the Great Qur‘an and the 
Hadith…‘ (NL 3) 
 
 Sheng‘s administration also embraced other institutes of modernity. Freedom of 
expression and press was one the most important directives of the new government (NL 3), 
equally important as education (NL 5). Publishing and printing was said to be fully transferred 
to the hands of the people so that books on religion, literature, history and politics could be 
put out and bookstores and reading rooms opened (NL 12). Sheng also continued the trend of 
vernacularization of printed matter and public affairs. The time was regarded ripe for the 
ancient and elite Uyghur language to regain its lost status (91: 1) and use of vernacular was 
explicitly supported (NL 14, 210). Gradually, New Life started to contain a regular Uyghur 
literary section, the ‗Literature Garden‘ (Edebiyat Baghchisi). Sun Yat-sen‘s works were to be 
translated into Uyghur language (NL 9) and Uyghurs could even appeal to the government 
using Uyghur language and script, which made Uyghur an official language of the province 
(NL 51: 2). Analogously, use of mother language and script was propagandized also to the 
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other Turkic nationalities with the covert aim of weakening the united Turkic identity. A good 
example of the vernacularization propaganda can be seen in the following excerpt: 
 
‗…What is Uyghur? Uyghurs are a civilized nation living in cities. Our fathers and 
grandfathers have lived in a civilized way. In later years, we have lived under tyranny, 
forgotten who we were and thus left the ranks of human beings (insan). Now, we 
have discovered our name, so let us also find the previous civilized existence of ours. 
Let us put into use our vanished Uyghur language (lughet)
69
 and recall our impressive 
Uyghur pronunciation (ahang), so that we can recall our previous existence. As much 
as possible, let every word we use be Uyghur (Uyghurche bolsun). Particularly, let 
our own Uyghur mother tongue (öz ana tilimiz Uyghur tilliri) be taught in our newly 
opened schools. Let our poems and dialect be as much Uyghur possible. In this way, 
our Uyghur language and dialect will not disappear.‘ (NL 25: 1-2) 
 
 At the same time, vernacularization of public life during Sheng‘s renewed heteronomy 
resulted in an increased usage of administration-related Chinese words in Uyghur language, 
such as sīl ng (a commander, 司令), sīzh ng (a commander, 司長), Mínzhòng liánhéhu  
(People‘s United Congress, 民眾聯合會), dūb n (a commissioner, 督辦), xíngzhèngzh ng 
(head of administration, 行政張), zh xí (chairman, 主席), f zh xí (vice-chairman, 副主席), 
xíngzhèngf  (government, 行政府), d  zǒngtǒng (great president, 大總統), g ng‟ n j  (public 
security bureau, 公安局), j zh ng (a bureau director, 局長), shěngpi o (provincial banknote; 
省票) etc. On the other hand, words for new technology and institutions continue to come 
from Russian, which reflects the growing Soviet influence in the region – ayroplan (airplane), 
telifon (telephone), teligraf (telegraph), telegram (telegram), gramafon (gramophone), 
aftamobil (automobile), pilimot (submachine gun), ayroplan bombiliri (airplane bombs), 
konstitutsiye (constitution), militarism (militarism), doktur (doctor), zawut (factory), mashina 
(mashine), konsulat (consulate), banka (bank) or frasent (percent). The loanwords are 
sometimes explained in Uyghur language in parentheses after the loanword – thus feudalism 
becomes ‗particularist rulers‘ (shekhsiy hakimlar; NL 3) and an agriculture specialist 
(agronom) becomes ‗a scholar of crops (zira‟et alimi; NL 8). The number of Persisms and 
Arabisms is substantially reduced in New Life in comparison with insurgent publications. The 
newspaper occasionally reported on events in Islamic or third world countries, such as Egypt, 
Iraq, Hijaz, Afghanistan, Abyssinia or Tibet, but predominantly brought news from European 
countries such as England, Spain, Sweden, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania or 
Bulgaria. Due to prominence of anti-imperialism in Sheng‘s policy, close attention was 
devoted to events in Germany, Italy, Turkey and Japan. The more than obvious reality of 
Xinjiang becoming a sphere of exclusive Soviet influence was of course never mentioned 
openly in New Life; even news from the Soviet Union were rather rare. In fact, one 
contemporary Western traveler‘s report relates the absence of prominent Soviet propaganda 
throughout the province (Hedin 1938: 186). 
 
 On the factual level, Sheng‘s administration did indeed achieve some significant 
developmental breakthroughs. The policy of construction brought about material 
improvements. For example, mechanization was introduced into farming and pasturage, 
factories and manufacturing plants were launched which brought modern technology, an 
oilfield was opened at Dushanzi (獨山子), a strategically crucial road from Urumchi to 
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 This word in a heated appeal to use Uyghur vernacular is somewhat ironic – lughet is a loanword 
from Arabic word, which in today‘s Uyghur language has acquired the meaning of ‗dictionary‘. Here, 
however, it is used in the sense of ‗mother tongue‘. 
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Ghulja by the Soviet border was built and medical facilities and healthcare were established. 
Again, due to China‘s war with Japan and Soviet and U.S. involvement in it, Sheng‘s 
Xinjiang became a pivot of complex geopolitical relations (Ezizi 1997a: 321-2; Du 85-91; 
Norins 105-20, 124-40; Lattimore 154, 170-81, 200-22). Rightfully, the initial phase of 
Sheng‘s rule has been termed ‗progressive period‘ (Forbes 152). 
 
 Sheng‘s policy of cultural autonomy and korenizatsiya triggered parallel 
breakthroughs in Xinjiang indigenous society. The division of Turkic Muslim population into 
Uyghurs, Taranchis, Kazaks, Kyrgyz, Uzbek and Tatars, and subsequent affirmative action in 
reinforcing their national identities was an extremely powerful stimulus in rise of national 
consciousness. Thus, the Uyghur Enlightenment Association acted powerfully in emergence 
of modern Uyghur national identity. As regards national education in general, the below table 
shows the impact of Sheng‘s policy by comparing the number of schools established by 
individual Xinjiang nationalities‘ enlightenment associations (listed as ‗EA schools‘ and ‗EA 
students‘) to number of schools run by provincial government (listed as ‗provincial schools‘ 
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Table 3. Number of Xinjiang schools established by the provincial authorities and the UEA, 
1934-42 (Zhou 317). 
 
 As regards the Uyghur Enlightenment Association in particular, there were allegedly 
1980 UEA-run schools with 129.640 students in Xinjiang in 1936 (Du 82), while 12.827 
Uyghur students studied in government-run elementary schools in 1938 and 104.658 Uyghurs 
attended literacy courses by June 1941 (Janishif 140-3). According to another figure, there 
were 1540 UEA-run Uyghur schools with 89.804 students in the province in 1938 (Zhou 316). 
Although these statistics do not mutually corroborate themselves, it is clear that the outreach 
of the UEA was enormous. There were also several schools and vocational schools 
established throughout the province which were directly administered by the Soviet Union, 
such as one pilot training institute in Urumchi (Hedin 1938: 158). Since 1934, hundreds of 
Uyghur students were sent to study at schools in Tashkent (at Administration and Law 
Faculty of the Central Asian University, Ottura Asiya Universitétining Memuriy Hoquq 
Fakultéti), Chimkent, Samarkand, Almaty and other places in Soviet Central Asia (Janishif 
144-5; Schleussel 393-4). Although direct indoctrination by communism was reportedly not 
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part of the curriculum for Xinjiang Uyghurs in Soviet Central Asia (Ezizi 1997a: 449, 473), 
all of the 1930s‘ Uyghur students encountered socialist ideology and some became strongly 
influenced by it, as became obvious in the following decade (researched in Chapter 4). 
 
 Uyghur national publishing also experienced quick development during Sheng‘s rule. 
The Uyghur mutation of the provincial newspaper Xinjiang Daily (Shinjang Géziti, 新疆日報 
Xīnji ng r b o) was published in six major locations besides Urumchi (Du 84). Other Uyghur 
periodicals were also published, often under the auspices of the UEA, such as New Xinjiang 
(Yéngi Shinjang) in Urumchi or Sieve (Ghelwir) in Aksu (Mekit 152; Esqeri 295). These and 
other similar developments inspired a true ‗wave of social enlightenment‘ (medeniyet aqartish 
dolquni; Janishif 192) and a boom of cultural activities such as theatre, music, arts or motion 
picture projections (Ezizi 1997a: 498-500).  
 
 There are several trustworthy reports written by foreign travelers to the region in 
1930s, which imply that southern Xinjiang sedentary Turkic population, in Sheng‘s 
propaganda called ‗Uyghurs‘, still identified themselves as ‗Turki‘ or ‗East Turki‘ during 
Sheng‘s era (Fleming; Maillart; Hedin 1936; Hedin 1938; Hedin 2009; Gablenz 1942). One 
exception is the Swedish explorer Sven Hedin‘s observation that the inhabitants of a small 
village near Bügür in spring 1934 referred to themselves as Lopliks, and thus formed a 
community that was distinct from majority Turki population (Hedin 1936: 121). Notably, 
Hedin‘s extensive memoirs arguably reflects contemporary social practice of Xinjiang Turkic 
Muslims in 1930s of using the word ‗Uyghur‘ exclusively when referring to ancient Uyghurs 
Here, the only exception noted is the Swiss traveler Ella Maillart‘s reference to a rumor 
overheard in Kashgar in 1935 that the Soviet Union might be considering to facilitate creating 
an ‗Uyghur Socialist Republic‘ in Xinjiang (Maillart 260). Nevertheless, it is again reasonable 
to argue that social penetration of Sheng‘s concept of Uyghur nation was not substantial rural 
population of southern Xinjiang oases. Nevertheless, Sheng‘s official policy of creating 
modern Uyghur nationality obviously did have impact among the Turkic intellectual elite 
perceptions of communal identity and interest. For instance the fact that New Life, once a 
pro-independence Turkic nationalist periodical, promptly appropriated the discourse of 
Uyghur nationality, and that Memtili Tewpiq, an activist influenced by Turkish nationalism, 
disseminated the idea of Uyghur national identity in his schools (mentioned in preceding 
chapter of this dissertation), indicates that at least some Xinjiang Turkic strata accepted 
Sheng‘s ethnic theory. The relatively quick social penetration of Sheng‘s concept in certain 
Xinjiang intellectual milieu will be further discussed in the following chapter. At the same 
time, it is worth noting here that with the exception of Taranchis, who are today by the 
People‘s Republic of China considered as belonging into the group Uyghur, the fourteen 
Xinjiang nationalities as delimited by Sheng exist within unchanged ethnic boundaries until 
today. 
 
 On the other hand, further developments in Sheng‘s Xinjiang suggest that interception 
of ETIR‘s discourse of national identity and national interest, construction of the concept of 
respective Xinjiang nationalities and their national symbologies, espousal of their national 
interests and other affirmative actions taken by Sheng towards their identities were mere 
legitimization measures adopted by Sheng in order to secure smooth consolidation of power 
during the initial stage of his rule. Sheng eventually commenced the second stage of his 
policy. As mentioned above, he gradually abandoned the discourse of individual Xinjiang 
nationalities – later issues of New Life before its termination in May 1937 do not speak of 
Uyghurs and other respective nationalities of Xinjiang. Instead, they refer to the population by 
the generic keyword ‗Xinjiang nationalities‘ (Shinjang milletliri) without any specification of 
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their ethnicity. After korenizatsiya, ethnic identity of Uyghurs, Kazaks, Kyrgyz and all other 
nationalities was generally ignored and safeguarding interests of Xinjiang nationalities did not 
constitute the most important mission of Sheng‘s government anymore. This naturally led to 
erosion of trust in Sheng‘s administration in the eyes of indigenous Turkic population, as 
implied by increased frequency of the government‘s condemnations of disunity and treachery 
in later issues of New Life. At the same time, it was struggle against ‗imperialism‘ (jahangirlik, 
imperyalism) that gradually became the top priority of provincial government (NL 193:2). In 
relation to this ideological line, an influential body used to mobilize popular support for 
Sheng‘s policy was (with Soviet assistance) established under the name Anti-Imperialist 
Association (Jahangirlikke Qarshi Uyushmisi, 反帝會 F nd  hu ; Ezizi 1997a: 376, 466). 
Another good example of the late phase of Sheng‘s policy is the fierce condemnation of 
Mahmud Muhiti, which was posted publicly on the streets of Kashgar after Muhiti fled to 
India due to his fears of getting arrested by Sheng in early April 1937 (Forbes 142). The 
document still voices professions of equality and rights of nationalities, religious freedom, 
founding modern schools and other above described institutes of representative government 
and modernity. It even uses the term East Turkestan for Xinjiang. But it also contains strong 
criticism of the popular hero who wielded enormous influence on local Turkic population. 
The pamphlet also portrayed the ETIR as an institution, which violated the sacred unity of 
nationalities by discriminating Hans, and which sought to bring Xinjiang under colonial 
domination of foreign imperialists (PFK 1937: 10). 
 
 A major uprising which erupted in spring of 1937 once again threw the entire southern 
Xinjiang into turmoil. This time, the Turkic armed resistance to Sheng‘s policies centered in 
Kashgar was reinforced by the Tungans, who had since 1934 controlled the southeastern rim 
of the Taklamakan. By fall 1937, Sheng managed (again with massive Soviet military 
assistance, including tanks and gas bombs) to crush the whole insurgency; by annexing the 
former Tungan enclave, he finally brought the entire territory of Xinjiang under his control. 
Subsequently, he embarked on a draconian campaign to consolidate his power. Also modeled 
largely on the Soviet model of Stalin‘s purges in late 1930s, Sheng eliminated all other 
significant power holders in the province and instituted strongly totalitarian rule. He executed 
a major portion of Turkic nationalist elite remaining in Xinjiang, such as for instance Memtili 
Tewpiq, Heyder Sayrani, Qutluq Haji Shewqi, Khoja Niyaz Haji, Yunus Beg or Tahir Beg, as 
well as many ordinary people. The victims of Sheng‘s atrocities likely totaled over one 
hundred thousand people (Ezizi 1997a: 349-62; Millward 2007: 210). He also intensified open 
anti-religious efforts, such as closure or conversion of mosques into theatres and clubs, 
encouragements to drink liquor for men or to appear in public unveiled for women (Forbes 
137). Figuratively speaking, the price of acquiring modern Uyghur identity was covertly set 
by Sheng for Xinjiang Turkic Muslims to be settled by relinquishing their East Turkestani and 
Muslim identity. Although, as mentioned above, the Soviet Union was not interested in direct 
communization nor annexation of Xinjiang, and although there was seemingly little sign of 
the province being factually under the control of the USSR, Sheng‘s later policies do show 
remarkable inspiration by Soviet totalitarianism. Thus, after the bloody and protracted 
insurgency of early 1930s, followed by a brief period of autonomy during the ETIR and by a 
promisingly affirmative beginning of Sheng‘s regime, Xinjiang Turkic Muslims (who in the 
course of these events became called Uyghurs) once again wound up under despotic Chinese 
heteronomy: 
  
‗…People‘s congresses and enlightenment unions, which were theoretically people‘s 
organizations, were established in Turkestan. False propaganda, such as ―we have 
allowed education‖, ―we have abolished dictatorship,‖ or ―all nationalities have 
 135 
obtained equal rights‖ was disseminated. Regrettably, this was trickery. The secret 
police kept putting people to prisons and killing them. The stench of death could be 
smelled all over Turkestan. A person who would be soundly asleep one night would 
be gone by the next night, and even if his children and wife would know where he 
disappeared to, they would not say a word to anyone. Most people were deprived of 
rights and knowledge. All that was left to them was fear...‘ (Wahidi 19) 
 
 Similarly to initial affirmative action and indigenization, the latter phase of Sheng‘s 
ethnic policy also bore a striking and most probably deliberate resemblance to Soviet 
nationality theory and practice. In the Soviet Union, affirmative action towards national 
identities actually aimed at eventual obliteration of national identities. This seemingly 
paradoxical and contradictory strategy was based on the assumption that once national 
identity and rights were granted to Soviet ethnic groups, these would eventually voluntarily 
give up their national loyalties. Instead, it was expected by Soviet theorists that due to all 
classes‘ common economic interests, the population would forge a unified socialist people, 
the homo sovieticus, which would by himself come ignore the internal national boundaries 
within the Soviet Union. In the words of Marxist-Leninist ideology, vertical national 
differences, possibly also all distinctions, were to utterly disappear, because the most 
significant social distinctions were of course horizontal, i.e. among classes. Technically, the 
‗amalgamation of nations‘ (Ru. sliyanie narodov) was a process of uniting several equal 
elements into a single whole, and was therefore different from assimilation of an inferior 
group by a superior one. In this way, Soviet republics and autonomous units would remain 
national in form, but socialist in content (Connor 1984: 8, 52, 202; Martin 182; Roy: viii; 
Wimbush: 73; Caroe: 148-9; Bruchis: 132; Soucek 222-224, 232). In Soviet society, 
brotherhood of nationalities was the classic socialist metaphor of an imagined multinational 
community (Martin 432-3) and was also one of the most prominent characteristic of 
communist society:  
 
‗…A great brotherhood of people of labor, people who are united, regardless of 
national origin, by a community of class interests and goals, has come into being and 
has gained strength in our country; it has developed relations unprecedented in 
history, relations that we can rightfully call the Leninist friendship of peoples...‘ 
(Connor 1984: 478) 
 
 Thus, the position of national identity in socialist society was ambiguous. On the one 
hand, Soviet society was overtly referred to as multi-national. On the other hand, nationalism, 
which had been utilized during the earlier stage in order to gain support of nationally aware 
population for supra-national socialist movement, would eventually be regarded by Soviet 
ideologues as something incompatible with socialism and communism, and therefore outright 
reactionary and in need of annihilation. Similarly, the slogan of self-determination of peoples 
was ‗designed to recruit ethnic support for the revolution, not to provide a model for the 
governing a multiethnic state‘ (Martin 2). There was also a stark difference between the 
technical right to self-determination of Soviet peoples, and the right to exercise this right 
(Connor 1984: 52). In his purges in 1930s, Stalin attempted to solve the national question, in 
other words the uncomfortable existence of nations and nationalism (Connor 1984: xv), by 
decimating elites of numerous Soviet nationalities, allegedly on charges of nationalist 
deviations. At the same time, it was the Russians who were later to become the first among 
equals and play decisive role in multi-national Soviet state, where all nationalities 
theoretically enjoyed the same rights (Martin 451-61; Connor 1984: 254-63).  
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 Despite the fact that at this moment there are no sources available on what was the 
specific means, process and degree in which Sheng adopted Soviet models, the principles of 
delimitation of nationalities, affirmative action, indigenization, cultural autonomy, formal 
political autonomy and other policies enforced by Sheng reveal clear Soviet handwriting. This 
assertion is also in accord with the widely accepted theory mentioned above, that during 
Sheng‘s era Xinjiang was factually administered by Soviet advisors. The gradual shift in 
wording of articles in New Life from references to ‗Uyghurs, Kazaks, Kyrgyz, Taranchis, 
Uzbeks, Tatars and other nationalities‘ right after consolidation of Sheng‘s power in Kashgar 
in early 1934 to ‗nationalities of Xinjiang united in friendship‘ in late 1936 and early 1937 
suggests that Sheng‘s proto-communist measures were likely intended to follow the whole 
course of Soviet ethnic policy – taking initial affirmative action towards ethnic identity with 
the aim of their eventual eradication. In northern Xinjiang, where the population was 
composed of several predominantly Turkic nationalities, the trend of converging multiethnic 
identity was to a certain degree natural, as evinced for instance by the existence of a Turkic 
‗common language‘ (ortaq til) used in publications in Chöchek since late 1930s (Ezizi 1997a: 
500-1; Tashbayov 58-9).  
 
 However, Sheng‘s unity of nationalities obviously did not point to unity of Turkic 
peoples, but to unity of all Xinjiang nationalities with each other, with provincial government 
and with the Republic of China. The texts from the period right before discontinuing New Life 
in 1937 suggest that by including disparate, Turkic and non-Turkic, Muslim and non-Muslim 
and sedentary and non-sedentary, ethnic groups into the de-ethnicized concept of ‗fourteen 
nationalities of Xinjiang‘, Sheng ultimately intended to replace ethnic criteria of identification 
with political ones. To corroborate this assumption, further research is of course still needed 
that should rely chiefly on sources held in archives of Soviet intelligence agencies and in 
Xinjiang provincial archives. Therefore, before concluding the section on Sheng Shicai‘s 
ethnic policy with perhaps the most illustrative exhibit of his later propaganda, it is worth 
pointing out that apart from the fact that Sheng‘s proto-communist national delimitation of 
fourteen Xinjiang nationalities survives in much the same shape until today, also his other 
ways of dealing with the plaguing nationality question eventually proved as forerunners to 
events that took place in Xinjiang in the following decade, as well as to ethnic policy of the 
Chinese Communist Party‘s ethnic policy enforced in the region since 1949:  
 
‗…To honour the memory of September 18,
70
 we must do our best to defend the 
whole province of Sinkiang, its privileges and territories, and firmly to unite all the 
different races, attack the Imperialists and recapture all the territory they had taken 
from us. If all the different races are to be welded together into a firm whole, they 
must be placed on the same level and treated in the same way. When this has been 
done, it does not matter what secret conspiracies Imperialism directs against Sinkiang, 
for we shall be able to crush them. We must be resolutely on our guard every moment 
against the Imperialists and give the one answer only: that is, blood. Down with 
Imperialism!‘ (Hedin 1938: 198) 
 
 To sum up the findings of this important chapter and to relate them to several theories 
of nation-forming processes, the above examination of perceptions of communal identity and 
interests as articulated by Xinjiang Turkic intelligentsia during their nationalist insurgency 
and Sheng Shicai‘s indigenization in 1930s reveals several significant developments in the 
                                                 
70
 This date refers to Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, after which Sheng Shicai, who had then 
been a military commander of northeastern China, was forced to flee with his troops via the Soviet 
Union to Xinjiang. 
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notions of communal consciousness and interest. As pointed out previously, these 
developments were enabled by the spread of progressive ideas among intellectual strata and 
nascent modernization of Xinjiang Turkic society from 1880s to 1920 (examined in Chapter 2 
of this dissertation). The events of 1930s suggest that the newly established social stratum of 
progressive intellectuals, teachers, philanthropists, merchants and other enlighteners did to a 
certain degree succeed in their national agitation – their call to national awakening was heard 
by portions of their community, who indeed started to perceive themselves as a nation and set 
out on the path towards defending their national interests. In early 1930s, scores of nationally 
conscious figures, cultivated previously in Jadidist schools, grew aware of their community‘s 
decline and resolved to stage a large-scale movement bent on achieving strictly political 
objectives. Links were forged between activists and large parts of population hitherto 
uninvolved in politics. Apart from national agitation and cultivation of nationally conscious 
individuals, Xinjiang Turkic progressive intelligentsia also directly and efficiently 
participated in the political movement in throughout 1930s, acquiring a strong presence in the 
insurgent administration and subsequent Sheng‘s administration.  
 
 In spite of the obvious differences of political objectives of Turkic insurgency and 
Sheng‘s indigenization, both initiatives promoted national consciousness among Xinjiang 
Turkic Muslims. In this period, the nation, in exact words the ‗East Turkestani nation‘ during 
the insurgency and the ‗Uyghur nation‘ under renewed heteronomy, started to be defined by a 
multitude of national attributes. While some of these attributes were merely intercepted from 
previously existing concepts of communal identity with the same or modified importance, 
other national symbols and traditions were ‗invented‘, ‗reconstructed‘ or ‗re-imagined‘, 
similarly as in processes illustrated by other theorists in other parts of the world in modern 
period (Hobsbawm 1983: 12-4; Smith 1986: 177; Anderson 7). The concept of ‗East 
Turkestani nation‘, for which we find so far no evidence in indigenous sources predating the 
1930s and can therefore argue that contemporary society still used the autonym Musulman, 
became the key structure of Xinjiang Turkic Muslim communal identity discourse and state 
practice during the insurgency. Similarly, Sheng introduced the concept of the ‗Uyghur 
nation‘, which had been until then known only to a very modest progressive circle of 
Musulman society. Subsequently, he also took up massive affirmative action towards 
implanting this construct into mindset of southern Xinjiang sedentary Turks. Both the 
insurgent and Sheng‘s administration acknowledged or even stressed Turkic national origins 
and desired to restore the grandeur of its ancient culture and political system, a principle 
pointed to by some general theories of nation-formation processes (Smith 1986: 50-3). In the 
same way, the invention by the respective political agencies of previously non-existent 
variations of the concept of national homeland (particularly of East Turkestan, of Uyghuristan 
and of Xinjiang as a part of China) enabled the justification of nationalist movements on the 
grounds of restoration of past territorial integrity of the nation, a pattern also ascertained 
elsewhere (Smith 1986: 57, 162-3, 174-5, 191-2; Hroch 1996: 84). 
 
 In a similar manner, other attributes of East Turkestani and Uyghur national identity 
were constructed in 1930s. In words of the same theories of nation-construction processes, 
Xinjiang Turkic nationalist ethno-engineers performed a sophisticated recombination of 
traditional motifs from mythology, chronicles, documents and material artifacts (Smith 1986: 
177-8), of relics and memories of past statehood (Hroch 1996: 84), and of pre-existing culture 
and elements drawn from distant past (Gellner 48-9, 77), into a new concept of East 
Turkestani nation. As a result of this process, a complex national history was drawn up and a 
whole new ‗ancient‘ heritage of ‗primordial‘ nation emerged. A vital element in the discourse 
of national past was the memory of national decline and misery caused in the past by 
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mismanagement of East Turkestani and Uyghur homeland by flawed Chinese administrations. 
Also, Muhemmed Emin Bughra‘s History of East Turkestan was the first modern Xinjiang 
Turkic history that discarded the traditional religious prism of classical Turko-Islamic 
historiography and instead narrated East Turkestanis‘ historical past from the so-called 
‗enlightenment perspective‘ – as a struggle of a nation to liberate itself from dark oppression 
and, by reviving its ancient splendor, to attain the light of progress facilitated by modern 
nation-state. To borrow an apt formulation used by a scholar researching construction of 
national history narrative in China proper, Bughra did not narrate history of East Turkestan 
‗evangelically‘, or ‗down time‘, but reconstructed it as the History of East Turkestan ‗up time‘, 
all the way from modern era to ancient times lit by modern archeology (Duara 33-4). Instead 
of resorting to the usual nationalist tactic known from elsewhere of claiming that his nation 
‗forgot‘ their national history (Anderson 205), Bughra posited that East Turkestanis were 
forcefully prevented by their oppressive overlords to remember and to speak of their past.  
 
 By construction of ‗national‘ past, Bughra and other Xinjiang Turkic thinkers, 
similarly to nationalists elsewhere, linked their efforts to a long and legitimate tradition of 
opposition to alien power. At the same time, the newly devised concept of troubled, yet 
common past was to reassure the sense of national identity, stimulate people‘s craving for 
reassertion of past national rights and thus facilitate return to status quo ante loss of national 
independence (Breuilly 60-2, 131, 161). Hence, the subsequent natural and legitimate national 
movement and nationalist insurgency were interpreted as dramatic national destiny (Smith 
1986: 179-83, 192; Hroch 1996: 79). Although the concept of the East Turkestani or Uyghur 
nation was a newly devised social practice and national history was an innovative cultural 
structure, the nation and all of its attributes were by the nationalists interpreted as primordial 
and self-same. In the same way, although the East Turkestani national blue flag with a star 
and a crescent was newly adopted only in 1933, it was explicitly called ‗ancient‘. Similarly, 
newly invented symbolic actions such as invoking tradition of resistance to heteronomy (such 
as history of national liberation struggle), glorification of remarkable figures of the revolution 
(such as Khoja Niyaz Haji or Mahmud Muhiti), public celebration of state holidays (such as 
the date of Sheng‘s coup) and other important identity events (such as using the Islamic 
calendar or celebrating Islamic holidays), communal care for important identity sites (appeals 
for keeping clean the Eid Kah mosque or cherishing of the ancient and famed city of Kashgar), 
use of national language in administration (emergence of national publishing) and similar acts 
of the national ritual were all targeted towards fortification of newly devised ‗primordial‘ 
national identities. 
 
 As a result of the industrious nation work of the nationalist intelligentsia in the 1930s, 
on the discourse level the concept of national identity replaced religion as the cornerstone of 
communal weltanschauung and principal value of life. National theorists performed a 
multitude of activities that sought to extract the Musulman of Seven Cities from receding 
structures of religious community, dynastic realm and agro-literate society (Anderson 12, 36; 
Gellner 8-14) and to situate them into modern world. Nation became the most prominent 
category of identification, which lay somewhere in between sub-ethnic structures of religious 
identity and supra-ethnic structures of local identity (Anderson 12, 36; Gellner 75-6). On the 
other hand, Xinjiang‘s sedentary Turkic Muslim intelligentsia clearly continued to perceive 
religion as an important national identity marker, at moments even as a marker equal in 
importance to ethnicity. It was not the case that the emergence of East Turkestani and Uyghur 
national identity was accompanied by loss of faith in legitimacy of Islam even among a small 
number of Xinjiang Turkic intellectuals. Politicization of Turkic national movement was 
rather caused by social and political crisis of Chinese administration that could be mapped 
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onto linguistic and religious divisions, eventually leading to communal conflict and 
nationalist movement (Hroch 1996: 85-6; Breuilly 20-2, 133). Even though in 1930s Xinjiang 
Turkic intellectuals perceived themselves as members of East Turkestani and Uyghur nation, 
they did not cease to think of themselves as of Muslims. 
 
 Besides engaging in rich discourse of national characteristics and thus stimulating the 
centripetal community principle of national identity of Xinjiang Turkic Muslims, nationalist 
statecraft thinkers and administrators of 1930s also coherently expressed their visions of 
interest of the newly delimited East Turkestani and Uyghur nation. Politicization of national 
movement meant that from early 1930s the primary objectives of national movement were 
seen in the sphere of politics. For obvious reasons, the political interests of the two 
administrations differed markedly. For the Turkic insurgency and policy-making circles of the 
ETIR, the highest political ideal was independent nation-state. In contrast, Sheng strove to 
counter the secessionist ideology by propagandizing the unity of Xinjiang nationalities with 
provincial government and with the Chinese republic. On the other hand, both the Turkic 
insurgency and Sheng‘s indigenization project rhetorically embraced representative 
government, national sovereignty, republicanism, the rule of law, morally justified 
governance, equality of its citizens and other principles as basic tenets of their administration.  
 
 As a result, from the early 1930s all members of the East Turkestani and Uyghur 
nation were, at least theoretically, considered citizens of a state with equal political, religious, 
cultural, national and other rights. In fact, this moment was an effective embodiment of the 
principle of egalitarianism and solidarity among members of a nation, which in view of 
several studies constitutes one of the most important traits of a nation (Gellner 24-5; Hroch 
1996: 79; Anderson 7; Smith 1986: 22-31, 135-6; Smith 2009: 27). Similarly, implementation 
of civil rights and political autonomy are by other theories considered important objectives of 
national movement and nationalism (Hroch 1996: 81), or even a process in which ethnic 
communities form states (Smith 1986: 137-41). It is understood that political autonomy, as in 
the case of Sheng‘s rule, is the humblest goal a nationalist movement is willing to settle for; 
ideally, the nation should have its own independent nation-state (Breuilly 3, 62), as was the 
case of the ETIR. At the same time, the principles of national rule facilitated retention of 
national homeland, a pattern which has been by one thesis regarded as the ultimate goal of 
nationalism (Smith 1986: 162-3). In words of another theory, the state of East Turkestanis and 
Uyghurs was conceived as a nation-state, or a state based on unity of several nationalities, and 
its political boundaries were meant to be congruent with those of ethnicity and culture. A state 
that defends the nation‘s, or nationality‘, political interests became a notable feature of 
nascent official modernity in Xinjiang in 1930s (Gellner 1, 5, 55). In other words, the high 
priority of political goals in Turkic insurgency and Sheng‘s (largely rhetorical) indigenization 
indicated a shift of largely culturally articulated national agitation of the preceding period into 
the arena of statecraft, where political interests prevailed over all other national interests. By 
politicization of communal interest in 1930s, Xinjiang Turkic Muslims‘ national movement 
became a pointedly nationalist one. Again, this pattern corresponds to the prevalence of 
national interests over other interests ascertained by some general theories of nation-forming 
processes and nationalism (Hroch 1996: 80; Breuilly 3). 
 
 Another set of national interests articulated by Turkic insurgency and Sheng‘s 
affirmative action can be found in their resolute embrace of modernization and progress. Both 
powers exerted enormous efforts at fulfilling an educational imperative – creating modern and 
standardized education system. In an extension of the Jadidist educational movement taken up 
by individual enlightened activists from 1880s and 1920s, the progress of schools in 1930s 
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could be seen, in words of other scholars, as a litmus test of the degree of national progress 
and nationalist movement, as well as an avenue to national well-being (Hobsbawm 1996: 135-
6; Smith 1986: 133; Breuilly 149-52). A universal and standardized education has been 
described as an essential feature of modernized society, in which every member of society is 
endowed with literacy and knowledge previously reserved only to clergy and other upper 
strata (Gellner 27-9, 32). The eruption of Turkic insurgency in 1930s also indicated, that the 
private modern schools emerging in the previous period greatly improved the mobility, 
communication and transmission of ideas within members of nationally conscious 
intelligentsia and strongly contributed to the rise of politicized national movement (Hroch 
1996: 85, 87-8; Breuilly 21-2). But in contrast to early educational efforts taken up by 
individual activists, often in direct conflict with the state, in 1930s Xinjiang Turkic education 
became irrevocably intertwined with state power. The control and operation of education was 
one of the means by which nation-state disseminated principles of its ideology and fortified 
national identity of its citizens on whose support it depended. In words of another academic, it 
was of vital interest of a modern state to launch a ‗mass educational enterprise‘ (Smith 1986: 
136, 142). At the same time, by facilitating the people‘s craving for modern education and 
knowledge, the state further legitimized its existence and created a need for more modern 
education and knowledge. In effect, the nation-state‘s taking up the overwhelming portion of 
the national education responsibility, as well as allowing or financially supporting non-state 
schools that fostered national identity, turned education into a structure that made the nation 
and nation-state interdependent on each other.  
 
 An analogous interrelation emerged in other aspects of modernity. In order to 
strengthen people‘s sense of national identity and popular support for state administration, 
both the East Turkestani nation-state and Sheng‘s multi-national heteronomy extolled the 
need to create a national publication enterprise and introduce the vernacular into public 
discourse and state practice. The state was specifically made responsible for facilitating these 
national interests, which in turn led to growth in public support for the state, as well as to an 
increased need for promotion of modernity and progress. In accordance with principles 
observed elsewhere, vernacularization of publishing and official intercourse underlined 
national language as one of the nation's chief attributes (Anderson 71-5; Breuilly 149-52). 
Through vernacularization, the nation-state aimed at engendering cultural and social 
homogeneity, defined mostly by national culture as a universal and egalitarian social structure 
completely penetrating Xinjiang Turkic Muslim society (Gellner 35, 43-5, 77, 97; Hroch 1996: 
81; Smith 1986: 142). Beyond the discourse arena, in Xinjiang of 1930s the declared 
modernization did to a certain degree occur in spheres of education, publishing, infrastructure 
construction, industry, agriculture, resource exploitation, healthcare or foreign policy. 
 
 In short, 1930s witnessed a strong shift in Xinjiang Turki intelligentsia‘s ideas of 
nation and national interest. Since this decade, the intellectuals viewed their community as a 
nation endowed with national attributes such as homeland, ethnic origin, culture, language, 
history, heroes, rituals and symbols. National interest was seen firstly in attaining national 
self-determination (either in the form of independent nation-state or a multi-nationality 
province), decent political status and representative government. Secondly, it was in the 
interest of the nation to undergo wide and deep modernization, namely in the spheres of 
education and knowledge, publishing, social organizations and other walks of life. It was the 
duty of the state to attend to these national needs. Successful accommodation of these needs 
by the state led to reinforcement of citizens‘ national identity, to an increase in their support 
for the nation-state and thus also to their growing need for more modernization. This demand 
justified the continued existence of the nation-state, which in turn kept on affirming national 
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identity of its citizens. This cyclic reproductive relationship between state power and 
modernization directive can be articulated as one in which an ethnic community is awakened 
to national consciousness, which in turn generates a nation, which in turn generates national 
interest, which in turn generates nation-state, which in turn generates accommodation of 
nation‘s vital needs, which in turn generates survival of the nation, which in turn continues to 
possess national consciousness, which in turn continues to generate national interest and so on. 
This pattern can be compared to the model of official nationalism outlined in a somewhat 
different context by Hugh Seton-Watson: a nation‘s leaders confer nationality and its benefits 
on all the people, while at the same time they strengthen their state by creating within it a 
single homogeneous nation (Seton-Watson 148). The importance of cultural homogeneity and 
school-transmitted culture in rise of nations has also been already pointed out (Gellner 39). 
 
 The above outlined intertwining of East Turkestani and Uyghur intellectual images of 
national consciousness and national interest with statecraft in 1930s is one fundamental 
change from perceptions of community and its interests in late imperial and early republican 
era examined in the previous chapter of this dissertation. It is also clear that due to improved 
means of communication, emergence of schools, cultural associations, printed media, public 
dimension of statecraft and other nascent social phenomena, in 1930s the practice of nation 
and nationalism penetrated Xinjiang sedentary Turkic Muslim society to a much wider and 
deeper extent than in the previous era. As pointed out above throughout the dissertation, in 
assessing the modalities of social penetration of East Turkestani and Uyghur ideas of nation 
and nationalism this research is sadly limited by the lack of reliable data produced by 
systematic contemporary field research. However, the next chapter of this dissertation will 
illustrate that the concepts of East Turkestani and Uyghur nation and national interest 
continued to play a decisive role in thinking of Xinjiang Turkic elites, and that these concepts 
markedly evolved as a result of majorly altered geopolitical position of Xinjiang within the 




4.  Significance of National Boundary in Flux (1940s) 
 
 
 The final chapter of this dissertation considers the transformation of the politicized 
Turkic nationalist insurgency and Sheng‘s affirmative action of the 1930s, explored in 
previous chapter, during the subsequent late republican era from Sheng Shicai‘s demise and 
restoration of central government‘s authority in Xinjiang in 1944 to Chinese Communist 
Party‘s takeover of Xinjiang in 1949. The first section of this chapter concentrates on 
ideology of Turkic activists, politicians and intellectuals associated with the Kuomintang 
(KMT). In the wake of southern Xinjiang Turkic insurgency in early 1930s, these figures left 
Xinjiang and allied with the central government in Nanjing, where they organized other 
members of Xinjiang Turkic Muslim diaspora, published Turkic periodicals and performed 
other kinds of nation work. A good sample of their ideas and activities is the periodical Voice 
of Chinese Turkestan (Chiniy Türkistan Awazi) published by Isa Yusuf Alptekin and other 
Turkic enthusiasts under auspices of the KMT-dominated central government in Nanjing in 
1934, which is the first source of research in this chapter. In this magazine, Isa Yusuf 
Alptekin and other authors acknowledged that their homeland, in their terminology ‗East 
Turkestan‘, ‗Chinese Turkestan‘ or simply ‗Turkestan‘, formed an integral part of Republic of 
China, and that all local Turkic groups made up a single Turkestani (Türkistanli) nationality, 
which at the same time constituted one of the five nationalities making up population of China. 
Simultaneously, they defended East Turkestanis‘ national interests by demanding that the 
central government grant Xinjiang Turks the same rights as to the majority Han population in 
China proper. 
 
 This ideology gained momentum after the central government instituted its factual 
control over Xinjiang in 1944 and appointed several Turkic figures into high political 
positions. These Turkic politicians and officials were thus able to promote national 
consciousness to their fellow Turkic nationals, as well as, albeit to a limited degree, lobby for 
Turkic national interests in the government level. Turkic politicians‘ writings under 
examination in this chapter, such as Mes‘ud Sabiri‘s Speech (Bir Nutuq) and Awareness of 
Being a Turk (Türklük Orani), Muhemmed Imin Bughra‘s War of Pens over Homeland and 
Nation (Yurt we Millet Heqqide Qelem Kürishi) and Polat Qadiri‘s Freedom Principle (Erk 
Shoari) and History of the Province (Ölke Tarikhi), reveal that the KMT-affiliated Turkic 
thinkers of 1940s viewed their nation in very much the similar way as we have seen in the 
previous decade. In this theory, all Turkic groups of East Turkestan, and indeed of the whole 
world, as a single Turkic ‗nation‘ (millet) defined primarily by common language and culture. 
East Turkestan was viewed as national homeland, whose political belonging to the Republic 
of China did not in the least conflict with the Turkicness of East Turkestanis. At the same 
time, the discourse of national interest of the KMT-affiliated Turkic politicians exposes that 
after Xinjiang fell under central Chinese administration, the primary objective of national 
movement also changed. Suddenly, Turkic elites were confronted with assimilationist KMT 
ethnic theory claiming that all Turkestanis are part of the ‗nation of China‘ (中華民族 
Zh nghuá mínz ), in which they formed a very insignificant ‗minority nationality‘ (azchilik 
millet). Therefore, late republican Xinjiang Turkic activists worked towards recognition of 
East Turkestanis‘ existence, name and rights by the central government of China. Preservation 
of national boundary was for them the chief national interest, as well as the main goal of their 
nation work within the republican power structure. 
 
 A very different approach towards maintenance of national boundary was taken up by 
politicians and propagandists of yet another insurgent movement, which erupted in northern 
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Xinjiang simultaneously with the KMT‘s takeover of the province in fall 1944. The result of 
this uprising was that three northern districts of Xinjiang proclaimed the second East 
Turkestan Republic in November 1944, and remained factually independent on provincial 
government until 1949. To a certain degree, this movement resembled the Turkic insurgency 
in southern Xinjiang in the 1930s – it strove to shake off the dysfunctional Chinese 
administration and establish an efficient administration that would represent its citizens‘ 
interests. However, arguably due to the strong influence of Soviet Union over the uprising, 
some factions within the rebel administration expressed ideas of nation and nationalism that 
were fundamentally different from those of 1930s‘ Turkic national movement. Issues of an 
influential periodical, Revolutionary East Turkestan (Inqilabiy Sherqiy Türkistan), as well as 
three other sources inspected in this section, divulge that the rebellion eventually came to be 
interpreted by its administration as a revolution of ‗Xinjiang people‘(Shinjang khelqi). It was 
not the nation, but the people who all jointly struggled for peace, democracy and unity, 
regardless of their (Turkic or non-Turkic) ethnicity, religious denomination, mode of life and 
other national traits. In this discourse, ethnic identity or nationality of the people was 
generally not discussed, and some formulations even denounce nationalism as detrimental to 
people‘s interest. The idea of ‗East Turkestan Republic‘ was also gradually shelved and the 
whole movement was interpreted as countering reactionary KMT administration, not as an 
independence-seeking anti-Chinese rebellion. Similarly to Soviet ethnic theory, the northern 
Xinjiang insurgent policy makers‘ discourse did not view national criteria as the most 
prominent marker of communal identity, and did not use national terminology to spell out 
communal interests. Thus, in the Soviet-influenced 1940s‘ northern Xinjiang insurgency, the 
decreased importance of national boundary of Uyghurs and other Turkic groups symbolically 
foreshadowed upcoming ethnic policies of the Chinese Communist Party after 1949. 
 
4.1.  Late Republican Turkic Nationalism (1944 – 1949) 
 
 After Sheng Shicai terminated his affirmative action experiment and staged his great 
purge of 1937, explored in Chapter 3, he upheld the pro-Soviet orientation of his policy. He 
also allowed cadres of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which had after the traumatizing 
Long March (長征 Chángzhēng; 1934-5) encamped in Yan‘an (延安) in the Shaanxi (陝西) 
province, to take up advisory positions in Xinjiang administration. But in 1941, after the 
Soviets signed a non-aggression pact with Japan, after Germany invaded the Soviet Union and 
after the USA had joined the war in the Pacific against Japan, Sheng switched sides and 
initiated rapprochement with Chiang Kai-shek, executing all CCP cadres and severing all ties 
to the Soviet Union. The first KMT office in Urumchi was established in January 1943, and 
later that year the first U.S. consulate opened in the city. The KMT continued its moving into 
the province even after Sheng once again attempted to restore the alliance with the Soviets in 
1943 – he failed and was forced by Chiang to give up his provincial post in September 1944. 
For the first time since the birth of the Republic of China on January 1, 1912, the central 
government was thus able to assert its factual authority over Xinjiang (Ezizi 1997a: 389-90; 
Forbes 157-62; Millward 2007: 210-1). 
  
 This step was a culmination of a complex KMT effort to regain control over the 
spacious northwest ruled by warlords and military cliques since the fall of the empire. Ever 
since the proclamation of the Nationalist government in 1925 in Canton and capture of 
Beijing in 1928, the KMT party-state presented itself as a nationalistic authority determined to 
reunify the vast territory and numerous ethno-cultural groups inherited by the republic from 
the Qing, such as Tibet or Outer Mongolia. The aspiration was also directed toward numerous 
warlord-controlled regions within the interior and along China‘s borderlands. This objective 
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gained even more importance after military incursion of Japan into northeastern and eastern 
China in early 1930s. That that moment, the northwest started to be considered by the KMT 
policy makers as one of potential new power bases where the central government could retreat 
in the face of imminent Japanese attack on Nanjing. In the early 1930s, as a result of 
negotiations with Ma (馬 ) family warlords in control of Ningxia, Gansu and Qinghai 
provinces, the central government managed to generate at least a propagandist image of a 
projection of its power into the area. This policy led to what has been termed ‗rhetorical 
development‘ of the Great Northwest (大西北 d  Xīběi) and what was to materialize during 
the actual military takeover by the KMT troops ten years later (Lin 2007: 6-21; Lin 2011: 34-
48). 
 
 The KMT‘s rise to power in mid-1920s was also reflected in its statecraft ideology and 
theory of ethnic relations. It was already mentioned in Chapter 2 that Sun Yat-sen‘s theory of 
ethnic relations included the principle of five-nationality republicanism, which defined China 
as a polity formed by five equal ethno-cultural groups. Sun also declared that all nationalities 
living in China were equal in rights and freedoms, including the inalienable right to 
self-determination. At the same time, Sun Yat-sen‘s theory of ethnic relations also contained 
much more assimilationist views. Since early 1910s, he addressed the nationality question of 
China in the sense that all ethnic communities of the Republic of China actually formed a 
single people, and all regions (including breakaway Tibet and Outer Mongolia, and 
semi-independent regions of Xinjiang, Qinghai and Inner Mongolia) formed a single territory 
(Leibold 188, 197-9). He maintained that the terms ‗state‘ and ‗nation‘ pointed to a single 
concept, because China stood for not only a country but also a race (種族 zhǒngz ) of human 
beings. Heterogeneous elements should remain within the Chinese state and eventually merge 
with the dominant Chinese race: ‗We must facilitate the dying out of all names of individual 
peoples inhabiting China… We must satisfy the demands of all races and unite them in a 
single cultural and political whole.‘ (Lin 2011: 10-1) As remarked elsewhere, for Sun Yat-sen 
China, which effectively meant the most numerous Han nationality, was the world‘s most 
completely formed nation, because the people were bound by all five necessary criteria: 
blood/race, language, custom, religion and livelihood (Duara 32). This theory was perfected 
by Chiang Kai-shek, who became the leading KMT strongman by mid-1920s. Chiang argued 
that all people living within historical China are descended from the same ancestors, therefore 
belonging to the same race (種族 zhǒngz ; literally ‗kind of lineage‘, or nesildash uruq, 
literally ‗descendants of the same lineage, clan‘) and making up the political and ethnic 
‗Chinese nation‘ ( 中華民族  Zh nghuá mínz ). The linguistic, religious and cultural 
differences among respective communities, or ‗religious clans‘ (宗族 z ngz ), were brought 
about by prolonged habitation in varied natural environments (Chiang: 30; Ezizi 1997a: 391).  
 
Given the totalitarian nature of the KMT party-state, Sun‘s and Chiang‘s strongly 
politicized theories naturally had massive influence on China‘s ethnic policy for coming 
decades. In Xinjiang, it was Chinese nationalism which in 1940 provided an unprecedented 
theoretical base for Chinese domination, which heretofore relied on mere manifestation of 
strength by military presence and oppressive policies (Newby 1986: 200). What Chiang‘s 
approach argued specifically in the case of Xinjiang Turkic Muslims is well observable in the 
memoir of Yolwas (1888-1971), a very interesting figure of early modern Xinjiang history. 
Originally from Yangissar in southern Xinjiang, he held a high post in the Komul khanate and 
later also in the KMT administration. After the communist takeover of Xinjiang in 1949, he 
continued guerilla war until 1951 when he became one of the very few Uyghurs who joined 
Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan. There, he continued to function in the exiled Xinjiang 
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administration until his death. As mentioned in the Introduction to this dissertation, Yolwas‘ 
memoir was presumably written with more than substantial assistance of an unknown KMT 
propagandist and thus presents rather an example of official KMT interpretation of Xinjiang 
history than Yolwas‘ own reminiscences and views. In particular, the text argues that it is 
misleading to point to linguistic and cultural similarities between Uyghurs and Turks of 
Turkey, because this phenomenon is a result of historical migrations of Uyghurs from 
Xinjiang during expansions of splendid Chinese dynasties to the west, for instance during the 
Yuan that established empires in Eastern Europe and Middle East. The concept of ‗East 
Turkestan‘ is an equally deceptive delusion fabricated by Russian imperialists, who 
introduced the terms ‗West Turkestan‘ and ‗East Turkestan‘ after their conquest of Central 
Asia in the nineteenth century, hoping to continue their expansion to Xinjiang. Considering 
Uyghurs a branch of Arabs is an erroneous conception influenced by religiosity, because that 
would imply that there were no Uyghurs in Xinjiang before the arrival of Islam in late Tang. 
It is evenly impossible to say that pre-Islamic Buddhist Uyghurs came from India. In short, 
„…Uyghurs are genuinely native to China and have existed in China for several thousands of 
years. Today, they are the main component of the Hui, who are one the five races constituting 
the Chinese nation – the Han, Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans and the Hui…‘ (Yaole Boshi 4-5). 
 
 The KMT was pulled into Xinjiang affairs first in the wake of the Komul rebellion of 
1931, the following Turkic insurgency which swept through eastern and southern Xinjiang 
and eventual rise of Sheng Shicai into the top Xinjiang position. During the insurgency, some 
Turkic insurgents dispatched pleas for help to the central government, despite the fact that 
they were only very poorly informed about the structure of KMT power apparatus (Lin 2006: 
46-7). On the eve of Sheng‘s advance into insurgent territory, several thousand Turkic 
Muslims fled and generated a sizeable diaspora of several thousand in India, Afghanistan, 
Saudi Arabia, Gansu and Qinghai (Wahidi 14-5; Sabiri 1947: 16-7; Qadiri 1948: 86; Bughra 
1998: xv). Thus, Nanjing politicians not only realized the danger of loosing the Xinjiang 
territory, but at the same time also understood that they had the opportunity to use the events 
against Sheng, who was defiant of central authority.  
 
 In this way, Chiang Kai-shek suddenly had the first opportunity to implement KMT‘s 
previously drafted Xinjiang policy. A part of Turkic refugees who sought assistance of 
Chinese central government and ventured all the way to Nanjing, were welcomed by the KMT 
that appreciated their criticism of Sheng‘s flawed administration. Prospective Turkic youth 
received education and official training, while other activists cooperated with the KMT on 
drafting an alternative Xinjiang policy. In spite of the purely theoretical level of such 
activities given the limits of central control over Xinjiang at the time, these activists were to 
later have a strong influence on Turkic ideas of nation and nationalism. Xinjiang Turkic 
refugees in China proper were organized in the Turkestani Compatriot Association 
(Türkistanli Yurtdashlar Uyushmisi, 同鄉會  Tóngxi nghu , TCA; elsewhere termed East 
Turkestani Compatriot Society, Sherqi Türkistanli Wetendashlar Jemi‟iti; VCT 5: 92), which 
had branches in Nanjing, Chongqing, Lanzhou, Tianjin, Shanghai and other major cities, and 
was recognized by the KMT, in contrast to Sheng‘s autocratic rule, as a legitimate council of 
Xinjiang Muslims. The expatriate community‘s intellectual activities were concentrated 
around the publishing house Altay based in Nanjing, in Chongqing after 1937 and in Urumchi 
after 1946. The diaspora published monthlies Tianshan and Altay in Chinese and Voice of 
Chinese Turkestan in Uyghur (Zhou 174-5; Benson 1990: 53). At the same time, the Nanjing 
government occasionally managed to send delegations to Xinjiang, which sometimes included 
Turkic diaspora Muslims who had joined the central government (Ezizi 1997a: 310, 461-2). 
The afore mentioned nationalistic Turkic insurgent source claims that the central government 
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started acting favorably toward Turks following the outbreak of the Komul revolt (Wahidi 14-
5). At the same time, a wave of interest in northwestern border region (i.e. mainly Xinjiang) 
emerged. Several academic societies and think-tanks appeared and books, periodicals and 
articles were published on northwestern geography, demography, politics, culture and other 
topics (Lin 2007: 118). Probably the first Turkic-Chinese and Chinese-Turkic dictionaries of 
the republican era were also compiled – this was for example the Phonetic Phrasebook of 
Colloquial Xinjiang Muslim Language (注音新疆回文常用字表 Zh yīn Xīnji ng Huíwén 
chángyòng z bi o) by Xu Xihua (徐錫華) of 1938, which featured Uyghur expressions 
handwritten in modified Arabic script along with their approximate transcription into 
Mandarin Phonetic Transcription (國語注音符號 Guóy  zh yīn f h o) and translations into 
Mandarin (Xu 1938). This trend intensified throughout the 1930s and by 1940s, it expanded 
into a regular program of developing the whole northwest, which included investment, 
construction of infrastructure or massive population transfers from China proper (Millward 
2007: 212). 
 
 One prominent Xinjiang Turkic figure associated with the Nanjing government was 
Mes‘ud Sabiri Bayqozi (1886-1951). He was born in northern Xinjiang near Ghulja and 
received a several-year education in Turkey, earning a medical degree at Military Medical 
School in Istanbul. After return to Ghulja, he opened a pharmacy and was also involved in 
progressive educational activities. For this, he was briefly imprisoned by Yang Zengxin‘s 
administration in 1924. He eventually resettled to Aksu where he supported the Turkic 
insurgency. After its fall, he fled to India and eventually to China. He held a large number of 
important posts in the KMT administration, such as Xinjiang delegate to the KMT party 
congresses, a member of the KMT central committee, deputy director of the China Islamic 
Association, professor at the Border Area Research Institute and at the Central Political 
Institute. At the same time, he wrote articles popularizing Xinjiang issues and strongly 
advocated autonomy for Xinjiang Turkic Muslims (Qadiri 1948: 145-7; Benson 1991: 93-4). 
 
 Another important activist for the Turkic cause was Isa Yusuf Alptekin (1901-1995), 
at that time known as Eysa Beg, Eysa Yusuf or Eysa Yusuf Beg. Born in Yangissar to local 
beg‘s family, he had received a traditional religious education and Russian education in 
Andijan. After return to Xinjiang, he worked briefly in the local bureaucracy. In 1932, he 
came to Nanjing as a Xinjiang people‘s representative and requested full autonomy to 
Xinjiang and countermeasures to Soviet influence in the province. After Sheng Shicai‘s rise to 
power, he remained in Nanjing and continued campaigning for the cause of autonomy of 
Xinjiang, gradually forging ties with the KMT. During the 1933 turmoil in 1933 in Xinjiang, 
Eysa was an interpreter of the central government‘s delegation to Xinjiang led by General 
Huang Musong (黄慕松, 1887-1937) and met with prominent Turkic figures, who informed 
his about the situation in the province. After return to Nanjing, Eysa Yusuf suggested that the 
central government does not recognize Sheng in power. After Jin Shuren, who had in the 
meantime arrived in Xinjiang in 1933, accused Eysa of being a communist spy, Eysa was 
charged and forced to discontinue his activities. He was finally acquitted and was able to 
resume his activities. He then functioned as one of the main organizers behind the publishing 
house Altay and was also active in maintaining communication with Turkic diaspora in China 
proper, India and Afghanistan (Wahidi 14; Qadiri 1948: 83-6; Benson 1991: 90-2; Lin 2011: 
90). 
 
 Nation work of Xinjiang Turkic activists affiliated with the central government in the 
1930s and the KMT‘s early Xinjiang policy are excellently exhibited by the Uyghur-language 
periodical Voice of Chinese Turkestan (Chinniy Türkistan Awazi). It was a monthly 
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supplement to Chinese bi-weekly Frontier Voice (邊鐸 Bi nduó), which was one of the 
Nanjing publications that emerged after the KMT central government started paying attention 
to its northwestern border issues following the 1931 Komul uprising and growth of Soviet 
involvement in Xinjiang. The main figure behind publication of Voice of Chinese Turkestan 
was Eysa Yusuf, who also wrote many of the articles; other texts were written by his 
associates of whom nothing is known at this moment. The printing technique used in 
publishing the magazine was lithographic reproduction of handwritten articles, itself an 
articulate illustration of the humble beginnings of the KMT policy vis-à-vis Xinjiang Turkic 
Muslims. This dissertation managed to make use of only two isolated issues of the Voice of 
Chinese Turkestan (VCT), No. 5 and No. 6, which were published in June and July of 1934. 
The Frontier Voice and Voice of Chinese Turkestan issues contained articles on topics such as 
Soviet, Japanese and British policy on Xinjiang, role of the northwest in national defense, 
central government‘s Xinjiang policy, history and culture of Xinjiang nationalities, Three 
People‘s Principles and other fundaments of KMT ideology or analyses of current political 
situation in Xinjiang. 
 
 From one point of view, it can be said that the articles in Voice of Chinese Turkestan 
contain ideas of nation and nationalism very similar to nationalism prevalent during Turkic 
insurgency, as analyzed in Chapter 3. The ‗nation‘ (millet) of ‗Turkestanis‘ or ‗Turks‘ 
(Türkestanli or Türk) are inhabiting a ‗homeland‘ (weten) which is called ‗Turkestan‘ 
(Türkistan), ‗East Turkestan‘ (Sherqiy Türkistan), ‗Chinese Turkestan‘ (Chinniy Türkestan), 
‗our Turkestan‘ (bizning Türkistan) or ‗Six Cities‘ (Alte Sheher). The Komul ‗revolt‘ (isyan) 
of 1931 and the subsequent turmoil is interpreted as a righteous resistance to corrupt 
misadministration of Yang Zengxin and Jin Shuren, which not only disregarded the ‗life‘ 
(me‟ishet, turmush) of indigenous Turkic Muslims, but even sought to wipe out their ‗culture‘ 
(medeniyet) as a whole. In another interpretation, the revolt stemmed from fifty-seven year of 
oppression (i.e. from 1874, roughly the time of Qing re-conquest) and was taken up by the 
brave and courageous ‗Turkic nation‘ (Türk milliti). The rebellion was a manifestation of 
‗nation work‘ (millet khizmiti) and was powerfully driven by aspirations for ‗freedom‘ 
(hürlük), ‗republicanism‘ (jumhuriyetchilik), ‗lives of our people‘ (khelqimizning turmushi), 
‗modernization of life‘ (turmush yéngilitish), ‗cultural progress‘ (medeniy tereqqiyat) and 
other similar concepts. Historically, East Turkestan was annexed to ‗Chinese state‘ (Khitay 
döliti) in 1878, and today‘s Turkestanis are descendants of ancient Uyghurs. Voice of Chinese 
Turkestan itself was published as a ‗political, social, economic and educational magazine‘ 
(siyasiy, ijtima‟iy, ikhtisadiy we terbiyiwiy mejmu‟e), which was a clear allusion to Tatar 
Jadidist publications featured also by Life of East Turkestan and Independence of 1933 (VCT 
5: 1, 4, 8, 30-2, 61, 73, 100, 110; VCT 6: 1-2, 7, 13-4, 25, 35, 41, 67, 73-4). This line of 
thought is well illustrated by the following excerpt: 
 
‗…Turkestan is my homeland and those living Turkestan are my brothers. What is 
beneficial for Turkestan is beneficial for me (Türkistanning paydisi méning paydam) 
and what is important for Turkestan is important for me (Türkistanning zörüri 
méning zörürüm)…‘ (VCT 5: 8) 
 
On the other hand, Voice of Chinese Turkestan introduces a political principle which 
had been non-existent in the ideology of Xinjiang Turkic insurgent activists in southern 
Xinjiang in 1930s and was present only in a limited and highly ritualized degree in texts 
engendered during Sheng Shicai‘s administration – the idea of Turkestan and Turkestanis 
being an integral part of the Republic of China. The concept of Turkic nationalism within the 
Chinese political realm was conveyed by the very name of the periodical. Visual content of 
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Voice of Chinese Turkestan flashed rich republican iconography, such as photographs of Sun 
Yat-sen, notable politicians (sometimes riding horses), republican identity sites (such as Sun‘s 
tomb or national sport champions, calligraphic inscriptions by leading officials, republican 
flags, national female swimming champions in swimming suits etc). All pictures were 
captioned in Turkic language written in Arabic script. Given the proscription of depicting 
living beings by Islam, the graphic content of the Voice of Chinese Turkestan can be 
altogether counted as quite a revolutionary undertaking in its time.  
 
The periodical also featured translations of Sun‘s Three People‟s Principles, 
republican legislature (mainly the constitution of the ROC), the history of revolutionary 
movement in China proper and other substantial treatises of Chinese republican and 
nationalist ideology. ‗China‘ (Khitay, Chin) and the ‗Chinese‘ (Khitaylik, Chinlik) are not 
viewed as enemies (as by the nationalist thinkers of southern Xinjiang insurgency at the time) 
or a vague political concept and fellow Xinjiang nationality (as by Sheng‘s propaganda), but 
as an inseparable part of political reality of the Xinjiang Turkic nation. Turkic ‗nation‘ (millet) 
is viewed as one the five constituent ‗nationalities‘ (millet) of China, or in another words of 
the ‗Chinese nation‘ (Khitay milliti) which constitutes the ‗Republic of China‘ (Chin 
Jumhuriyiti). The republican discourse is also sharply critical of Sheng Shicai‘s policy for 
recognizing only formally the sovereignty of the central government, while factually allowing 
the Soviet Union to run the province (VCT 5: 1-18, 4, 8, 19-29, 34, 35, 62-8, 80-88; VCT 6: 
37, 44-59, 62). The following well-known passage of Sun‘s words on nationalism suggests 
that Voice of Chinese Turkestan and other early KMT publications of 1930s were the first 
vehicles that delivered the fundaments of KMT nationalism to Turkic Muslims of Xinjiang in 
their mother language and script: 
 
‗…There are four hundred million people (khelq) in China. In this number, several 
million Mongols, approximately one million Manchus, several million Tibetans and 
more than one million Muslim Turks are of another race (jins). The number of people 
belonging to these outside races does not exceed ten million. That is to say that most 
of them are of the same blood, same language, same religion and same culture, and 
belong to the Han Chinese race. And what is the standing of our nation (millet) 
within the world? When compared with other nations (millet), we have the largest 
population and also are the longest lasting civilization which has been around for four 
thousand years. We have been on the same level of development as European and 
American nations (milletler). But the people of China (Khitay khelqi) formed factions 
based on family (a‟ile) or tribe (qebile), and there was no spirit of a nation (millet 
rohi) or national consciousness (milliy tuyghu). As a result, although we are a people 
(khelq) of four hundred million, in reality we resemble a nation (qawm) which does 
not stick together, similarly to a handful of sand…‘ (VCT 5: 67-8) 
 
 Finally, another new national interest expressed by Eysa Yusuf and other contributors 
in Voice of Chinese Turkestan were Turkestani demands towards the KMT government. In 
other words, while acknowledging being part of China, early Turkic Muslim activists 
affiliated with the KMT also demanded that government fulfilled their legal obligations. In 
this way, references to Sun Yat-sen‘s ideology emphasize his embrace of autonomy and 
people‘s rule (VCT 5: 8). Another article states that throughout the first twenty-some years of 
existence of the ROC, central government was not in the least concerned about the plight of 
Xinjiang people and thus enabled exploitation by Yang Zengxin and Jin Shuren (VCT 5: 62). 
The Voice of Chinese Turkestan itself was seen as a means through which the Turkestani 
nation could address the government, which would then accommodate its demands and 
appeals, whereupon the nation would attain freedom (VCT 6: 43). Another passage points to 
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the necessity for the central administration to cultivate local Turkic leaders and reflect on their 
demands: 
 
‗…If our leaders will believe government‘s views and policies, the Turkestan 
problem will be quickly solved. Then there will be no need to force us into 
compliance as it is happening today. If the government will want to solve the 
Turkestan problem hastily and will not adopt this measure, then we will be obliged to 
say that the government is not concerned about peace in our land…‘ (VCT 6: 44) 
 
 Throughout the 1930s, Eysa Yusuf and Mes‘ud Sabiri became respected leaders of 
Turkestani expatriate community in China proper. At the same time, they continued their 
activities under patronage of the Nanjing government and were able to substantially increase 
their status with the KMT. Their integration into power apparatus provided the central 
government with a means of justification of its Xinjiang policy as one rightfully based on 
local people‘s demands. In early 1940, Sabiri was named to several important state 
administration posts, such as membership in the People‘s Political Council or the State 
Council of the Republic of China, and became closely affiliated with the so-called Center 
Club Clique (or CC Clique), a wing of the KMT close to Chiang Kai-shek at the time. An 
important moment occurred when Eysa was commissioned by Chiang Kai-shek to carry out a 
diplomatic mission to the Near East to secure their support against Japan. During the way 
back in 1940, Eysa Yusuf visited Afghanistan where he met with the Xinjiang Turkic refuge 
community. An important exiled figure was also Muhemmed Imin Bughra, who had found 
asylum in Afghanistan since his flight after the ETIR‘s collapse in 1934. After return to 
Chongqing, Eysa Yusuf persuaded the KMT that Bughra could be used to strengthen central 
government‘s influence in Xinjiang. After Bughra left Afghanistan and had been detained in 
Peshawar by the British for alleged espionage for Japan, the KMT arranged for his release. 
Bughra arrived in Chongqing in 1943 and joined Mes‘ud Sabiri and Eysa Yusuf in their 
nation work. Along with Eysa, he became one of the two leading activists and contributors of 
the periodicals published by the Altay publishing house (Benson 1991: 90, 92, 94; Lin 2011: 
90). The triumvirate subsequently became known as the ‗Three Gentlemen‘ (Üch Ependi). 
 
 The role of three Three Gentlemen increased after the central government gained 
control over Xinjiang in fall 1944. In the first step, the KMT appointed General Wu Zhongxin 
(吴忠信, 1884-1959) into the position of Xinjiang governor. Wu was a CC Clique member 
and, as the head of the central government‘s sole ethnic policy drafting body, the Mongolian 
and Tibetan Affairs Commission (蒙藏委員會 Měng-Z ng wěiyuán hu , Mongol-Tibet Idarisi; 
the MTAC), had gained a reputation of a promoter of hard-line assimilationist ethnic policy. 
In Xinjiang, his insensitive measures immediately proved disastrous for the province. His 
efforts to institute firm KMT control over society, deployment of large number of troops and 
resettlement of Han migrants from China proper utterly alienated indigenous Turkic Muslims, 
while his economic policy sent Xinjiang financial system into collapse. Moreover, a rebellion 
has broken out simultaneously with the KMT‘s arrival in northern Xinjiang with the 
consequence of provincial and central authorities again loosing factual control over a 
significant part of Xinjiang territory. Wu was eventually replaced as provincial chairman by 
General Zhang Zhizhong (張治中, 1895-1969), who had been in the meantime entrusted with 
negotiating with the north Xinjiang rebels in September 1945. After his appointment, Zhang 
extensively consulted with the Three Gentlemen and eventually also brought them along to 
Urumchi in fall 1945. After a coalition government of the provincial and rebel parties was 
formed in 1946, the Three Gentlemen were appointed to high posts in the provincial 
administration – Mes‘ud Sabiri became the Supervisory Commissioner directly responsible 
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directly to Nanjing, Muhemmed Imin Bughra was the Minister of Reconstruction and Eysa 
Yusuf a Minister without portfolio (Benson 1990: 70, 73; Forbes 196). Eventually, Sabiri 
even rose to the position of Xinjiang governor in 1947-9. Another prominent Uyghur figure 
who returned to Xinjiang with the KMT was Yolwas (Forbes 163-70, 190-4; Millward 2007: 
213-9; Benson 1991: 91-93).  
 
 It has been rightfully remarked that Zhang Zhizhong is unique in Xinjiang‘s history 
because his performance was equally welcomed by all Xinjiang circles (Millward 2007: 217). 
He instituted a number of measures bent on improving the overall economic and political 
situation in Xinjiang, and also managed to establish a productive working relationship with 
the Ili rebels. He is also credited with a number of conciliatory measures in ethnic policy. His 
public acknowledgment of grave mistakes made by the KMT and suggestions that power in 
the province should be turned over to indigenous Turkic groups since these constitute 95 per 
cent of its population was indeed a bold and significant departure from Chiang Kai-shek‘s 
chauvinist theory and Wu Zhongxin‘s totalitarian practice (Forbes 200). In recognition of Sun 
Yat-sen‘s principle of autonomy, Zhang‘s government appointed a number of native leaders 
into high official posts throughout the province and commenced a series of affirmative 
policies towards non-Han ethnic groups, such as mother language education, publishing in 
local languages and governmental sponsoring of non-Han cultural societies (Forbes 201-204, 
Millward 2007: 220-1). These KMT policy breakthroughs were partially brought about by 
lobbying of the Three Gentlemen, whose rise of political status enabled them and their 
associates to articulate the demands of Xinjiang Turkic Muslims in a more systematic and 
emphatic way. At the same time, the wave of publishing in national languages enabled the 
Three Gentlemen and other nation workers to disseminate their ideas of Turkic nation and its 
interests among their fellow compatriots. Subsequent sections of this chapter demonstrate late 
republican Turkic discourse of nation and nationalism as articulated in writings of Mes‘ud 
Sabiri, Muhemmed Imin Bughra and Polat Qadiri. 
 
Writings of Mes’ud Sabiri 
 
 One source of research in Three Gentlemen‘s advocacy of Xinjiang Turkic Muslim 
demands and propagandizing Turkic nationalism is Speech (Bir Nutuq; Sabiri 1947; Fig. 9), a 
short booklet containing speeches by Mes‘ud Sabiri at the 8
th
 KMT congress in 1941 in 
Chongqing as recorded by Eysa Yusuf. The text was put out in Urumchi by the Altay 
publishing house in cooperation with the TCA in Urumchi in 1947 during the surge in Turkic 
publishing after Mes‘ud‘s rise to governorship. In fact, the publication of Sabiri‘s speeches 
some six years after the congress suggests that the issues addressed in the speeches retained 
their high relevancy for Turkic nationalists under KMT‘s administration. As stated on the 
cover of the book, the reason for publication is the historical need (tarikhiy hajet) to provide a 
record of events helpful to the ‗struggle for liberation of our people‘ (khelqimiz milliy azadliq 
üchün qilghan küresh). Throughout the text, Mes‘ud professes his and other refugee‘s 
devotion ‗nation‘ (ulus), ‗nationalism‘ (uluschilik) and ‗homeland‘ (yurt; Sabiri 1947: 1). He 
calls his nation ‗Turks‘ (Türk, Türkistanli), who are aware of Turkestan as of ‗our land‘ (bizim 
yérimiz) and ‗our homeland‘ (bizim yurtimiz; Sabiri 1947: 8, 12, 13). He openly denounces 
division of Turks into individual nationalities and also rejects Sheng‘s concept of fourteen 
ethnic groups of Xinjiang. According to Mes‘ud, there are four ‗nationalities‘ (ulus) currently 
inhabiting Xinjiang – the most numerous are Turks, followed by Hans, Mongols and Manchus. 
He also acknowledges Kazaks and Turkic refugees in China proper, India, Afghanistan and 
Arabia as integral part of the Turkic nation (Sabiri 1947: 14-7). From political point of view, 
the Turkic nationality is part of ‗China‘ (Chin, Khitay), along with other four constituent 
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‗nationalities‘ (ulus; i.e. Hans, Mongols, Manchus and Tibetans). The Han people are 
specifically called ‗fellow countrymen‘ (wetendash), while Turkestan and Turks are viewed 
as important and responsible part of China because they inhabit a strategically important 
territory and contribute to war efforts (Sabiri 1947: 3, 19-20). 
 
 In relation to national interest, Mes‘ud voiced several demands raised on behalf of 
Xinjiang Turks and ‗for the benefits of nationalities other than Hans‘ (Chindin bashqa 
uluslarning pa‟idiliri üchün; Sabiri 1947: 3). An elementary request was to change the name 
of Turkic nation and homeland in Chinese language. In politically correct KMT terminology 
of the time, Xinjiang Turkic Muslims were called ‗Hui‘ (囘 ). However, this category 
comprised all Muslims living in the territory of the ROC regardless of their ethnicity, lumping 
together several subaltern communities as diverse as Xinjiang Turkic Muslims, 
Chinese-speaking Tungans or Mongolian and Tibetan converts to Islam. On several occasions, 
Mes‘ud pointed out that from academic point of view, the name Hui was not suitable as a 
national name and requested that Chinese rendering of the words ‗Turk‘ (突厥人 Tūjuérén) 
and ‗Turkestan‘ (突厥斯坦 Tūjuésīt n) be used to call his nation and its homeland in Chinese 
language: 
 
‗…One of our requests is for our name (bizim adimiz) not to be ‗Hui‘. This term is an 
erroneous name use by the Chinese. Is ‗Hui‘ supposed to be a name of a religion? If 
so, then it cannot be a name of a nation (ulus). If it is supposed to be a name of a 
nation (ulus) or tribe (aymaq), for instance coming from a corrupted form of the 
name ‗Uyghur‘,
71
 then it is not to be used as a name of the religion of a particular 
nation or a particular tribe. For religion belongs to a multitude of people. For instance, 
to say ‗Uyghur religion‘ or ‗people who believe in Uyghur religion‘ sounds 
somewhat peculiar, because Uyghurs did not use to have a special religion of their 
own. That is to say, our people have a name and we ask to be called by this name...‘ 
(Sabiri 1947: 5-6) 
 
‗As for the Chinese calling us in Turkestan ‗Rag-Heads‘ and later ‗Huihui,‘ ‗Huijiao‘ 
and ‗Huizu‘: ‗Huizu‘ means ‗Hui nationality‘ (millet). ‗Huijiao‘ means ‗people of 
Hui religion,‘ as ‗jiao‟ means ‗religion‘. We do not know where the term ‗Huihui‘ 
and ‗Huizu‘ for us and the term ‗Huijiao‘ for Islam came from. Anyway, the Muslims 
are thus called ‗Huijiao‘. Some people say that the term ‗Huihui‘ is a corrupted form 
of the word Uyghur. As Islam came to China mostly via Uyghurs, some people 
started calling Islam ‗Huijiao‘, that is ‗Uyghur religion‘. Thus calling us ‗Huijiao‘ is 
the same like calling us ‗Uyghur‘.
72
 (Sabiri 1947: 33-4) 
 
 Another important issue addressed by Mes‘ud was the central government‘s 
recognition of his nation‘s existence. Until 1940s, interests of Turkic and Uyghur nation had 
been negotiated solely within the territory of Xinjiang, where the Turks formed an 
overwhelming majority of population. By Mes‘ud and other‘s alliance with the KMT and 
acknowledging that Turkic nation is part of China, suddenly a whole new political reality 
emerged for Xinjiang Turks – they became a minority nationality of China. Thus, struggle for 
acknowledgement by the overwhelming Han majority forming the ROC and its power 
structure became a matter of life and death for the Turkic nation and also the top priority of 
                                                 
71
 This remark alludes to one possible interpretation of the origin of the term ‗Hui‘ (囘) as being a 
transcription of the name ‗Uyghur‘ in Chinese characters – 回紇 (Huíhé). This issue was previously 
addressed in Chapter 1. 
72
 Again, this passage alludes to the confusion of terms ‗Uyghur‘, ‗Islam‘ and ‗Hui‘ that is mentioned 
in Chapter 1. Here, the author also voices disagreement with being labeled ‗Uyghur‘. 
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Turkic nationalist negotiation with the state. Therefore, Mes‘ud specifically requested that the 
Turks are recognized on equal terms with Mongols and Tibetans (Sabiri 1947: 3-4). The lack 
of systematization, transparency and budget in central government‘s ‗nationality policy‘ (ulus 
siyaseti) vis-à-vis Xinjiang Turks should be rectified by placing Turkestani affairs under the 
jurisdiction of the MTAC or by creating a special department that would be in charge solely 
of Turkic affairs (Sabiri 1947: 26-7). Naturally, preserving bare existence in the face of Han 
majority was a fatal issue for all other non-Han nationalities and translated into various level 
of political practice. For instance, despite their excellent knowledge of Chinese, all Turkic, 
Mongol and Tibetan delegates to the party congress were deliberately conducting their part of 
communication with Han delegates in their native languages through interpreters (Sabiri 1947: 
6, 10, 12, 41-2). Indeed, Mes‘ud spoke out boldly about the issue of recognition: 
 
‗…Central government must acknowledge and endorse the existence and status of all 
nationalities in China. Since long ago, the words that we are all one nation (ulus) and 
one blood (qan), which we kept hearing, have terrified us and made us wonder. If the 
central government would want to add other nationalities to the Hans and thus turn 
them into Han, that would be a big loss. If our small nationality is added to the Hans, 
how much bigger will the Han nation (Khitay ulusi) become? How much benefit will 
you gain? Maybe this step would even grow detrimental, rather than beneficial. 
Today, the government of China is telling the world: ―We are democrats and are 
struggling for democracy.‖ But regardless if imperialism is white or blue, it always 
oppresses minority nationalities (azchiliq uluslar), or is even trying to annihilate and 
wipe them out. Is it not so? If, in contrast to its own words, China makes us disappear, 
no one will believe the above words and no one will stand by the Hans...‘ (Sabiri 
1947: 23-5) 
 
 Mes‘ud further pressured for promotion of Turkic language publishing and education, 
arguing that learning Chinese language was not as natural and easy for Turkic Muslims as 
learning for example English or French. Again, he justified this appeal to the Han-dominated 
KMT by pointing that Turkic national identity was distinct from that of the Han:  
 
 ‗…Having heard this, you might feel offended. It is right for you to ask: ―Why do 
you not learn, or are not able to learn, something that we can learn?‖ The uniqueness 
of Chinese script and language is related to your own abilities (qabiliyet) and blood 
(qan); it is also related to atavism and history. But for us it is somewhat alien. Our 
education should not be in Chinese script and language, but in our own script and 
language. In this way, education will be simpler and faster for us. This principle 
should be recognized and enforced from this day, and textbooks in minority 
nationality languages should be designed…‘ (Sabiri 1947: 29-30) 
 
 Mes‘ud also openly criticized mismanagement of Turkestan and suggested numerous 
improvements in the KMT‘s policy. He called for allowing the region‘s autonomy in 
accordance with the state legislature and the official KMT codex, the Three People‘s 
Principles. On objections to difficult wartime situation, he asserted that yielding to demands 
in ethnic policy facilitates ‗unity and cooperation of all nationalities‘ (pütün uluslirining birlik 
we yardemi) and thus is beneficial for the whole country (Sabiri 1947: 20, 23, 36-7). Along 
this line, Sabiri also demanded direct political representation of Turks in the central 
government, for central ethnic policy drafting agencies to be headed by ethnic minorities, for 
the budget on education of minority education to be increased and for state to carry out a 
responsible minority policy (Sabiri 1947: 25-9).  
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 Naturally, Mes‘ud statements were not welcomed by some Han KMT delegates. 
Notably, the chairman of the MTAC Wu Zhongxin reacted by stating that the rights of 
‗frontier people‘ (chégarali) are stipulated in the legislature of the ROC, which is being fully 
implemented. He also denounced minority people‘s requests as endless, saying that if they are 
given something, the immediately ask for more. While asking for high posts, the minorities do 
not realize that their knowledge does not suffice for such responsibilities. Moreover, Wu 
insinuated that minority people are not willing to be educated. He also ignored Mes‘ud‘s calls 
for rectification of the Chinese term for Turks and continued to use the term ‗Hui jiaotu‘ 
(‗Islam believer‘; Sabiri 1947: 38-9). Wu‘s disrespectful reaction incurred a passionate retort 
by Mes‘ud: 
 
 ‗…Mr. Wu said that frontier people lack knowledge. Fine. But at the same time, who 
is responsible for us lacking knowledge? Who has put us into this bitter condition? 
Who has not educated us and not enabled us to be educated? Does Mr. Wu know? It 
is not that we did not study. We wanted to study, and established our own schools. 
But you have not let us study and closed our schools down.
73
 When we want to study, 
our children, who are still feeding on the milk of their mothers, endured great 
hardships, traveled over long distances and high mountains to inner China – is this an 
unwillingness to be educated? And even today, the education problem of these people 
is still not solved. It is not that we do not want to be educated. We do not want to be 
educated in Chinese, because the language is difficult for us. If you claim us to be 
unwilling to be educated without looking into the reason, this is a slander to us. I do 
not know how frontier issues can be solved, when a person who is the head of 
frontier affairs administration holds views which are hostile to frontier people…‘ 
(Sabiri 1947: 40-1) 
 
 At the close of the KMT congress, Mes‘ud submitted a typed rebuttal in Chinese to 
Wu and 300 other delegates. In it, he declared that equality of nationalities in China was 
merely formal, as were the state ethnic policy agencies. True equality meant equality in ethnic, 
political, economic and cultural affairs, as well as in the use of respective languages and 
scripts. Education level of frontier peoples was low, because administration had not only not 
promoted it, but had even obstructed it. Thus, the authorities should be blamed for it. The 
deprivation in skills and education of Turkestanis should be the reason for more concern by 
the authorities, and not for accusations of excessive requests. The harsh feelings existing 
among Turkic population towards the corrupt Chinese administration should be countered by 
the central government by policy improvements and facilitation of progress in the province. 
Mes‘ud further argued that in case the appeals of Turkic Muslims would not be addressed, 
their bitterness and harsh feelings would not go away. He even demonstrated Wu‘s 
incompetency for functioning as an ethnic policy administrator by showing his inadequate 
expertise in Xinjiang ethnic affairs (Sabiri 1947: 41-51). In this way, Speech illustrates well 
the major national interests the Three Gentlemen and similarly minded activists sought to 
represent in their interaction, and often confrontation, with the KMT administration. 
 
 Another text that lays out Mes‘ud‘s ideas on Turkic identity and nationalism is his 
short essay Awareness of Being a Turk (Türklük Orani; Sabiri 1948). Here, Mes‘ud stressed 
the importance of ‗national consciouness‘ (ulusal ang), ‗feeling‘ (tuyghu) and ‗awareness‘ 
(oran) of his ‗fellow nationals‘ (ulusdash), as well as the ‗future of Turkicness‘ (Türklükning 
kélecheki). The relatively new concept of Turkic national consciousness emerged only after 
Turks ‗awakened for their exanimate sleep‘ (tuyghusiz uyqudin oyghandiler; Sabiri 1948: 1-2). 
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 Sabiri refers here to obstructions to modern education during Yang Zengxin‘s and Jin Shuren‘s 
administration. 
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According to Mes‘ud, national feeling of ‗noble Turkicness‘ (ulugh Türklük) facilitates 
peaceful coexistence of all Turks and also transcends their ephemeral individual lives. In 
other words, national values stand higher than individual values and personal lives (Sabiri 
1948: 3-4). Mes‘ud also notes that all nations have a national feeling. The Slavic nations in 
their pan-Slavist movement in Europe, today‘s ‗Chinese state‘ (Chin döliti) in Three People‘s 
Principles, Greeks in the form of their national movement (which is actually anti-Turkic), 
Hungarians, Serbs, Romanians, Germans, Italians and other nations have all awakened and 
formed national feeling from ‗tribes‘ (aymaq) and ‗clans‘ (awul). ‗Each nation, be it small or 
large, has national feeling (ulusal orani). A nation without national feeling is nothing but a 
herd of animals.‘ (Sabiri 1948: 6-8) 
 
 To explain Turkic ‗nationness‘ (uluschilik), or the sense of belonging to a nation, 
Mes‘ud clarified the important concepts of nation, religion and state. The most prominent 
criterion of Turkic nationness was language. ‗All people speaking Turkic (Türkche) are Turkic 
nation (Türk ulusi), Turks. That is to say – the terms „nation‟ and „being a nation‟ (uluschilik) 
point to a land (el), or a very large group (türküm) with a unified language. All those people, 
who speak Turkic in Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Turkestan, Kashgar, China, Manchuria, 
Caucasus, Crimea, Russia, all of them are „of our nation‟ (bizim ulusimizdin) and are Turks.‘ 
Turks also share Islam as their common religion, which is, however, practiced also by other, 
non-Turkic nations. The homeland of Turkic nation, in other words the territory currently 
inhabited by nationalities speaking Turkic languages, is by Mes‘ud called Turan. Thus, 
Xinjiang Turkic Muslims are ‗Turks of eastern Turkic homeland (doghu Türk yurti Türkler), 
that is Turks of eastern Turkestan (doghu Türkistan Türkliri). We are of the same nation 
(ulusdash) as Turks from other places on earth, for instance Anatolia or Crimea. We share 
national affairs (ulusal ishlar) with all other people of our nation, we feel the same sorrow 
and the same pride‘ (Sabiri 1948: 8-10). The state, however, unites people of different 
language, religion and nationness on one territory (tupraq) or region (ölke) and under one flag 
(bayraq). The Turks of eastern Turkestan belong under the state of China, and all their state 
affairs are governed by its constitution and legislature. „So we are of the same nation as 
Anatolian Turks, of the same religion as Arabs and of the same state as the Chinese.‟ (Sabiri 
1948: 11) 
 
 Mes‘ud illustrated the birth of national feeling on the case of Turkey. In his 
schematized narrative, he employed the usual nationalist argument of a nation forgetting its 
nationness (mentioned in Chapter 3 the case of Muhemmed Imin Bughra‘s History of East 
Turkestan) – after the Turks had lost their ancient national consciousness, they started calling 
themselves Ottomans. But this was not a name of a nation, but of a state. Subsequently, the 
national feeling was engendered by national movement and also by modern schools which 
disseminated the concept of nation, national consciousness and ‗national obligation‘ (ulusal 
wezipe). Along with national awakening, there appeared also political national movement. 
Nowadays, national feeling must be fostered by one‘s love for mother language. This was the 
problem of Ottoman Turks, who did not treasure their own language, started using a lot of 
Persisms and Arabisms and ceased to understand ancient Turkic writing. After national 
awakening, the beauty of national language was understood again and all the foreign words 
were purged. From then on, people who have national feeling write in beautiful and easily 
comprehensible Turkic script. Turkic language is the most significant value of a nation and 
must be used in literature. ‗Language is a spiritual homeland of a nation. If one does not work 
hard toward preserving its spiritual homeland, it, just like its physical homeland, will not 
survive.‘ An equally important way to cultivate national feeling is love for homeland. Each 
person has two homelands. One is the state that he lives in, while the other one is Turan, the 
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‗national homeland‘ (ulusal yurt) of Turks. Regardless of under which state‘s administration 
the respective parts of currently Turan are, they are still Turan and belong to Turks (Sabiri 
1948: 16-24). 
 
 According to Mes‘ud, all the Turks of the world are bound to each other by mutual 
obligations based on their belonging to the same nation. ‗One who knows of and 
acknowledges his national consciousness, where ever on earth there is a Turk, he recognizes 
him as a Turk and loves him in the same way as he loves himself. This is what it means to love 
Turks, to love Turkicness and to love one hundred million Turks as oneself.‘ Every Turk has 
numerous obligations to his nation, namely to become educated and wealthy, to oppose those 
who stand against Turkism, to uphold the good reputation of Turks, to speak well of 
Turkicness etc. Turkic children become nation-lovers (ulussewer) by speaking the beautiful 
Turkic language and writing Turkic vernacular. Thus, to love and protect nation and national 
feeling is to protect oneself, and vice versa. In this way, the nation unites, progresses and is 
not enslaved by other nations. ‗Rejuvenated and enriched nation (janlanghan zenginleshken 
ulus) nation will come to sense its national consciousness by itself (ulusal tuyghusini özidin 
özi tuyar) and to acquire its identity by itself (oranni özidin özi tapar). Such are the national 
consciousness and identity.‘ (Sabiri 1948: 25-9)  
 
 Thus, the contents of Awareness of Being a Turk reveal Mes‘ud‘s formidable 
inspiration by Turkish modernism and pan-Turkic nationalism acquired during his lengthy 
stay in Turkey. Understandably, the language of the essay, and to a certain degree also of 
Speech, is replete with expressions and grammar structures loaned from Ottoman and modern 
Turkish. As the meaning of this slightly artificial language would be hardly comprehensible to 
less educated Xinjiang Turkic readers, it is explained in Xinjiang Turkic in the form of 
footnotes or parenthetical references throughout the text. Mes‘ud clearly considered all Turkic 
languages to be rather dialects of one language than separate tongues. What is entirely new in 
Awareness of Being a Turk is the fact that the text contains few references to socio-political 
context of China, focusing instead on trends in Turkic milieu. Although the close relation of 
Xinjiang Turks to other Turkic nationalities had been previously referred to by Xinjiang 
Turkic cultural agitators and nationalist activists, this pan-Turkic bond was never the basis or 
argument of their writings. For instance, despite the fact that Independence and Life of East 
Turkestan of the 1930s cultivated Turkic identity of their readership, they were not 
engendered with the aim of fostering a sense of shared pan-Turkic identity of Turkic nations. 
They dealt solely with Xinjiang issues and were written in a locally comprehensible 
vernacular. In contrast, Mes‘ud Sabiri‘s Awareness of Being a Turk stands out in writings of 
early modern Xinjiang Turkic Muslim intellectuals as an eloquent manifesto of cultural pan-
Turkism. 
 
Writings of Muhemmed Imin Bughra 
 
 Another illustrative exhibit of how intensely the Three Gentlemen contended for the 
recognition and autonomy of the Turkestani nation is the discussion about ethnic identity of 
Xinjiang Turkic Muslims between KMT historian Li Dongfang and Turkic nationalist 
politician Muhemmed Imin Bughra, which occurred in the form of articles written in Chinese 
and published in Central Daily News (中央日報  Zh ngy ng r b o), a KMT flagship 
newspaper aiming at general public, in 1944-5. The argument has been previously researched 
and publicized by Linda Benson, who based her research on reading Chinese versions of the 
articles that were reprinted in the Altay magazine (Benson 1991: 96-98). The very fact that the 
articles were reproduced in Altay, the main Chinese-language forum of Turkic nation workers 
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targeted at Han readership, points to the importance Turkic Muslim nationalist activists 
attached to the argument. Interestingly, its significance was further underscored several years 
later, when the whole dispute was reprinted once again by the Urumchi branch of the Altay 
publishing house in 1948. This time, all the articles of the exchange were published in Turkic 
in a single volume called War of Pens over Homeland and Nation (Yurt we Millet Heqqide 
Qelem Kürishi; Bughra 1948) with an articulate subtitle: ‗This war of pens waged with 
Chinese historian Li Dongfang over history and name of our homeland and nation reveals the 
rightfulness of our national struggle (milliy dewayimiz) and shows a fine victory of Turkestani 
nationalism (Turkistan milletchilik).‘ Its preface declares the author‘s and publisher‘s 
devotion to the struggle for ‗dear homeland‘ (eziz weten), for ‗great nation‘ (ulugh millet) and 
for Turkicness and being Turkestani by all means necessary, while the purpose of the 
publication is stated as the need to commemorate such struggle (Bughra 1948: i-iii). Thus, the 
text is yet another exhibit of the Turkic nationalist activists‘ efforts to strengthen the sense of 
Turkic identity among Xinjiang Turkic Muslims in the face of becoming a minority 
nationality in KMT China. At the same time, the re-publication of the article series and 
intended dissemination among nationally minded Xinjiang Turkic public reveals that the 
issues addressed by Bughra held strong social appeal. 
 
 Importantly for this research, the War of Pens over Homeland and Nation republished 
an important prelude to Li‘s and Bughra‘s dispute, which had not been publicized by Benson 
– a list of demands for Constitution amendments as raised by the Turkestani Compatriot 
Association (TCA). After the central government invited suggestions for constitution draft 
amendments in early 1944, the TCA held a two-day convention in Chongqing which agreed 
on several demands of Xinjiang Turks. These were submitted to the government in April 1944 
and publicized in October 1944 in another important paper close to the KMT, the Ta Kung 
Pao (大公報 D g ng b o, sometimes translated as Impartial Daily).74 Again, the first request 
raised by the TCA was that the population of Turkestan should be called ‗Turkestani‘ instead 
of the incorrect name ‗Hui‘: 
  
‗…When Dr. Sun Yat-sen waged revolution, he formulated a theory according to 
which the China people‘s state (Chin khelq döliti) consists of five nationalities and 
that these nationalities are equal (musawiy, teng). The five nationalities are the Han 
(Chin), Manchus (Manchu), Mongols (Monghol), Muslim Turks (Musulman Türk) 
and Tibetans (Tibet). Also, Dr. Sun Yat-sen in his first speech on nationalism (milliy 
meslek), one of his Three People‘ Principles, said that ―there are more than one 
million Islamic Turks appended to China (Chingha qoshulghan).‖ These are Muslim 
Turks and population of Turkestan and thus the words correspond well with the truth. 
Even though the population of Turkestan was later divided into Uyghurs, Kazaks, 
Kyrgyz, Taranchis, Uzbeks, Tatars and Tajiks, all these seven names are tribal names 
(aymaq ati). By no means they are nationality names (ulus ati). Nationality (millet), 
language, religion, customs and traditions of these seven tribes is the same; they are 
not at all separate. All belong solely to one nationality, and this nationality is Turkic 
nationality (Türk ulusi). The term ‗Hui nationality‘ (Hui ulusi), which came to be 
customarily used (that is to say, customarily used in China), does not designate any 
of the tribes in Turkestan. These are scientific and historical reasons reflecting the 
truth, for which the population of Turkestan should be called Turks…‘ (Bughra 1948: 
3-4) 
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 The Hong Kong branch of this newspaper continues to publish this paper until today, its title in 
English being Takung Pao and contents being close to the Communist Party of China‘s official stance. 
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 Similarly, the TCA argued for abandonment of the term Xinjiang and its replacement 
by the name Turkestan in Chinese: 
 
‗…The word ―Xinjiang‖ is a name that emerged due to violent and brutal Manchu 
administration. It does not at all suit the special ethnic, geographic, social and 
economic context of Turkestan province. Turkestan is a place (yurt) that has since 
historical times been called by the name ―Turkestan‖. In Turkic and Persian, ―-stan‖ 
means ―place‖. If the use of the word ―Turkestan‖ instead of the word ―Xinjiang‖ 
should become too difficult (that is to say, too difficult to pronounce in Chinese), the 
word ―Tujuesitan‖
75
 can be also used as a name in Chinese...‘ (Bughra 1948: 5-6) 
 
 Again, Turkestanis voiced their strong concerns about the concept of the ‗Chinese 
nation‘ that was being advocated by the KMT ideology. It is clear that in their minds the 
absence of their recognition by the government as a distinct nationality automatically led to 
lack of political rights stipulated by the ROC legislature and Sun Yat-sen‘s ideology: 
 
‗…In the draft of the constitution, there is the term ―China state nationality‖ (Chin 
dölet milliti).
76
 We have wondered about the meaning of this word for a long time, 
but have not understood it. We are actually distressed by it and suspicious of it. If we 
endorse the principle of permanent life and existence of smaller nationalities within 
the state, then the term ‗China state nationality‘ is unsuitable. To make Turks an 
example, they are one of the separate components of the government of China, and 
not a single part of some China state nationality. So we have not understood the 
meaning of the term ―China state nationality‖. Premier Dr. Sun Yat-sen has in his 
Three People‘s Principles written that a nation exists on a condition of common 
blood, mode of life, language, religion and culture. Turkic nationality possesses all 
these five necessary characteristics. There is no reason why the Turks should not 
associate on equal terms and have the same rights as other nationalities constituting 
China…‘ (Bughra 1948: 6-7) 
 
 Arguing that assisting small and weak nationalities to attain self-rule was one of the 
basic principles of state and party legislature, the TCA further demanded institution of full 
‗autonomy‘ (mukhtariyet) for the Turkestanis. Another important demand was 
implementation of complete ‗equality‘ (baraberlik) of political, economic, education, cultural, 
religious, social, language, writing and other rights of all nationalities of China, which was 
firmly articulated by the Three People‘s Principles. The TCA also demanded use of all 
China‘s nationalities‘ writing systems on state currency and stamps, protection of religious 
worship, increase of number of Turkestani delegates to state organs in order to reflect the 
larger population ratio in comparison with Mongols and Tibetans and use of Turkic language 
in Turkestani administration, in state examinations, education, publishing and other areas of 
Turkestani public life (Bughra 1948: 3-15). 
 
 The TCA‘s outspoken demands incurred an intense debate between Li Dongfang and 
Muhemmed Imin Bughra. The Chinese version of this discussion has already been researched 
and briefly publicized by Benson. However, as her article centers on a different subject than 
this dissertation, it is useful here to summarize the sections of Li‘s and Bughra‘s dispute 
related to Turkic intellectual ideas of nation and nationalism. According to the Turkic edition, 
in October 1944 Central Daily News published Li‘s article Are Xinjiang People Turks? 
(Shinjangliqlar Türkmu?). The article presented a combination of more or less erroneous 
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 Bughra does not offer particular Chinese characters to transcribe the term into Chinese. 
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 The term refers to the concept of ‗nation of China‘. 
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claims that the population of Xinjiang was not of Turkic origin, and of hard-line KMT-style 
argumentation dismissive of Xinjiang Turkic demands. Some of Li‘s interesting assertions 
were for instance that so-called Turkic people of Xinjiang could not be of Turkic origin 
because ancient Uyghurs had been allies of the Tang dynasty (618-907), because Kyrgyz were 
enemies of ancient Uyghurs, because Kazaks were related to Cossacks of Russia, because 
Uzbeks originated from Central Asia that had been a dominion of China and because Tatars 
were descendants of Chinggis Khan who mixed with white race in the territory of today‘s 
Georgia. Li concluded by saying that although he had a strong personal liking for Xinjiang 
people, he strongly discouraged them from imitating small nations of Central Europe and the 
Balkans in from demanding separation and autonomy. Such demands would be in conflict 
with the ethnic, language and religious unity of the Chinese nation and could lead to its 
fragmentation. Li did agree that the term Xinjiang (En. ‗New Dominion‘) was unsuitable for 
the region. However, given Xinjiang‘s long historical integration into China, he argued that 
the name should be altered to Gujiang (‗Old Dominion‘), Xijiang (‗Western Dominion‘) or 
Tianshan (Bughra 1948: 16-21). 
 
 Not surprisingly, Li‘s contemptuous article provoked a heated retort by Muhemmed 
Imin Bughra published in Central Daily News in November 1944. Wryly questioning Li‘s 
expertise and citing works of Western Turkologists Vilhelm Thomsen (1842-1927), Arminius 
Vámbéry (1832-1913), Vasiliy Radlov (1837-1918), Vasiliy Bartol‘d (1969-1930) and 
Edward Denisson Ross (1971-1941), Bughra acerbically refuted Li‘s views on ethnicity of 
Xinjiang Turkic Muslims and stressed their common Turkic origin. In a way no less 
politicized than Li‘s argumentation, Bughra interestingly claimed that Xinjiang‘s Tajiks were 
a people of Turkic origin who had migrated from Kashgar and Yarkend into the Tashqurghan 
region and started speaking a mixture of Turkic, Afghan, Persian and Hindi; moreover, they 
call themselves Wakhi, not Tajiks. Bughra further argued that should the differences between 
individual Turkic peoples in Xinjiang mean that they are different nationalities, then one 
would analogously have to designate the population of China proper as several distinct 
nationalities. Therefore, differences in language do not necessarily constitute distinct 
nationality. Bughra also argued that politics should respect scientific conclusions. Moreover, 
it was Sun Yat-sen himself who stated that Muslims of Xinjiang are Turkic. 
 
 As for Li‘s reaction to the TCA‘s political demands, Bughra again referred to the ROC 
state legislature and the Three People‘s Principles as the ‗highest state-founding ideal‘ (eng 
yüksek dölet qurush ghayesi) that guaranteed equality of China‘s nationalities. He suggested 
that Li read these texts again and only then lectured Turkestani people about elementary state 
laws. Whereas the peoples of Central Europe and the Balkans strived for independence, 
Turkestanis have never demanded independence from China. Instead, they were requesting 
autonomy, which was moreover guaranteed by the state legislature. Bughra reasoned that by 
comparing these demands to separatism, Li sought to defame Turkestani ‗autonomy 
movement‘ (mukhtariyet hérikiti), which in fact was a denigration of Turkestanis as one of the 
state-founding nationalities. Bughra suggested that if the government abandoned the principle 
of nationalism, the state ideology should either be renamed to ‗Two People‘s Principles‘ (二
民主義 Èrmín zh y ) and all other legal provisions should be also discarded. He consented to 
Li‘s claim that territorial integrity was the most important aspect of a country‘s existence. 
However, it was only by enforcing autonomy to all regions that a state‘s territorial integrity 
could be preserved, and therefore it was necessary for the state to institute it. As for the name 
Xinjiang, Bughra repeated that the term was associated with brutality and oppression, and 
therefore it could not be used by a ‗democracy and people‘s government‘ (démoqrasi – khelq 
hökümiti). He concluded by sarcastically refusing Li‘s proposals at renaming the province and 
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stating his hope for Li‘s admission of Turkic origins of Turkestani people (Bughra 1948: 22-
36). 
 
 Li Dongfang reiterated by another article published in Central Daily News in 
November in 1944, in which he again presented several arguments why Xinjiang Muslims 
were not of Turkic origin. Besides a number of scientifically hardly sustainable views he also 
pointed out that during several Urumchi congresses, delegates elected by the people of 
Xinjiang had agreed to call the region‘s population by the names of fourteen nationalities, of 
which none, however, was called ‗Turkic‘. Moreover, the issue of ethnicity of Xinjiang 
population was yet to be thoroughly researched and thus could not be addressed in the new 
ROC constitution. He again argued that demands for autonomy could lead to fragmentation of 
a country, just like in the case of Czechoslovakia, where Henlein‘s
77
 requests for German 
autonomy evolved into secession of Sudetenland, the Moravians and the Poles. Therefore, 
Li‘s posited, there had to be a centralized authority: ‗All our brothers (qérindash) must with 
all their strength stand on the side of central government and reinforce the unity of the 
Chinese nation (Chin milliti). For this reason, it is necessary to abstain from all senseless 
affairs that could become a reason for secession.‘ (Bughra 1948: 37-9) 
 
 Bughra retorted by yet an even more biting article, in which he insisted on his previous 
views and supported TCA‘s demands of constitutional amendments. He again challenged Li‘s 
knowledge and urged him to stop comparing Turkestanis to traitors such as Henlein. Stating 
that Turkestanis love their government as much as their homeland and nation, Bughra 
reminded Li that Turkestani politicians came voluntarily to assist China‘s government and 
that China‘s government delightedly accepted their offer of help. Now, Turkestani‘s had 
raised their demands in the same way as other nationalities raised their demands. Turkestan 
was an important frontier region, and that was precisely the reason why good policy in 
accordance with republican principles must be enforced there. Otherwise, the region would 
not be peaceful, and that would prove disastrous for China. Bughra also denounced Urumchi 
nationality congresses as assembled by force. Moreover, the fact that the Turkic nationalities 
of Xinjiang were called Uyghur, Kazak, Kyrgyz, Taranchi, Uzbek, Tatar and Tajik did not 
prove that they are not Turks. Indeed, they were ‗Turkic descendants‘ (Türk oruqliri). Once 
again, Bughra underlined that by asking to be called by their own name, Turkestani people 
were not seeking secession. He remarked that whoever is afraid of granting such a petty 
demand was a very terrified person. Throughout the world, all subjugated nations were called 
by their own name. Stressing again that politics must yield to science, Bughra posited that, 
unlike prevalent terminology such as Hui or Rag-Head, the term Turk is scientifically correct 
and the name ‗Chinese Turkestan‘ or ‗East Turkestan‘ is politically correct. Bughra concluded 
his reply by a summary of the argument: ‗Finally, let me summarize for Mr. Li: Turkic nation 
is a nation (millet). It is not a clan (awul) or a tribe (aymaq). Turks are the autochthonous 
people of Turkestan.‘ (Bughra 1948: 50-66) In sum, similarly to account of Mes‘ud‘s 
speeches and activities at the KMT congress in 1941, the intense debate between Bughra and 
Li excellently illustrates that recognition of Turkestanis‘ existence as a full-fledged nationality 
of China was a top goal of national movement staged by the KMT-affiliated Turkic nation 
workers, and indeed one that was not easy to defend in confrontation with the strongly 
politicized KMT‘s ethnic theory and practice. 
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 Konrad Henlein (1898-1945) was a leader of Czechoslovakian German minority prior to World War 
II., whose activities contributed to separation of large border regions of Czechoslovakia by the Munich 
Agreement of 1938. 
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Writings of Polat Qadiri Turfani 
 
 Another late republican intellectual engaged in formulating ideas similar to those of 
the Three Gentlemen was Polat Qadiri Turfani (1919-1970). Born in Qutubi near Urumchi, he 
graduated with honors from Urumchi pedagogical institute and later became the editor of the 
Turkic version of the main provincial newspaper, the Xinjiang Daily (Xinjiang Géziti), 
working closely with the Three Gentlemen. Some of his ideas of Turkic nation and 
nationalism are revealed by examination of two of his texts. Firstly, the undated essay Slogan 
of Freedom (Erk Shoari; Qadiri undated), which was published by the Altay publishing house 
in Urumchi probably in 1947 or early 1948, is an explanation of several political principles 
upheld by the late republican Turkic nationalists in their actions and writings. The principle of 
freedom consisted of six component tenets expressed by the slogan ‗We are democrats, we 
are nationalists, we are humanists; our race is Turkic, our religion is Islam, our homeland is 
Turkestan‘ (Biz khelqchimiz, biz milletchimiz, biz insaniyetchimiz; erqimiz Türükdur, dinimiz 
Islamdur, yurtimiz Türkistandur). This motto was printed in the mast of the daily Freedom 
(Erk; F), one of the Turkic nationalist publications commenced during Mes‘ud Sabiri‘s 
appointment as Xinjiang governor in 1947-9. Apart from this slogan, the mast of Freedom 
also featured the slogan ‗Unity in language, work and opinion‘ (Tilde, ishte, pikirde birlik) 
and description as a ‗political, economic, social, scientific, discussion and literary newspaper‘ 
(siyasiy, ikhtisadiy, ijtima‟iy, ilmiy, pikiriy we edebiy ghézitedur; F 83), which was again a 
reference to Jadidist principles embraced by Xinjiang Turkic nationalist periodicals in the 
1930s.
78
 Qadiri further stated that contrary to some people‘s explanations, which interpret this 
slogan as a manifest sign of ‗narrow nationalism‘ (tar milletchilik), ‗pan-Turkism‘ (pan-
Türkistliq), ‗pan-Islamism‘ (pan-Islamliq) or ‗as having other political motivations‘ (bashqa 
bir siyasiy mekshset bar), the above fundaments of freedom regard the ‗state interest‘ (dölet 
menpe‟iti) and ‗interest of our nation‘ (millitimizning menpe‟iti) as one (Qadiri undated: 1-2). 
 
 In Qadiri‘s words, the embrace of democracy referred to the fact that Xinjiang Turkic 
Muslims were prevented by past administrations from having a democratic government 
promoting progress and development. Indeed, people had been slaves of the government in 
the past.  ‗Therefore, as democracy is now the most important thing for our people, and as 
democracy is also the highest goal to which the world is headed, the slogan of freedom has 
come to being.‘ In this day, democracy was realized and people were able to decide their 
future by the means of election. Qadiri explicitly associated democracy with light. Should in 
future democracy disappear, ‗the future prospects of our homeland would become dark‘ 
(yurtimizning istiqbali qaranghulishidu). In explanation of the principle of nationalism, Qadiri 
referred to Sun Yat-sen‘s expression that ‗nationalism is a treasure which saves the nation‘ 
(milletchilik milletni qutquzidighan gewher). Therefore, Sun made nationalism the ‗basis‘ 
(asas) of a movement aimed ‗to revive own nation‘ (öz millitini tirildürmek). Nationalism and 
fulfilling ‗national interest‘ (milliy menpe‟et) was the source of development and well-being 
of all nations, for instance the progress of England or China‘s victory over Japan. Previous 
administrations of Turkestan had not allowed for Turkestani ‗national spirit‘ (milliy roh) and 
nationalism to come about; Sheng Shicai had even wanted to extirpate nationalism altogether. 
Nationalism is truly the most necessary thing for saving a nation. Importantly, one nation‘s 
nationalism must be realized on the basis of respecting the interests of other nations. Qadiri 
called this principle internationalism. On personal level, he referred to the need to perceive 
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 The allusion to Gaspirali‘s Interpreter flaunted by Xinjiang Turkic nationalists in the mast of 
Freedom is also remarkable from the point of view of history of Jadidism – it signified that Jadidist 
ideas were still alive sixty-five years after their birth and some thirty years after the original initiative 
had been terminated by the Soviets. 
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other beings as humans and respect their interests as humanism (insaniyetchilik; Qadiri 
undated: 3-11). 
 
 In explanation of the slogan ‗our race is Turkic‘, Qadiri denounced the terms ‗Hui‘ and 
‗Uyghur‘ as incorrect names of Turkic nation that had been instituted by previous flawed 
administrations:  
 
‗…We are a nation that has been coerced to forget its own nation, and so we do not 
know to which race we belong. We do not even know the name of our race. Up to 
this period, we have been caused to think of ourselves as of Rag-Head nation 
(Chantou milliti), as of Muslim nation (Musulman milliti) and as of Uyghur nation 
(Uyghur milliti). But these are not names of our nation. The name of our nation is 
Turk. Rag-Head is a name given to us by the Chinese. In the world, there is no such 
nation as ‗Musulman‘ – it is a name of religion, not of a nation. Uyghur is also not a 
name of a nation; it is a name of a tribe (aymaq). In his era, in order to alienate us 
from each other, Sheng Shicai divided us into Uyghur nationality, Kazak nationality, 
Uzbek nationality, Taranchi nationality and several other nationalities. The Turkic 
race, into which we belong, includes Kazaks, Tatars, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Taranchis, 
Tajiks, Turkmens, Uyghurs and other tribes, totaling over thirty. They have the same 
language, blood and history. Most of them live in East Turkestan, where we are now 
living, in Central Asia, which is now under Soviet jurisdiction, in Iran, Afghanistan 
and Turkey. As for the Turks who are living in our homeland, they are a part of the 
Turks living throughout the world. That is to say that since the beginning of history, 
we have been Turks and will go on living with our Turkicness until the end…‘ 
(Qadiri undated: 12-3) 
 
 Further, Qadiri specifically stressed that the slogan ‗Our race is Turkic‘ was not a 
manifestation of politically oriented pan-Turkism aiming at unification of all Turks in a single 
state following the model of Attila the Hun or Oghuz Khan. Pan-Turkism had failed in the 
Soviet Union, where its influence vanished in mid-1930s. The only independent Turkic 
country was at the moment Turkey, which was, however, too weak to liberate other Turkic 
nations and too busy trying to protect itself from the Soviet Union. Qadiri opined that given 
the negative connotations the word pan-Turkism currently evoked, for Xinjiang Turks to 
pursue pan-Turkism would actually be detrimental. Thus, the purpose of the pan-Turkist creed 
was solely to explain to which race Turkestani people belong. The same was true for the 
slogan ‗Our religion is Islam‘. As it is was not possible to unite all the Muslims in the world, 
the concept merely sought to protect and revive religion, to introduce Islamic rules to the 
people, to support nation‘s religious leaders and not to let religion become a weapon against 
the nation.  
 
 Finally, Qadiri stated that the principle ‗Our homeland is Turkestan‘ sought to remind 
to the nation the true name of its homeland. Since the nation was Turkic, its homeland was 
called Turkestan. Contrary to some people‘s claims, the name ‗Turkestan‘ was not newly 
invented or imposed after the ‗Ili rebellion‘ (Ili qozghilish); it has been in use for several 
thousand years. Geographically, the area of Turkestan was extensive and comprised western 
Turkestan, eastern Turkestan and southern Turkestan. Therefore, it was correct to call the 
homeland of Xinjiang Turks ‗Eastern Turkestan‘. Politically, the western part of Turkestan 
was under the administration of Russia, and so it was called ‗Russian Turkestan‘. The eastern 
part was under the administration of China, so it was labeled ‗Chinese Turkestan‘. Thus, the 
slogan ‗Our homeland is Turkestan‘ sought to initiate the practice of calling a place inhabited 
by Turks Turkestan, as well as to promote the knowledge that Turkestan had been the original 
name of the region and that in future Turkestan would also remain the name of Turks‘ 
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homeland (Qadiri undated: 13-20). Ideology of Qadiri‘s Slogan of Freedom thus resembles 
Mes‘ud‘s Awareness of Being a Turk in its accented popularization of cultural pan-Turkism. 
 
 Polat Qadiri is also the author of the important work Provincial History (Ölke Tarikhi; 
Qadiri 1948), published in 1948 by the Urumchi branch of Altay. In the preface, Qadiri 
commented that he based his ‗short history of the homeland‘ (qisqiche yurt tarikhi) on reading 
Muhemmed Imin Bughra‘s History of East Turkestan (analyzed in Chapter 3), as well as on 
sources assembled by Eysa Beg about insurgency in the 1930s and various other sources on 
the latest affairs. Provincial History was the first modern history of the region which was 
written by a Turkic intellectual, published by a governmental agency and intended for mass 
Xinjiang Turkic readership. For this purpose, Provincial History (similarly to Slogan of 
Freedom) was written in an easily understandable vernacular and printed in almost fully 
phonetic modified Arabic script. As regards contents, the text concentrated on factual 
depiction of actions rather than on propagandizing ideology or offering evaluations of 
particular historical events or figures. Already the first sentence of the text revealed the idea 
that appeared on other texts by late republican Turkic activists: that Xinjiang Turkic Muslims‘ 
homeland was politically a part of China while culturally and historically it belonged to 
Turko-Islamic milieu:  
 
‗…Our homeland (yurtimiz), or our province (ölkimiz), is located in the northwestern 
part of the territory of China (Zhongguo topraqi) and in the center of Asian continent 
(Asiya qit‟esining ortasida). It is bordered in the west by western Turkestan, in the 
north by Outer Mongolia, in the east by Gansu and in the south by the Pamirs. The 
name of our homeland used by the state is ―Xinjiang‖, while its historical national 
name (tarikhiy milliy ismi) is East Turkestan…‘ (Qadiri 1948: 4) 
 
 Similarly to Bughra‘s History of East Turkestan, Qadiri‘s Provincial History then 
narrated the history of the region to which it retroactively applies the name East Turkestan. 
Qadiri claimed that Central Asia was the cradle of human civilization from which various 
Turkic tribes migrated and spread culture and progress to all surrounding areas. He mentioned 
ancient Uyghurs, one of the most cultured of ancient tribes, as well as the brief periods of 
Chinese control over the region. Manchu administration was described by Qadiri as an era of 
oppression, destruction of local culture and sinicization, which ultimately led to uprisings 
intent on annihilating Manchus and immigrants from inner China. After reconquest, the Sino-
Manchu government accelerated its sinicization policies: immigration from China proper, 
institution of Chinese language in official intercourse, closing of national schools and 
mosques. Sun Yat-sen‘s revolution and Three People‘s Principles were interpreted favorably 
by Qadiri. Unfortunately, however, their effects have not reached East Turkestan which 
remained a backwards and mismanaged territory under strong influence of Russia and Great 
Britain (Qadiri 1948: 4-40). The insurgency of 1930s was interpreted as a ‗revolution‘ 
(inqilab) against oppression and corruption seeking to liberate the homeland and the people 
from under iron heels of oppression and corruption. The revolutionaries declared an 
independent ‗East Turkestan Republic‘ (Sherqi Türkistan Jumhuriyiti), whose leadership was 
made of outstanding intellectuals (Qadiri 1948: 56-73). 
 
 Qadiri also disputed the legitimacy of Sheng Shicai‘s administration of Xinjiang and 
criticized his policies for allowing the extensive Soviet influence in the region, for obstructing 
the ‗national movement‘ (milliy hériket) and ‗national progress‘ (milliy tereqqiyat) and for 
erroneously dividing Xinjiang‘s population into fourteen nationalities (Qadiri 1948: 80-83, 
101-2, 110-22). The text also related the origins of Eysa Beg‘s and Mes‘ud Sabiri‘s 
‗revolutionary work for the homeland‘ (yurt üchün inqilabi khizmiti) and efforts to ‗save the 
 163 
homeland‘ (yurtni qutquzush): after being inspired by progressive ‗nationalists‘ (milletchi), 
‗revolutionaries‘ (inqilabchi) and ‗outstanding intellectuals‘ (munewwer ziyalilar) abroad, 
Eysa and Mes‘ud allied with the central government and lobbied for ‗national autonomy‘ 
(milliy mukhtariet) of East Turkestan (Qadiri 1948: 83-89, 145-7). The text also speaks 
favorably of Mahmud Muhiti‘s promotion of modern education (Qadiri 1948: 102-3). 
 
 Qadiri was also critical of the KMT‘s administration after consolidation of its power in 
East Turkestan. In contrast with Three People‘s Principles, the new government did not take 
into account the wishes and aspirations of ‗local people‘ (yerlik khelq) of Xinjiang. Instead, 
the administration desired assimilation of ‗local nationalities‘ (yerlik milletler) – stopped 
referring to them as to ‗nationalities‘ (millet) and started using the term ‗descendants of the 
same lineage‘ (nesildash uruq). Thus, the locals grew terrified and realized that the slogans 
contained in Three People‘s Principles about equality of nationalities and need to help frontier 
peoples to establish their autonomy were nothing but empty words. Wu Zhongxin released 
prisoners, but allied with religious figures, instead of intellectuals who were the ‗essential 
social forces‘ (jemi‟etning asasiy küchliri). The KMT government imprisoned many other 
people and numerous local intellectuals fled their homeland. The corruption of government 
increased and so did the distrust of the local people (Qadiri 1948: 130-3). Interestingly, Qadiri 
also devoted a large space to the self-proclaimed independent government of East Turkestan 
which was established after the uprising in northern Xinjiang in fall of 1944. He specifically 
mentioned the national flag with the crescent and star and also the fact the rebels made armed 
incursions to Six Cities Region, the ‗place of predominant residence of Turkic – Uyghur 
people‘ (Türk – Uyghur khelq eng köp orunlashqan jéyi). After the coalition government was 
formed with the Ili faction, Turkic and Chinese were to be both made the official script of the 
province and national education and publishing were to be instituted (Qadiri 1948: 136-144). 
 
 Qadiri argued that the KMT administration became more moderate after Zhang 
Zhizhong was commissioned by negotiating with the insurgents and eventually became the 
governor of Xinjiang. Qadiri related that during this time, Turkic youth became organized 
several in ‗nationalist‘ (milletchi) and ‗homeland-loving, patriotic‘ (wetenperwer) associations, 
staging a ‗national movement‘ (milliy hériket) ‗for the benefit of the nation and homeland‘ 
(yurt millet paydisi üchün) to raise ‗national consciousness‘ (milliy ang). Specifically, these 
youth bodies petitioned the provincial government and raised national demands. Zhang 
negotiated directly with the youth representatives and acknowledged the mistakes in past 
policies. He even specifically promised that should this time the central government‘s policy 
fail again, he himself would stand as a leader of Xinjiang people in a rebellion against 
renewed oppression (Qadiri 1948: 162-5). This strong expression seems to stem from Zhang‘s 
alleged liberal stance on minority affairs, which incurred his popularity with the general 
Xinjiang population, even with Turkic Muslims. 
 
 Qadiri also described how the Turkic youth representatives reportedly called on the 
government to include the Uyghurs, Kazaks, Kyrgyz, Tatars, Taranchis, Uzbeks and Tajik so-
called ‗peoples‘ (khelqler) under the name Turk, to unify the cultural associations of 
respective ‗tribes‘ (aymaq) into one comprehensive Turkic Cultural Enlightenment 
Association (Türk Medeniy Aqartish Uyushmisi), to enforce in the Six Cities region an equally 
free political system as was currently functioning in the insurgent northern Xinjiang, to 
terminate Han immigration from inner China, to appoint Turkic officials in administrative 
posts, to allow freedom of speech, assembly and press, to erect memorials to national heroes 
who had died in prison, to support orphans, to bring Sheng Shicai to Urumchi and punish him 
publicly in front of Xinjiang people for his evil deeds etc. Other agencies were also 
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established by the government which were to facilitate affirmative cultural policies, such as 
the Society for Cultural Development of the Northwest (Gherbiy Shimal Medeniy Qurulush 
Jemi‟iti) or the Association for Joint Building of New Xinjiang (Yéngi Shinjang Qurushqa 
Hemkarlashmaq Uyushmisi). Under Zhang, the first Xinjiang Turkic dance and song troupe 
was established and sent on tours to China interior, including Taiwan, to change the Han 
misconception that Turkestanis are an uncultured and backward people (Qadiri 1948: 162-6, 
187-8). 
 
 Provincial History also provided an account of the Three Gentlemen‘s activities. 
Qadiri remarked that the Three Gentlemen were not favored by the politicians of the Ili 
faction who called them ‗China-ists‘ (Khitaychi) or ‗those who had been sold to China 
(Khitaygha sétilghan). The Three Gentlemen were equally disliked by the KMT hard line 
administration, which obstructed their nationalist activities. Qadiri claimed that in reality, the 
three were deeply involved in working for the nation. Following the appointment of Zhang 
Zhizhong, they were able to implement some of their ideas. Namely, they used their high 
political status to accelerate advocacy of Turkic demands from the central government. The 
main request continued to be autonomy: 
 
‗…To grant high-degree autonomy (aliy mukhtariet) to Turkestan is the only way to 
preserve its eternal peace, to ensure that it will not separate from the state and to 
completely solve the Turkestan national problem (Türkistan milliy mesilisi)...‘ 
(Qadiri 1948: 154)  
 
 Besides autonomy, the Three Gentlemen for instance demanded for the government to 
call Turkestani people by their own name and recognize them as a ‗nationality‘ (millet, 民族 
mínz ), to abolish arbitrary taxation, to suspend Han immigration from inner China, to reduce 
troops stationed in the province, to raise Turkestanis to a position equal with Mongols and 
Tibetans, to institute education in Turkic language, to protect Turkic culture, history, language, 
writing and customs, to terminate the practice of Hans running the region, to appoint Turkic 
figures to high posts etc. Besides lobbying on the highest level, the Three Gentlemen were 
also said by Qadiri to have triggered a wave of Turkic national awakening, namely as regards 
national publishing and education.
79
 Given the fact that Mes‘ud‘s was a ‗nationalist‘ 
(milletchi), during his governorship Turkic nationalism also thrived. Young people acquired 
awareness of ‗their ancestors‘ history‘ (ata babasining tarikhi), of the ‗situation in the 
homeland‘ (yurtning ehwali) and of the ‗name of their nation‘ (millitining ismi). There was 
also a movement bent on unifying the corrupted, fully phonetic orthographies of individual 
Turkic groups which had been commenced during Sheng Shicai‘s era. Due to Three 
Gentlemen‘s policies, the Turkic awareness spread, more so around Urumchi than in southern 
Xinjiang (Qadiri 1948: 144-58, 186-8). Thus, similarly to Muhemmed Imin Bughra‘s History 
of East Turkestan, Polat Qadiri Turfani‘s Provincial History is an excellent example of 
national agitation text that integrates the invention of nation‘s historical past with construction 
of its modern national identity and with formulation of contemporary national interests, such 
as cultural awakening, technological modernization, economic progress and political rights. 
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 The boom in Turkic education and publishing was indeed exemplified by the publication of Uyghur 
primer, Alphabet for Turks-Uyghurs (Türk-Uyghurlar Üchün Élifba), which attempted to introduce 
fully phonetic Arabic-based Uyghur script. The title suggests that the author, the afore mentioned 
intellectual Ibrahim Muti‘i at the time closely associated with the Three Gentlemen, regarded speakers 
of Uyghur as Turks (Muti‘i 1947). 
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 In sum, on the one hand the examination of above writings of the Three Gentlemen 
and their colleagues in 1940s reveals that their contents were similar to ideas of politicized 
Turkic national movement of the 1930s analyzed in Chapter 3. Similarly to the previous 
decade, Turkic nationalists of the 1940s also perceived their community as a ‗nation‘ (millet, 
ulus) defined by common descent (Turkic), religion (Islam), homeland (East Turkestan, 
Chinese Turkestan, Turkestan, Turan), language, history, culture, national decline under past 
oppressive administration (Sheng Shicai) and other national attributes. For nationalist 
intellectuals of 1940s, the Turkic nation consisted of several tribes or clans residing in the 
territory of East Turkestan, such as Uyghurs, Kazaks, Kyrgyz, Taranchis, Uzbeks, Tatars and 
even Tajiks. Again, religious denomination was an identity marker that was, at least 
rhetorically, of equal importance as ethnicity. However, judging by the extent of space 
dedicated to discussion of ethnic and religious affairs in the examined texts, it can be argued 
that for Turkic intellectuals in 1940s, ethnicity and Turkic lineage was a much more 
significant national identity marker when compared to religion than for activists of 1930s. As 
observed by Laura Newby, despite the fact that Islam provided a useful common language, in 
1940s the nationalists felt that religion could not suffice to secure the goals of nationalist 
movement (Newby 1986: 223).  
 
 On the other hand, the 1930s‘ modernization imperative, namely concepts such as 
national liberation, freedom, improvement, progress, national awakening, promotion of 
national culture, modernity, national education and publishing etc., continued to embody 
important national interests in 1940s. Similarly to nation work strategies devised in 1930s, 
activists of 1940s also made sure to establish the important symbolic connection with past 
liberations movements and resistance to oppression, that was traced in other national 
movements (Breuilly 161). In words referring to Miroslav Hroch‘s thesis applied to other 
contexts, apart from being able to build on previously existent cultural relics, preserved 
ancient literary language, memories of past statehood and other ‗national‘ attributes, Turkic 
nationalists of the 1940s were able to make great use of the concept of East Turkestani and 
Uyghur national identity and interest, which had been clearly articulated by their predecessors 
(or, in the case of Muhemmed Imin Bughra, themselves) in 1930s. Mes‘ud, Eysa, Bughra and 
others endorsed the popular indignation at previous flawed administrations, propagandized 
national identity and culture as the basis of Xinjiang Turkic public life and acted toward 
creating a complete social structure permeating their nation, including nationally aware youth, 
civilian strata literate in national vernacular, economic elites and political leadership. They 
engaged in dissemination of national consciousness on both academic and civic level, and 
also achieved at least some social movement in the form of youth organizations‘ initiative 
(Hroch 1996: 81-7). At the same time, the fact that in the above texts of 1940s the intellectual 
discourse of Xinjiang sedentary Muslim Turkic community as East Turkestani nation did not 
undergo a substantial change in comparison with the previous decade suggests that this 
concept became fairly consolidated among local intellectual strata by the early 1940s. 
 
 A major change did, however, occur in discourse of the chief national interest. The 
Three Gentlemen and their colleagues of 1940s operated in an utterly different political 
setting than nationalists of the 1930s. Although the previous administrations of Yang Zengxin, 
Jin Shuren and Sheng Shicai rhetorically proclaimed allegiance to the Republic of China, they 
maintained Xinjiang as an entity almost completely devoid of any factual interaction with 
China proper. Similarly, the Turkic insurgency by default functioned on the premise that East 
Turkestan is independent from China. Thus, in all past settings the Turkic population of East 
Turkestan constituted an overwhelming majority of over ninety per cent of the factually 
independent regions‘ total population. Both the Chinese and insurgent administration 
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recognized the Turkic populace as a full-fledged nationality and, albeit to a varying degree, 
upheld their rights. This phenomenon changed completely when Xinjiang found itself under 
factual control of the ROC‘s KMT-dominated central government in 1940s. Turkic 
inhabitants of Xinjiang suddenly became a part of, albeit theoretically multi-national, yet in 
reality unitary and overwhelmingly Han state, where they constituted less than one per cent of 
total population. It was at the moment of the KMT‘s arrival in Xinjiang that local indigenous 
Turkic Muslims‘ status fell from a ‗nation‘ (millet, ulus) to China‘s ‗minority nationality‘ 
(azchiliq ulus, azchiliqde ulus, azchilikdeki ulus) or ‗frontier people‘ (chégarali). Similarly, 
Xinjiang became one of many regions of China, a reality signified for instance in the shift of 
connotations of the term ölke, which had from ‗region‘ acquired the clear meaning of a 
‗province‘ of China. 
 
 Central government‘s takeover of Xinjiang therefore generated a whole new set of 
political interests of Turkic national movement. From then on, efforts of Turkic nationalists 
did not only consist of awakening national consciousness and creating national attributes of 
East Turkestani nation, as examined in Chapter 3. In confrontation with the overwhelmingly 
Han Chinese state, the most important point on national agenda was the state‘s recognition 
and preservation of Xinjiang Turks‘ existence as a separate nationality. Referring yet again to 
Fredrik Barth‘s concept of ethnic boundary mentioned in the Introduction and Chapter 1 of 
this dissertation, it was the maintenance of national boundary that was to secure Xinjiang 
Turks‘ future existence as a distinct entity in China (Barth 14). This task was especially 
difficult given the KMT‘s rigid adherence to Chiang‘s assimilationist argument that all people 
residing within the Republic of China‘s borders constitute a single ‗nation of China‘ (中華民
族  Zh nghuá mínz ). Therefore, Turkic nationalists engaged in lengthy and passionate 
disputes with KMT theoreticians and emphasized a distinct identity of Xinjiang Turks, 
different from majority Han population. They insisted that while Turks and East Turkestan 
were under political control of China, their ethnic, religious and cultural identity was 
inseparable from other Turkic nations of the world. In fact, 1940s‘ Xinjiang pan-Turkists 
perceived Turkic population of Xinjiang and other Turkic nations as one nation, not making a 
distinction between the concept ‗Turkic‘ and ‗Turkish‘ that we use today. While their premise 
that all Turkic groups throughout the world are only tribes of a single nation might have been 
influenced by Chiang‘s theory of the ‗nation of China‘, their cultural pan-Turkism was in fact 
a very powerful argument in defense against the Han majority as it placed East Turkestanis 
into mythical Turan, a massive Turkic milieu stretching over two continents and numbering 
over one hundred million people.  
 
Along this line, Three Gentlemen and similarly minded activists argued that the 
official term ‗Hui‘ (囘 ) should replaced by the terms ‗Turk‘ (突厥人  Tūjuérén) and 
‗Turkestan‘ (突厥斯坦 Tūjuésīt n) in China‘s official discourse. Referring to Sun Yat-sen‘s 
Three People‘s Principles and other state legislature stipulating equality of China‘s five 
constituent nationalities, they pushed for recognition of Turks as a nationality equal in ethnic, 
political, economic and cultural rights to Hans, Mongols, Tibetans and Manchus. In their 
arguments, Turkic nationalists of 1940s were often bitterly critical of the KMT‘s 
incompetency in ethnic policy, of the central government‘s discrimination of Xinjiang Turks 
and of Chinese imperialism. By citing basic Chinese revolutionary premises of equality of 
nationalities and democracy, the Three Gentlemen effectively managed to turn Chinese 
history against the KMT‘s Han chauvinists and, to borrow Benedict Anderson‘s attractive 
expression, to scrape boldly the weld between modern nationalism and imperialism 
(Anderson 117). Firmly rejecting accusations of separatism, they also argued that only 
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effective ethnic policy and high-degree autonomy could result in successful integration of 
Chinese Turkestan into China, and thus be beneficial for the whole state.  
 
In another words, the KMT-affiliated Turkic nation workers of 1940s perceived East 
Turkestanis‘ national interest and the ROC‘s state interest as fully compatible. Indeed, in their 
ideology they espoused the ideals of Chinese revolutionary republicanism, democracy and 
nationalism, all the way from early Sun Yat-sen‘s thought and the 1911 Ili revolutionaries to 
contemporary KMT ideology, legislature and symbology. At the same time, they performed 
complex nation work bent on constructing and promoting Turkic national identity. Their 
efforts at introducing Turkic script and language into Xinjiang public life were successful 
steps towards official nationalism, an important nation-forming principle illustrated in other 
studies (Seton-Watson 148; Anderson 85-6). Similarly, their founding of Turkic education, 
publishing and other cultural projects of national awakening resound John Breuilly‘s 
intellectual interpretation of nationalism, previously referred to in Chapter 2 and 3. Arguably, 
Three Gentlemen‘s and their associates‘ nation work was likely to subsequently generate wide 
political opposition to dysfunctional KMT administration with colonialist tendencies (Breuilly 
159-60). In any case, Three Gentlemen and their soul mates‘ ideology were an interesting and 
strikingly compatible fusion of Turkic ethnic sub-nationalism and ideas of Chinese 
revolutionary state nationalism. In short, Turkic intellectuals of 1940s formulated a complex 
set of ideas of nation and nationalism that was also to carry over into the following period of 
the People‘s Republic of China‘s control over Xinjiang from 1949. 
 
4. 2.  Insurgency in Northern Xinjiang (1944 – 1949)  
 
 The last important stimulus for evolution of early modern Uyghur concepts of nation 
and nationalism under research in this dissertation arose during insurgency in northern 
Xinjiang in late 1940s. As with the central Nanjing government‘s policy vis-à-vis Xinjiang 
Turkic Muslims, the roots of northern Xinjiang rebellion lay in the 1930s. Xinjiang Kazaks, 
some of who had escaped from the USSR to Xinjiang in flight of Soviet anti-nomadism 
campaigns in late 1920s and early 1930s, were angered by Sheng Shicai‘s secularization 
efforts and other policies. Since mid-1930s, small-scale Kazak uprisings erupted in Xinjiang 
in the areas of Tianshan, near Gez Köl by Gansu-Qinghai border and in Altay. The intensity 
of unrest somewhat decreased in the wake of Sheng‘s consolidation of power in 1937, but the 
fighting resumed after Sheng broke with the USSR in 1942, which prompted the Soviets to 
start indirectly supporting Kazak rebels through Mongolian People‘s Republic. Kazak 
resistance in Xinjiang eventually centered in Altay around the figure of Osman Batur (Osman 
the Hero, 1899-1951), whose activities however did not seem to have any political agenda. 
Kazak unrest further increased with the KMT‘s policies, particularly with intended 
requisitioning of horses for the provincial army (Forbes 137, 155-7, 170-2).  
 
 Another locus of insurgent activity in northern Xinjiang was the Ili valley, which, due 
to its close relations with Russia, had been since late nineteenth century the most 
economically and culturally advanced area of the province. After Sheng severed Xinjiang‘s 
ties with the USSR in 1942, the Ili valley and entire northern Xinjiang lost its means of 
income from exporting raw materials and livestock, as well as access to imported 
manufactured goods. After the KMT‘s takeover of Xinjiang in fall 1944, the decline in Soviet 
trade was accompanied by increased taxation, soaring prices of daily consumption goods, 
requisitions in labor and kind, termination of cross-border cultural ties and security 
crackdown on everything related to Soviet Union, such as periodicals, books, textbooks, 
social organizations and even numerous intellectuals educated in Soviet Central Asia. In 
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October 1944, a small clash in the township of Nilka triggered a large-scale insurgency that 
quickly spread throughout the entire northern Xinjiang. The rebels seized control of the 
district capital Ghulja and, exactly to the day eleven years after founding of the first East 
Turkestan Republic (ETIR, researched in Chapter 3), proclaimed the second East Turkestan 
Republic (Sherqiy Türkistan Jumhuriyiti, ETR) on November 12, 1944. By summer 1945, the 
rebels formed a regular military force under the name Ili National Army (Ili Milliy Armiyisi, 
INA), took control of the so-called Three Districts of northern Xinjiang (Altay, Chöchek and 
Tarbaghatay) and seriously challenged the provincial troops near Urumchi. An armistice with 
the government was reached in September 1945 (Forbes: 172-6; 186-90; Benson 1990: 42-52). 
 
  Presently, there does not exist a unanimous scholarly agreement in interpretation of 
the uprising. It appears certain that some of its traits were very similar to those of Turkic 
insurgency of the 1930s, examined in previous chapter of this dissertation. In particular, the 
1940s‘ movement was also set in motion by economic crisis aggravated by immediate 
political abuse of power by newly arrived and ethnically heterogeneous administration. Initial 
action was taken by Turkic groups, namely Kazaks (who were the most populous group in the 
Three Districts and formed around 50% of its population), Uyghurs (who should be in fact 
considered Taranchi according to Sheng‘s classification), Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and Tatars. Despite 
the fact that the common anti-KMT cause also attracted all the other non-Turkic ethnic groups 
inhabiting northern Xinjiang, namely Tungans, Mongols, Shiwes, Solons, Manchus, Russians 
and even some Han, the name of the ETR and the timing of its proclamation suggests that it 
was established primarily as a state of Turkic Muslim ethnic groups. A flag with crescent and 
star on green background symbolizing Islam was used and massacres of Hans occurred 
frequently in the early turmoil of fighting. The highest post of the ETR‘s president was 
initially given to a highly popular religious scholar Elikhan Töre Saghuni (1885-1976), an 
Uzbek from Russian Turkestan who had fled the communists to Xinjiang in 1920s and served 
a sentence of several years in Sheng Shicai‘s prison until 1942. Similarly, Hakim Beg Khoja, 
appointed as Töre‘s deputy, was an influential Uyghur landowner, while other prominent 
members of the government, such as Abdulmuta‘ali Khalifa, minister of religious affairs, and 
Saud Damolla, vice-minister of education, allegedly used their religious expertise and 
charisma to ally with Töre in efforts to institute Islamic law, religious education and selection 
of state officials based on their religious knowledge (Forbes 176-9, 184). As discernible in the 
below pamphlet issued sometime in the early stage of the uprising and signed by Elikhan Töre, 
some aspects of the proclamation of the ETR were strongly reminiscent of the first attempt at 
East Turkestani independence:  
 
‗…The Turkestan Islam Government is organized: praise be to Allah for his manifold 
blessings! Allah be praised! The aid of Allah has given us the heroism to overthrow 
the government of the oppressor Chinese. But even if we have set ourselves free, can 
it be pleasing in the sight of our God if we only stand and watch, while you, our 
brethren in religion…still hear the bloody grievance of subjection to the black 
politics of the oppressor Government of the savage Chinese? Certainly our God 
would not be satisfied. We will not throw down our arms until we have made you 
free from the five bloody fingers of the Chinese oppressors‘ power, nor until the very 
roots of the Chinese oppressors‘ government have dried and died away from the face 
of the earth of East Turkestan, which we have inherited as our native land from our 
fathers and our grandfathers…‘ (Benson 1990: 45-6) 
 
 Nevertheless, a scholarly controversy continues about other ideological currents within 
the late 1940s‘ northern Xinjiang uprising, which apparently flowed in a different direction 
than the above outlined ideology resembling the Turkic nationalist insurgency of 1930s. 
 169 
Namely, the dispute evolves around the question to what degree the 1940s‘ revolt was a 
genuine Turkic nationalist movement seeking independence, or at least autonomy, and to 
what degree it was a result of Soviet manipulation aimed at destabilization of the KMT‘s rule 
in Xinjiang. Linda Benson in her thoroughly researched work, which continues to be the most 
informative source on the movement, stresses the first aspect of the Ili rebellion issue. She 
interprets the insurgency as a nationalist attempt at founding East Turkestan Republic, an 
independent Muslim nationalist state of mostly Turkic Muslim population of northern 
Xinjiang (Benson 1990: 3, 41, 145, 152). She perceives the most prominent leader of the 
movement, Akhmet Jan Qasimi (1912-1949), as a Turkic nationalist intent on establishing a 
democratic, Muslim-majority government in Xinjiang (Benson 1990: 141). According to her, 
the most influential Turkic political body of the Three Districts was the ‗highly nationalistic‘ 
East Turkestani Revolutionary Youth Organization (Sherqi Türkistan Inqilabiy Yashlar 
Teshkilati; ETRYO; Benson 1990: 151, Benson 1992: 38), which was in favor of establishing 
independent East Turkestan and acted also in the KMT-controlled districts. In Benson‘s 
opinion, the insurgency necessarily depended on Soviet tacit consent and support, non-
interference and non-support to the KMT provincial government (Benson 1990: 5, 34, 40, 
137). While acknowledging that there might have even been some Soviet support in the form 
of advisors or military units (Benson 1990: 138-42), Benson argues that the ETR policy 
implementation does not show an ‗exaggerated Soviet influence‘ and that the Soviets 
probably rather acted as a conservative force, who in latter stages of the movement sought to 
reduce the insurgency‘s nationalist drive and urged the rebels to reconcile with the provincial 
government. Despite this pressure, she Benson claims the ETR to have symbolized the dream 
of independent Islamic state uniting its Turkic population under democratic government 
(Benson 1990: 152-4).  
 
 Similarly, while Laura Newby admits that Soviet influence and socialist ideas had by 
mid-1940s deeply permeated the Ili insurgency and the ETR showed clear signs of 
Sovietization, she also claims that the nationalist movement ‗…was not merely a tool for 
Soviet strategy; resistance from within cannot be ruled out as an important factor in 
discouraging the Soviet Union from helping the Kuldja group to carry the separatist 
movement to final victory with the liberation of all Sinkiang.‘ In fact, accommodations to 
Soviet pressures should be interpreted as a political foresight by moderates dominating the 
movement, who understood Eastern Turkestan‘s precarious position between two 
ideologically opposed powers (Newby 1986: 155-61, 227-30). Roostam Sadri in his article 
concludes that the liberation struggle of all ethnic groups of Eastern Turkestan fell victim to 
the USSR and both KMT and PRC-controlled China‘s consensus over their common 
geopolitical interests at the expense of interests and will of Xinjiang‘s indigenous peoples 
(Sadri 311-3). Similarly, Allen Whiting acknowledges the formidable influence of the USSR 
over the matter, but also points out to the indigenous groups‘ liberation struggle aspect of the 
movement (Whiting and Sheng 110-1). 
 
 Other studies argue that Soviet role was much stronger. Although Andrew Forbes 
claims that the degree of Soviet involvement is impossible to asses, he thoroughly describes 
Soviet support by supply of military and organizational training, weaponry, logistics, advisory 
personnel and allegedly even some direct military action. He even parallels the USSR‘s role 
in setting up the ETR to Soviet interventions in Iran that led to emergence of Muslim 
secessionist statelets of Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan and Kurdish Republic of 
Mahabad in 1945 (Forbes 177-8, 261-3). Soviet involvement in the affair was also related to 
the fact that the USSR did not look favorably at the assumption of power by the 
USA-supported KMT in its volatile borderland, and therefore could benefit from an 
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insurgency that compromised the authority of Xinjiang provincial government (Millward 
2007: 11). Again, it was the pivotal position of Xinjiang at the crossroads of world power 
politics that influenced its fate. As a result of Soviet interest, Elikhan Töre‘s ‗Turko-Islamic‘ 
wing was gradually outmaneuvered by a Soviet-supported ‗progressive‘ wing that sought to 
establish a secular, pro-Soviet secessionist state. Several figures of the ‗progressive‘ group 
were trained and organized in the Soviet Union already prior to the uprising. A Xinjiang 
Turkic People‘s National Liberation Committee (XTPNLC) was established in Almaty in 
1943 with the goal of generating opposition to Sheng-KMT regime and eventually became the 
most influential structure in the insurgency, through which the USSR successfully propelled 
the insurgency in the direction it desired (Forbes 173-4). Headed by Akhmet Jan Qasimi, who 
according to Forbes was most probably ‗Stalin‘s man‘ in the movement, this group included 
also Abdukerim Abbasov (?-1949), Ishaq Beg (Kyrgyz, 1903-1949) and Seypidin Ezizi 
(Uyghur, 1915-2003; Forbes 177-86).  
 
 Forbes states the armistice of summer 1945 between the INA and provincial troops 
was also reached due to direct pressure from the Soviet Union on the former to stop their 
imminent advance on Urumchi. The USSR exerted this effort in the wake of signing the Yalta 
Agreement of February 1945, which also stipulated that the USSR stops interfering in 
Xinjiang in exchange for regaining its privileges in northeastern China. During lengthy 
negotiations between the two sides, the Ili leaders agreed to abandon their separatist goals and 
cease to refer to the insurgent territory as to the ETR,
80
 while the KMT promised to grant 
autonomy, inspired by the Ili model, to the entire Xinjiang. The talks concluded in June 1946 
by signing of peace agreement and by forming coalition government consisting of the Ili 
delegates, provincial appointees and central government‘s appointees (Forbes 177-186). 
Elikhan Töre himself was shortly after signing the peace agreement forcibly transported to the 
Soviet Union, where he was held under house arrest in Tashkent until his death in 1976. 
According to Forbes, the pro-Soviet faction successfully managed to harness the uprising, 
while its initial Turko-Islamic overtone evaporated by summer 1945 (Forbes 186-95). As 
pointed out by Linda Benson, by recognizing Xinjiang as part of China while insisting on its 
political autonomy, the  Three Districts‘ delegates‘ stance moved closer to that of the Three 
Gentlemen, although these were, as will be shown later in this section, continuously vilified 
by the Three Districts‘ propaganda. 
 
 The coalition government effectively collapsed in summer 1947, the Three District 
delegates retreated to Ili and northern Xinjiang was administered as a factually independent 
territory until communist takeover in 1949. During this period, the key political organization 
in control of the Three Districts was the Union for Suppport of Peace and Democracy in 
Xinjiang (Shinjangda Tinchliqni we Khelqchilikni Himaye Qilish Ittipaqi; USPDX), which 
integrated several other bodies, such as the ETRYO, and ‗despite the name was the party 
behind Ghulja‘s one-party system‘ (Millward 2007: 223). The USPDX‘s main publication 
organ was Forward (Algha), while other Turkic publications at the time were for instance 
People‟s Voice (Khelq Awazi), Revolutionary Youth (Inqilabi Yashlar), Democrat (Khelqchi), 
New Path (Yéngi Yol), Örnek (Mirror), Women‟s Voice (Khanim-Qizlar Awazi), Mirror of 
                                                 
80
 On the topic of East Turkestan‘s independence, Akhmet Jan Qasimi is said by several sources to 
have proclaimed in August 1946 that ‗… Although East Turkestan is a geographical name, it cannot 
be regarded as a political movement theory. If people use it as such, then they are the enemy of the 
provincial government and of all the province‟s people…‘, and to have denounced the idea of 
Xinjiang‘s secession at several other occasions. The shelving of the original objective of East 
Turkestan‘s independence is thus interpreted as a realistic assessment of Xinjang‘s geopolitical 
position between two powerful neighbors (Benson 1992: 34, 41, 43). 
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Knowledge (Bilim Örnesi), Unity (Birlik) or Union (Ittipaq; Xu 1994: 80-1). At the same time, 
presumably with more Soviet assistance than what could be described as mere blessings, the 
USPDX‘s agenda was very much in accordance with the USSR‘s policy of supporting the 
principle of territorial indivisibility of the Republic of China (Benson 1990: 152). 
 
 The interpretation of the insurgency as a Soviet scheme can be naturally also found in 
contemporary central government and KMT materials. It has been already pointed out by 
Benson that in contemporary sources close to the central government, the insurgency figured 
as the ‗Ili Incident‘ (伊犁事件 Yīlí sh ji n; occasionally also the ‗Yining Incident‘ [伊寧事件 
Yīníng sh ji n] according to the Chinese name for the city of Ghulja) and was seen as a 
consequence of Soviet imperialist intrigue (Benson 1990: 4-5, Benson 1992: 23). Here, it is 
again useful to refer to Zhang Dajun‘s work for it presents a very good example of the KMT 
view of the insurgency. While acknowledging that the discontent of indigenous nationalities 
in Xinjiang was to a large degree caused by the incompetency of KMT officials, Zhang places 
the greatest part of guilt on the USSR, who supported the ‗treachery of Ili native nationalities‘ 
(伊犁土著民族叛變 Yīlí t zh  mínz  p nbi n). The previous Soviet support of Sheng and all 
other Han ruling elites is by Zhang described as a cover for its ‗intrusive behavior‘ (侵略行為 
qīnlǜe xíngwéi), while subsequent turn to supporting the rebels was caused by the 
improvement of China‘s standing towards the end of anti-Japanese war. Soviet support to the 
‗native nationalities‘ revolutionary movement‘ (土著民族的革命運動 t zh  mínz  de gém ng 
y ndòng) antagonized the actions of the central government‘s and the rebels. The initial stage 
of the rebellion occurred under the flag of nationalism and leadership of characters such as 
Elikhan Töre, a fanatically nationalistic element demanding ‗self-determination and 
autonomy‘ (自决自治 z zh  z jué). This group was subsequently replaced by communists, 
such as Qasimi and Seypidin. Zhang refers to the insurgency as to ‗treachery‘ (背叛 bèip n), 
‗incident‘ (事件 sh ji n), ‗coup‘ (事變 sh bi n), ‗rebellion‘ (叛亂 p nlu n) or even ‗fake 
Turkestan People‘s Republic‘ (偽東土耳其斯坦人民共和國  wěi Tūěrqísīt n rénmín 
gònghéguó), which are all expressions with connotations of illegal and illegitimate activity 
(Zhang 6243-50, 6527). Similar interpretation of the events was presented by David Wang, 
who in his work concentrated on illustrating the intensity and scope of Soviet. In his 
interpretation, the „…Ili Regime was a feudal Moslem nationalist regime which was 
encouraged, supported, and controlled by the Soviet Union…‘ According to Wang, the initial 
goal of the movement, establishing a Muslim state under the rule of pan-Islamists, was 
manipulated for its own purposes by the Soviets and finally by the Chinese Communist 
Party‘s propaganda (Wang 167-72, 321-36, 407-18). 
 
 Finally, the PRC‘s interpretation of the events is determined by a comment of Chinese 
communist leader Mao Zedong (毛泽东; 1893-1976) that the insurgency was a ‗part of all of 
us Chinese people‘s democratic revolutionary movement‘ (我全中国人民民主革命运动的一
部分 wǒ quán Zh ngguó rénmín mínzh  gém ng y ndòng de yī b fēn; Xu 1998: 259). Thus, 
the whole movement is glorified by today‘s communist propaganda by one of the most correct 
words of communist theory – Three Districts‘ Revolution (三区革命  S nqū gém ng; 
according to the three northern districts of Altay, Chöchek and Tarbaghatay). The Chinese 
Communist Party today asserts that the Three Districts‘ Revolution was supported by Soviet 
communists through international diplomatic pressure, propaganda (which to some degree 
contained also ‗erroneous‘ ideas that were in conflict with the concept of the unity of 
motherland), forming and supporting secret organizations, training of leading figures in 
ideology and military skills, supplying equipment, advisors, occasional manpower and other 
subversive activities (Xu 13-4). However, the most decisive impulse to the success of the 
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Three Districts‘ Revolution was the Chinese Communist Party‘s support from interior China. 
The insurgency, as well as the national question itself, is seen as a part of mankind‘s social 
evolution and development, namely struggle against ‗imperialistic, feudal and 
bureaucratic-capitalist reactionary domination‘ (帝国主义, 封建主义,官僚资本主义的反动
统治 d guó zh y , fēngji n zh y , gu nliáo zīběn zh y  f ndòng tǒngzh ) of the KMT. After 
some mistakes were made in the initial stage of the uprising by separatist elements such as 
Elikhan Töre, the movement was steered into the right direction by Qasimi, Abbasov and 
other politically conscious figures. However, by far the most important factor was the fact that 
the revolutionary movement of all the people of China the under the leadership of the CCP 
surged day by day and weakened the KMT‘s rule. It was specifically the Han people who 
made up the main force of all victorious nationalities of China and thus made the most 
significant contribution to the success of the Three Districts‘ revolution (Xu 18, 259-266).  
 
Similar interpretations of the movement resound also in the memoirs of participants of 
contemporary events. Seydulla Seypullayov, who held a senior official post during the 
insurgency, claims that the movement was Soviet-supported, non-separatist and strove to 
implement policies analogous to those of the CCP in the interior. He uses the term of the 
movement ‗Three Districts‘ revolution‘ (Üch wilayet inqilabi) and claims that the designation 
‗East Turkestan‘ carried only geographical connotations. Although the initial purpose of the 
revolt was to liberate the people of East Turkestan, separatism was not among its goals. The 
reason why the policies of Three Districts‘ administration could not have been at the time 
referred to as ‗communist‘ and ‗Marxist-Leninist‘ was because of strong religiosity of a large 
part of local population. Nevertheless, the administration was highly sympathetic to the 
success of communist movement in the interior and prepared Three Districts for eventual 
takeover by the CCP (Seypullayov 25-7, 34, 45, 49, 68-9). Burhan Shehidi in his memoir does 
not systematically approach the issue of Soviet involvement in the insurgency. However, he 
remarks that revolutionarily minded individuals with early communist ideas such as Qasimi 
and Abbasov were one of three ideological elements present in Three Districts‘ government 
(the other two being bourgeois and feudally-religious representatives), and presents anecdotic 
evidence of influence of Soviet consulate in the province. According to him, the initial 
ideological mistakes of the insurgency were promptly corrected by representatives who had 
under Qasimi‘s leadership adopted Marxist-Leninist viewpoint and took control of Three 
Districts‘ administration (Burhan 606-8). Finally, interpretation of Seypidin Ezizi, a 
high-ranking Three Districts‘ official who after the unclear death of other insurgent leaders in 
1949 allied the region with Mao Zedong‘s PRC, writes in his memoirs in a similar tone. 
Although he regards Soviet help and assistance one of vital agents in the insurgency (Ezizi 
1997b: 368-70) and in many places presents anecdotic evidence of Soviet hand in the events 
(Ezizi 1997b: 28-33), he nevertheless interprets the whole insurgency as a ‗part of new 
democratic revolution‘ (yéngi démokratik inqilabining bir qismidur) of the proletariat of 
China (Ezizi 1997b: 400-6). Influence of the Chinese Communist party in Xinjiang and its 
indoctrination of local population with communist and Marxist ideology was according to him 
a factor as important as the revolutionary zeal of Xinjiang‘s oppressed peoples (Ezizi 1997b: 
24-28, 363-8). 
 
Ideas of Nation and Nationalism in the Three Districts 
 
All of the above mentioned authors imply that the less nationalistic, less pan-Turkist 
and less Islamist creed more compatible with Soviet and Chinese communist principles 
gradually gained prominence in the ideology of the Three Districts. Establishing friendly 
relations with the Soviet Union had already been one of the main principles of the so-called 
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Ghulja Declaration, a rebel manifesto issued in January 1945 (Forbes 183). The national 
question is addressed in two other rebel pamphlets from 1945 and 1947, previously publicized 
by Linda Benson. East Turkestan and Central Asia is by their authors perceived as the hearth 
of Turkic nations, namely Uyghurs, Taranchis, Kazaks, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and Tatars, which 
have all lived in the place since ancient times. The Turkic nationalities are devout Muslims, 
while God is on their side in their struggle for free Muslim East Turkestan State and will 
punish the oppressors. There are also Mongols and Russians living nowadays peacefully in 
the region, whose homeland is also not China. All of the above groups were considered true 
masters of East Turkestan. After the arrival of the Chinese, local people were robbed of their 
civilization and even prevented to refer to their homeland by its real name. During Sheng 
Shicai‘s government, a truly cruel oppression was instituted. Therefore, the insurgents were 
demanding termination of Chinese rule and immigration, institution of equality of 
nationalities, representative government, autonomy, national armed forces, education and 
other revolutionary political ideals. The insurgents were specifically intent on achieving 
democracy, justice and liberty. Notably, reestablishing friendly relations with the USSR in the 
spheres of commerce and politics was claimed to be an absolutely indispensable precondition 
to achieving these ideals (Benson 1990: 200-208). Indeed, the Soviets were perceived as 
patrons of the Xinjiang people:  
 
‗…The people of East Turkestan [Xinjiang] are like an orphaned child, without father 
or mother or anyone to heed its cries. The savage Chinese have torn the child from 
the mother that bore it (the Soviet Government) and seek to give it to a foster mother 
(the Three People‘s Principles) for the latter to trample it under foot. For the people 
of East Turkestan the severance of their mutually friendly relations with the Soviet 
Union and their subjection to the discipline of the Three People‘s Principles by the 
savage Chinese is the same thing as death by torture...‘ (Benson 1990: 204) 
 
 The sources in Uyghur language examined in the following section of this chapter 
seem to indicate that the less Turko-Islamic and more pro-Soviet ideological orientation of the 
Three Districts‘ Rebellion also brought about a change in Three Districts‘ official discourse of 
nation and nationalism. The first example under research is the pamphlet We Are Ready to 
Defend Our Rights Acquired at the Price of Blood (Qan Bedelige Kelgen Hoquqimizni 
Himaye Qilishqa Teyyarbiz; ETRYO). It was authored jointly by the above mentioned East 
Turkestan Revolutionary Youth Organization (Sherqiy Türkistan Inqilabchil Yashlar 
Teshkilati; ETRYO) and Seven Districts Democrats‘ Association (Yette Wilayet Khelqchilar 
Birleshmisi), and published most likely in Ghulja by the Free People (Erkin Khelq) publishing 
house shortly after the collapse of Xinjiang coalition government in summer 1947. The text 
condemns the KMT authorities‘ non-adherence to the program of Xinjiang coalition 
government and voices strong determination of the Three Districts to defend the program 
regardless of the coalition‘s dissolution. The text starts in the name of God by this passage: 
 
‗…People of East Turkestan (Sherqiy Türkistan khelqi) have put up numerous 
revolutionary struggles, in particular the revolution of November 12, against the 
reactionary government‘s evil policy of oppression, enslavement, robbery, 
exploitation, assimilation, upholding backwardness and creating inequality in order to 
acquire freedom (erkinlik), equality (baraberlik) and democracy (khelqchilik), and 
signed the Eleven Point Treaty which guarantees equality, freedom and democracy 
and, according to the treaty, formed a democratic provincial government (khelqchil 
ölkülük hökümet)…‘ (ETRYO 1) 
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 The pamphlet further criticizes the ‗reactionary‘ (eksilhériketchi) KMT administration 
for obstructing the enactment of the government program. The oppression in the KMT-
administered seven districts of Xinjiang increased, essential rights guaranteed to the people by 
the treaty were violated and many prominent local figures were imprisoned. The government 
did not appoint to high posts those who were determined to do ‗people work‘ (khelq khizmiti). 
Instead, it appointed those participating at hindering the program, thieves, bribers, ‗those who 
sell out the homeland‘ (weten satquchi), ‗position-hungry traitors‘ (mensepperest munafiq), 
who all jointly increased the tyranny. Instead of allowing ‗freedom of publication‘ (metbu‟at 
hürlüki) and ‗freedom of speech‘ (söz hürlüki), the government terminated many existing 
periodicals and started publishing reactionary and fascist press. In Urumchi alone, martial law 
was enforced and thousands of people were imprisoned. When Three Districts‘ appointees to 
the provincial government sought to enact the government program, they heard only 
‗míngti n, hòuti n‘ (明天, 後天; literally ‗tomorrow, day after tomorrow‘). ‗Three Districts 
people‘s liberation troops‘ (Üch wilayet khelq azadliq qisimliri) were supposed to be included 
in the regular provincial army, but from October 1946 were not receiving provincial 
government‘s money. Funds for official and educational expenses in Three Districts were also 
withheld by the provincial government. Although the ‗Three District people‘s representatives‘ 
(üch wilayet khelq wekilliri) took part in provincial official duties, they were not able to 
overcome the KMT reactionaries. Therefore, in accordance with Ahmed Jan Qasimi‘s 
statement ‗…in a place where the treaty is enforced, we are also present. We are not present 
in a place where the treaty is not enforced. If people‟s demands are fulfilled, we will be a part 
of provincial government. If people‟s demands are not fulfilled, from that day we will not be a 
part of provincial government…‘, Three District delegates found it unsuitable to remain in the 
provincial government and resigned (ETRYO 2-15). 
 
 The text further reprimands the KMT for supporting Osman Batur, who is in the text 
referred to as ‗Osman the Robber‘ (Osman Bandit), because he turned against the Three 
Districts‘ administration in early 1946. Osman is portrayed as a person who twisted the 
‗revolutionary nature‘ (inqilabiy kharaktér) of ‗people‘s uprising‘ (khelq qozghilingi) in Altay 
into banditry and thus caused a great harm to it. Indeed, Osman is fighting those who are 
themselves ‗struggling for religion, for homeland and for the people‘ (din üchün, weten üchün, 
khelq üchün küresh qilghuchi); therefore, he should not be considered a Muslim. Regardless 
of the KMT‘s support to Osman, ‗our troops of national army‘ (milliy armiye qisimlirimiz) 
will fight Osman ‗in unity with our people‘ (khelqimiz bilen birlikte; ETRYO 14-22). 
Altogether, the people of Three Districts have the duty to fight by all means necessary against 
exploitation and tyranny, as well as for reinforcement of the peace agreement in the whole 
territory of Xinjiang. The ultimate goal of the Three Districts‘ administration was ‗peace 
based on true democracy, equality and freedom‘ (heqiqiy khelqchilik, baraberlik we erkinlik 
asasidiki tinchlik: 
 
‗…We, the people of Three Districts, who are fighting for liberation (azadliq), 
freedom (erkinlik), equality (baraberlik) and democracy (khelqchilik), will not yield 
to Osman nor to any reactionaries plotting against us by arming and shielding him. 
We will strike those who will try to ignite the fire of conflict and start a war; we will 
continue our fight for truly democratic policy (heqiqiy khelqchiliq siyaset) based on 
the peace agreement, as well as for peace (tinchliq) based on true parity and equality 
(heqiqiy tenglik we baraberlik). Our cause is truthful (heq) and truth (heqiqet) 
definitely indicates victory. Reactionaries will surely be punished by history for their 
disgraceful crimes…‘ (ETRYO 23) 
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‗…We do not love false peace and false democracy. We will not let go from our 
hands the rights that we gained, nor will we let to the life of true peace and 
democracy for which the people of Three Districts have spilled their blood. It is 
necessary to strengthen and preserve such peace and democracy by all means… We 
have acquired human rights and life of equality, democracy and freedom by such 
means. And by these means, we will preserve and strengthen our human rights and 
our life of equality, democracy and freedom. Let reactionaries disappear! Hail our 
people‘s freedom!...‘ (ETRYO 26-8) 
 
 The text of the pamphlet also inadvertently elaborates on the previously mentioned 
hypothesis that the ETRYO was a ‗highly nationalistic organization‘ (Benson 1990: 151). 
Notably, throughout the whole text, the words ‗nation‘ (millet) and ‗national‘ (milliy) are 
almost completely replaced by the term ‗people‘ (khelq). The situations, in which the national 
terminology is employed, are actually only isolated and relatively fixed expressions (such as 
‗National Army‘). Moreover, the word ‗national‘ (milliy) almost invariably carries the 
connotations of a ‗nationality‘, which are, moreover, not always positive: 
 
‗…But people of East Turkestan have no more patience left with the excessively evil 
policy of reactionary totalitarian elements. By the means of the November 12 
liberation revolution (azadliq inqilabi), they have acquired today‘s free life (erkinlik 
hayat) and human rights (insaniy hoquq). Our East Turkestan is a part of the world 
and our people are a part of people of the world. Therefore, just like people of the 
world we also love peace and democracy. But we love true peace and true democracy. 
In the kind of peace we love, it is necessary not to yield to bandits, terrorists, 
gossipers, militarists and those, who verbally support peace but in reality are igniting 
the fire of conflict. In the kind of democracy we love, it is necessary not to yield to 
reactionaries, tyrants, conservatives, those favoring supremacy of one nationality 
(millet), position-hungry flatterers who kiss up to the bureaucracy, bribers and 
treacherous rulers who are democrats only in speech or on paper. In the kind of peace 
that we want, it is necessary to promote and enforce equality, freedom, true 
democracy and progressivity...‘ (ETRYO 25-6) 
 
 Another example of increasing prominence of the term ‗people‘ as the concept of 
communal identity in Three Districts is Appeal to All Our Muslims of East Turkestan from the 
East Turkestan Central Religious Supervision (Sherqiy Türkistandiki Barliq 
Musulmanlirimizgha Sherqiy Türkistan Merkiziy Dinniye Nazaritidin Muraji‟et; here 
abbreviated as Appeal; RS), a pamphlet issued by the Religious Supervision (Dinniy Nazariti; 
RS) in Ghulja in 1948 and printed by the printing house of an influential Three Districts‘ 
newspaper Revolutionary East Turkestan (Inqilabiy Sherqiy Türkistan). Besides explaining 
the fundamental principles of Islam, the text elaborates on the role of religion in Three 
Districts. It stresses the social function of religion in facilitating ‗unity and union‘ (birlik we 
ittipaqliq), as well as progress and well-being of the ‗Muslim people‘ (Musulman khelq) of 
the Three districts: ‗That is to say that not only are religion and civilization not contrary to 
each other, both of them are even compatible components that guide society toward 
progress.‘ (RS 5) One passage asserts that one of the functions of religion is to uphold the 
state structure (RS 20). The text articulates four important appeals to Muslims by the Three 
District administration: to preserve unity of all Muslims in the region, to establish ‗friendly 
love‘ (dostane muhebbet) among all previously exploited groups living in the ‗historical 
homeland‘ (tarikhiy weten), for clerics to use the religion in a truthful and non-political way 
to cultivate people‘s ethical qualities and for the people themselves to strive for their spiritual 
and ethical improvement according to principles of Islam (RS 70-2). If these calls are heard, 
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then after having attained freedom, the ‗society‘ (jemi‟et) of the Three Districts will also see 
reform and progress (RS 77). 
 
 The Appeal also strongly denounces the politicization of religion in the remaining part 
of Xinjiang by the KMT. In particular, it is claimed that clerics in the south have to 
supplement their one word on religion by fifty words on Three People‘s Principles and have 
to include verbal support of the KMT and its ideology into their sermons, which have to be 
moreover previously approved by the state officials (RS 76-7). In contrast, the pamphlet 
declares that there is full freedom of Islamic worship in Three Districts. For more than three 
years, the religious affairs have been successfully run by the Religious Supervision, which 
provides for satisfying religious needs of the people, religious education of youth and clergy, 
construction of mosques and religious schools, as well as for their ‗reform‘ (islahat). At the 
same time, there is complete separation of religion from politics in the Three Districts, which 
enables complete freedom of religion (RS 73-7). What was not specifically expressed in the 
Appeal was the fact that this principle effectively limited the validity of religious rules and 
influence of Islamic clerics to religious and social affairs. 
 
 Similarly to the previous source, the word ‗nation‘ itself is used extremely rarely in the 
Appeal. The insurgency itself is invariably and in absolutely every instance called ‗national 
liberation rebellion‘ (milliy azadliq inqilabi; RS 54, 67). Other contexts featuring the national 
concept is for example the interpretation of the Three Districts‘ rebellion as of ‗work for 
religion‘ (din khizmiti), ‗work for homeland‘ (weten khizmiti) and ‗work for nation‘ (millet 
khizmiti; RS 62), an honorary address of a prominent religious figures as ‗nation worker‘ 
(millet khadimi; RS 49) or awareness of existence of the individual ‗nationalities‘ (millet) of 
Three Districts – Uyghur, Kazaks, Kyrgyz etc. (RS 17). However, this usage of the national 
terminology is both very rare and strongly ritualized. In an overwhelming majority of cases, 
the community inhabiting the Three Districts is defined as ‗people‘ (khelq). The term ‗East 
Turkestan‘ is used in a strictly geographical sense, such as in the title of the work or in 
formulations such as about ‗Han intruders occupying our beautiful homeland East Turkestan‘ 
(RS 13, 22). The expression ‗people of East Turkestan‘ (Sherqiy Türkistan khelqi) appears as 
frequently as ‗people of Three Districts‘ (Üch Wilayet khelqi). There are also references to the 
existence of ‗independent East Turkestani state‘ (musteqil Sherqiy Türkistan döliti; RS 56) or 
‗our previous famous state‘ (bizning burunqi ataqliq dölitimiz; RS 71). However, these 
instances are used strictly when speaking about the past. In the present, the geographical 
entity called East Turkestan houses a political structure called the ‗Three Districts‘ (Üch 
Wilayet) or ‗our districts‘ (bizning wilayetlirimiz; RS 67). The problem of Three Districts 
presently being or not being independent on China is not addressed at all in the Appeal.  
 
 The enemies of the national liberation revolution are called in the Appeal ‗Chinese 
tyrants‘ (Khitay mustebitliri; RS 66) or ‗Chinese reactionaries‘ (Khitay eksilhériketchiliri), not 
the Han as such. Another phenomenon jeopardizing the liberation revolution is disunity of the 
various groups in the Three Districts. The text alerts the people of Three Districts not yield to 
‗sabotage‘ (buzghunchilik) of the reactionaries, who are trying to implant ‗separatism‘ 
(bölgünchilik) and ‗antagonism‘ (ziddiylik) among the ‗nationalities‘ (milletler). Thus, 
defending the interest of an individual nationality is seen as outright detrimental. In fact, 
‗national antagonisms‘ (milliy ziddiylik) had already been the cause of decline of the region in 
the past (RS 70-1). Instead, the people of Three Districts should form a unity regardless of 
any kind of partial interest in order to attain ‗liberty and freedom‘ (azadliq we erkinlik) and 
‗well-being‘ (sa‟adet): ‗Thank God that now in our districts (bizning bu wilayetlirimizde), all 
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the people became one soul and one body (bir jan bir ten bolup) and staged national 
liberation revolution against slavery (qulluq). (RS 67; also 17, 19) 
 
 The decreased frequency of use of national terminology is also discernible by reading 
issues of Revolutionary East Turkestan (Inqilabiy Sherqi Türkistan; RET) of 1947 and 1948, 
one of the chief propaganda organs of the Three Districts (Forbes 185). From one point of 
view, the discourse of the Revolutionary East Turkestan is again similar to that of nationalistic 
periodicals of the 1930s examined in Chapter 3:  
 
‗…The essential goal (asasiy mekhsed) of the national liberation movement (milliy 
azadliq hérikiti), that has been occurring incessantly for centuries in our homeland 
East Turkestan, is to preserve our race, to continue our history, to advance prosperity 
of our homeland, to develop modern and progressive national education (milliy 
ma‟arip) and to exist in the same way as nations in democratic and civilized states 
(dölet) of the world are existing…‘ (RET 35: 1) 
 
 However, similarly to the two texts analyzed above, in the articles in the 
Revolutionary East Turkestan the words ‗nation‘ (millet) and ‗national‘ (milliy) are used 
rarely, while the context in which these terms are used is also very specific. For instance the 
armed forces of the Three Districts are called ‗Ili National Army‘ (Ili Milliy Armiye) or ‗East 
Turkestan National Army‘ (Sherqiy Türkistan Milliy Armiye; 26: 3). The term ‗East 
Turkestan‘ is still perceived as the only suitable historical and geographical name for the 
whole province (RET 33: 1, 45: 1, 151: 1), and there also exists the notion that East Turkestan 
is inhabited by several ‗nationalities‘ (milletler; 35: 1). References to independent state in 
East Turkestan are strictly limited to contexts when speaking about the past (RET 26: 3), 
while the issue of present political independence of Three Districts on China is ignored. On 
the contrary, the frequent use of the term ‗Xinjiang‘ implies that the region was tacitly 
perceived as a part of China. The present insurgency is in Revolutionary East Turkestan 
termed ‗national liberation movement‘ (milliy azadliq hérikiti), or ‗national liberation 
revolution‘ (milliy azadliq inqilabi) of November 12, in which ‗all people of Ili‘ (pütün Ili 
khelqi) took part (RET 26: 3, 231: 3, 203: 1). The name of a particular high school in Ghulja 
is Ili Nationalities‘ Grammar School (Ili Milletler Gimnaziyisi) and its mission is to educate 
children of various ‗nationalities‘ (milletler; RET 151: 3). The insurgency in southern 
Xinjiang in the 1930s is referred to as ‗national liberation struggle‘ (milliy azadliq küresh) 
joined by those ‗whose heart was agitated for the sake of homeland, nation and religion‘ 
(weten millet din üchün jan köydürüdighan kishi; RET 195: 1). In the present, neighboring 
Soviet Central Asian nationalities, closely related to the people of East Turkestan, are living 
in republics which are suitable to their ‗national specifics‘ (milliy khususiyetlik). These 
republics form a ‗union‘ (ittipaq) of ‗independent national republics‘ (musteqil milliy 
jumhuriyet) on the basis of ‗friendship‘ (dostluq) and ‗cooperation‘ (hemkarlik; RET 151: 1). 
On the other hand, separatism and nationalism in Three Districts are seen as negative and 
undesirable phenomena (RET 205: 2). ‗Union‘ (ittipaq) and ‗friendship‘ (dostluq) among the 
peoples of Three Districts is the essential principle of functioning of the society, while 
separatism and nationalism is a negative and undesirable phenomenon that needs to be 
eradicated because ‗the disease of nationalism (milletchilik késili) destroys the friendship 
among nationalities (milletler ara dostluqi), is the cause of weakening of their strength and 
opens avenues for enemy conspiracies‘ (RET 25: 1). 
 
 Thus, as in the previous sources in Revolutionary East Turkestan the word ‗nation‘ is 
also almost utterly replaced by the term ‗people of Three Districts‘ (Üch Wilayet khelqi), 
‗East Turkestani people‘ (Sherqiy Türkistan khelqi; RET 35: 1), or occasionally by the term 
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‗the public‘ (amma; RET 36: 2). Local ethnic groups are predominantly not referred to by the 
term ‗nationality‘. Instead, terms such as ‗brothers‘ (qérindash; RET 144: 3) or ‗peoples‘ 
(khelqler; RET 26: 3, 173: 1, 177: 1) are used in discussions of the respective peoples‘ affairs, 
such as functioning of cultural associations (151: 3). ‗Enemies‘ (düshmenler) of the 
insurgency consist of ‗reactionary elements‘ (eksilhériketchi unsurlar; RET 26: 3), which can 
be of any nationality, not specifically Han. The most important social objectives, or ‗people‘s 
interests‘ (khelq menpe‟iti), of the insurgency are ‗democracy‘ (khelqchilik), ‗equality‘ 
(baraberlik), ‗freedom‘ (erkinlik) and ‗people‘s happiness and well-being‘ (khelq bekhti-
sa‟aditi; RET 36: 2, 173: 4, 214: 3). Ahmet Jan Qasimi is titled ‗our democratic leader‘ 
(khelqchil rehberimiz; RET 177: 3), while the leadership is seen as legitimate for ‗all strata of 
the people of the province‘ (pütün ölke khelqining her qatlamdiki wekilliri) and inclusive of 
‗progressive persons‘ (tereqqiperwer ademler) and ‗democratic intellectuals‘ (khelqchil 
ziyalilar; RET 177: 1). The aim of revolutionary struggle is to do away with ‗superstition‘ 
(khurapatlik), ‗illiteracy‘ (jahaletlik) and ‗ignorance‘ (nadanqliq) engendered by the 
oppression of the reactionary Urumchi government and previous administrations which 
obstructed ‗civilization‘ (medeniyet) and ‗progress‘ (tereqqiyat; RET 26: 3). The articles in 
Revolutionary East Turkestan frequently describe successful functioning of ‗democratic 
education‘ (khelqchil ma‟arip) system, libraries being opened, appeals to the people to assist 
peasants with harvesting crops, political activity in the region etc. Large importance is 
attached to physical education of the people, because only in a healthy body can there be a 
healthy mind, and only with a healthy body the homeland and the people can be strong. 
Indeed, the physical health of the people is one of the essential duties of the administration 
after the liberation revolution (RET 224: 1). In agriculture, laxity in struggle against locusts is 
the same as laxity in struggle against enemies (RET 151: 1). Several articles also mention 
political and military courses being integrated into school curricula (RET 36: 1, 147: 3, 214: 1, 
215: 1). Treacherous officials like Three Gentlemen are interpreted as puppets in the hands of 
the KMT which is using them to fragment ‗people‘s strength‘ (khelqning küchi) in order to 
‗entirely annihilate our race‘ (nesilimizni pütünley yoqitish üchün; RET 208: 1).  
 
 The news coverage of Revolutionary East Turkestan often addresses revolutionary 
struggle of oppressed peoples against imperialism throughout the world. The USSR is seen as 
a patron of anti-colonial ‗national liberation movement‘ (milliy azadliq hérikiti) of peoples 
(khelqler) throughout the world (RET 151: 2, 248: 3). Considerable attention is devoted to 
victories of the Chinese Communist Party‘s People‘s Liberation Army (Khelq Azadliq 
Armiyisi) over the KMT troops in civil war in China proper (RET 200: 1, 201: 1, 202: 3). 
Turkey is portrayed as a reactionary country that sided with Germany during the World War 
(RET 248: 3). The paper also reports on uncovering a reactionary spy ring in Czechoslovakia 
connected with Catholic Church and involved in anti-state activities and propaganda, or on 
arrival of Czechoslovakian people‘s delegates on state visit to Moscow in 1948. The 
Czechoslovakian communist coup of February of 1948 is celebrated (RET 200: 2), as well as 
the election of communist leader Kim Il-sung (1912-1994) as the chairman of Korean 
‗people‘s democratic government‘ in September 1948 (222: 2), are celebrated in the paper. 
The Soviet Red Army Day (February 23) is pointed out as a festivity (RET 41: 2), while the 
elections in Soviet Central Asian republics are also closely covered (RET 38: 1). Unlike in the 
capitalist countries where well-being is available only for certain social strata, according to 
Revolutionary East Turkestan all the people of the Soviet Union can benefit from progress 
and civilization (RET 27: 1). Soviet Union is also seen as instrumental in bringing civilization 
to Xinjiang, for instance by running Uyghur, Uzbek, Tatar, Russian and Chinese movie club 
free of charge at the Ghulja consulate (RET 140/435: 4).  
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 The last source for examination of ideas of nation and nationalism in the Three 
Districts is the anthology Poems (Shé‟irlar) written by one Uyghur Son (Uyghur Oghli), 
which is a penname of a currently unknown author. The collection of twenty-four 
predominantly lyrical poems was published in Almaty in 1948 by the printing house of the 
Kazak Land (Qazaq Éli) journal, one of the periodicals through which the Soviet Union was 
seeking to assist and steer the revolutionary movement in the Three Districts. Kazak Land and 
other such Soviet Central Asian periodicals, for instance Oriental Truth (Sherq Heqiqiti) or 
New Life (Yéngi Hayat)
81
, were sent directly from Soviet Central Asia to Three Districts and 
surrounding areas (Seypullayov 29; Tursun 90). Although the degree of social penetration of 
ideas presented in the anthology is not certain, the poems are an interesting exemplification of 
the direction the Soviet authorities sought to steer the Three Districts rebellion. Poems in the 
collection are dated between 1937 and 1947 and are written in an easily understandable 
Uyghur vernacular set out in an almost fully phonetic script. We can therefore assume that the 
anthology was targeting the massive social stratum that had, due to recent Soviet policies, just 
recently emerged from the darkness of illiteracy, or that it was intended to influence still 
illiterate citizens, who were expected to listen to recitation of the poems or to memorize them. 
Notably, vernacularization of the historically elite genre of poetry was intended to openly 
manifest the Soviets‘ promotion of popular culture and modernization of the whole society. 
 
 Topics of the anthology‘s poems include school life, family affairs, relationships 
between children and their parents, revolutionary struggle, war for homeland, freedom, 
lyricism and nature. The concepts of ‗homeland‘ (weten), ‗land‘ (el) and ‗people‘ (khelq) are 
the strongest notions in a number of poems (Uyghur Oghli 13-5, 21, 22). It is seen as patriotic 
‗to devote life to the homeland‘ (wetenge jan bérish) or to die in struggle for it and to become 
‗people‘s hero‘ (khelq qehrimani; Uyghur Oghli 23, 29, 34, 35-7, 38-40). The collection 
features translations of poems by Alexander Pushkin (1799-1837) and even by influential 
Tatar Jadidist poet Abdulla Toqay (1886-1913; Uyghur Oghli 25, 26, 41, 42-3). There are also 
panegyrics on Moscow as the resting place of Lenin, who is seen as the father of Uyghur 
children, and on Stalin, who is perceived as the ‗fortune and representative of the people‘ 
(khelq bekhti hem deputat; Uyghur Oghli 10, 13-5, 17-20). The concept of territorial 
homeland of western Central Asia is strongly associated with the Soviets and becomes ‗Soviet 
land‘ (Sowét éli), while one poem also introduces the figure of Russian fairy tale hero Father 
Frost (Qish Boway; Uyghur Oghli 16, 28). Central Asian nationalities are termed ‗peoples‘ 
(khelq) which are fighting like ‗brothers‘ (aka-uka) with Russians for great Russia (Uyghur 
Oghli 12, 35-7). Importantly for the central theme of this dissertation, the word ‗nation‘ 
(millet) does not appear a single time in the collection. 
 
 The discourse of nation and nationalism in the above examined sources of Three 
Districts thus constituted a very significant development in early modern Uyghur perceptions 
of communal identity and interest. It has been remarked above that to a certain extent, the 
Three Districts‘ discourse of national interest, namely of righteous government of indigenous 
nationalities, resembled that of the ETIR and even that of the Three Gentlemen. On the other 
hand, propagandists of the Three Districts fully subscribed to the concept of Xinjiang‘s 
nationalities introduced by Sheng Shicai. In their perception, the geographical entity ‗East 
Turkestan‘ was inhabited by several nationalities, each clearly defined and distinct from each 
other. These nationalities jointly rose in a revolutionary liberation movement to overthrow the 
dysfunctional administration of the KMT in order to defend their interests of well-being, 
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 Not to be mistaken with periodical of the same name published during Sheng Shicai‘s 
administration in Kashgar in 1934-7. 
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progress and modernity. Similarly to Sheng‘s theory and in sharp contrast to nationalistic 
ideology of the ETIR and the KMT-affiliated Turkic nationalists, Three Districts‘ 
theoreticians rejected the idea of a single Turkic nation inhabiting its primordial and 
trans-state homeland of Turkestan, of which East Turkestanis are an inseparable part. Instead, 
the examined ideology of Three Districts viewed Uyghurs, Kazaks, Kyrgyz, Taranchis, 
Uzbeks and Tatars as separate nationalities living on the territory of East Turkestan. It appears 
that, unlike Sheng Shicai, the Three Districts propagandists seemed not to be willing to devote 
a lot of effort to repeating the defining traits of individual Xinjiang nationalities or verbally 
mentioning their names, or even to mentioning the national idea as such. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, the phenomenon of decreased importance of national labels in northern Xinjiang 
was partially caused by the natural multiethnic composition of the region and resulted for 
instance to the existence of common Turkic language used in some periodicals. As asserted 
elsewhere, in the insurgency ‗…a united front of the peoples of Eastern Turkestan was 
brought into existence, marking an unprecedented development in the nationalist movement of 
Sinkiang…‘ (Newby 1986: 148) Another reason to this reality was that by early 1940s, 
Sheng‘s pattern of Xinjiang nationalities took roots among Xinjiang Turkic intellectuals and 
therefore did not need to be specifically re-explained. Similarly to western Central Asia, in 
East Turkestan where until 1920s even Turkic intellectuals did not perceive their community 
as a nation, Sheng‘s affirmative policies and indigenization in Xinjiang obviously had the 
effect of relatively quick consolidation of disparate modes of identification into national 
identities, and therefore the absence of the need to repeatedly refer to them (Martin 73). 
 
 Nevertheless, the shift of primary communal identification from ‗nation‘ and 
‗nationality‘ to ‗people‘ in the late Three Districts‘ ideology is closely related to another, 
more decisive agent behind – the intensity of Soviet involvement in Three Districts‘ rebellion. 
Despite the fact that the terms ‗communism‘, ‗socialism‘, ‗Marxism‘, ‗Leninism‘ and other 
key concepts of Soviet ideology do not overtly appear in the above inspected texts, the 
discourse of ‗people,‘ as well as of ‗nation‘ and ‗nationalism,‘ is strikingly similar to Soviet 
ethnic theory and practice, as articulated for instance by a section of the political program of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of 1961: 
 
‗…Nationalism is the chief political and ideological weapon used by international 
reaction and the remnants of the domestic reactionary forces against the unity of the 
socialist countries. Nationalist sentiments and national narrow-mindedness do not 
disappear automatically with the establishment of the social system. Nationalist 
prejudice and survivals of former national strife are a province in which resistance to 
social progress may be most protracted and stubborn, bitter and insidious. The 
Communists consider it their prime duty to educate the working people in a spirit of 
internationalism, socialist patriotism, and intolerance of all possible manifestations of 
nationalism and chauvinism…‘ (Connor 1984: 477) 
 
 The content, vocabulary and lilt of the materials analyzed above suggest that Three 
Districts‘ ideologues envisioned, in a way highly similar to Soviet ethnic theory, the 
nationalities of East Turkestan as a single people, merged by centripetal forces of unity, 
brotherhood and friendship from several constituent nationalities. The people‘s ethnic identity 
clearly existed and was acknowledged by the state, but in fact did not matter much. Concepts 
such as ‗struggle for the nation‘ or ‗national uprising‘, which were crucial cornerstones of 
nationalist ideology during Turkic insurgency of the 1930s and KMT Turkic nationalists of 
1940s, yielded to ideas such as ‗struggle for the people‘ and ‗people‘s uprising‘, while ideas 
such as ‗people‘s representatives‘ or ‗people‘ liberation troops‘ started to function with an 
unprecedented prominence. As in the Soviet Union, in Three Districts nationalism, or in other 
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words placing loyalty on one‘s nationality instead on common identity of the people, was 
ideologically incompatible with the direction of Three Districts‘ social evolution and 
gradually started to be viewed as reactionary, counterrevolutionary and decisively negative, 
and the administration engaged in systematic propaganda about its detrimental effects 
(Connor 1984: 204-5). Portrayals of Three Gentlemen and their associates reveal that 
reactionary elements were not defined by the Three Districts‘ propagandists on the basis of 
nationality and could even have been members of one‘s own nationality.  
 
 Although the word ‗class‘ (sinip) is not used in Three Districts‘ texts, emphasis on 
‗people‘ and mentions of ‗strata‘, ‗social groups‘ and ‗reactionaries‘ reveals the 
administrators‘ conviction that, similarly to Soviet assertion, the most significant divisions 
among the populace were horizontal distinctions cutting across national groupings (Connor 
1984: 5). Or to paraphrase words of Ernst Gellner‘s famous ‗Wrong Address Theory,‘ Three 
Districts‘ propagandists believed that by delivering the ‗awakening message‘ to nationalities 
and not to people of all classes and strata, history or humanity made a grave mistake (Gellner 
129). As in the Soviet Union, by eliminating antagonisms among nationalities, loyalties to 
northern Xinjiang ethnic groupings were expected to crumble and social differentiations and 
contradictions to be revealed (Martin 67, 73). By furthering the interests of the people, namely 
democracy, equality and freedom, the Three Districts‘ government was to create a modern 
and prospering society where national identity did not pose a significant issue. The national 
question, in Soviet polity a ‗network of problems‘ arising from the existence of nations and 
nationalism (Connor 1984: xv), would thus cease to exist in the territory of East Turkestan. 
Moreover, the almost total absence of references to nation and nationality in Three Districts‘ 
texts suggests that, in view of government ideologues, the degree of solving the national 
question was now much higher when compared to Sheng Shicai‘s era – administration of 
Three Districts furthered the interests not of ‗fourteen nationalities of Xinjiang‘, but of a 
single ‗people of Three Districts‘. As in the Soviet Union, supra-national identity was 
expected to come forward after national cultures, following a period of affirmative action and 
indigenization, had exhausted themselves, the nationalities had naturally merged into a unified 
people and national territorial forms grew devoid of significant national content (Martin 5, 73, 
182). 
 
 Resemblance of the Three Districts‘ discourse of nation and nationalism to Soviet 
nationality policy is one powerful argument in favor of the above explored thesis that the 
Soviet Union had a considerable impact on institutions and ideology of the insurgency. 
Unfortunately, the future course of Three Districts‘ national policy can be only speculated 
about, while the degree of social penetration of Three Districts‘ official ideology can also not 
be reliably assessed. In fact, as many Muslims of Three Districts undoubtedly knew the recent 
history of Soviet Central Asia, it is reasonable to argue that the ideology expressed in Three 
Districts‘ periodicals did not necessarily reflect ordinary people‘s affection for the USSR. 
What is beyond doubt, though, is that the Three Districts‘ Revolution effectively ended in 
August and September 1949 after Akhmet Jan Qasimi, Abdukerim Abbasov, Ishaq Beg and 
other highly esteemed leaders perished in a shady plane crash en route from Almaty to Beijing 
to negotiate with the victorious Chinese Communist Party about the future of the Three 
Districts. After the crash was announced by the Soviets with a substantial delay, Seypidin 
Ezizi, the Three Districts‘ minister of education became the head of a new group of 
representatives that consented in Beijing to abandon calls for autonomy of East Turkestan. 
Simultaneously, the provincial troops surrendered in the KMT-administered districts of 
Xinjiang and the People‘s Liberation Army more or less peacefully took over the province by 
the end of 1949. Muhemmed Imin Bughra, Eysa Yusuf, Polat Qadiri and other 
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KMT-affiliated nationalist activists fled via southern Xinjiang and India to Turkey, while 
Mes‘ud Sabiri, refusing to leave, was arrested and executed in early 1950s, along with many 
other senior Turkic officials and activists associated with the both KMT and Three Districts, 
as well as with captured guerilla fighters such as Osman Batur. Eventually, the Chinese 
Communist Party instituted minority policy which contained some principles that had 
appeared in the Three Districts‘ proto-communist discourse on nation and nationalism. It can 
be, therefore, said that Three Districts‘ approach to community and communal interest 
foreshadowed the stance that would be taken toward national question by the administration 








 The above research attempted to outline the emergence and evolution of Xinjiang 
Turkic Muslims‘, or Uyghurs‘, ideas of communal identity and interest, or in other words of 
ideas of nation and nationalism, throughout the early modern period between 1880s and 1949. 
The examination was based on intellectual perceptions of these phenomena as articulated in 
historical works, poems, newspaper articles, pamphlets, speeches, memoirs and other texts 
authored by Uyghur intelligentsia and politicians. Due to lack of systematic field research in 
how ordinary people of the time felt about their communal identity and interest, this 
dissertation cannot and does not assess how deeply and widely the ideas expressed in the 
analyzed texts penetrated early modern Uyghur society. Instead, the probe limits itself to the 
sphere of early modern Uyghur intellectual history. This dissertation also does not claim to 
cover the whole process of emergence of Uyghur national consciousness. Although the 
overwhelming majority of the sources examined by this research have not been previously 
used by other scholars, and although this dissertation sought to make use of all, often 
painstakingly acquiesced, sources available to the author, the fact is that due to the restrictions 
of the PRC authorities to archival and field research in this sensitive theme, there remain 
numerous aspects of the topic that await further analysis. However, adopting time of 
provenance and contents of the available writings under analysis as the chief criteria for 
research, this dissertation did to a substantial degree manage to answer the two main research 
questions posed in the Introduction, particularly ‗What were the characteristics based on 
which Uyghur intellectuals perceived their people as a community?‘ and ‗What was regarded 
by Uyghur intelligentsia as communal interest?‘ The answers to these questions provided 
throughout the dissertation enable us to tentatively identify four stages of emergence of early 
modern Uyghur ideas of nation and nationalism. 
 
 Writings of Molla Musa Sayrami analyzed in Chapter 1, Pre-Modern Basis of 
National Identity (late 19
th
 century), exposed ideas of community and communal interest as 





 century. It was illustrated that the term Musulman, or Muslims, which 
Molla Musa Sayrami used to refer to his community, conveyed a clear sense of common 
identity defined by shared ancestry, religion, place of residence, mode of life, language, 
culture, history, mythology, political tradition, relics and memory of the past, sense of 
solidarity and number of other traits of indigenous sedentary Turkic Muslims of the Seven 
Cities region (southern and eastern Xinjiang) and Zungharia (northern Xinjiang). In other 
words, in pre-modern era the Musulman of Xinjiang formed a basis of modern nation, which 
in some aspects resembled other proto-national phenomena defined elsewhere by other 
scholars, such as pre-modern ethnie or even a modern nation. In the initial stage of anti-Qing 
uprisings described by Sayrami, the Musulman of Xinjiang also managed to act as a 
proto-national community seeking to defend its common interest – overthrowing of a 
religiously and ethnically heterogeneous administration and establishing sovereign 
jurisdiction in respective localities throughout Xinjiang. Nevertheless, in the subsequent 
stages of the insurgency Musulmans‟ proto-national identity and solidarity in action dissipated 
and their movement fractured along the lines of local and social factionalism. Therefore, 
although the Musulman elite strata, and probably also a large proportion of Musulman society, 
in Xinjiang did have a clear sense of proto-national communal identity and interest at the 
close of pre-modern period, this sense was of secondary importance to local and social 
interests and thus failed to materialize into communal action. In imagination of Musulman 
intellectual elite at the close of Qing period, the Musulmans‟ shared proto-national identity 
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failed to generate supra-local and supra-social sense of communal equality and homegeneity, 
whereas local and social divisions remained prominent stimuli for communal action within 
the broader scope of pre-modern religious realm. In any way, it is this chapter which 
corroborates the assumption voiced by other scholars (Geng 1982; Newby 2007, Bellér-Hann 
2008; Brophy 2005; Roberts 2009; Rudelson 1997) that the community, who in following 
decades came to be called Uyghurs, possessed distinct a certain proto-national sense of 
communal identity already prior to institutional introduction of the term ‗Uyghur‘ in 1920s in 
Soviet Central Asia and in 1930s in Xinjiang. 
 
 Chapter 2, Transfer of National Idea and National Agitation (1880s-1920s), focused 
on indigenous sedentary Turkic Muslims‘ intellectual elite views of communal identity and 
interest at the dawn of modernity in Xinjiang from 1880s to late 1920s. It was illustrated that 
during this period, affluent Xinjiang Turkic entrepreneurs and scholars sojourning in 
Russia/Soviet Union, the Ottoman Empire/Turkey and China proper grew familiar with local 
principles of modernism and nation-forming processes (such as those exemplified by writings 
of a Russian Taranchi Jadidist Nezerghoja Abdusémet) and introduced them into Xinjiang 
Turkic context. As a result, modernist projects in education, to a lesser degree also in the 
spheres of printing, publishing and new social organizations, appeared in Xinjiang and 
triggered a wave of Xinjiang Turkic Muslim cultural awakening. Writings of influential 
enlighteners Abdukhaliq Uyghur and Memtili Tewpiq revealed that during this period 
Xinjiang Turkic elites embraced the concept of their community as a modern nation 
descended from famed ancient Uyghurs and defined by a shared ancestry and homeland. 
Similarly to patterns ascertained elsewhere in the world, writings and actions of this new class 
of nationally conscious intelligentsia strongly contributed to emergence of modern national 
identity of Xinjiang Turkic Muslims. At the same time, the Xinjiang Turkic enlighteners 
clearly defined and agitated towards attaining communal interests of their nascent nation – 
modern education and culture leading to improvement of social and economic status of their 
community. Turkic intellectuals themselves also diligently acted towards defending of these 
objectives by opening modern schools and promoting progress within their community. In 
other words, national agitation of the new Xinjiang Turkic intelligentsia in this period was a 
passionate call on indigenous sedentary Xinjiang Turkic Muslims to awaken into national 
mode of perception of their own identity and to start defending their national interests, which 
the intellectuals of the period envisioned mostly in cultural and economic contours. 
 
 Chapter 3, Politicization of National Movement (1930s), explored the expansion of 
national interest from realms of culture and economy into the sphere of politics and statecraft. 
A decisive impulse in this direction was provided by Turkic insurgency in 1930-1934, which 
caused the provincial government to lose factual control of eastern and southern Xinjiang and 
resulted in proclamation of the first East Turkestan Republic in Kashgar in November 1933. 
During this movement, Qutluq Haji Shewqi, Muhemmed Imin Bughra, Emin Wahidi and 
other Turkic intellectuals and politicians viewed their community as a nation of East 
Turkestanis inhabiting the homeland of East Turkestan. They also defined other 
characteristics of the newly awakened, yet, as they believed, primordial East Turkestani 
nation inhabiting since the dawn of history its homeland East Turkestan, such as national 
history, abuse by dysfunctional Chinese administrations, tradition of national resistance to 
oppressive heteronomy and national symbology. They posited that past exploitation by China 
justified the insurgency as revolutionary national movement bent on restoration of national 
territory and prestige. Not surprisingly, for the insurgent thinkers the chief interest of East 
Turkestanis was national independence that was to enable rise of representative government, 
republicanism and modernity mainly in the form of national education, press, technology, 
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progress and development. In the nationalist ideology, these national interests were to be 
defended by the national state, who by their fulfilling sought to foster national consciousness 
of East Turkestanis, who were in turn expected to continue supporting the national state. The 
intertwining of communal identity and interest with modern nation-state transformed the 
heretofore largely cultural national movement into strongly politicized nationalist action.  
 
 Similarly, after the Turkic insurgency was defeated in 1934, provincial ruler Sheng 
Shicai temporarily built on the nationalist rhetoric and practice of the Turkic insurgency, in 
with he made several, nonetheless substantial alterations. Namely, he chose to divide the East 
Turkestani nation into several nationalities, of which the largest one was Uyghurs inhabiting 
eastern and southern Xinjiang. He also instituted unity of Xinjiang province with the 
motherland as the main political interest of Turkic nationalities, thus rejecting the concept of 
independent East Turkestani nation-state. Subsequently, similarly to the Turkic insurgent 
nationalist creed, Sheng either took up affirmative action toward fostering of newly defined 
identities of Uyghurs and indigenization of their public life, or permitted such trends to keep 
flourishing. Nevertheless, Sheng‘s brutal of purge progressive nationalist intelligentsia and 
abortion of affirmative action toward national identities reveals that his nationality policy was 
modeled on the Soviet strategy. Namely, Sheng resorted to the efficient Soviet scheme of 
utilitarian incorporation of the dynamics of national identity and nationalism in order to win 
trust of local Turkic nationalities, and of their later annihilation. In any way, though, it was a 
result of Turkic separatist nationalism and Sheng Shicai‘s affirmative policies in the 1930s 
that East Turkestani, or Uyghur thinkers, and arguably also substantial segments of East 
Turkestani/Uyghur society, started to see their community as a modern nation bound by 
distinct national traits and sense of solidarity in common movement toward their national 
interest of modern and prosperous life endowed with political rights. Importantly, the 
intelligentsia and the people also expected these interests to be protected by the administration 
of a more or less autonomous polity in which East Turkestanis, or Uyghurs, formed an 
overwhelmingly predominant nationality. 
 
 Chapter 4, Significance of National Boundary in Flux (1940s), illustrated the shift in 
intellectual discourse of nation and nationalism that occurred in altered geo-political situation 
in 1940s‘ Xinjiang. After the assertion of the Kuomintang authority in Xinjiang in 1944, local 
Turkic Muslims suddenly became a tiny fragment within the huge population of the Republic 
of China, which the Han-chauvinist ethnic theory of Chiang Kai-shek moreover defined as a 
single ‗nation of China‘. Therefore, KMT-affiliated Turkic nationalists like Eysa Beg, Mes‘ud 
Sabiri, Muhemmed Imin Bughra, Polat Qadiri and others had to engage in fierce arguments 
with the KMT policy makers about the status of their nation within the Chinese state. They 
refused to be considered a part of the ‗nation of China‘ and instead claimed that all Turkic 
groups of East Turkestan were inalienable components of a single Turkic nation comprising 
all Turkic nationalities of the world. Referring to Three Peoples‘ Principles and other 
cornerstones of the ROC legislature stipulating for right to self-determination of all 
nationalities of China, the KMT Turkic nationalists argued that only if the central government 
abandoned its discriminatory and chauvinist policy towards East Turkestanis and 
acknowledged them as a separate nationality with the right to high degree autonomy, could 
East Turkestan be sustainably administered as a part of China and thus contribute to 
well-being of all citizens of the Republic of China. In other words, at the moment when 
Xinjiang was factually incorporated into the ROC administration and indigenous Turks 
became a minority nationality of China, East Turkestani intellectuals where pressed to 
consider institutional recognition of their nation‘s existence and preservation of its boundaries 
as the primary national interest. Fulfillment of this fundamental national demand by the 
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central government was to enable Turkic activists defending secondary national interests, 
such as political autonomy, representative government, economic well-being or spread of 
national education and press. Preserving national boundary was seen as the key to survival of 
distinct Xinjiang Turkic identity within the KMT-dominated China. 
 
 In contrast, the insurgency that broke out in three northern Xinjiang districts in fall of 
1944 and led to the provincial government‘s loss of control over the territory until 1949, gave 
rise to an entirely different discourse of community and its interests. Particularly, the Soviet 
Union‘s strong influence over the Three Districts‘ revolution was reflected in an almost 
complete disappearance of the vocabulary of nation and nationalism in the texts published in 
the insurgent press and propaganda pamphlets. The ideologues of the Three Districts‘ 
revolution instead perceived their community as a single people formed of all, i.e. not only 
Turkic and not only Muslim, respective peoples residing in the geographical entity of East 
Turkestan. In other words, although the notion of ethnicity and national identity did exist in 
Three Districts, it was the people, not nation or nationalities, who were to strive for their 
communal interests of liberation, equality and democracy. Nationalism was occasionally even 
declared a reactionary and detrimental ideology. Similarly to Sheng Shicai, the Three 
Districts‘ propagandists also strived to downplay, possibly also to outright obliterate, the 
significance of boundaries of Uyghurs, Kazaks, Kyrgyz, Taranchis, Uzbeks, Tatars and all 
other nationalities of Xinjiang and to engender other than national modes of communal 
identity. 
 
 It has been emphasized in the Introduction that this dissertation strives to refrain from 
adopting a decidedly primordialist, modernist or ethno-symbolist approach to the emergence 
of modern Uyghur national consciousness. Likewise, the above chapters did not treat nation 
as a tangible entity; rather they viewed it as an intellectual construct, mode of perception, 
style of discourse and way of communal identification articulated and disseminated by elites 
among their fellow compatriots. On the one hand, the defining traits of the Musulman 
proto-national community relevant for Xinjiang Turkic scholars at the close of imperial era 
continued to shape elite perceptions of communal identity throughout the whole early modern 
era. At the same time, Xinjiang Turkic intelligentsia‘s notions of communal identity and 
interest evolved into national and nationalist argument clearly as a result of stimuli generated 
by modernization trends beyond Xinjiang borders. Similarly, national movement and 
nationalism was not treated here as a clearly defined ideology which had a certain beginning 
and attracted a definite number of followers; rather it was viewed as movement of a national 
community toward attaining a common interest. Along this line, early modern ideas of 
national interest of Xinjiang Turkic Muslims evolved from cultural self-improvement through 
political autonomy to preservation of, or alternatively to disposal of, national boundary. Here, 
it is possible to borrow Miroslav Hroch‘s aforementioned approach of periodization 
nation-formation process of European nations (Hroch 1996: 81, Hroch 2000: 23). However, it 
is important to stress here again that this dissertation uses different criteria than Hroch‘s 
perspective and falls into category of intellectual history, generally refraining from assessing 
the degree of social penetration and modalities of mass national movement. Therefore, the 
results of this research do not outline a nation-formation process, but establish four stages of 
evolution of early modern sedentary Xinjiang Turkic intelligentsia‘s ideas of national identity 






 Phase A – Pre-modern basis of national identity (late 19
th
 century) 
 Phase B – Transfer of national idea and national agitation (1880s – 1920s)  
 Phase C – Politicization of national movement (1930s) 
 Phase D – Significance of national boundary in flux (1940s) 
 
 Besides this more or less narrative thread, this dissertation also revealed several other 
patterns resonating through the phenomenon of early modern Uyghur nation and nationalism. 
Firstly, the developments under research again attest to the role of Xinjiang as a pivotal 
conduit of ideas and ideologies among cultures and empires. Chapter 1 described the 
interrelation of an indigenous uprising with Khoqandi adventurism, Qing empire-building 
strategies and British diplomacy. Chapter 2 talked about the journey of the national idea and 
progressive modernism from Europe-inspired Turkic communities of Russia/USSR and 
Ottoman Empire/Turkey to Chinese Turkestan, where it interacted with ideas of modern 
Chinese revolutionary republicanism. Chapter 3 depicted the inclusion of theretofore largely 
isolated post-imperial satrapy of Xinjiang into the Sino-Japanese conflict and the growth of 
Soviet influence in the province, which led to combining of Soviet-inspired policies with 
Republican Chinese state ideology and practice. Chapter 4 illustrated the insertion of Xinjiang 
into global affairs of World War II, into the plethora of Sino-Soviet ties and into the Cold War, 
which generated a curious mix of East Turkestani nationalism and cultural pan-Turkism with 
Kuomintang state ideology in areas under provincial control and an increased penetration of 
Soviet ideology into the insurgent Three Districts. It is in the early modern era between 1884 
and 1949 that this dissertation delved into, when the immense geopolitical importance of 
Xinjiang as once vital hub along the Silk Road reemerged in unabated degree. Notably, the 
strong Russian and Soviet influence on Xinjiang‘s political, cultural, commercial, military and 
other affairs throughout the whole period under research in this dissertation is one of 
prominent traits of the region‘s central position. As a result, both Czarist Russia and the 
Soviet Union were regardless of their administrators‘ stance toward Islam viewed by Xinjiang 
Turkic intelligentsia as a source of Western modernity and a model of progressive 
development. This mechanism to a certain degree survived founding of the People‘s Republic 
of China – the strong Soviet involvement in the Three Districts lasted until the Sino-Soviet 
split in early 1960s. Since then the Xinjiang border between the two powers became a divide 
between two openly hostile nuclear powers. In 1980s, as one of the many consequences of the 
Afghan war, Xinjiang Uyghurs became increasingly exposed to radical Islamist ideology 
stemming from Pakistan and the region became once again an epicenter of conflict between 
two antagonistic ideologies. Other nowadays‘ manifestations Xinjiang‘s importance in global 
politics have already been pointed to in the Introduction. 
 
 It was also shown by this dissertation that the two antagonistic dynamics outlined in 
Chapter 1, namely the community principle and the disparity principle influencing the 
cohesiveness of Xinjiang indigenous sedentary Turkic Muslim notions of communal identity 
and interest, remained active throughout the whole early modern era until 1949. The 
centripetal dynamics of common ethnic origin, religion, language, mode of life, culture, 
mythology, political heritage and other traits shared by the Musulman at the and of 
pre-modern era were in the following decades elaborated on by concepts such as common 
ethnonym, homeland, history, plight, liberation movement and many other characteristics, 
which eventually came to define the East Turkestani, or Uyghur, nation. As regards 
communal interest, the pre-modern Musulmans‘ frenzied urge to overthrow ethnically and 
religiously heterogeneous administration evolved in early modern period into relatively well 
coordinated East Turkestani and Uyghur national movement intent on improving their cultural 
level, attaining political sovereignty and preserving distinct identity in the immense Chinese 
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realm. However, these aspirations articulated by intellectual strata were confronted by actions 
taken simultaneously by their compatriots, which were a manifestation of the centrifugal 
disparity principle. Thus, in 1910s and 1920s when Abdukhaliq Uyghur, Memtili Tewpiq and 
other enlightened philanthropists promoted secular education and the idea of Uyghur nation, 
significant portions of religious establishment actively sabotaged the modernist initiative due 
to their fears of erosion of traditional values and principles of religious realm. At the time 
when Qutluq Haji Shewqi and other nationalist intellectuals propagandized the concept of 
East Turkestani nation in Kashgar in 1930s, Khoja Niyaz Haji and thousands of his troops 
allied with Sheng Shicai, who overtly strived to dissolve East Turkestani identity into fourteen 
nationalities of Xinjiang. At the time when the Three Gentlemen spread ideals of cultural 
pan-Turkism in Urumchi and the KMT-controlled eastern and southern Xinjiang in 1940s, 
their compatriots in the Three Districts asserted that ethnic distinctions among Xinjiang 
nationalities were not significant and all the people of the province, regardless of their 
ethnicity and religious creed, should unite in revolution against reactionary government, 
whose ethnicity in fact also did not matter much. It is worth remarking here that the disparity 
principle continues to shape Uyghur communal action today, as can be seen for example in 
the fact that only rarely in last years did Uyghur demonstrations or violent clashes 
simultaneously erupt in more than a few cities in Xinjiang. 
 
 However, this dissertation demonstrated that despite such diverse factionalism in 
thought and action, during the course of early modern era East Turkestanis, or Turks, or 
Uyghurs, came to think of themselves as of a single nation and to pursue widely consented 
national interests. In particular, although some Turkic educators of 1920s are known to have 
pursued pointedly anti-Christian and anti-Western agendas, they at the same time participated 
in the modern educational enterprise run by Jadids. Although Mahmud Muhiti allied with 
Sheng Shicai and thus indirectly contributed to consolidation of his totalitarian regime in 
southern Xinjiang in 1930s, he also actively supported and operated new education projects 
bent on inculcating Turkic national consciousness. And even though in 1940s the Three 
Gentlemen and Turkic leaders of the Three Districts allied with directly antagonistic political 
powers, both groups were clearly aware that they belonged to the same national community 
and even drafted largely sets of national interest. The phenomenon of a community imagining 
itself as a nation regardless of varying interests defined and actions taken by its respective 
segments, or in other words awareness of shared national identity regardless of unity or 
disunity in articulating national interest and in exerting national movement, could be perhaps 
referred to as divided nationalism. Early modern Uyghur ideas of nation and nationalism 
reconstructed by this dissertation in fact suggest that a joint and unanimous movement exerted 
by the whole nation towards nationalist goals is a figment, a practically hardly attainable 
dream of nationalists, rather than a realistic political prospect. In contrast, it was shown that a 
community can feel as a nation even when its separate subgroups do not act as one and pursue 
diverging political objectives. 
 
 It is useful here to relate this assertion to the two major studies of early modern 
Uyghur and East Turkestani nationalism mentioned in the Introduction and referred to 
throughout this dissertation – the works of Andrew Forbes and Laura Newby. In conclusion of 
his research, Forbes disputes the idea that the various Xinjiang Muslim rebellions of the 1930s 
shared a common aim of founding an independent state. Instead, he posits that Xinjiang 
should be viewed as three separate areas, in each of which Turkic and other Muslim peoples 
possessed a different degree of loyalty to China. In particular, eastern Xinjiang Turks with 
long history of close relations to China and northern Xinjiang Taranchis, Kazaks, Huis and 
other agriculturalists were much less prone to secession than the Tarim Basin Turks. Given 
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these differing patterns of loyalties to China, the respective insurgent factions could hardly 
pursue the same political objectives, or, in terms of this dissertation, form a unified nationalist 
movement. In the following decade, Turkic nationalism was further manipulated and 
compromised by clash of interests of the USSR and the KMT, and finally quenched by the 
CCP‘s takeover (Forbes 229-33). In contrast, Laura Newby claims that despite the obvious 
fact that Xinjiang Turkic Muslim factions did not share a common objective of founding an 
independent state, „…what they did share and what Forbes has perhaps failed to stress 
sufficiently, was a national consciousness.‘ (Newby 1986: 238) This dissertation provided a 
substantial textual evidence to corroborate the thesis of Laura Newby. 
 
 The focus of this dissertation on the intellectual aspect of early modern Uyghur 
national movement and nationalism, or in other words on the history of early modern Uyghur 
national idea, also contributes strongly to what has been termed intellectual interpretation of 
nationalism (Breuilly 149-50). This approach ascribes the most decisive role in fomenting the 
emergence of nation and nationalism to enlightened intellectuals and modernist activists. 
Similarly to phases A and B outlined by Hroch (Hroch 1996: 81; Hroch 2000: 23), it was first 
the travelled and cultured Turkic entrepreneurs and educators who in late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century brought the national idea to Xinjiang and disseminated it within their 
community. At the same time, they were able to articulate various cultural interests and 
educated the first generation of progressive social stratum. Later, the first generation of 
educators took part in the initial wave of nationalist movement in the 1930s, while their 
students played a major role in defending national interests in the 1940s. In other words, the 
new intelligentsia was able to use knowledge and skills acquired in first secular schools to 
stage a complex political movement aiming to further national values and seriously challenge 
their alien government. It was this generation of East Turkestani, or Uyghur, intelligentsia 
who propelled the largely cultural national movement in the direction of heated political 
nationalism and who accomplished the intertwining of national idea with politics and 
statecraft. It has been pointed out numerous times throughout the dissertation that it is difficult 
to assess the degree of social penetration of the above examined early modern intellectual 
ideas of communal identity and interest. Regardless of this fact, Uyghur articulations of nation 
and nationalism after 1949 suggest that the albeit small, yet outspoken, circle of early modern 
Xinjiang Turkic nation workers did succeed in their mission to inculcate national values into 
minds of their fellow compatriots. This intriguing process is perhaps best exemplified by life 
and activities of Muhemmed Imin Bughra. Educated in traditional institutions during the first 
and second decade of 20
th
, he actively promoted modern education at the turn of 1920s and 
1930s, became one of the leading figures of Turkic insurgency during 1930s, authored one of 
the most authoritative works of nationalist historiography at the turn of 1930s and 1940s and 
finally returned to the sphere of active nationalist politics in the 1940s. On the eve of 
communist takeover of Xinjiang, he fled via India to Turkey, where he continued to campaign 
for the East Turkestani cause until his death in 1965. Muhemmed Imin Bughra is thus one of 
the most prominent figures of East Turkestani intellectual history with a massive impact on 
the formation of East Turkestani ideas of nation and nationalism. The impact of his 
intellectual struggle for national interest is underlined by reverence for his life and work by 
today‘s Uyghurs. 
 
  A special mention should also be made here about the position of religion in 
emergence of modern Uyghur, or East Turkestani, national identity. Several studies pointed 
out that formation of modern nations is closely related to, if not directly caused by or 
dependent on, the demise of religious old world order (Gellner 1983; Anderson 1991). This 
dissertation has elaborated on this assertion by showing that even during the process in which 
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pre-modern imperial and religious Islamic realm in Xinjiang vacated the historical stage to 
East Turkestani and Uyghur national idea, religious affiliation retained its enormous 
significance for Xinjiang indigenous sedentary Turks. Despite the fact that in early modern 
era religion ceased to be the most important, indeed the only, prism through which the 
Musulman saw the world and themselves, becoming an East Turkestani and Uyghur also 
implicitly meant remaining Muslim. As shown in the above explored texts, virtually all 
theoreticians of East Turkestani and Uyghur nation and nationalism regarded Islam as one of 
the fundamental traits of national identity. And although on practical level Xinjiang Turks 
were since late nineteenth century heavily influenced by Russian and Soviet secular culture, 
and occasionally even subjected to overtly secularizing and anti-religious pressures by 
Xinjiang administrators, they never discarded the Islamic section of their identity. Even 
though some Uyghurs might not have practiced Islam actively, drank alcohol or engaged in 
other ritually proscribed activities, they still proclaimed their adherence to Islam and regarded 
religion a fundamental trait of their identity. This status of religious creed and practice within 
Uyghur national identity continues until today. 
 
 Finally, the second section of Chapter 3, which explored ideas of nation and 
nationalism during Sheng Shicai‘s administration, and the second section of Chapter 4, which 
examined ideas of nation and nationalism during the Three Districts‘ rebellion, can serve as 
an introduction to Xinjiang nationality policy of the Chinese Communist Party after founding 
the People‘s Republic of China. During the sixty years of existence of the PRC, there have 
been periods when the authorities ‗relaxed‘ (放 f ng) or even took up an affirmative action 
toward identities of minority nationalities (少数民族 sh osh  mínz ) of Xinjiang and other 
regions, such as in early 1950s, early 1960s or 1980s. In contrast, these stages alternate with 
periods when the party-state aims to ‗repair‘ and ‗put in order‘ (收 sh u) the national identity 
of minorities of China. In these periods, the state emphasizes that all fifty-six nationalities (民
族 mínz ) of China form a unified ‗nation of China‘ (中华民族 Zh nghuá mínz ), which is 
bound together by common historical, cultural and political heritage, represented nowadays 
mainly by their allegiance to the party-state. During drastic socio-political experiments of the 
CCP such as the Anti-Rightist Movement (反右派运动 F n yòup i y ndòng; late 1950s and 
early 1960s) or the Cultural Revolution (文化大革命  Wénhu  d  gém ng; 1966-1976), 
national identities and cultures of Chinese minorities were subjected to brutal assimilation 
pressures. Less radical, yet structurally identical efforts are being furthered by the Chinese 
party-state since early 1990s until today. The concept of the ‗nation of China‘, formed by 
friendship of all China‘s nationalities, is an important tenet of current ideology tenet of 
‗harmonious society‘ (和谐社会 héxié shèhu ) defined by current president Hu Jintao (胡锦
涛 ). According to Chinese policy makers, regional autonomy should not be nowadays 
understood as administration in the hands of a single nationality, but rather as ‗collective rule 
by all nationalities in the region‘ (区域内各民族共治 qūy  nèi gè mínz  gòngzh ; Millward 
2007: 348). Likewise, several Chinese theorists have recently questioned feasibility the 
concept of ‗ethnic autonomy‘ (民族自治 mínz  z zh ). According to these theories, China is 
today standing on the threshold of the age of ethnic ‗post-autonomy‘ (后自治 hòu z zh ), in 
which ‗collective rule‘ (共治 gòngzh ) of all nationalities is the most suitable principle to 
manage inter-ethnic relations (Bovingdon 2010: 77). It is tacitly understood by Chinese policy 
makers that the leading role in the system of collective rule would be played by the Han as the 
most populous and advanced ethnic group. This imminent policy shift is also accompanied by 
increasing hard line stance of the party-state towards Uyghur discontent with Beijing policies. 
Beijing currently denies legitimacy to any kind of Uyghur dissent and brands all Uyghur 
actions and statements contradictory to government‘s vision of harmonious unity of the nation 
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of China as exhibits of so-called ‗Three Evil Forces‘ (三股势力 s n g  sh l ; üch khil küchler) 
of ‗violent terrorism‘ (暴力恐怖主义 b ol  kǒngb  zh y ), ‗religious extremism‘ (宗教极端
主义 z ngji o jídu n zh y ) and ‗ethnic separatism‘ (民族分裂主义 mínz  fēnliè zh y ). 
 
 In this context, besides presenting an outline of emergence of the idea of modern 
Uyghur nation and nationalism, this dissertation also adds to the discussion of the relationship 
of Uyghurs and communist Chinese state. In particular, it clarifies why current Chinese 
communist propaganda and scholarship are engaged in tireless and repetitive condemnations 
of nationally minded activists and nationalist figures of early modern, as well as 
contemporary, Uyghur history. In contrast with official portrayals by the PRC party-state of 
the first East Turkestan Republic and activities of the Three Gentlemen as a fundamentalist 
pan-Islamic undertaking of an irrelevant group of separatists massively supported by foreign 
imperialism, this dissertation illustrated that early modern Turkic nationalists in fact defended 
national interests of their people in accordance with valid legislature of the ROC. The findings 
of this dissertation actually imply that the concept of modern East Turkestani and Uyghur 
nation and nationalism emerged partially as a result of movement by Xinjiang indigenous 
sedentary Turkic Muslims pressed by Chinese abuse to defend their communal interests.  
 
 What is equally unpleasant for contemporary Chinese party-state about the emergence 
of East Turkestani and Uyghur national consciousness is the fact that, as the dissertation 
illustrates, mistreatment by China, lack of political and human rights, police brutality, official 
corruption, assimilation efforts, plundering of local resources, immigration of Hans and all 
other communist policies protested against by Uyghurs today have been condemned by the 
intelligentsia of their forefathers since the very beginning of modern era in Xinjiang. It is 
striking how the national interests articulated by nationalists and politicians some eighty years 
ago are virtually identical with demands of contemporary Uyghur dissent. Sadly, it appears 
that in the twenty-first century, there exists a place in our world where political and legal 
status of a group of over ten million human beings has not changed over more than a century. 
It is for this reason that early modern Turkic figures discussed in this dissertation, such as 
Muhemmed Imin Bughra, Mahmud Muhiti, Mes‘ud Sabiri, Eysa Yusuf Alptekin, Akhmet Jan 
Qasimi, Osman Batur and many others, remain to be perceived today by dissenting Uyghurs 
as national heroes and symbols of national resistance to Chinese totalitarianism. The 
nationalist message of early modern Turkic thinkers examined by this dissertation continues 
to live clandestinely in today‘s Xinjiang. 
 
 This dissertation also revealed that even under strongly authoritarian Kuomintang 
regime some sixty-five years ago it was possible for a Xinjiang Turk to publicly accuse top 
party officials of Han chauvinism and discrimination of ethnic minorities. Obviously, in 
KMT-run Xinjiang the discussion about social and political issues was colossally more open 
and free than in nowadays‘ PRC, where public voicing of personal opinions on government 
policy is illegal. The case of Nurmuhemmet Yasin, Uyghur writer sentenced in 2004 to ten 
years for writing an allegorical story about a wild pigeon who chooses to commit suicide over 
living in captivity, signals that even a literary allusion to struggle for legitimate defense of 
national interest is today punishable by years of incarceration. As in other communist regimes 
in the past, in contemporary communist party-state the very status of national identity and 
national movement is ambiguous. The word ‗nationalist‘ (milletchi) grew to possess strongly 
negative connotations, which can be fatal to those who became branded by it; even the status 
of the once positive term ‗one who cares for his nation‘ (milletperwer) is unclear. It has been 
remarked in the Introduction that nationalism has been said to be able to function as a 
sustainable ideology not enforced by other doctrines exclusively in cases, when it propels 
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oppressed nations. This indeed pertains to the case of Uyghurs. This dissertation has shown 
that Uyghur nationalist have been engaged in maintaining national boundary, uplifting 
cultural standard, defending political interests in the face of flawed Chinese administration 
and other types of nation work from the earliest dawn of modern era until present day. Thus, 
besides examination of early modern Uyghur ideas of nation and nationalism, this dissertation 











Fig. 1. Map of Xinjiang (Millward 2007: xx). 
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Fig. 2. Scheme of Chinese culturalist worldview with Chinese civilization as the center of the 
universe (Illustration on the cover of Fairbank 1968). 
 




Fig. 3. Scheme of early Qing parallel emperorship (Millward 1998: 201). 
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Fig. 4. Title page of Turkestan Calendar, i.e. Calculation of the Months, Days and Year of 
1327 (Teqwayim Türkistan Ye‟eni 1327 Ay Kün Yilning Hisabi; i.e. AD 1909; PFK 1908: 1). 
 
 
                                       
 
 
Fig. 5. Title page of Independence (Istiqlal; PFK 86). 
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Fig. 6. Title page of a manual Rearing of Silkworms (Yépekchilik. Шелководство. Rearing of 
silkworms.) of 1935 (PFK 1935: 3). Place of publication is stated as ‗Southern Uyghuristan‘ 
(Jenubiy Uyghuristan). 
                                           
 
 
Fig. 7. Title page of Uyghuristan Calendar (Uyghuristan Teqwayimi) for the year 1937 (PFK 
1936: 5). 
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Fig. 8. Title page of Tatar Alphabet Book (Tatarcha Elifba Kitabi), published by the Ili Tatar 
Enlightenment Union (Ili Tatar A‟artu Uyushmasi) in Tatar language in Ghulja in 1941 
(Janishif 149). 
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 The dissertation examines evolution of intellectual ideas of nation and nationalism of 
Uyghurs, a Turkic nation inhabiting today‘s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in 
northwestern China, throughout the period from 1880s to 1949. Primary sources of the 
research are texts written by Uyghur intellectuals throughout the period, in particular 
historiography works, poems, journalistic articles, memoires, political essays and propaganda 
pamphlets. Most of the sources have not been previously researched, the dissertation therefore 
presents new information and conclusions. The perceptions of nation and nationalism in the 
sources are also juxtaposed to several general authoritative approaches to nation-formation 
processes, such as those of Benedict Anderson, Ernst Gellner, Anthony Smith, Miroslav 
Hroch and John Breuilly. Based primarily on the criteria of historical chronology and content 
of the respective sources, the dissertation is structured into four empirical chapters. 
 
 The first chapter examines perceptions of communal identity in late imperial period 
and illustrates that although at this stage Xinjiang Turkic intellectuals perceived their 
community as a clearly defined group, its communal interest did not outweigh interests of 
numerous local and social sub-groups. The second chapter outlines the transfer of the idea of 
Uyghur nation from progressive Muslim circles in the Russian and Ottoman empire to 
Xinjiang and shows that during this period Xinjiang Turkic intellectuals started to view their 
community as a modern nation and to define its national interest as a pursuit of cultural 
objectives. The third chapter shows that in 1930s, Xinjiang Turkic intelligentsia perceived 
their community as East Turkestani or Uyghur nation and articulated its political interests as 
establishing an independent nation-state or effecting autonomy within Xinjiang as a part of 
republican China. The fourth chapter illustrates that in 1940s, Xinjiang Turkic intellectuals 
either saw national interest in preserving the national boundary of Xinjiang Turks as a distinct 
nationality of the Republic of China, or strove to create a multiethnic society of Xinjiang 
people whose national identity was not significant. 
 
 In conclusion, the dissertation defines the principle of divided nationalism by asserting 
that although throughout the entire period under research Xinjiang Turkic Muslims often 
failed to act as a unified nation, they nevertheless strongly felt as one. Furthermore, the results 
of the research also underline the persistence of the region‘s historical function as a hub of 
world ideologies, to the prominence of religion among Uyghur national characteristics, to the 
importance of intellectuals in Uyghur nation-formation process and to the close connection of 






 Disertační práce zkoumá vývoj intelektuálních představ národa a nacionalismu u 
Ujgurů, turkického národa obývajícího dnešní Ujgurskou autonomní oblast Xinjiang 
v severozápadní Číně, v období od 80. let 19. století do roku 1949. Primárními prameny 
výzkumu jsou texty napsané ujgurskými intelektuály v průběhu zkoumaného období, zejména 
dějepisecká díla, básně, články v časopisech, paměti, politické eseje a propagandistické letáky. 
Většina pramenů nebyla v minulosti podrobena zkoumání, práce tedy přichází s množstvím 
nových informací i závěrů. Představy o národě a nacionalismu v  pramenech jsou také 
srovnány s několika obecně autoritativními teoretickými přístupy k národotvorným procesům, 
prezentovanými například ve studiích Benedicta Andersona, Ernsta Gellnera, Anthonyho 
Smithe, Miroslava Hrocha a Johna Breuillyho. Práce je členěna především podle kritérií 
chronologické posloupnosti a obsahu jednotlivých pramenů do čtyř obsahových kapitol. 
 
 První kapitola se zabývá představami společné identity v pozdně císařském období a 
ukazuje, že ačkoli v této fázi xinjiangští turkičtí intelektuálové vnímali svoje společenství jako 
jasně definovanou skupinu, jejich společný zájem nepřevažoval nad zájmy četných místních a 
společenských podskupin. Druhá kapitola nastiňuje transfer myšlenky ujgurského národa 
z pokrokových muslimských kruhů v Rusku a Osmanské říši a ukazuje, že v této době 
xinjiangští turkičtí intelektuálové začali pohlížet na své společenství jako na moderní národ a 
definovat jeho národní zájem jako usilování o převážně kulturní cíle. Třetí kapitola ukazuje, 
že ve 30. letech xinjiangská turkická inteligence vnímala svoji komunitu jako 
východoturkestánský či ujgurský národ, a spatřovala jeho politické zájmy buďto v založení 
nezávislého národního státu, nebo v uskutečnění autonomie v Xinjiangu coby součásti 
republikánské Číny. Čtvrtá kapitola objasňuje, že ve 40. letech xinjiangští turkičtí 
intelektuálové považovali za národní zájem udržení hranice národa všech xinjiangských 
turkických skupin, anebo usilovali o vytvoření mnohonárodnostní xinjiangské společnosti, 
v níž národnostní identita neměla mít velký význam. 
 
 Závěrem práce definuje princip rozděleného nacionalismu tvrzením, že ačkoli 
v průběhu celého zkoumaného období xinjiangští turkičtí Muslimové nedokázali jednat jako 
jednotný národ, tak se nicméně jako jednotný národ nesporně cítili. Výsledky zkoumání dále 
poukazují na přetrvávající historickou funkci oblasti jako průsečíku světových ideologií, na 
významné místo náboženství v ujgurských národních charakteristikách, na důležitost role 
intelektuálů v procesu vzniku ujgurského národa a na úzkou spojitost minulých ujgurských 
představ o národním zájmu s požadavky současného ujgurského disentu. 
 
 
